United States v. Lofton ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Samuel LOFTON III, Colonel
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 10-0565
Crim. App. No. 37317
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 13, 2010
Decided February 17, 2011
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER,
ERDMANN, and RYAN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, C.J., filed a separate
dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Nicholas W. McCue (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Gail E. Crawford (on brief); Colonel Eric N. Eklund and
Major Anthony D. Ortiz.
For Appellee: Major Charles G. Warren (argued); Colonel Don
Christensen, Captain Joseph J. Kubler, and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq.
(on brief).
Military Judge: William M. Burd
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Lofton III, No. 10-0565/AF
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review to consider (1) whether Appellant’s
conviction for engaging in conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman by making unsolicited comments of a sexual nature is
legally sufficient; and (2) whether the convening authority
abused his discretion in failing to order a post-trial hearing
pursuant to Article 39(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2006). We hold that Appellant’s
conviction is legally sufficient and that Appellant suffered no
prejudice by the convening authority’s failure to order a post-
trial hearing.
I.
At a general court-martial, Appellant pled guilty to eleven
specifications of being absent without authority from his place
of duty, one specification of being derelict in the performance
of his duties, one specification of violating a lawful general
regulation (the Joint Ethics Regulation), and seventeen
specifications of larceny of money, military property of the
United States. Articles 86, 92, and 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§
886, 892, 921 (2006). Contrary to Appellant’s pleas, court
members convicted him of two specifications of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman and two specifications of
indecent assault. Articles 133 and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933,
934 (2006). The members sentenced Appellant to a dismissal,
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confinement for nine years, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, a fine of $14,000, and additional confinement for
one year if the fine was not paid. The convening authority
approved the sentence but ordered suspension for three months of
the execution of the forfeiture of pay and allowances for the
first three months and waived for three months the mandatory
forfeitures resulting from his sentence to a dismissal and
confinement. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. United States v. Lofton, No. ACM 37317, 2010
CCA LEXIS 142, at *17, 2010 WL 2266628, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished).
II.
In specification 2 of Charge IV, Appellant was convicted of
“wrongfully and dishonorably mak[ing] unsolicited comments of a
sexual nature to Chief Master Sergeant [RM] . . . which conduct
under the circumstances was unbecoming an officer and
gentleman.” Appellant asserts that the evidence is legally
insufficient to sustain this conviction.
A.
“This Court reviews questions of legal sufficiency de
novo . . . .” United States v. Harman, 68 M.J. 325, 327
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted). We have adopted the Supreme
Court’s test in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979),
for determining legal sufficiency -- “‘whether, after reviewing
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Harman, 68 M.J. at
327 (quoting United States v. Mack, 65 M.J. 108, 114 (C.A.A.F.
2007)). This test requires that we “draw every reasonable
inference from the evidence of record in favor of the
prosecution.” United States v. Bright, 66 M.J. 359, 365
(C.A.A.F. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The elements of a violation of Article 133 are that: (1)
the accused did or omitted to do certain acts; and (2) under the
circumstances, these acts or omissions constituted conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. United States v.
Conliffe, 67 M.J. 127, 132 (C.A.A.F. 2009); see Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (MCM) pt. IV, para. 59.b. (2008
ed.).
Conduct violative of this article is action or
behavior in an official capacity which, in dishonoring
or disgracing the person as an officer, seriously
compromises the officer’s character as a gentleman, or
action or behavior in an unofficial or private
capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the
officer personally, seriously compromises the person’s
standing as an officer. There are certain moral
attributes common to the ideal officer and the perfect
gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of
dishonesty, unfair dealing, indecency, indecorum,
lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not everyone is
or can be expected to meet unrealistically high moral
standards, but there is a limit of tolerance based on
customs of the service and military necessity below
which the personal standards of an officer, cadet, or
midshipman cannot fall without seriously compromising
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the person’s standing as an officer, cadet, or
midshipman or the person’s character as a gentleman.
This article prohibits conduct by a commissioned
officer, cadet, or midshipman which, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, is thus
compromising. This article includes acts made
punishable by any other article, provided these acts
amount to conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman. Thus, a commissioned officer who steals
property violates both this article and Article 121.
Whenever the offense charged is the same as a specific
offense set forth in this Manual, the elements of
proof are the same as those set forth in the paragraph
which treats that specific offense, with the
additional requirement that the act or omission
constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman.
MCM pt. IV, para. 59.c.(2).
An officer’s conduct need not violate other
provisions of the UCMJ or even be otherwise criminal
to violate Article 133, UCMJ. The gravamen of the
offense is that the officer’s conduct disgraces him
personally or brings dishonor to the military
profession such as to affect his fitness to command
the obedience of his subordinates so as to
successfully complete the military mission. Clearly,
then, the appropriate standard for assessing
criminality under Article 133 is whether the conduct
or act charged is dishonorable and compromising as
hereinbefore spelled out -- this notwithstanding
whether or not the act otherwise amounts to a crime.
United States v. Schweitzer, 68 M.J. 133, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
B.
In large measure, Appellant relies on this Court’s opinion
in United States v. Brown, 55 M.J. 375 (C.A.A.F. 2001), to
support this assignment of error. Brown was a nurse who made
crude and sexist comments to, and inappropriately touched, three
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other nurses. Id. at 378-82. The government relied on an Air
Force pamphlet to establish the applicable standard of conduct.
Id. at 385. In overturning the conviction for the crude and
sexist comments, this Court held:
The rigorous standard in the pamphlet shows that
it is not merely a civility code for policing the
workplace. Only severe conduct with harsh effects
constitutes sexual harassment under the pamphlet;
comments or questions that offend one’s sensibilities
and make one uncomfortable do not create a hostile
work environment under the standard in the pamphlet.
Appellant’s breaches of etiquette may well have
warranted instruction, counseling or other types of
administrative corrective action, but his comments did
not violate the standard relied upon by the Government
at trial to establish the custom of the Air Force for
purposes of Article 133.
Id. at 387 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
C.
Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt) RM, Command Chief for the 82d
Training Wing (82 TRW), testified that Appellant was the
commander of the 82d Training Group. Shortly after she arrived
at the installation, CMSgt RM thought Appellant was the
“greatest group commander we had.” She attended an Asian-
Pacific breakfast at which leis were handed out to the
attendees. The airman who greeted her said “let’s get you
lei’d,” and became embarrassed about it. CMSgt RM thought it
was funny and recounted the incident before the staff meeting,
which followed the breakfast. After the staff meeting,
Appellant followed CMSgt RM back to her office and asked if she
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needed help with that -- which she took as a double entendre
reference to the term “lei’d.” She took it as a joke. As
Appellant left, he said they should set something up, to which
she replied, “‘I’ll have my assistant call your secretary.’”
Later that week, one evening after 8 p.m., Appellant had the
command post patch a telephone call through to CMSgt RM’s work
cell phone. He wanted to continue the previous conversation.
CMSgt RM, who was at home, told him that she was working and the
conversation ended soon thereafter. He later telephoned her on
her personal cell phone, but she noted the number, recognized it
as his, and didn’t answer the call. She thought the call to her
personal cell phone was “creepy,” because if he had wanted to
discuss work, he could have called her on her work cell phone.
Appellant also sent CMSgt RM e-mails saying they should try
to get together. On one occasion, he asked where she lived and
whether she wanted him to visit her at home. She declined to
give him her address. At other times, during staff meetings,
when his Group’s performance exceeded that of others in the
Wing, he would remark to her that “they can go all night,” they
are “better than everybody else” and “bigger than everyone
else,” and “I can go all night.”
CMSgt RM was not personally offended by Appellant’s
comments. Because she worked for Appellant’s boss, she was not
intimidated by him. Nevertheless, she didn’t think his comments
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were appropriate and she lost respect for him. Once other
allegations had been made against Appellant, she notified her
boss of Appellant’s conduct. Appellant was convicted of
attempting to establish an inappropriate relationship with CMSgt
RM and making unsolicited comments of a sexual nature to her,
both as conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. We are
concerned here with the latter offense only.
D.
Appellant’s words cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. Unlike
the appellant in Brown, Colonel Lofton was not dealing with
fellow officers of equal or nearly equal grades who worked
together on a basis of familiarity, and the Government did not
rely on an Air Force pamphlet to try to establish that
Appellant’s conduct was unbecoming. Here, the Government
established that Appellant, a senior officer, made these
comments as a means to further his attempt to establish a
personal and unprofessional relationship with CMSgt RM, an
enlisted woman. CMSgt RM lost respect for him as a military
officer as a result of his comments. We have no doubt that
Appellant’s actions disgraced him personally and as an officer
such that they compromised his fitness to command and to
successfully complete the military mission. Taking the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt each of
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the elements of the offense of conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman.1
III.
A.
After trial, Ms. King, a victims’ advocate who assisted
some of the victims in this case, sent an e-mail to other
members of the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Program (AFSAPRP) community, of which she was a member,
describing the trial, the media interest in the trial, and the
results. Included was the following passage:
I sat in for the majority of the testimony, and one of
the victim’s [sic] had family members sitting in on
the full trial. One of the challenges was the family
members often relayed testified information in person
or via text message to the victims, which was very
upsetting to the victims. We rotated victim advocates
being with them and sitting in the courtroom to give
them accurate feedback.
Trial ended on June 26, 2008. The staff judge advocate (SJA)
came into possession of a copy of this e-mail and forwarded it
to the defense counsel on June 30, 2008. That same date, the
defense requested post-trial discovery of the actual text
messages.
The record of trial was authenticated on July 29, 2008. On
September 15, 2008, two and one-half months after defense
1
We have no doubt that Appellant had notice that such conduct
was an offense under the UCMJ.
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counsel’s request, the senior trial counsel notified the defense
that “the government is not under any obligation to produce
these messages, or any other potential evidence regarding these
text messages.” Unless the text messages were in the custody or
control of the Government, the trial counsel did not have an
obligation to produce them. R.C.M. 701(a)(2).
On September 19, 2008, four days after the senior trial
counsel denied the discovery request, the defense counsel
submitted a request to the convening authority to order a post-
trial Article 39(a) hearing, asserting that when she had
asked [Ms. King] to provide the information, she was
non responsive. Therefore, we are asking you to
empower a military judge to convene a post-trial
Article 39(a) session to determine what happened in
the courtroom. . . . Because Ms. King has chosen to
be evasive, we must avail ourselves to the court,
again.
Appellant suggests in his brief that the convening authority
might not have seen the request for the post-trial Article 39(a)
hearing or the e-mail from Ms. King. The record does not
contain any evidence that the convening authority either saw the
request for the post-trial Article 39(a) session or that he ever
formally denied it. But the convening authority was aware of
the issue from both the clemency matters Appellant submitted and
from the Addendum to the Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation.
By taking action without granting the motion, it is clear the
convening authority decided not to grant Appellant’s request.
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B.
When asked, a military judge shall exclude witnesses from
the courtroom “so that they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses.” Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 615. “The
purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent witnesses from
shaping their testimony to match another’s and to discourage
fabrication and collusion.” United States v. Miller, 48 M.J.
49, 58 (C.A.A.F. 1998), quoted in United States v. Langston, 53
M.J. 335, 337 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Appellant did not request
sequestration of witnesses.
The Air Force has a stronger rule: “Prospective witnesses
will not be present in the courtroom during proceedings except
upon agreement by both sides and approval of the military judge,
or as otherwise required by law.” Uniform Rule of Practice
Before Air Force Courts-Martial 6.4(C) (Oct. 18, 2006).2 There
is no evidence that the parties had agreed to, or the military
judge had approved, lifting the sequestration rule. The purpose
of the Air Force sequestration rule appears to be the same as
that of M.R.E. 615 -- “to prevent witnesses from shaping their
testimony . . . and to discourage fabrication and collusion.”
Miller, 48 M.J. at 58. Court-martial spectators should not
2
TJAG Policy Memorandum: TJAGC Standards -- 3, Air Force
Standards for Criminal Justice, Attachment 2 (May 15, 2005).
The current Rule 6.4(C) (Feb. 1, 2009) remains the same.
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provide summaries of testimony to sequestered witnesses, and the
parties and the military judge should be vigilant in preventing
such incidents.
C.
Post-trial hearings may be convened, for, among other
things, “the purpose of inquiring into, and, when appropriate,
resolving any matter that arises after trial and that
substantially affects the legal sufficiency of any findings of
guilty or the sentence.” R.C.M. 1102(b)(2). The military judge
may direct a post-trial session at any time before
authenticating the record. R.C.M. 1102(d); Denedo v. United
States, 66 M.J. 114, 124 (C.A.A.F. 2008), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 2213(2009); see United States v. Williams, 55 M.J. 302, 304
(C.A.A.F. 2001). The convening authority may direct a post-
trial hearing at any time before taking initial action. R.C.M.
1102(d); United States v. Ruiz, 49 M.J. 340, 348 (C.A.A.F.
1998). By the time Appellant asked for a post-trial hearing,
the military judge had already authenticated the record and,
without direction from an authorized reviewing authority, was
without jurisdiction to conduct a post-trial hearing. R.C.M.
1102(d).
We review a convening authority’s decision not to grant a
post-trial hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Ruiz, 49
M.J. at 348. A convening authority is “not compelled to” grant
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a post-trial hearing “based merely on unsworn, unsubstantiated
assertions.” Id. This is not such a case.
D.
The Government contends that this appeal must fail because
Appellant’s allegation is based on an unsworn and
unsubstantiated e-mail. Ms. King’s e-mail was somewhat vague;
it does not mention which witnesses or which family members were
involved or if it occurred during findings, sentencing, or both.
The defense counsel’s assertion that she made an attempt to
interview Ms. King is similarly vague. There is no explanation
of what the defense counsel said or what Ms. King’s response
was, other than to characterize it as “non responsive” and
“evasive,” whatever those terms signify here. Nor is there any
evidence that the defense counsel asked the SJA or command for
assistance in getting a more definitive statement from Ms. King
to augment the vague e-mail. Although Ms. King did not work
locally, she was an Air Force employee and, therefore, subject
to direction by Air Force officials to cooperate in any
investigation.
In Ruiz, the appellant asserted that at least one of the
court members was subject to unlawful command influence. 49
M.J. at 347. This Court was unwilling to conclude that the
convening authority abused his discretion in denying a request
to order a post-trial hearing when there was nothing but the
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“unsubstantiated,” unsworn statement of the civilian defense
counsel to support this claim. Id. at 348.
Appellant’s case is different. The basis of his claim is
an unsworn e-mail from an Air Force employee, not from one of
the parties or a disgruntled witness. It was part of an
official communication describing the court-martial to other
members of the AFSAPRP community. Under all the circumstances,
we conclude that the defense claim is not unsubstantiated, and
the convening authority abused his discretion in not ordering a
post-trial hearing to determine whether there was reason to
inquire into Ms. King’s allegations and its effect, if any, on
Appellant’s court-martial.
E.
Prejudice under the sequestration rule of “M.R.E. 615 is
determined by considering whether the witness’s testimony was
affected by the trial proceedings that the witness heard.”
United States v. Quintanilla, 63 M.J. 29, 38 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
We see no reason to employ a different rule for sequestration
required by rules of court.
Three female witnesses testified against Appellant at
trial -- CMSgt RM, DM, and PP, in that order. DM was also
called to testify for the defense, but this testimony was
limited to attempts to impeach her credibility. During this
second testimony, the defense attempted to show DM lied during
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her previous testimony concerning whether she had hired an
attorney and had filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
complaint. DM’s testimony remained consistent with her
testimony for the prosecution.
Each of the three victims testified to her own private
relationship with Appellant. CMSgt RM was the first to testify
and so could not have shaped her testimony based on the
testimony of DM or PP. Nor did she accept victim assistance, so
it is unlikely that her friends or family were involved or that
she could have benefited. Although it is not clear, it appears
Ms. King’s e-mail was referring to the family and friends of DM,
PP, or both.
As Appellant was acquitted of all charges involving PP, no
prejudice could have occurred with respect to her testimony.
Thus, we are left to evaluate whether DM’s testimony was shaped
by CMSgt RM’s testimony on direct or by PP’s testimony when DM
was recalled to testify by the defense. It is unlikely that
DM’s testimony was shaped by CMSgt RM’s testimony: the
incidents were distinct, there is no evidence of any kind of
relationship between the two, and a review of the testimony does
not provide any basis for concluding that shaping of testimony
or collusion occurred.
The relationship between PP and DM’s testimony is harder to
evaluate, as they shared the same attorney and had discussed
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filing an EEO complaint against Appellant and possibly taking
other civil action. Nevertheless, DM’s testimony after PP
testified is remarkably similar to her testimony before PP
testified and not very congruent with that of PP. Contrary to
PP, DM insisted that she had not filed a formal EEO complaint
and that unless and until she did so, she would not be hiring
the attorney she and PP had consulted. DM’s testimony was not
shaped by PP’s testimony. Under these circumstances, we hold
that Appellant was not prejudiced.3 Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006); Quintanilla, 63 M.J. at 38.
IV.
The judgment of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
3
The dissent suggests that we have unduly presumed “that the
messages would have contained nothing more than a description of
the testimony offered in the courtroom” and that without a post-
trial hearing, we are unable to divine whether the messages
contained other evidence of collusion. United States v. Lofton,
__ M.J. __ (4) (C.A.A.F. 2011) (Effron, C.J., dissenting). We
engage in no such presumption. Appellant’s allegation is that
the testimony was affected by the text messaging. We have
determined on the basis of the record that it was not.
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EFFRON, Chief Judge (dissenting):
At trial, the defense contended that two of Appellant’s
accusers, DLM and PP, collaborated to fabricate allegations of
sexual assault by Appellant. The defense focused on evidence
that the two regularly conversed about Appellant, shared
information about the allegations in the course of preparing
administrative requests for financial compensation based upon
the alleged incidents, and did not report the alleged incidents
until they became coworkers. Although the panel returned a
verdict of not guilty on the charges pertaining to PP, Appellant
was convicted of the charges involving DLM.
Shortly after the conclusion of Appellant’s court-martial,
the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) forwarded to defense counsel an
e-mail by Barbara King, Chief of the Sheppard Air Force Base
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, containing
observations about the trial. The e-mail included the following
comment:
One of the challenges was the family members
often relayed testified information in person or
via text message to the victims, which was very
upsetting to the victims [sic]. We rotated
victim advocates being with them and sitting in
the courtroom to give them accurate feedback.
The defense immediately sent a brief reply to the SJA:
This is obviously a huge deal. We are requesting
post-trial discovery for those actual text
messages as well as have the government talk to
the family members in question to find out what
United States v. Lofton, No. 10-0565/AF
was said. Having witnesses informed about
anything that happened in that courtroom before
they testified certainly could have played a part
in influencing their testimony and effected [sic]
our client’s right to a fair trial.
In a message rejecting the defense request, the senior
trial counsel stated that “the government is not under any
obligation to produce these messages, or any other potential
evidence regarding these text messages.” The defense then
formally requested the convening authority to convene a post-
trial session so that a military judge could obtain and consider
the pertinent information under Article 39(a), Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 839(a) (2006). The defense
emphasized the relationship of the request to the defense
position at trial that “the complaining witnesses were
colluding.” The defense asked the convening authority to assist
“in finding out just who was sending texts and what those texts
were about.” The defense took the position that it would have
been improper for the witnesses to have remained in the
courtroom during the testimony, and that the receipt of the
testimony by unauthorized means also would have been improper.
Shortly thereafter, the defense submitted a formal clemency
request to the convening authority that included a discussion of
the defense request for a post-trial hearing. The defense noted
that the request for a hearing had been based upon “further
evidence of collusion in the courtroom.” The defense further
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United States v. Lofton, No. 10-0565/AF
stated that the information about the e-mail was “troubling,
because if it happened, it gave the witnesses a chance to change
their testimony in light of the reported happenings in the
courtroom.” Defense counsel reminded the convening authority
that “the ramifications of this on the trial we aren’t able to
explore without the intervention of the military judge, or you.”
In a concluding comment, defense counsel stated, “If there is
any doubt these women colluded, it can be resolved in this
hearing.”
The SJA’s post-trial recommendation to the convening
authority stated: “The defense does not allege any legal
errors.” The SJA also offered the following brief reference to
the post-trial developments matters: “The defense also states
they requested evidence after the trial and the request was
denied by the government.” The SJA did not discuss the
substance of the defense request, the rationale for denying the
request, or the subsequent defense request for a post-trial
hearing before a military judge. The convening authority, in
taking action on the case, did not address the defense request.
I agree with the majority that “the convening authority
abused his discretion in not ordering a post-trial hearing to
determine whether there was reason to inquire into” the
allegations in the e-mail and the “effect, if any, on
Appellant’s court-martial.” United States v. Lofton, ___ M.J.
3
United States v. Lofton, No. 10-0565/AF
___ (14) (C.A.A.F. 2011). I respectfully disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that the error did not prejudice
Appellant. The majority grounds its conclusion upon a
determination that the witnesses’ testimony was not affected by
the texting. Id. at ___ (16 n.3). The majority’s conclusion
presumes that the messages would have contained nothing more
than a description of the testimony offered in the courtroom.
In the absence of a post-trial hearing, however, we do not know
the content of any such messages. We do not know whether such
messages conveyed accurate or inaccurate information about the
trial proceedings; nor do we know whether the messages contained
views, recollections, or references to earlier developments that
could have supported and strengthened the defense theory of
improper collusion by Appellant’s accusers.
The treatment of the defense request by the trial counsel,
the SJA, and the convening authority leaves unresolved the
question of whether the messages were neutral in content or
supportive of the defense theory of the case. The defense
identified the problematic nature of the messages on June 30,
2008, just four days after trial, providing the Government with
an early opportunity to resolve the factual and legal
consequences in a prompt and effective manner. See United
States v. Meghdadi, 60 M.J. 438, 444-45 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(explaining that one of the purposes of a post-trial Article
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39(a) session is to discover and preserve “evidence at the
earliest possible time . . . while still relatively fresh in the
witness’ memory”) (quotation marks omitted).
During the nearly three-month period between the defense
request and the convening authority’s action on September 29,
2008, the Government treated the defense request in a peremptory
fashion, with the result being that the record on appeal does
not even contain a response by the convening authority to the
defense request for a post-trial Article 39(a) session. Before
acting on this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals should have
returned the record of trial to the convening authority with
direction that a post-trial session be ordered to determine
whether any messages were sent, to ascertain the content of any
such messages, and to assess the impact of any such messages on
Appellant’s court-martial. At this stage, we should set aside
the decision of the court below and return the case to the
convening authority for a post-trial Article 39(a) session. I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the
findings and sentence without ordering such a proceeding.
5