United States v. Hutchins , 72 M.J. 294 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Lawrence G. HUTCHINS III, Sergeant
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 12-0408
Crim. App. No. 200800393
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 13, 2012
Decided June 26, 2013
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
STUCKY, J., and EFFRON, S.J., joined. RYAN, J., filed a
separate opinion concurring in the result. BAKER, C.J., filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major S. Babu Kaza, USMC (argued).
For Appellee: Major Paul M. Ervasti, USMC (argued); Colonel
Stephen C. Newman, USMC, and Brian K. Keller, Esq. (on brief);
Major William C. Kirby, USMC.
Military Judge: Jeffrey G. Meeks
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Contrary to his pleas, Sergeant Lawrence G. Hutchins III
was convicted by members at a general court-martial of making a
false official statement, unpremeditated murder, larceny, and
conspiracy to commit larceny, false official statements, murder,
and obstruction of justice in violation of Articles 107, 118,
121, and 81, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§§ 907, 918, 921, 881 (2006).1 The members sentenced Hutchins to
reduction to E-1, confinement for fifteen years, dishonorable
discharge, and a reprimand. The convening authority approved a
sentence of reduction to E-1, confinement for eleven years, and
a dishonorable discharge.
The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals (CCA) concluded that the military judge had improperly
severed the attorney-client relationship with one of Hutchins’s
defense counsel, set aside the findings and sentence, and
authorized a rehearing. United States v. Hutchins, 68 M.J. 623,
624, 631 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010). The Judge Advocate General
of the Navy certified the issue involving the termination of the
attorney-client relationship to this court pursuant to Article
1
Hutchins was initially charged with one specification of
conspiracy to commit larceny, housebreaking, kidnapping, false
official statements, murder, and obstruction of justice, two
specifications of making false official statements, one
specification each of premeditated murder, larceny,
housebreaking, and kidnapping, two specifications of obstruction
of justice, and four specifications of assault.
2
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
67(a)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2006). We reversed the
CCA decision holding that while the attorney-client relationship
had been improperly severed, Hutchins was not prejudiced.
United States v. Hutchins, 69 M.J. 282, 293 (C.A.A.F. 2011). We
returned the record of trial to the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy for remand to the CCA for further review pursuant to
Article 66(c), UCMJ. Id. Upon further review, the CCA affirmed
the findings and the sentence as approved by the convening
authority. United States v. Hutchins, No. NMCCA 200800393, 2012
CCA LEXIS 93, at *32, 2012 WL 933067, at *12 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. Mar. 20, 2012) (unpublished).
We granted review to determine whether Hutchins’s post-
trial rights were influenced by unlawful command influence and
whether the military judge erred when he denied the defense
motion to suppress Hutchins’s statement made to the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) after having invoked his
right to counsel.2 We hold that the NCIS request to Hutchins for
2
We granted review of the following issues:
I. Whether the findings and sentence must be
dismissed with prejudice where unlawful command
influence from the Secretary of the Navy has
undermined substantial post-trial rights of the
Appellant.
II. The Appellant was interrogated by NCIS concerning
his involvement in the alleged crimes, and
terminated the interview by invoking his right to
counsel. Appellant was thereafter held
incommunicado and placed in solitary confinement
3
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
his consent to search his belongings reinitiated communication
with Hutchins in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981), and Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). We
therefore reverse the decision of the CCA, set aside the
findings and the sentence, and return the case to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy.3
Factual Background
The charges against Hutchins arose from an incident that
occurred in April 2006 while Hutchins was a squad leader in Iraq
and his unit was conducting counterinsurgency operations. The
CCA summarized the facts of the offenses as follows:
where he was denied the ability to communicate
with a lawyer or any other source of assistance.
Appellant was held under these conditions for 7
days, whereupon NCIS re-approached Appellant and
communicated with him regarding their ongoing
investigation. In response, Appellant waived his
previously invoked right to counsel and
subsequently provided NCIS a sworn statement
concerning the alleged crimes. Did the military
judge err when he denied the defense motion to
suppress the Appellant’s statement? See Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) and United States
v. Brabant, 29 M.J. 259 (C.M.A. 1989).
United States v. Hutchins, 71 M.J. 344 (C.A.A.F. 2012)
(order granting review).
3
Issue I addresses matters occurring during the post-trial
appellate and secretarial review of the case. Issue II
addresses claims of error at trial. In light of our resolution
of Issue II -- that the military judge committed prejudicial
error at trial in failing to suppress Hutchins’s statement --
Issue I has no bearing on our decision. Accordingly, we do not
address granted Issue I. Hutchins, 71 M.J. 344.
4
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
The appellant was assigned as squad leader for 1st
Squad, 2nd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th
Marines, assigned to Task Force Chromite, conducting
counter-insurgency operations in the Hamdaniyah area
of Iraq in April 2006. In the evening hours of 25
April 2006, the appellant led a combat patrol to
conduct a deliberate ambush aimed at interdicting
insurgent emplacement of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). The court-martial received testimony from
several members of the squad that indicated the
intended ambush mission morphed into a conspiracy to
deliberately capture and kill a high value individual
(HVI), believed to be a leader of the insurgency. The
witnesses gave varying testimony as to the depth of
their understanding of alternative targets, such as
family members of the HVI or another random military-
aged Iraqi male.
Considerable effort and preparation went into the
execution of this conspiracy. Tasks were accomplished
by various Marines and their corpsman, including the
theft of a shovel and AK-47 from an Iraqi dwelling to
be used as props to manufacture a scene where it
appeared that an armed insurgent was digging to
emplace an IED. Some squad members advanced to the
ambush site while others captured an unknown Iraqi
man, bound and gagged him, and brought him to the
would-be IED emplacement.
The stage set, the squad informed higher headquarters
by radio that they had come upon an insurgent planting
an IED and received approval to engage. The squad
opened fire, mortally wounding the man. The appellant
approached the victim and fired multiple rifle rounds
into the man’s face at point blank range.
The scene was then manipulated to appear consistent
with the insurgent/IED story. The squad removed the
bindings from the victim’s hands and feet and
positioned the victim’s body with the shovel and AK-47
rifle they had stolen from local Iraqis. To simulate
that the victim fired on the squad, the Marines fired
the AK-47 rifle into the air and collected the
discharged casings. When questioned about the action,
the appellant, like other members of the squad, made
false official statements, describing the situation as
a legitimate ambush and a “good shoot.” The death was
brought to the appellant’s battalion commander’s
5
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
attention by a local sheikh and the ensuing
investigation led to the case before us.
2012 CCA LEXIS 93, at *4-*6, 2012 WL 933067 at *2 (paragraph
formatting added).
On May 11, 2006, NCIS initiated an interrogation of
Hutchins after advising him of his rights in accordance with
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Article 31(b),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2006). Following Hutchins’s
invocation of his right to an attorney, NCIS properly terminated
the interrogation. At that point Hutchins was confined to a
trailer under guard where he was held essentially in solitary
confinement and was not allowed to use a phone or to otherwise
contact an attorney. The Government conceded that these
conditions were restriction tantamount to confinement. However,
despite the requirements of Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)
305(d)(2) and Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 305(f), the
Government made no effort to secure an attorney for Hutchins
during this period.
After a week of confinement under these conditions, on May
18, 2006, the same NCIS investigator who had interrogated
Hutchins on May 11 entered his trailer in the late evening and
asked for permission to search his personal belongings. The
investigator provided Hutchins with a Permissive Authorization
for Search and Seizure form which reminded him that he was still
under investigation for conspiracy, murder, assault, and
6
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
kidnapping. While reading this form, Hutchins asked if the door
was still open to give his side of the story. Hutchins
consented to the search and signed the form.
The investigator informed Hutchins that he could talk to
them but not that night.4 The next morning Hutchins was taken to
NCIS where he was readvised of his Article 31 rights. Hutchins
waived his rights, was interrogated, and subsequently provided a
detailed written confession.
Discussion
Introduction:
The Government argues that this case is governed by the
holding in United States v. Frazier, 34 M.J. 135, 137 (C.M.A.
1992), that “[a] request for consent to search does not infringe
upon Article 31 or Fifth Amendment safeguards against self-
incrimination because such requests are not interrogations and
the consent given is ordinarily not a statement.” We do not
take issue with that basic principle and agree that the NCIS
request to search Hutchins’s personal belongings on May 18 was
not an interrogation. The principle set forth in Frazier,
however, does not end our inquiry. Once Hutchins requested an
attorney, under Edwards he could not be further interrogated
unless: (1) counsel had been made available; or, (2) Hutchins
reinitiated further “communication, exchanges, or
4
The investigator testified that he was exhausted after a long
day and wanted to be fresh the next morning.
7
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
conversations.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. As no attorney
was made available to Hutchins, the Edwards inquiry in this case
centers on whether, under the circumstances of this case, it was
the Government or Hutchins that reinitiated further
communication under Edwards and Bradshaw.
Edwards and Bradshaw -- Reinitiation of the Communication:
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards in 1981, it
has been clear that:
[A]n accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
There is no disagreement between the parties that Edwards
applies to the circumstances of this case. However, the parties
differ as to whether NCIS or Hutchins initiated further
“communication, exchanges, or conversations.” Hutchins argues
that the request for consent to search was an initiation of
further communication by NCIS in violation of Edwards because it
was directly related to the criminal investigation and was not
merely incidental to the custodial relationship, citing
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044. The Government responds that, under
Frazier, the request for consent to search is not an
interrogation and therefore such a request did not initiate
further “interrogation” as proscribed by Edwards.
8
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
The fundamental purpose of the judicially crafted rule in
Edwards is to “[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused’s choice
to communicate with police only through counsel.” Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1988). The need for such a rule is
to provide added protection against the coercive pressures of
continuous custody after an individual has invoked his right to
counsel, because he is “cut off from his normal life and
companions, thrust into and isolated in an unfamiliar, police-
dominated atmosphere, where his captors appear to control his
fate.”5 Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The Court in Oregon v. Bradshaw stated:
[The test in Edwards] was in effect a prophylactic
rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody
from being badgered by police officers . . . [and we]
restated the requirement in Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S.
42, 46 (1982) (per curiam), to be that before a
suspect in custody can be subjected to further
interrogation after he requests an attorney there must
5
“Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it
be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in
which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.”
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). It is hard to
imagine a situation where this would be more of a concern than
in the present case, i.e., while deployed to a foreign country
in a combat environment Hutchins was held in essentially
solitary confinement in a trailer for seven days after invoking
his right to counsel; despite his request for counsel, no
attorney was provided during this period and no explanation was
provided to Hutchins as to why; he was held incommunicado (other
than a chance conversation with a chaplain for three or four
minutes); and he was not allowed to use a phone, the mail
system, or other means of communication to contact an attorney,
family, friends, or anyone else.
9
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
be a showing that the “suspect himself initiates
dialogue with the authorities.”
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.
Not all communications initiated by an accused or law
enforcement will trigger the protections under Edwards.6 The
Court in Bradshaw went on to distinguish between inquiries or
statements by either a police officer or a defendant that
represented a desire to open a more “generalized discussion
relating directly or indirectly to the investigation” and those
“inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a police
officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial
relationship.” Id. at 1045. The former circumstance
constitutes a reinitiation of communication while the latter
circumstance does not. The Edwards rule does not merely
prohibit further interrogation without the benefit of counsel,
it prohibits further “communication, exchanges, or
conversations” that may (and in this case, did) lead to further
interrogation. 451 U.S. at 485. Under Bradshaw, the issue
before this court is whether the NCIS agent opened a more
“generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the
6
See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 (“While we doubt that it would
be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements
around the word ‘initiate’ in this context, there are
undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a
defendant or by a police officer should not be held to
‘initiate’ any conversation or dialogue.”).
10
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
investigation” or whether his inquiry related to “routine
incidents of the custodial relationship.” 462 U.S. at 1045.
The NCIS investigator was forthright in his testimony that
he initiated contact with Hutchins on May 18 to further the
investigation.7 The investigator testified that he requested
permission to search Hutchins’s personal belongings that he had
brought from Abu Ghraib to look for any media that could contain
photographs. In connection with this request Hutchins was
provided a permissive search authorization to sign.
Importantly, the search authorization again reminded Hutchins
that he was under investigation for conspiracy, murder, assault,
and kidnapping. Its purpose was to seek Hutchins’s cooperation
in the ongoing investigation by providing his consent to a
search of his belongings. The investigator testified that it
was while Hutchins was reading that form that he asked if there
was still an opportunity to talk to NCIS and give his side of
the story. This request for consent to search by the NCIS
initiated a generalized discussion which related directly to the
7
[Defense Counsel]: Now, getting to your purpose for coming
back to Sergeant Hutchins, you went back to
Sergeant Hutchins to further your
investigation, didn’t you?
[Investigator]: Yes
11
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
ongoing investigation as contrasted to a bare inquiry about
routine incidents of Hutchins’s custody.8
Frazier -- A Request to Search is Not an Interrogation:
The Government’s reliance on the holding in Frazier is
misplaced in this situation. Frazier stands for the proposition
that a request for consent to search does not “infringe upon
Article 31 or Fifth Amendment safeguards against self-
incrimination because such requests are not interrogations and
the consent given is ordinarily not a statement.” Frazier, 34
M.J. at 137. Frazier, however, did not involve or address the
reinitiation of communications by law enforcement after an
accused has invoked his right to counsel and cannot be held to
modify or nullify the protections established by Edwards and
Bradshaw.9
8
See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 (“There are some inquiries, such
as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a
telephone . . . relating to routine incidents of the custodial
relationship, [that] will not generally ‘initiate’ a
conversation in the sense in which that word was used in
Edwards.”); see also United States v. Applewhite, 23 M.J. 196,
199 (C.M.A. 1987) (request to take a polygraph examination
initiated by investigator after an invocation of right to
counsel was “in blatant disregard of Miranda and Edwards”).
9
As noted, generally a request for consent to search does not
itself implicate the Fifth Amendment. 34 M.J. at 135. This is
because a request for consent to search is not considered
“interrogation.” Id.; see also M.R.E. 305(b)(2) (defining
“interrogation” as including “any formal or informal questioning
in which an incriminating response either is sought or is a
reasonable consequence of such questioning”); Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (“‘[I]nterrogation’ under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of police (other than those
12
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Conclusion:
Hutchins’s subsequent May 19 statement was a direct result
of the reinitiation of communication by NCIS.10 Accordingly,
under the circumstances of this case, it was error for the
military judge to admit the statement made by Hutchins on May
19, 2006.11 For an error in admitting the statement to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this court must be convinced
that there was no reasonable likelihood that its erroneous
admission contributed to the verdict. See United States v.
Mitchell, 51 M.J. 234, 240 (C.A.A.F. 1999). The Government made
use of Hutchins’s detailed statement in its opening statement,
closing argument, and rebuttal argument and as evidence to
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.”). To be clear, our decision in this case does not
affect this basic proposition. However, the issue we address
today is not whether the request for consent to search was an
“interrogation,” but rather was it a reinitiation of “further
communication” prohibited by Edwards and Bradshaw.
10
Although a request for consent to search is not in itself an
interrogation under Frazier, we do not agree with the dissent’s
suggestion that such a request has no bearing on the separate
legal question as to whether, under all the surrounding
circumstances, the Government reinitiated a communication under
Edwards and Bradshaw. United States v. Hutchins, __ M.J. __, __
(6-10) (C.A.A.F. 2013) (Baker, C.J., dissenting). In this case,
for example, the communication was more than a simple request
for consent to search, but instead included an implicit
accusatory statement.
11
Because the Government reinitiated communication with Hutchins
concerning the criminal investigation, it is unnecessary to
resolve whether Hutchins knowingly and intelligently waived the
prior invocation of his right to counsel before the
interrogation that resulted in his statement on May 19, 2006.
See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.
13
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
corroborate other evidence and to attack the opinion of the
defense expert witness. Therefore, notwithstanding the other
evidence of Hutchins’s guilt, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the statement contributed to the verdict.
Decision
The request by NCIS to Hutchins for his consent to search
his belongings reinitiated communication with Hutchins in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). Accordingly, the
decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed. The findings and the sentence are
set aside. The record is returned to the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy for referral to an appropriate convening authority
who may authorize a rehearing.
14
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
RYAN, Judge (concurring in the result):
This case presents the very close question whether,
under the circumstances, the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service’s (NCIS) request for consent to search Appellant’s
personal belongings constituted a reinitiation of
interrogation under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477(1981), and, therefore, a violation of Appellant’s Fifth
Amendment right to not incriminate himself. It is clear
that a mere request for a permissive search authorization
is not itself an interrogation, see United States v.
Frazier, 34 M.J. 135, 137 (C.M.A. 1992) (“A request for a
consent to search does not infringe upon Article 31 or
Fifth Amendment safeguards against self-incrimination
because such requests are not interrogations and the
consent given is ordinarily not a statement.”), and I do
not read the majority to suggest that it is.
Recognizing, however, that a mere request for a search
authorization is not an interrogation does not answer the
distinct question whether, under the unique circumstances
of this case, the reinitiation of contact by NCIS for an
otherwise permissible purpose was “reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect,” and
thus an interrogation nonetheless. Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted). In my view,
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
the admissibility of Appellant’s confession turns on that
question, and no cases with like facts clearly dictate the
answer.
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that
“when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of
that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”
451 U.S. at 484. The Court further held that when an
accused invokes his right to counsel, he is “not subject to
further interrogation . . . until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.” Id. at 484-85. Statements made after a suspect
invokes his right to counsel and in response to further
custodial interrogation “d[o] not amount to a valid waiver
and hence [are] inadmissible.” Id. at 487.
This bright-line rule serves as a “second layer of
prophylaxis” safeguarding “a suspect’s right to have
counsel present at a subsequent interrogation if he had
previously requested counsel,” Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.
Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), and is separate and distinct from the
2
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
question whether a suspect’s waiver was otherwise “knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary under the ‘high standar[d] of
proof . . . [set forth in] Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458(1938),’” Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 (alterations in
original) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966)); see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-
45 (1983) (plurality opinion); id. at 1053 (Marshall, J.,
with whom Brennan, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.,
joined, dissenting) (agreeing with the majority on this
point of law). My agreement with Chief Judge Baker, then,
that Appellant’s waiver was not involuntary under “Zerbst’s
traditional standard of waiver,” Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at
1219, does not end the inquiry.
Edwards does not protect against all reinitiations of
contact with a suspect held in continuous custody who has
invoked his right to counsel –- only those that the
government should reasonably expect to result in an
incriminating statement. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. We
view the latter class of reinitiations with a jaundiced eye
and compare it to the psychological ploys that necessitated
the protections first instituted in Miranda. See Miranda,
384 U.S. at 448-57. Whether NCIS’ reinitiation of contact
with Appellant should be deemed a reinitiation of
interrogation in contravention of Edwards turns on whether
3
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
NCIS should have known that its actions were “reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446
U.S. at 301; see also United States v. Brabant, 29 M.J.
259, 262-63 (C.A.A.F. 1989).
In making this determination, we must consider, among
other things, that: (1) after Appellant invoked his right
to counsel during his initial interrogation, he was held in
sequestration in a war zone for seven days; (2) during this
period of solitary confinement, Appellant was neither
provided an attorney nor permitted to contact one; (3)
Appellant was not permitted to speak with anyone other than
the chaplain, use any facilities other than the head and
shower, or have access to phones, computers, or other
methods of communication; (4) the Government’s explanation
as to why it did not provide Appellant with an attorney or
the ability to even contact one during this seven-day
period of sequestration was that “[it] is not required,”
Audio recording of oral argument at 29:18, United States v.
Hutchins, __ M.J.__ (C.A.A.F. Nov. 13, 2012) (No. 12-0408)
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/calendar/2012-
11.htm#13; (5) after Appellant was held in sequestration
for seven days, the NCIS agent who had conducted
Appellant’s initial interrogation reinitiated contact with
him to obtain a permissive search authorization; and (6)
4
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Appellant did not make a statement until the day following
NCIS’ request for consent to search and after cleansing
warnings were provided.
While (6) is strong evidence that Appellant’s
confession was not involuntary under Zerbst, it does not
answer the altogether different question whether, under the
circumstances, NCIS should have known that its reinitiation
of contact with Appellant, made for any purpose, was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement in
violation of Edwards. The military judge did not consider
this question, which is different from whether law
enforcement was engaged in intentional subterfuge.
After considering the facts outlined above, and that
the prosecution has the burden to “demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Appellant] initiated
the communication leading to the waiver,” Military Rule of
Evidence 305(g)(2)(B)(i), I resolve this close question in
Appellant’s favor.
Moreover, while I agree with much of Chief Judge
Baker’s analysis of whether the Secretary of the Navy’s
(the Secretary) comments resulted in unlawful command
influence, I disagree with two aspects of his discussion.
First, in my view, Chief Judge Baker blurs the
distinction between the doctrines of actual and apparent
5
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
unlawful command influence by suggesting that the Secretary
of the Navy’s comments did not constitute unlawful command
influence either because (1) the Secretary did not intend
to influence the outcome of Appellant’s proceedings, or (2)
his comments did not actually affect any judicial or
reviewing authority. See Hutchins, __ M.J. at __ (28, 31-
34, 41) (Baker, C.J., dissenting). Of course, if a speaker
intends to influence a judicial or reviewing authority and
that speaker actually influences that authority, the
speaker will have likely committed actual unlawful command
influence. See United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 414
(C.A.A.F. 2006) (finding actual unlawful command influence
where the Government’s “orchestrated effort to unseat [the
military judge] exceeded any legitimate exercise of [its]
right” to challenge her). In my view, apparent unlawful
command influence may be shown even without proof that the
speaker intended to influence a particular authority or
that any authority was actually influenced. The focus of
apparent unlawful command influence is whether a
reasonable, disinterested member of the public, fully
informed of all the facts, would perceive the military
justice system as fair. Id. at 415.
Second, Article 37, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2006), which prohibits unlawful
6
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
command influence, has been in existence since the UCMJ was
established in 1950, see Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No.
81-506, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, 120 (Article 37), and there
has been no showing whatsoever that its prohibition against
unlawful command influence trammels upon the statutory or
constitutional duties of senior civilian leaders such as
the Secretary, or that the two are incompatible in any way.
I thus disagree that there is any justification for the
civilian head of the Department of the Navy’s inflammatory
comments on a case where neither appellate review nor the
clemency process are complete. But see Hutchins, __ M.J.
at __ (29) (Baker, C.J., dissenting) (“Senior officials
dealing with national security questions that also
implicate military justice concerns must
contemplate . . . the impact on foreign relations and
national security of not commenting at all.”).
Appellant was convicted of unpremeditated murder. In
November 2009, despite both ongoing appellate review and
the annual Naval Clemency & Parole Board (NC&PB) review
process, the Secretary made widely disseminated, public
comments, which left no doubt about his strong view that
Appellant had already received substantial clemency from
the convening authority and would receive no further
clemency. Moreover, despite the fact that Appellant was
7
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
acquitted of premeditated murder, the Secretary
emphatically stated that Appellant had committed that
crime. As quoted in several military publications, he
stated that the murder was:
[S]o completely premeditated, that it was not in
the heat of battle, that not only was the action
planned but the cover-up was planned, and that
they picked somebody at random, just because he
happened to be in a house that was convenient.
He was murdered.
The Secretary further stated that (1) Appellant had not
acted “‘in the fog of war,’” (2) “‘[the] sentence [was]
commensurate with the crime,’” and (3) Appellant had been
granted “‘substantial clemency already,’” referring to the
convening authority’s approval of only eleven of the
fifteen years confinement provided for in the adjudged
sentence.
Following these events, and as relevant to the
unlawful command influence claim before this Court, the
NC&PB, which had previously recommended that Appellant
receive a six-year reduction in his sentence, recommended
that he receive no clemency or parole at all. Whether the
Secretary’s comments actually caused the NC&PB’s change of
heart is irrelevant in assessing apparent unlawful command
influence, as “the mere appearance of unlawful command
influence may be ‘as devastating to the military justice
8
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
system as the actual manipulation.’” United States v.
Ashby, 68 M.J. 108, 128 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Ayers, 54 M.J. 85, 94-95 (C.A.A.F. 2000)).
In Appellant’s case, “a reasonable member of the
public,” Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415, apprised of the Secretary’s
unequivocal, publicized position that Appellant deserved no
further clemency, would “harbor a significant doubt about
the fairness,” id., of Appellant’s annual NC&PB clemency
review. This doubt would be bolstered by (1) the NC&PB’s
dramatic change following the Secretary’s comments that
Appellant receive no clemency or parole; (2) the
subordinate status of all NC&PB members to the Secretary,
see Dep’t of the Navy, Sec’y of the Navy Instruction, Dep’t
of the Navy Clemency and Parole Systems pt. I, § 111, at I-
2 (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter SECNAVINST 5815.3J]; and (3)
the fact that any NC&PB clemency or parole recommendation
would have to be approved by the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy M&RA, see id. pt. II, § 205, at II-3, who was
presumably aware of the Secretary’s position on this
matter. That Appellant ultimately received 251 days of
clemency –- a period commensurate with the duration of his
release following United States v. Hutchins, 68 M.J. 623(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010) -- is far from curative of the
apparent unlawful command influence when viewed in light of
9
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
the NC&PB’s initial recommendation of six years of
clemency.
No member of the public, aware of the remarks made and
the change in clemency recommendation that occurred, could
fail to harbor grave concerns that the change in the
NC&PB’s clemency recommendation was directly related to the
Secretary’s intemperate remarks about Appellant, in a case
where neither appellate review nor clemency proceedings had
been completed. These concerns are not cured by the facts
that (1) Appellant has no right to any clemency at all, (2)
the Secretary need not feel impartial about Appellant’s
actions, and (3) the Secretary has the ultimate authority
to grant any or no clemency. Here, the Secretary’s brash
public remarks resulted in the appearance of unlawful
command influence.
In my view, the Secretary’s disturbing and
inappropriate comments created an “intolerable strain on
public perception of the military justice system,” United
States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 374 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
(citation and internal quotations marks omitted), with
respect to the clemency proceedings. We are not, however,
in a position to repair this damage because SECNAVINST
5815.3J limits the NC&PB’s role in Appellant’s clemency
process to one that merely advises the Secretary on a
10
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
matter committed, by statute, to his discretion.
SECNAVINST 5815.3J, pt. III, § 308(a)(6)(d)-(e), at III-6.
Moreover, Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S.
272 (1998), represents a sharp limitation on this Court’s
role in safeguarding clemency proceedings that “are not
part of the trial -- or even of the adjudicatory process,”
id. at 284.
These reasons, however, provide a very different basis
for declining to act in this case than either suggesting
that such comments did not result in apparent unlawful
command influence because the Secretary did not intend to
or actually affect the proceedings or are otherwise
justifiable.
“‘[A] prime motivation for establishing [this Court]
was to erect a further bulwark against impermissible
command influence.’” United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13,
17 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citation and footnote omitted).
“Fulfilling this responsibility is fundamental to fostering
public confidence in the actual and apparent fairness of
our system of justice.” Id. We cannot decline to
criticize the Secretary for making the remarks he made, and
by implication lend our own judicial imprimatur to the
civilian leadership’s making of such public statements
11
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
about cases where neither appellate review nor the clemency
process are complete.
12
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
BAKER, Chief Judge (dissenting):
INTRODUCTION
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, I do not
agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Naval Criminal
Investigation Service (NCIS) agent’s request for a permissive
search authorization constitutes reinitiation of communication
in violation of Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Appellant
initiated communication with the NCIS agents, and his statement
was both voluntary and the result of a knowing waiver of his
right to counsel. Therefore, the military judge did not abuse
his discretion in denying the motion to suppress the statement,
and the statement was properly admitted into evidence.
Second, by failing to address the allegations of unlawful
command influence, the majority avoids a systemically important
question and central aspect of the case, which warrants inquiry
and consideration by this Court. This case raises matters of
first impression involving the scope of Article 37, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2006), and the
nature of a service secretary’s clemency process, as well as the
general question of whether the prohibition against unlawful
command influence bars policymakers from addressing matters of
national and foreign policy importance where they also involve
issues of military justice and executive clemency. While I
would ultimately find that Appellant has not met his burden of
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
raising “some evidence” of unlawful command influence, these
matters deserve full and fair consideration.
ADMISSIBILITY OF APPELLANT’S STATEMENT
Background
On May 10, 2006, Appellant and the members of his squad
were transferred to Fallujah for questioning as “suspects in a
homicide.” Upon arrival, all members of his squad had their
weapons confiscated and were not permitted to communicate with
each other. Appellant and the other members were billeted in
trailers referred to as “cans.” “The doors of the trailer rooms
were locked, and the locks had to be opened with a key from both
sides.” When outside the “cans,” an escort remained with them
at all times.
On May 11, 2006, NCIS agents questioned Appellant at Camp
Fallujah. The agents informed Appellant that he was suspected
of the offenses for which he was subsequently charged. He was
also properly advised of his rights. Appellant waived his
rights and stated that the shooting was part of an ambush. When
the agents confronted him with evidence indicative of a
homicide, Appellant invoked his right to counsel. The agents
terminated the interrogation and returned Appellant to custody.
For the next seven days, Appellant remained in the “can.”
While Appellant spoke with the chaplain, he was not permitted to
use morale, welfare, and recreation facilities, to have access
2
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
to phones, computers, or mail, or to communicate with other
members of the squad. Appellant was allowed to use the latrine
and shower facilities. The military judge found that, during
this time period, the Government “made no direct or indirect
attempts to contact him . . . or to persuade him to reopen
discussion.” Nor did the Government provide Appellant with
counsel, as requested.
On May 18, 2006, NCIS agents approached Appellant to obtain
permissive authorization to search his belongings, which he
granted. The military judge made findings, based on his
assessment of the witnesses’ testimony, that “the agents
strictly restricted their contact with the accused to the
request for permissive authorization for a search of his
belongings” and “the government did not seek to discuss the case
with the accused further.” As they searched, Appellant asked if
“the door was still open to discuss his side of the story.” An
agent reminded Appellant that he had exercised his right to
counsel, and told Appellant that they did not have time to talk
that night, which the military judge found “directly contradicts
any allegation that this visit to his can was a subterfuge to
reinitiate contact.” The agent told Appellant that he was not
sure what time the following day Appellant would be sent back to
the United States, but said that they would speak with him if
there was time.
3
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
The next day, May 19, the NCIS agents again informed
Appellant of his rights. Appellant “expressly waived those
rights and indicated a continued desire to reinitiate contact
with the government without the benefit of counsel.” Appellant
gave a lengthy, detailed statement.
Discussion
This Court reviews a military judge’s denial of a motion to
suppress a confession for an abuse of discretion. A military
judge’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Chatfield, 67 M.J. 432, 437 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing
United States v. Pipkin, 58 M.J. 358, 360 (C.A.A.F. 2003);
United States v. Leedy, 65 M.J. 208, 213 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
However, voluntariness of a confession is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo. Chatfield, 67 M.J. at 437 (citing
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); United States
v. Bubonics, 45 M.J. 93, 94-95 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
Appellant argues that the subsequent inculpatory statement
on May 19 was involuntary and thus erroneously admitted into
evidence. First, Appellant contends, and the majority
incorrectly holds, that under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477(1981), it was the agents, not Appellant, who reinitiated
interrogation. Second, in the custodial context presented in
Iraq, Appellant argues that the statement was not a product of
4
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
voluntary choice, but that his will was overborne by seven days
of custodial isolation in the “can.”
Reinitiation of Communication
The majority’s assertion that a request for a permissive
search authorization constitutes reinitiation of communication
in violation of Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights both
misapprehends the Edwards doctrine and directly contradicts the
jurisprudence of this Court and every federal court of appeals
to have addressed this issue.
Under Edwards, when an accused invokes his right to counsel
during custodial interrogation, he “is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.1 On one side of the equation, the
authorities are barred from interrogation, which has been
1
In military practice, Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)
305(e)(1) incorporates the Edwards rule, stating:
Absent a valid waiver of counsel under subdivision
(g)(2)(B), when an accused or person suspected of an
offense is subjected to custodial interrogation . . . and
the accused or suspect requests counsel, counsel must be
present before any subsequent custodial interrogation may
proceed.
Subsection (g)(2)(B)(i) describes a waiver as valid, if by a
preponderance of evidence the government demonstrates “the
accused or suspect initiated the communication leading to the
waiver.”
5
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
broadly interpreted to include “express questioning or its
functional equivalent” of “any words or actions . . . that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
300-01 (1980). This Court has defined “reinitiation of
interrogation” in violation of Edwards to include a
confrontation having “the natural tendency to induce the making
of a statement by” Appellant. United States v. Brabant, 29 M.J.
259, 262-63 (C.M.A. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On the other side, the accused may initiate further
communication, exchanges, or conversations by making inquiries
or statements that can “be fairly said to represent a desire on
the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion
relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983).
In summary, while the authorities must halt the
interrogation after invocation of the right to counsel, “[i]f a
defendant makes a statement in response to words or actions by
the police that do not constitute interrogation or if the
defendant himself initiates further communications, the police
are not prohibited from ‘merely listening’ to his voluntary
statement.” United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir.
2010); see also Alvarez v. McNeil, 346 F. App’x 562 (11th Cir.
2009); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1999); United
6
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
States v. Gonzalez, No. 97-4541, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14891,
1998 WL 377901 (4th Cir. July 1, 1998) (unpublished table
decision); United States v. Colon, 835 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1987).
“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).2 As
the majority acknowledges, this Court has already determined
that, “[a] request for a consent to search does not infringe
2
The majority conflates the two doctrines and interprets Edwards
and Bradshaw as barring the authorities from initiating not only
any words or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response, but any communication which has the
result of leading directly or indirectly to discussion of the
investigation. Moreover, in this case, the military judge found
that the communication in question was no more than a request to
search, a well-established exception to the Edwards rule. See
infra pp. 9-15. The majority fails to cite any authority to
support such an expansion of the Edwards and Bradshaw doctrines,
in direct opposition to the case law of this Court and the
federal courts of appeals. While the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed this issue, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
who dissented in Bradshaw in favor of a broader interpretation
of Edwards protections, were clear that the doctrine only barred
the authorities from words and acts amounting to interrogation.
See James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 993 (1984) (order denying
certiorari) (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined,
dissenting) (“Under the strict rule of Edwards and Bradshaw once
an accused has invoked the right to counsel no further
interrogation is permitted until the accused initiates a new
dialogue with the authorities. Sergeant Midkiff’s query ‘[i]s
he going to show us where the body is,’ though directed at
Officer Davis, indisputably triggered James’ statement ‘I’ll
show you where the body is.’ That James made the statement in
response to Midkiff’s inquiry is not, however, determinative of
the ‘initiation’ question. If Midkiff’s inquiry is not viewed
as interrogation for Fifth Amendment purposes, then James’
response might be a voluntary initiation of dialogue. Some
official statements made within earshot of an accused in custody
are not ‘interrogation’ even if they prompt a response.”).
7
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
upon Article 31 or Fifth Amendment safeguards against self-
incrimination because such requests are not interrogations and
the consent given is ordinarily not a statement.” United States
v. Frazier, 34 M.J. 135, 137 (C.M.A. 1991).3 Moreover, the
military judge found that “the agents strictly restricted their
contact with the accused to the request for permissive
authorization for a search of his belongings” and “the
government did not seek to discuss the case with the accused
further.” In other words, it was not a circumstance where the
agents baited their words to encourage or elicit a response,
which is further evidenced by the fact that the agents did not
follow-up Appellant’s question by taking an immediate statement,
but waiting until the next day. As the military judge found,
this “directly contradicts any allegation that this visit to his
can was a subterfuge to reinitiate contact.”
Federal courts of appeals that have considered this issue
“unanimously agree that consenting to a search is not an
incriminating statement under the Fifth Amendment because the
consent is not evidence of a testimonial or communicative
3
The majority’s reference to United States v. Applewhite, 23
M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1987), is misplaced. Unlike consent to search,
a polygraph examination involves evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature, which is why this Court held that it
constituted further interrogation. Id. at 198 (“Rather than
immediately ceasing all interrogation as the law requires,
however, Agent Bernardi asked appellant to submit to further
interrogation in the form of a polygraph examination.”).
8
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
nature,” United States v. Cooney, 26 F. App’x 513, 523 (6th Cir.
2002), and Fifth Amendment protections only apply to
incriminating evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760–61 (1966).4
The majority fails to address, however, this Court’s prior
holdings that, since a request for consent to search does not
constitute an interrogation, Edwards does not bar police
authorities from requesting the suspect’s consent to a search
before he or she has consulted with counsel. United States v.
4
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1303 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the judge meant to suggest that an officer
must issue a Miranda warning before asking permission to search
an individual, ‘every federal circuit court that has addressed
the question has reached the opposite conclusion.’”); United
States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1974) (citation
omitted) (“The argument that Miranda warnings are a prerequisite
to an effective consent to search is not at all persuasive . . .
. There is no possible violation of fifth amendment rights since
the consent to search is not ‘evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature.’”); Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149,
1152 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[C]onsent to search is not a self-
incriminating statement; ‘[i]t is not in itself evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature.’”) (second set of brackets
in original) (citation omitted); United States v. Glenna, 878
F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A]lthough the district court
believed that the officers’ request for consent to retrieve the
registration papers was ‘reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response’ and therefore ran afoul of Miranda,
every federal circuit court that has addressed the question has
reached the opposite conclusion.”); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d
1323, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (“a consent to search is not an
incriminating statement”); United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467,
472 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[C]onsent to a search is not the type of
incriminating statement toward which the fifth amendment is
directed.”); United States v. Rodriguez–Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563,
1568 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566,
1568 (11th Cir. 1993).
9
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Burns, 33 M.J. 316 (C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Roa, 24 M.J.
297 (C.M.A. 1987). In Burns, this Court rejected the
appellant’s claim that his Fifth Amendment and Article 31, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 831 (2000), rights were violated by a request for
consent to search after he invoked his right to counsel, holding
that the argument was “plagued by a faulty premise, for it seems
to ignore the significant distinctions outlined by us in Roa.”
33 M.J. at 320. The Court explained:
[I]nterrogation is for the purpose of eliciting from a
suspect communications about the matter under
investigation. However, a consent to search does not of
itself communicate any information about the investigated
crime; and it is not a statement regarding an offense.
Therefore, requesting consent to search property in which
a suspect has an interest is not prohibited by his prior
request for counsel, because Edwards provides protection
only as to interrogation.
Id. (quoting Roa, 24 M.J. at 301 (Everett, C.J., concurring in
the result)). Since consent “is not a statement” and a request
for consent is not an “interrogation,” consent to search is “a
neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is
guilty of any crime” and is not in itself incriminating. Id.
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, the Edwards doctrine does not prevent authorities
from making a search request after a suspect invokes the right
to counsel. Id.
The other federal courts also agree that a defendant’s
consent to search is not an incriminating response, and
10
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
therefore a request for consent is not “interrogation” and does
not violate Edwards. See United States v. Knope, 655 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Knope’s argument [that his consent to
search was invalid under Edwards because he signed after
invoking his right to counsel] is foreclosed, however, by this
court’s holding that ‘a consent to search is not an
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.’”); United States
v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 892 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Though all
interrogation must cease once a defendant in custody has invoked
his right to counsel, a request to search a vehicle or home is
not likely to elicit an incriminating response and is therefore
not interrogation.”); United States v. Taylor, No. 99-4373, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 106 at *4, 2000 WL 6146 at *2 (4th Cir. Jan 6,
2000) (unpublished table decision) (“There was no Miranda
violation when, after Taylor informed investigators that he was
not responding to any more questions, investigators asked him to
consent to a search of his financial records. Asking for and
receiving consent was not part of the interrogation because
giving consent is not a self-incriminating statement.”); United
States v. Gonzalez, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14891, at *3-*4, 1998
WL 377901, at *1 (“Gonzalez’ consent to search, however, is not
an interrogation that triggers his previously invoked right to
counsel [under Edwards].”); United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d
1251, 1256 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Even though Shlater stated that he
11
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
wished to have counsel present for any interrogation regarding
the specific events of the evening, the law provides that
request for counsel during the interrogation does not apply to
the subsequent request for a consent to search.”); Tukes v.
Dugger, 911 F.2d 508 (11th Cir. 1990) (denying habeas corpus
claim based on consent to search obtained after defendant had
invoked right to counsel); Dunn v. Pliler, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32633, at *35-*39, 2008 WL 1701904, at *13-*15 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(consent to search was voluntary after defendant had invoked
right to counsel); State v. Crannell, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (Vt.
2000), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brillon,
2008 VT 35 ¶ 41, 183 Vt. 475, 497, 955 A.2d 1108, 1123 (“The
federal courts of appeal agree that a defendant’s consent to
search is not an incriminating response and therefore a request
for consent is not “interrogation” subject to limitation by
Edwards.”). In United States v. Harmon, for example, the
defendant invoked her right to counsel, but then made statements
about what was in her work area after an officer requested her
consent to search the area. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 390, at *18,
2006 WL 42083, at *6 (D. Kan. 2006). The court found that since
a request to search does not amount to interrogation, the
defendant voluntarily initiated the statements and they should
not be suppressed. Id.12
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
In the present case, when Appellant invoked his right to
counsel, the NCIS agents properly terminated the interrogation.
Thus, when the agents requested Appellant’s consent to search
and provided him with a permissive search authorization,
Appellant was not subject to interrogation in the form of
“express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Innis, 446
U.S. at 300-01. As this Court and every federal court of
appeals that has considered the issue have found, a request for
consent to search does not constitute an interrogation. A
defendant’s consent to search is neither of a testimonial or
communicative nature, nor an incriminating response, and
therefore a request for consent is not “interrogation” subject
to limitation by Edwards. Furthermore, a request for consent to
search, even if accompanied by a reminder on a form that the
accused is under investigation, is not “for the purpose of
eliciting from a suspect communications about the matter under
investigation.” Burns, 33 M.J. at 320 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Therefore, even under the standard
proposed by the majority, the request cannot be said to “open up
a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to
the investigation.” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045.
Rather, in asking whether “the door was still open to
discuss his side of the story,” Appellant himself initiated
“further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
13
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The military judge’s
finding on this point, based on his assessment of the witnesses’
testimony, is not clearly erroneous. Further, as a matter of
law, Appellant’s inquiry “evinced a willingness and a desire for
a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not
merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the
custodial relationship.” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46. That
the agents understood the question in this manner is apparent
from the fact that they immediately reminded the accused that he
had exercised his right to counsel, and did not continue
questioning until the following day after Appellant had
expressly waived his rights. See id. at 1046.
Waiver
Absent an Edwards violation, the question becomes:
whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the
right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the
purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found
to be so under the totality of the circumstances,
including the necessary fact that the accused, not the
police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.
Id. (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9); see also M.R.E.
305(g)(1) (“The waiver must be made freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.”). Such assessment is based on the totality of
the circumstances, including: the condition of the accused, his
health, age, education, and intelligence; the character of the
detention, including the conditions of the questioning and
14
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
rights warning; and the manner of the interrogation, including
the length of the interrogation and the use of force, threats,
promises, or deceptions.” United States v. Ellis, 57 M.J. 375,
379 (C.A.A.F. 2002).5
The record reflects that Appellant first invoked his right
to counsel, immediately terminating the interrogation.
Appellant spent seven days in confinement, and then reinitiated
conversation. The agents did not bait him into doing so with
threats, promises, or inducements, but merely asked Appellant
for a permissive search authorization. Appellant then had a
further night to consider his waiver. The next day, Appellant
received a cleansing warning and waived his rights.
Appellant does not contest that, after communicating with
the agents during the search process on the evening of May 18,
he was again orally advised of his right to counsel and that
reinterrogation did not commence until the following day. He
further does not contest that at that time and prior to
questioning he received a cleansing warning orally and in
writing. Ordinarily such circumstances are persuasive
indication that a statement is voluntary. However, Appellant
argues that the circumstances of his custodial detention in a
combat zone should alter the analysis.
5
These factors go to the separate consideration of whether a
valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence
occurred; they are not part of the Edwards determination.
15
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
I would conclude that Appellant’s detention conditions and
lack of access to counsel for seven days did not vitiate what
was otherwise his knowing and voluntary waiver. This conclusion
is based on three factors. First, civilian courts have
consistently found that solitary confinement, which also creates
an inherent incentive to seek release by making a statement,
alone does not render a waiver of rights involuntary. Appellant
has not cited contrary authority. Custodial detention in the
“can” no doubt creates its own pressure and incentive to obtain
release, but Appellant has not made the case that as a matter of
law his detention should be treated differently for Edwards
purposes than solitary confinement, where there is a subsequent
knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. See, e.g., United
States v. Webb, 311 F. App’x 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2009) (Webb
initiated contact and knowingly and voluntarily waived his
rights after being held in isolation for four days without
access to counsel); United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr.), 552 F.3d 177, 214 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“Taking into account the totality of the
circumstances, as we must, we cannot conclude that, because Al-
‘Owhali was detained incommunicado for fourteen days, the
statements he made after waiving his Miranda rights were
involuntary.”); Clark v. Solem, 693 F.2d 59, 61–62 (8th Cir.
1982) (sixty days of solitary confinement did not render plea
16
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
involuntary); United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 351 (1st
Cir. 1981) (Nineteen year-old’s solitary confinement for thirty
days “cannot be presumed to have weakened his will to such an
extent that he was incompetent to exercise his rights.”); Brown
v. United States, 356 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir. 1966) (placement
in disciplinary segregation for several days did not render
confession involuntary).
Second, while the combat context in the present case may
have added to the pressure Appellant may have felt in isolation,
Appellant was also aware the he was returning to the United
States on an imminent basis -- in fact, the same day that
Appellant made the statement. In other words, Appellant was not
facing the prospect of an unknown and indeterminate period of
custodial detention in the “can,” the escape from which he might
have concluded might only come from waiving his right to counsel
and making a statement.
Finally, Appellant did not waive his rights immediately
after reinitiating communication with the agents. Nor was he
tricked, lured, or baited into doing so. Having opened the door
to making a statement, Appellant was given the opportunity to
reflect upon his decision overnight. This was not a snap
decision or the product of a personality overborne.
Certainly, seven days in the “can” without access to
counsel is anything but a model in light of Edwards. Generally,
17
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
this Court expects “assignment of counsel for representational
purposes at the earliest possible moment in the process of
military justice.” United States v. Jackson, 5 M.J. 223, 226
(C.M.A. 1978).6 But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (“If
authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a
reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is
carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating
the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not
question him during that time.”). At the same time, we are not
charged in this case with determining best practice, but rather
with determining whether Appellant’s constitutional rights as
described by Edwards were violated. In the absence of a per se
rule that a delay in providing counsel invalidates an otherwise
knowing and voluntary waiver, I would conclude that Appellant’s
rights were not violated. Appellant’s waiver occurred following
his reinitiating communication. A substantial delay occurred
before the subsequent interrogation, in which Appellant could
contemplate and consider his options. And, a cleansing warning
was provided in both oral and written form. Thus, for the
purpose of Edwards and M.R.E. 305, Appellant’s statements were
voluntary and the result of a knowing waiver under the totality
of the circumstances. Therefore, I would hold that the military
6
While counsel must also be provided as part of the initial
review, Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 305(f), defense counsel
did not raise this issue at trial.
18
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to
suppress the statement, and the statement was properly admitted
into evidence.
UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE
Background
The offenses at issue in this case received national and
international press attention, as did the ensuing court-martial
of Appellant. The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals (CCA) summarized the facts of the offenses as
follows:
The appellant was assigned as squad leader for 1st
Squad, 2nd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th
Marines, assigned to Task Force Chromite, conducting
counter-insurgency operations in the Hamdaniyah area
of Iraq in April 2006. In the evening hours of 25
April 2006, the appellant led a combat patrol to
conduct a deliberate ambush aimed at interdicting
insurgent emplacement of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). The court-martial received testimony from
several members of the squad that indicated the
intended ambush mission morphed into a conspiracy to
deliberately capture and kill a high value individual
(HVI), believed to be a leader of the insurgency. The
witnesses gave varying testimony as to the depth of
their understanding of alternative targets, such as
family members of the HVI or another random military-
aged Iraqi male.
Considerable effort and preparation went into the
execution of this conspiracy. Tasks were accomplished
by various Marines and their corpsman, including the
theft of a shovel and AK-47 from an Iraqi dwelling to
be used as props to manufacture a scene where it
appeared that an armed insurgent was digging to
emplace an IED. Some squad members advanced to the
ambush site while others captured an unknown Iraqi
19
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
man, bound and gagged him, and brought him to the
would-be IED emplacement.
The stage set, the squad informed higher headquarters
by radio that they had come upon an insurgent planting
an IED and received approval to engage. The squad
opened fire, mortally wounding the man. The appellant
approached the victim and fired multiple rifle rounds
into the man’s face at point blank range.
The scene was then manipulated to appear consistent
with the insurgent/IED story. The squad removed the
bindings from the victim’s hands and feet and
positioned the victim’s body with the shovel and AK-47
rifle they had stolen from local Iraqis. To simulate
that the victim fired on the squad, the Marines fired
the AK-47 rifle into the air and collected the
discharged casings. When questioned about the action,
the appellant, like other members of the squad, made
false official statements, describing the situation as
a legitimate ambush and a “good shoot.” The death was
brought to the appellant’s battalion commander’s
attention by a local sheikh and the ensuing
investigation led to the case before us.
United States v. Hutchins, No. NMCCA 200800393, 2012 CCA LEXIS
93, at *4-*6, 2012 WL 933067, at *2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar.
20, 2012) (unpublished) (paragraph breaks added). As cited by
Appellant, the events in Hamdaniyah were alternatively portrayed
in the media as one of the most significant war crimes cases to
emerge from the Iraq war, or as an unfortunate collateral
consequence in the fog of war. The case drew the attention of
members of Congress, who both publicly condemned what had
occurred, as well as questioned in public and in correspondence
directed to senior defense officials the prosecution of
20
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Appellant and other members of his squad.7 In 2007, Appellant
was tried and convicted of conspiracy, making a false official
statement, unpremeditated murder, and larceny, in violation of
Articles 81, 107, 118, and 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 907,
918, 921 (2006).
In November 2009, while Appellant’s case was pending before
the CCA on direct appeal, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
issued a press release and gave interviews discussing the case.8
For example, of Appellant and his squad, the Secretary of the
Navy stated:
None of their actions lived up to the core values of
the Marine Corps and the Navy . . . . This was not a
“fog of war” case occurring in the heat of battle.
This was carefully planned and executed, as was the
cover-up. The plan was carried out exactly as it had
been conceived.
7
The CCA granted Appellant’s request to attach documents to the
record reporting from members of Congress in support of
clemency. See, e.g., Clemency Denied for Plymouth Marine
Convicted of Murder in Iraq, The Patriot Ledger, Nov. 19, 2009,
http://www.patriotledger.com/ourtowns/x1792901664/Clemency-
denied-for-Plymouth-Marine-convicted-of-murder-in-Iraq
#axzz2w11HeWPV; Mark Walker, Navy Secretary Boots Four Pendleton
Troops Involved in Iraqi’s Killing, North County Times, Nov. 19,
2009.
8
On September 12, 2011, the CCA granted Hutchins’s motion to
attach certain documents to the record which reported the
Secretary of the Navy’s comments. The CCA determined that
“[t]he comments were publicly made and their content and timing
are not in dispute.” 2012 CCA LEXIS 93, at *6, 2012 WL 933067at *2. The CCA summarized the Secretary’s comments as
expressing “surprise and disappointment with the sentences and
the prospect of continuing service for the personnel involved in
this case.” 2012 CCA LEXIS 93, at *6 n.1, 2012 WL 933067 at *2
n 1.
21
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Walker, supra note 7 (quoting statement of Secretary of the Navy
Ray Mabas in telephone interview). The Secretary of the Navy
noted that the sentence was “commensurate” with the offense, and
that Appellant had already received sufficient clemency. The
Secretary of the Navy also publicly expressed “surprise” that
members of the squad had been permitted to remain on active
duty. In addition, the Secretary announced his decision to
direct their separation from the service.
As depicted in the following table, the Secretary of the
Navy’s comments occurred nearly a year after the Navy Clemency
and Parole Board (NC&PB) voted to recommend that Appellant’s
sentence be reduced. After the Secretary of the Navy’s
statements, the NC&PB then voted against additional clemency.
Later, however, the CCA set aside the findings and sentence.
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs also approved a recommendation reducing
Appellant’s sentence by 251 days. Hutchins, 2012 CCA LEXIS 93,
at *18 n.6, 2012 WL 933067, at *7 n.6.
Table 1: Timeline9
3 Aug. 2007 Members adjudge sentence at General Court-Martial
15 Feb. 2008 Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation
2 Apr. 2008 Addendum to Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation
2 May. 2008 CA’s action granting clemency
12 Jun. 2008 Record docketed at CCA for Article 66, UCMJ, review
9
Adapted from Hutchins, 2012 CCA LEXIS 93, at *5, *18, 2012 WL
933067, at *3, *7.
22
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Feb. 2009 NC&PB votes to reduce sentence to five years
17 Nov. 2009 SECNAV’s public comments about Appellant’s case
Jan. 2010 NC&PB votes against clemency or parole
22 Apr. 2010 CCA issues opinion setting aside findings and
sentence
7 Jun. 2010 JAG certifies case to CAAF
14 Jun. 2010 Appellant released from confinement
11 Jan. 2011 CAAF reverses the CCA decision and remanded to CCA
17 Feb. 2011 CCA redocketed case for Article 66, UCMJ, review
30 Mar. 2011 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary approves
clemency recommendation reducing sentence by 251
days
20 Mar. 2012 CCA issues opinion affirming the sentence
Appellant contends that the Secretary of the Navy’s
comments to the media about his case constituted unlawful
command influence, in light of their actual or apparent
influence on his appellate review and clemency proceedings.
Discussion
In deciding this case based on the admission of Appellant’s
statement, the majority avoids a systemically important question
involving unlawful command influence. This is a mistake.
First, the issue of unlawful command influence was litigated
throughout these proceedings. It is a central aspect of the
case. As a result, Appellant’s and the public’s confidence in
the ultimate outcome in the handling of this case rests in part
on how this issue is addressed, or not addressed.
Second, this Court has referred to unlawful command
influence as “the mortal enemy of military justice.” United
States v. Douglas, 68 M.J. 349, 355 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). If that is the case,
23
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
then the issue should warrant inquiry and consideration by the
military justice system’s highest, and only, civilian court.
Moreover, this case raises matters of first impression involving
the scope of Article 37, UCMJ, as well as the nature of a
service secretary’s clemency process. To what extent, if at
all, does the prohibition against unlawful command influence bar
policymakers from addressing matters of national and foreign
policy importance where they also involve matters of military
justice and executive clemency?
Framework of Review
The framework for addressing unlawful command influence
before this Court reflects the seriousness with which the issue
is considered by Congress, the President, the military, and this
Court. First, the framework is intended to promote the
adjudication of the facts rather than a reliance on concepts of
deference and waiver. Thus, this Court reviews allegations of
unlawful command influence de novo. United States v. Harvey, 64
M.J. 13, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Villareal, 52 M.J.
27, 30 (C.A.A.F. 1999). Furthermore, “[w]e have never held that
an issue of unlawful command influence arising during trial may
be waived by a failure to object or call the matter to the trial
judge’s attention.” United States v. Baldwin, 54 M.J. 308, 310
n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
24
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Second, while Appellant bears the initial burden of raising
unlawful command influence, the threshold of persuasion is
relatively low before the burden shifts back to the Government.
United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
Appellant “must show: (1) facts, which if true, constitute
unlawful command influence; (2) . . . that the proceedings were
unfair; and (3) . . . that the unlawful command influence was
the cause of the unfairness.” United States v. Richter, 51 M.J.
213, 224 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150). Prejudice is not presumed
until Appellant “produces evidence of proximate causation
between the acts constituting unlawful command influence and the
outcome.” Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150. Thus, the initial burden of
showing potential unlawful command influence “is low, but [is]
more than mere allegation or speculation.” United States v.
Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
“The quantum of evidence required to raise unlawful command
influence is ‘some evidence.’” Id. (quoting Biagase, 50 M.J. at
150). Once an issue of unlawful command influence is raised by
some evidence, the burden shifts to the Government to rebut an
allegation of unlawful command influence by persuading the Court
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the predicate facts do not
exist; (2) the facts do not constitute unlawful command
influence; (3) the unlawful command influence did not affect the
25
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
findings or sentence; or (4) if on appeal, by persuading the
appellate court that the unlawful command influence had no
prejudicial impact on the court-martial. Biagase, 50 M.J. at
151.
Third, the Court considers both actual and apparent
unlawful command influence. United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J.
368, 374 (C.A.A.F. 2003). The appearance of unlawful command
influence exists “where an objective, disinterested observer,
fully informed of all the facts and circumstances, would harbor
a significant doubt about the fairness of the proceeding.”
United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 415 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
Consideration of an issue of unlawful command influence falls
short if it “‘fails to take into consideration the concern of
Congress and this Court in eliminating even the appearance of
unlawful command influence at courts-martial.’” Stoneman, 57
M.J. at 42 (quoting United States v. Ayers, 54 M.J. 85, 94–95
(C.A.A.F. 2000).
Application of Unlawful Command Influence to Civilian Leadership
As a preliminary matter, one must consider whether Article
37, UCMJ, applies to the Secretary of the Navy. The Government
argues that it does not.
Article 37(a), UCMJ, establishes the prohibition against
unlawfully influencing the action of a court-martial:
26
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
No authority convening a general, special, or summary
court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, may
censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any
member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with
respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the
court, or with respect to any other exercises of its
or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings.
No person subject to this chapter may attempt to
coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the
action of a court-martial or any other military
tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the
findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any
convening, approving, or reviewing authority with
respect to his judicial acts.
(emphasis added). As the Secretary of the Navy does not fall
within the statutory ambit of Article 2, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802(2006), as the Government argues, there is a textual argument
that Article 37, UCMJ, would not directly apply unless the
Secretary of the Navy was acting as the convening authority.
See Article 22, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2006); Mullan v. United
States, 42 Ct. Cl. 157, 162 (1907).
However, an accused has a due process right to a fair trial
and appeal, free from the undue influence of superiors, whether
they are military officers or civilians in policy and
administrative positions. Thus, regardless of whether Article
37, UCMJ, applies to the Secretary of the Navy, unlawful
influence by a civilian official may present a due process
“error of constitutional dimension.” See Biagase, 50 M.J. at,
149-50 (citing United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 394 (C.M.A.
1986)). Based on these due process considerations, while this
27
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Court has never explicitly stated so, it has applied an Article
37-based analysis to prohibit unlawful command influence by
civilians who are in positions of authority in the military
civilian hierarchy, but not subject to the UCMJ, including the
Secretary of the Navy who exercises administrative command of
the Department of the Navy.10
On the other hand, not all statements about a court-martial
are necessarily “unlawful,” even if addressed to the merits of
the proceeding. Such a judgment will depend on a number of
factors. To whom, for example, are the comments addressed? How
will they be perceived by the intended audience, as well as by
the larger audience, intended or not? Is the spokesperson
attempting to influence the outcome of the proceeding? Is the
spokesperson implicitly or explicitly threatening repercussions
if his or her view is not adopted? And, whether or not the
speaker intended the comments to influence the outcome or the
actors in such a manner, given the nature of the comments or the
nature of the speaker, should the comments be deemed to have had
been made with that intent or had that effect?
10
See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 20 C.M.A. 317, 43 C.M.R.
157 (1971); United States v. Estrada, 7 C.M.A. 635, 23 C.M.R. 99(1957); United States v. Fowle, 7 C.M.A. 349, 22 C.M.R. 139(1956); United States v. Doherty, 5 C.M.A. 287, 17 C.M.R. 287(1954); see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 5013-14 (detailing the role of the
Secretary of the Navy).
28
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
While it is tempting to be critical of officials who
comment on pending cases and prudent for lawyers and judges to
advise against doing so at all, there is a difference between
what is safe or prudential and what is required as a matter of
law or violates Article 37, UCMJ. Senior officials dealing with
national security questions that also implicate military justice
concerns must contemplate not only the impact of their actions
on matters of military justice, but also the impact on foreign
relations and national security of not commenting at all.
Moreover, the good order and discipline of a military unit in
combat is most assuredly a national policy matter warranting the
private and public attention of senior officials as well as
appropriate comment. In a system of separate and equal branches
of government, senior officials must also weigh their duty to
respond appropriately to inquiries from the legislative branch.
Whatever the correct answer in a given context, surely that
answer cannot and should not be reached without consideration of
Article 37, UCMJ, and the advice of counsel. And, where a trial
is ongoing or a case is on direct appeal to a military court,
the ramifications of speaking and misspeaking increase.
Thus, it is through a due process lens, as well as with an
appreciation of the complex responsibilities of senior
officials, that I would apply the Biagase framework to determine
whether Appellant established “some evidence” that the Secretary
29
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
of the Navy’s public comments constituted unlawful command
influence in relation to: (1) the decision of the CCA, (2) the
Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) certification, or (3) the
clemency process. Because these comments occurred after
Appellant’s court-martial and the convening authority’s action,
my analysis is limited to the appellate and clemency
proceedings.
United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
Appellant alleges unlawful command influence in connection
with the decision of the CCA on the ground that the Secretary’s
comments were made while Appellant’s record was docketed at the
court for review, and because the CCA judges, as officers in the
Navy and Marine Corps, are subordinate to, and in theory subject
to the administrative direction of, the Secretary.
On the one hand, the statements made by the Secretary were
of a sort that could have influenced the CCA and done so
unlawfully. The comments addressed the Secretary’s specific
views on the findings and sentence of the court-martial,
indicating that the verdict was well founded and the sentence
commensurate with the offense. In addition, the statements were
publicly made and widely reported while Appellant’s case was on
direct review. Thus, such statements could influence judges of
the CCA in both their determination to uphold the findings and
30
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
sentence as well as in the exercise of their power to determine
if a sentence was appropriate.
On the other hand, there is no verbal or textual indication
that the Secretary was addressing his comments to the CCA or
intending to influence the outcome of Appellant’s direct appeal.
Nor is there indication that the Secretary intended with his
comments to explicitly or implicitly threaten sanction if the
judges on the CCA did not rule in a particular manner. Indeed,
there is no apparent indication that the Secretary made his
comments cognizant of Article 37, UCMJ, or Appellant’s pending
CCA appeal. That leaves the question as to whether the comments
might nonetheless have had that affect given the Secretary’s
status as well as the visible and vehement manner in which the
comments were made.
After the Secretary’s comments, the CCA issued an opinion
setting aside the findings and sentence, and authorizing a
rehearing. United States v. Hutchins, 68 M.J. 623 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 2010). “In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
judges of the Courts of Criminal Appeals are presumed to know
the law and to follow it.” United States v. Schweitzer, 68 M.J.
133, 139 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (citing United States v. Mason, 45 M.J.
483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997)). Without such evidence, courts will
not conclude that a military judge was affected by unlawful
command influence. United States v. Rivers, 49 M.J. 434, 443
31
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
(C.A.A.F. 1998). Clearly, such a ruling setting aside the
findings and sentence does not amount to “some evidence” of
actual unlawful command influence. It was only after reversal
and remand from this Court that the CCA found against Appellant
on each assignment of error.
Similarly, the facts do not support an appearance of
unlawful command influence. An objective, disinterested
observer, fully informed of all the facts and circumstances,
would not harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the
proceeding. See Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. To the contrary, the
actions of the CCA would validate for a member of the public
that the CCA acted as a fair and impartial court independent
from external command and policy influence.
On this record, Appellant has not moved beyond mere
allegation or speculation in demonstrating “some evidence” that
the CCA proceedings were unfair or affected by unlawful command
influence.
Judge Advocate General
Appellant also alleges unlawful command influence with
respect to the JAG’s certification. After the Secretary’s
comments were made public and the CCA had set aside the findings
and sentence, Appellant’s case was reviewed by the JAG to assess
whether an appeal to this Court should be certified under
Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2006). The JAG then
32
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
certified the case for review to this Court asking: (1) whether
the CCA erred in finding that the military judge severed the
attorney-client relationship; (2) whether, under R.C.M.
505(d)(2)(b), the CCA incorrectly found no “good cause” on the
record for the replacement of Appellant’s second detailed
defense counsel; and (3) whether the lower court applied the
wrong standard and erroneously presumed, without assessing,
prejudice.
Appellant notes that the JAG reports to the Secretary of
the Navy. See 10 U.S.C. § 5148; Dep’t of the Navy, Secretary of
the Navy Instr. 5430.27C, Responsibility of the [JAG] and the
[SJA] to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for Supervision and
Provision of Certain Legal Services (Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
SECNAVINST 5430.27C]. Appellant also cites media reporting that
an advisor to the JAG recommended against certifying the appeal.
However, even if such media reports are treated as established
facts of record, differing legal opinions within the office do
not alone demonstrate unfairness or unlawful influence. One
would expect debate on a legal matter on which lawyers, and as
it turns out, military judges, might reasonably disagree.
Moreover, this Court in a unanimous opinion reversed the CCA on
the question presented. Furthermore, the certified question
addressing the severance of an attorney-client relationship had
implications beyond this case, as shown by the cases applying
33
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
this Court’s earlier decision reversing the lower court. See
United States v. Hohman, 70 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. 2011); Wuterich v.
United States, No. NMCCA 200800183, 2011 CCA LEXIS 148, at *2,
2011 WL 3726640, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2011)
(unpublished); United States v. Hancock, No. NMCCA 201000400,
2011 CCA LEXIS 114, at *2, 2011 WL 2557622, at *1 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. June 28, 2011). The Secretary’s comments were of a
sort that might have influenced a subordinate officer unaware or
uncommitted to Article 37, UCMJ. But there is no evidence they
did and there were valid reasons to certify the case, and no
showing that invalid reasons influenced the decision.
Ultimately, subordination, a divergence of staff advice,
and a certification do not alone amount to some evidence of
unlawful command influence. Rather, they reflect the ordinary
process of review and appeal.
Clemency Process
Finally, Appellant argues that the Secretary’s statements
unlawfully influenced the process of the NC&PB. As noted above,
the NC&PB initially voted to recommend five years of clemency,
in addition to the four years of clemency Appellant had received
from the convening authority.11 Nearly a year later, the
11
We also note that, although not part of the record, as
publicly reported and repeatedly stated in Appellant’s briefs,
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy rejected the NC&PB’s
clemency recommendation on March 10, 2009, eight months before
34
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
Secretary made his public comments about the case. Two months
after the Secretary’s comments, the NC&PB voted against
recommending the five years of clemency it had earlier
considered. In 2011, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
approved a clemency recommendation reducing Appellant’s sentence
by 251 days.
The Government argues that the Secretary of the Navy cannot
unlawfully influence the NC&PB’s clemency process because the
Secretary retains the final determination to award clemency.
Under the system established by the Secretary, the NC&PB acts
for or provides recommendations or advice to the Secretary on
clemency or parole matters. Dep’t of the Navy, Secretary of the
Navy Instr. 5815.3J, Dep’t of the Navy Clemency and Parole
Systems para. 306 (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter SECNAVINST
5815.3J]. However, the Secretary of the Navy retains statutory
authority over clemency decisions. Article 74, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 874 (2006).12 Moreover, in the context of Appellant’s case,
the Secretary’s comments. See, e.g., Rich Harbert, Navy Panel
Considers Clemency for Lawrence Hutchins III, Wicked Local
Plymouth, (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://wickedlocal.com/plymouth/news/x1161119945/Navy-panel-
considers-clemency-for-Lawrence-Hutchins-III#axzz2WmlcuGZI;
Tony Perry, Marine Convicted of Murder Has a Job Waiting, Parole
Board Is Told, L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/07/local/la-me-marine7-
2010jan07.
12
The delegation of authority to the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is an ordinary delegation
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United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
the Secretary not only retained general authority over clemency,
but specifically reserved the opportunity to make the decision
himself through regulatory exception. The NC&PB submits to the
Secretary, with recommendations, cases such as “[a]ny individual
whose clemency may be the subject of controversy or substantial
congressional or press interest as determined by SECNAV or a
designee” or cases in which the NC&PB recommends clemency and
the approved, unsuspended sentence to confinement is in excess
of ten years. SECNAVINST 5815.3J para. 308(a)(6)(d)-(e)
(emphasis removed). The Secretary of the Navy has delegated the
authority to act in matters of clemency and parole to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, except in cases involving the death penalty, life
without parole, and national security. Id. para. 205; Dep’t of
the Navy, Secretary of the Navy Instr. 5430.7Q, Assignment of
Responsibilities and Authorities in the Office of the Secretary
of the Navy para. 7(b)(3)(f)(2) (Aug. 17, 2009).
by the Secretary of the Navy to a subordinate officer within the
executive branch, and does not require the Secretary of the Navy
to amend or revoke the instruction to exercise his statutory
authority. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696, 694
(1974) (holding that, unlike an “ordinary delegation . . . to a
subordinate officer,” the Attorney General’s delegation was
“with unique authority and tenure.” As long as the regulation
remained in effect, the authority was the Special Prosecutor’s
to exercise, not the Attorney General’s.). Here, the Secretary
did not deny himself the authority to act.
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United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
The Government further argues that clemency is inherently
discretionary and executive in nature, and is not subject to
review on due process grounds. Clemency is a “highly
discretionary” power vested in the executive, United States v.
Travis, 66 M.J. 301, 303 (C.A.A.F. 2008), which, as a general
matter, “has not traditionally ‘been the business of courts.’”
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 284 (1998)
(quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464
(1981)).13 The Secretary’s instructions provide that clemency
“is not a right, but a discretionary decision of the NC&PB or
SECNAV.” SECNAVINST 5815.3J para. 308(a) (emphasis omitted).
13
See also Travis, 66 M.J. at 303 (“We cannot and do not
substitute our judgment about the merit of a request for
clemency or the weight to be given any specific clemency
recommendation by a convening authority.”); United States v.
Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395-96 (C.M.A. 1988) (While the courts
determine sentence appropriateness, “[t]he responsibility for
clemency, however, was placed by Congress in other hands.”);
United States v. Darville, 5 M.J. 1, 2 (C.M.A. 1978) (“Congress
has continued the previous pattern of limiting the power of
suspension to The President, to the Secretary of the Department,
and the convening authority, who may order the sentence
executed.”); United States v. Cavallaro, 3 C.M.A. 653, 655, 14
C.M.R. 71 (1954) (“Congress has seen fit to grant to certain
reviewing authorities the right to commute or suspend the
execution of a sentence, but it did not extend that authority to
boards of review.”); Courts-Martial -- Pay Status of Enlisted
Men in Naval Service -- Duty of Comptroller Gen., 34 Op. Atty.
Gen. 162, 165-66 (1924) (When the Secretary of the Navy makes a
clemency determination, “the question of whether you have
exercised your discretion wisely or erroneously is not subject
to review by others, but your action is conclusive, and the
matter has become res ajudicata.”).
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United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
A couple of break points emerge with respect to this third
allegation of unlawful command influence. First, the Secretary
of the Navy’s authority to commute, remit, or suspend all or
part of a sentence is found in Articles 71 and 74, UCMJ, as well
as in 10 U.S.C. § 953 (2006). In the present case, the record
is not clear whether the exercise or failure to exercise
clemency in this case occurred pursuant to Article 74, UCMJ, and
thus was part of the military justice process, or solely
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 953. While it is not clear whether the
Secretary’s clemency process at issue in this case was conducted
pursuant to Article 74, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 953, or both, it is
clear that the clemency process authorized pursuant to Article
60, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2006), was complete at the time the
Secretary made his comments.
Second, with respect to convening authorities, this Court
has held that the clemency process must comply with the “essence
of post-trial practice [which] is basic fair play -- notice and
an opportunity to respond.” United States v. Lowe, 58 M.J. 261,
263 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). However, federal civilian courts have concluded that
the application of the due process clause only ensures that an
accused receive the clemency procedures explicitly set forth by
statute, and that the procedure followed in rendering the
clemency decision will not be wholly arbitrary, capricious, or
38
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
based upon whim, for example, by flipping a coin. Duvall v.
Keating, 162 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Noel v.
Norris, 336 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 2003) (if a state actively
interferes with a prisoner’s access to the system that it has
established for considering clemency petitions, due process is
violated). Thus, absent a statutory or constitutional provision
to the contrary, due process does not include the right of an
accused seeking clemency to have the request reviewed by a
decision maker or an executive possessing the level of
impartiality normally required of a judge presiding over an
adjudicatory proceeding.14 This is true of the convening
authority acting under Article 60, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2006).
14
See Perry v. Brownlee, 122 F.3d 20 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying
Arkansas law) (petitioner does not have right under Equal
Protection Clause to unbiased decision maker under Arkansas
executive clemency statute); Joubert v. Neb. Bd. of Pardons, 87
F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Nebraska law) (pardons board
members’ alleged predisposition to deny inmate’s application for
commutation of death sentence, based on members’ statements to
media, did not preclude finding that members adequately
considered application in accordance with statute); Otey v.
Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994) (inmate under sentence of
death had no constitutionally protectable interest in clemency
that could be implicated by fact that Nebraska Attorney General,
who had prosecuted defendant, sat on clemency board or by fact
that two assistant attorneys general appeared in opposition to
commutation); Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840 (N.C. 2001) (allowing
the governor, who served as attorney general throughout part or
all of death row inmate’s appellate and post-conviction review
proceedings, to consider the inmate’s clemency request did not
violate due process, despite the governor’s alleged “actual
bias” or “inherent conflict of interest”).
39
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
And it is true of the Secretary of the Navy acting pursuant to
Article 74, UCMJ.
Third, in my view, the Secretary of the Navy would be hard
pressed to exercise unlawful command influence over the NC&PB
clemency decision over which he retains sole discretion with the
sort of public comments attributed to him in this case.
However, the exercise of sole discretion does not permit the
exercise of indiscretion. The Secretary is not free to act in a
manner that is arbitrary and capricious or that runs afoul of
constitutional principle, such as those pertaining to the equal
protection of the law.
Fourth, and more relevant for the purposes of this case,
the fact that the Secretary’s comments were addressed to his
clemency process does not remove the matter from the
jurisdictional purview of this Court; not while direct review is
pending. That is because a clemency decision taken by the
Secretary pursuant to Article 74, UCMJ, necessarily impacts the
sentence that is reviewed by the CCA not only to assure that it
is correct in law and fact, but also to determine whether it is
an appropriate sentence. In short, an unlawfully influenced
clemency decision under Article 74, UCMJ, might well directly
influence the substance of direct appellate review by changing
the sentence reviewed by the CCA and indirectly so by
40
United States v. Hutchins, No. 12-0408/MC
influencing the views of CCA judges as to whether a sentence was
appropriate. But that allegation was already addressed.
The problem for Appellant with respect to this allegation
of unlawful command influence is that, as previously discussed,
he has not shown “some evidence” that the Secretary’s comments
influenced or appeared to influence, let alone unlawfully
influenced the CCA, which overturned the findings and sentence,
or the Judge Advocate General’s decision to certify the case to
this Court. With respect to the Secretary’s NC&PB clemency
process, exercised during direct review, the Appellant has not
produced “some evidence” that the Secretary acted in a manner
that was contrary to regulation, arbitrary and capricious, in
violation of constitutional principle, or that unlawfully
influenced a member of the NC&PB. The record also does not
support apparent unlawful command influence. A disinterested
observer, fully informed of all the facts and circumstances,
would not harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the
proceeding. See Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. This is especially so
given the independent nature of the CCA’s review as well as the
subsequent independent review by this civilian Court.
For the reasons stated above, I must respectfully dissent.
41