Sutterfield v. Dye ( 2020 )

INT HEU NITSETDA TEDSI STRCIOCUTR T WESTERN DIOSFTA RRIKCATN SAS HARRISDOINV ISION ARLISSU TTERFIELD PLAINTIFF V. CASNEO 3.2: 0-CV-3029 DEPUTSYH ERITFRFO DYY E; CODCY ASSELPLr,o baatniPdoa nr oalned; JUDGHEA RRGY.F OSTER DEFENDANTS OPINIAONNDO RDER Thiissa c ivriilga hcttsif oinlb eyPd l aiAnrtlSiiuffst teprufriseultado4n 2Ut . S.C. §1983P.l aipnrtoicffe perdsose a nidn f orrnpaa upeTrihse.c asiesb efotrhCeeo urt forp reservsiccree eningt hepu rnodveirso ifto hnPesr isLoint igRaetfiooArncm t ("PLRPAu"r)s.u tao2n 8tU .S.§C1 .9 15tAh,Ce o uhrta tsh oeb ligtaost ciroenae nny complianwi hnitca h p risosneeerkr se drfersosam g overnmeennttoiartol yff icoerr emplooyfaeg eo vernmeennttiatly . I.BACKGROUND Accortdoti hnaegl legaotfti hCoeon msp l(aDion1c)t .D, e puDtyyea nPdr obation OfficCears sfealiltl oue sdpe r opperro cedaunrpder so taoncvdoi lo lPaltaeidn Ftiiftffh' s Amendmreingth Itdsa..t4 .P laianltlietffgh ehaseti osn t hvee rogfle o shiinhsgo use andp ropertiisge osi,tn hgr oaud gihv oarncdies ,u nabtlote a tlokh isso dnu et ot he "corrutphtei oopnffu iitcn emtryow ifea[n'cdsh ]i lhde[a'dssI].d ". Plaicnltaiitffmh soa ntD ecem6b,2e 0r1 19 h,ed rohviem steotl hfSe e arCcoyu nty Jabielc auhsehe a hde atrhde wraesa ni nciwdheenrhtee w asa lletgohe adv bee einn 1T heC omplianei rnrtlo irst htes adsaD teec em6b,2e 0r2 0. 1 possession of a firearm. Plaintiff states that he was “cross examin[ed]” and told by police and probation that the questioning would be recorded, but it was not. /d. at p. 8. He further alleges that he did not confess to the crime, but the Defendants maintain that he did. Plaintiff was ultimately arrested and detained. /d. at 8-9. Plaintiff now disputes a pending criminal charge against him for possession of a firearm. He claims that his fingerprints were not on the gun and that the gun was actually his wife’s. Plaintiff is currently charged in the Searcy County Circuit Court with felony possession of firearms by certain persons. State v. Sutterfield, 65CR-19-184.2 Judge Foster is the presiding judge. /d. Plaintiff is represented by a public defender, David Harrison. /d. The docket sheet reveals that the case is scheduled for a jury trial to commence on June 25, 2020. /d. The Complaint includes no allegations against Judge Foster, other than the fact that he is presiding over the criminal trial. ll. LEGAL STANDARD Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 2 The Court may take judicial notice of public records. Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005). its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 560 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support aclaim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). Ill. DISCUSSION Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). A. Deputy Dye and Probation Officer Cassell It is a settled principle of comity that state courts should be allowed to exercise their functions without interference from the federal courts, particularly where a state criminal trial is pending. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971), the Court held that absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not interfere with state criminal prosecutions. The Younger abstention doctrine applies “if the proceeding: (1) involves an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) implicates an important state interest, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding.” Hudson v. Campbell, 663 F.3d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 2011). Younger abstention applies here. Plaintiffs state criminal case was pending when he filed this case and is still pending. He now maintains that his confession was falsified and that the probation officer made false statements under oath. These allegations go to the validity of the criminal charge against him and to the question of his innocence or guilt. He does not contend that he is barred from raising these claims in the state criminal case. For all these reasons, Plaintiffs claims against Deputy Dye and Probation Officer Cassell are subject to dismissal without prejudice. B. Judge Foster Judge Foster is a state court judge presiding over Plaintiff's criminal proceedings. Judges are generally immune from lawsuits. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“[JJudicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”). Judicial immunity is only overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and, (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. /d. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged that Judge Foster took actions that were non-judicial or without proper jurisdiction. Accordingly, the claims against him are subject to dismissal. IV. CONCLUSION IT 1S THEREFORE ORDERED that the claims against Deputy Dye and Probation Officer Cassell are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE due to Younger abstention, and the claims against Judge Foster are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE due to judicial immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This case CLOSED. IT 1S SO ORDERED on this A ay of April 2020. | von Z IL TIMOTAY BROOKS TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE