ECC International Constructors, LLC ( 2019 )


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  •                 ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
    Appeals of --                                )
    )
    ECC International Constructors, LLC          )      ASBCA Nos. 59138, 59586
    )                 59643,60284
    )
    Under Contract No. W912ER-10-C-0054          )
    APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT:                      R. Dale Holmes, Esq.
    Amy M. Kirby, Esq.
    Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall
    & Furman PC
    Philadelphia, PA
    APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT:                     Michael P. Goodman, Esq.
    Engineer Chief Trial Attorney
    Sarah L. Hinkle, Esq.
    Matthew Tilghman, Esq.
    Engineer Trial Attorneys
    U.S. Army Engineer District, Middle East
    Winchester, VA
    OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCILMAIL ON THE
    PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    The parties move for summary judgment on issues related to a contract to build a
    compound outside a military base in Afghanistan. The parties have filed voluminous briefs
    with numerous proposed statements of undisputed facts. In an effort to streamline the
    issues and ready the appeals for hearing, this decision will only address select issues that
    pertain to contract interpretation. Matters of contract interpretation are questions of law
    and are amenable for resolution through summary judgment. Vari/ease Technology Group,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    289 F.3d 795
     (Fed. Cir. 2002). Contract interpretation begins with
    examination of the plain language of the written agreement. LAI Services, Inc. v. Gates,
    
    573 F.3d 1306
    , 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The terms are given their plain and ordinary
    meaning; if the contract language is clear and unambiguous, the plain language controls,
    and extrinsic evidence is not allowed to contradict the plain language. Coast Federal
    Bank, FSB v. United States, 
    323 F.3d 1035
    , 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The contract terms are
    interpreted and read as a whole, giving reasonable meaning to all of its parts, and without
    leaving a "portion of the contract useless, inexplicable, void, or superfluous.'' NVT
    Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 3 70 F .3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004 ).
    Summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Avant Assessment, LLC. 
    ASBCA No. 58867
    , 15-1 BCA i/ 36,067 at 176.127 (citing FED. R.
    CIV. P. 56(a)). The Board has previously issued a decision in the above-referenced appeals.
    See ECC International Constructors, LLC, 
    ASBCA No. 59138
     et al., slip op. (Jan. 24, 2019).
    Familiarity with the facts is presumed.
    "Additional" Voice and Data Outlets
    The following is not in dispute. In 2010, the parties contracted for appellant to
    construct a compound outside the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
    military base in Afghanistan (gov't mot. at 2, ,i,i 1-2; app. resp. at 1-2, 11 1-2). The
    contract provides that, with respect to a "Joint Operations Center":
    One secure network outlet, one above secret network outlet
    and one NIPR net outlet per every 4.5 square meters of
    office space. One coax outlet per office.
    (Gov't mot. at 11, ,i 45 (§ 018000.12 10, ,i 10.16); app. resp. at 5, ,i 45) The parties
    disagree on the interpretation of that provision. The government argues that the plain
    language is unambiguous. Appellant contends that adherence to the contract terms
    would require more outlets than necessary for the compound. (Gov't mot. at 40-43;.
    app. resp. at 40-44). We apply the principle of noscitur a sociis, which teaches that "a
    word is known by the company it keeps,'' so as to avoid ascribing to one word a
    meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words. Schlumberger
    Technology Corp. v. United States, 
    845 F.3d 1158
    , 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Because the
    provision uses the term "office space'' in one sentence and the term "office" in the
    next, we interpret the term "office space" to mean "the space within an office," within
    the meaning of the provision. Accordingly, the provision requires one secure network
    outlet, one above secret network, and one NIPR net outlet for every 4.5 square meter
    increment of space within an "office" (defined as any space requiring a coax outlet
    under the provision). To illustrate, if an office measures 4.5 square meters, the office
    shall have one secure network outlet, one above secret network, and one NIPR net
    outlet; if an office measures more than 4.5 square meters but fewer than 9 square
    meters, one of each; if 9 square meters, two of each; and so on. Thus, we find the
    government's argument persuasive and grant summary judgment on this issue.
    Cable Ladder Rack
    The following is not in dispute. The contract provides that:
    UL listed, black painted, cable ladder rack. .. shall be
    installed around the perimeter of the communication
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    and server rooms .... The cable ladder shall be the Telco
    type as described in the I3A specifications.
    (App. resp. at 63, ,i 287 (§ 018000.12 10, ,110.11.5); gov't resp. at 45,   ~   287)
    The parties disagree on the interpretation of the term "perimeter'· within the
    meaning of that provision, with the government contending that the language is
    unambiguous, and appellant arguing that the term does not mean "entire perimeter
    (app. resp. at 65-68; gov't mot. at 50-52). Among the definitions of the term
    "perimeter" are "the continuous line forming the boundary of a closed geometric
    figure'· and ·'the outermost parts of a boundary of an area or object.'" NEW OXFORD
    AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1303 (3d ed. 2010). Applying those definitions, the perimeter
    of a communications or server room is its boundary; that is, its walls.* Consequently,
    the provision requires the installation of a cable ladder rack around the walls of such a
    room. We see no meaningful distinction between the term "perimeter" and appellant's
    use of the characterization "entire perimeter" (app. resp. at 66); the latter smacks of
    tautology in that it says the same thing twice. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
    DICTIONARY 1779. Appellant relies upon the I3A specifications referenced in the
    provision above that depicts a Cable Rack Detail (Typical) that appellant says shows a
    cable ladder installed around only part of the perimeter of the depicted room (app.
    resp. at 63-64, ,r 288; gov't resp. at 45, ,r 288). However, that reference refers to the
    type of cable ladder to be used, not where to install the cable ladder, despite what the
    typical detail may depict. Accordingly, appellant's arguments must fail.
    Fiber Optic Combination Units (FOCU) Size
    The following is not in dispute. The contract provides that:
    The fiber optic cables shall be terminated in floor
    mounted, four post relay rack combination units that
    will allow splicing and patching within the same enclosure.
    The enclosures shall be sized to contain a minimum of
    48 fibers and a maximum of 144 fibers.
    (Gov't mot. at 16, ,r 71 (§ 018000.12 10, ,r 10.4.1); app. resp. at 7, ,r 71). The parties
    disagree on whether the provision requires each "enclosure" to be able to contain 144
    fibers (gov't mot. at 52; app. resp. at 76). The plain unambiguous language of the
    * We exclude from the "perimeter" of the room the door when closed; we presume
    that it would be absurd to interpret the provision to require that a cable ladder
    rack be installed on the inside of the door, and we should avoid such an
    interpretation. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 
    308 U.S. 389
    , 394 (1940).
    3
    provision requires that "enclosures," in general, be sized to contain at least 48 fibers but no
    more than 144 fibers; it does not require that each enclosure be sized to contain 144 fibers.
    Relocation and Disposal of "Spoils"
    Appellant moves for summary judgment that the government constructively
    changed the contract by directing appellant to ·'change the location and relocate all spoils
    disposed at the approved site'' ( app. resp. at 106-07). The government concedes "liability
    for entitlement" on this issue (gov't resp. at 70). We grant summary judgment to
    appellant that the government constructively changed the contract by directing appellant
    (1) to change the location of the spoils disposal site, and (2) to relocate to the changed
    location all spoils already disposed at the previously-approved disposal site.
    CONCLUSION
    The parties' motions are granted and denied to the extent reflected by the
    foregoing opinion; otherwise, the motions are deferred.
    Dated: March 4, 2019
    TIMOTH P.         LMAIL
    Administrative Judge
    Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals
    I concur                                           I concur
    M--
    RICHARD SHACKLEFORD                                OWEN C. WILSON
    Administrative Judge                               Administrative Judge
    Acting Chairman                                    Vice Chairman
    Armed Services Board                               Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals                                of Contract Appeals
    4
    I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the
    Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 59138, 59586, 59643,
    60284, Appeals of ECC International Constructors, LLC, rendered in conformance
    with the Board's Charter.
    Dated:
    JEFFREY D. GARDIN
    Recorder, Armed Services
    Board of Contract Appeals
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