Highland Al Hujaz Co., Ltd. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
    Appeal of --                                  )
    )
    Highland Al Hujaz Co., Ltd.                   )      
    ASBCA No. 58243
    )
    Under Contract No. W917PM-09-C-0049           )
    APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT:                       Herman M. Braude, Esq.
    Edward D. Manchester, Esq.
    Braude Law Group, P.C.
    Washington, DC
    APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT:                      Thomas H. Gourlay, Jr., Esq.
    Engineer Chief Trial Attorney
    Daniel B. McConnell, Esq.
    James A. Wallace, Esq.
    Engineer Trial Attorneys
    U.S. Army Engineer District, Middle East
    Winchester, VA
    OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE THRASHER
    This appeal arises out of a contract between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
    (Corps or government) and Highland Al Hujaz Co., Ltd. (Highland or appellant) to
    design and build an Afghan National Army (ANA) installation on Camp Hero in
    Kandahar, Afghanistan. Highland appeals from the government's decision to
    terminate the contract for default. Only the propriety of the Corps' default decision is
    before us in this appeal. 1 We have jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal pursuant to the
    Contract Disputes Act, 
    41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109
    . Because the Corps has shown that it
    properly terminated the contract for default and Highland has not shown that its
    default was excusable, the appeal is denied.
    1
    Post-hearing; the government asserted government claims for excess reprocurement
    costs, overpayments during performance, and liquidated damages under this
    contract. Appellant appealed all these claims and all have been set for hearing:
    reprocurement costs and overpayments, ASBCA Nos. 59746, 59818, 60134; and
    liquidated damages, 
    ASBCA No. 60385
    . On 26 February 2016, the files in these
    associated appeals were consolidated with Highland Al Hujaz Co., Ltd., 
    ASBCA No. 58243
    . However, this decision only addresses appellant's appeal of the
    government's termination of Contract No. W917PM-09-C-0049 for default.
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    A. Background
    1. Solicitation and Contract Requirements
    1. In February 2009, the Corps issued a solicitation for a firm-fixed-price
    contract for the design and construction of an ANA Corps Support Battalion (CSB)
    installation to be located adjacent to the ANA Garrison at Camp Hero in Kandahar,
    Afghanistan (R4, tab 3 at 1, 3, 60).
    2. While the project required the CSB to be master planned so that it could
    ultimately accommodate 1,640 soldiers, the site initially would host about 700 soldiers
    (R4, tab 3 at 3, 60-61). Accordingly, the solicitation stated that the soldiers' barracks,
    the dining facility (DFAC), and several priority life-support systems were to be
    completed by 1 September 2009. If they were not completed by that date, the
    contractor would be responsible for providing temporary facilities or systems to
    support 700 soldiers until the permanent facilities or systems were in place. (Id. at 67,
    70, 74, 75) The site electrical distribution system, or power system, was one such
    system. The solicitation stated in red lettering: "If the power system is not completed
    by September 01, 2009 the contractor will be required to supply temporary power to
    the compound" (id. at 67).
    3. The solicitation set forth in full text local clause 2.2, "ATTACKS FROM
    HOSTILE ENTITIES," which stated in pertinent part:
    This contract is firm fixed-price. Costs incurred in the
    performance of project execution that arise from the
    attacks of hostile entities, such as costs arising from
    damage to or destruction of contractor equipment and
    facilities, and damage to or destruction of project prior to
    Government acceptance, are the sole responsibility of the
    contractor. The Government makes no guarantee to
    provide the contractor with security, and bears no
    obligation to reimburse the contractor for costs arising
    from the attacks of hostile entities. When appropriate, the
    Contracting Officer may provide the contractor with an
    equitable adjustment with respect to time - but not cost -
    in accordance with clause 52.249-10[.]
    (R4, tab 3 at 175) The solicitation also set forth in full text an "AI Other Changes in
    Contract Performance" clause which stated:
    2
    It is recognized by the parties entering into this contract
    that performance of the contemplated project will take
    place in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been designated by
    the President of the United States as an area in which
    Armed Forces of the United States are and have been
    engaged in combat. As such, circumstances may cause the
    contemplated project to be [a]ffected during said
    performance. Examples of such circumstances include but
    are not limited to: Outbreak of hostilities in or near the
    project site; changes in contemplated project site
    (ownership of the project); U.S. Government and
    Afghanistan Government policy changes; site access
    denials; and other unforeseeable changes in the conditions
    of the project site that prevent the completion of the project
    as originally contemplated. Such circumstances may
    require the contract to be terminated, relocated, redesigned,
    etc[.], or a combination of factors. The aforementioned
    possibly [sic] remedy to unforeseen circumstances is meant
    to be illustrative and not all inclusive. In the event the
    Contractor is UNABLE to perform the project on the site
    set forth and described in the contract for any of the
    circumstances set forth above, the Contractor shall be
    entitled to an equitable adjustment to the [a]ffected terms
    and conditions of the contract. [Italics added]
    (Id. at 54) Similarly, the solicitation recognizes that: "Construction delays due to full
    or partial base closures due to incidents such as demonstrations, civil unrest and
    outright attacks will be examined on an individual basis for consideration of time
    extensions" (R4, tab 3, § 01060, special clauses, 1.22.3).
    4. On 26 February 2009, the Corps amended its solicitation, extending the move-in
    date for the barracks and priority life-support systems from 1 September 2009 to 1 January
    2010 (R4, tab 4 at 1). Additionally, several "Questions and Answers" were incorporated
    into the solicitation by the 26 February 2009 amendment (id. at 6-9). One of the questions
    was whether a contract line item number (CLIN) would be added for CSB temporary
    facilities in the event the contractor was unable to have the barracks and or the priority
    life-support systems completed by the move-in date. The Corps' response was:
    NO. The contractor should bid appropriately according to
    the contractor's ability to complete the permanent facilities
    and utilities within the required schedule. If the contractor
    believes he will not have the life support facilities
    3
    completed by the Soldier move-in date, then he should
    include the temporary facilities cost into his bid proposal.
    (Id. at 7) Additionally, the Corps confirmed that the number of soldiers to be
    supported initially would be 700 and that the battalion of ANA soldiers was expected
    to actually move in and occupy the barracks by the revised move-in date, 1 January
    2010 (id. at 7).
    5. On 27 March 2009, the government amended the solicitation to incorporate
    additional "Questions and Answers" (R4, tab 8 at 1, 5-19). Referring to the
    solicitation's Attacks from Hostile Entities clause (see findiµg 3), and noting the "rise
    of terrorist incidents and the deterioriation [sic] of security conditions throughout
    Afghanistan," one prospective offeror "respectfully requested" that the Attacks from
    Hostile Entities clause be replaced by a "War Risk" clause that shifted the risk of loss
    of equipment and materials resulting from such attacks to the government (id. at 9).
    The Corps declined to make such a change, insisting instead that:
    THE CONTRACTOR MUST BID UPON THIS
    PROJECT KNOWING ALL RISKS ASSOCIATED
    WITH CONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN. SUCH
    RISKS FAR EXCEED HOSTILITIES. NO SPECIAL
    CLAUSE IS TO BE ADDED; THE CONTRACTOR IS
    RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ACTIONS, INCLUDING
    DELAYS FROM HOSTILITIES, ETC[.] AND SHOULD
    REFLECT THIS RISK IN HIS BID. THE PURPOSE OF
    THE DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACT IS TO REFLECT
    SUCH RISKS UPON THE CONTRACTOR AND NOT
    THE GOVT[.]
    (Id. at 9-10)
    6. Another question which was raised was about the CLIN under which a
    prospective offeror should price temporary facilities and service, to which the Corps
    responded that "[t]he contractor shall bid accordingly under each facility CLIN.
    Contractor should take into account the ability or inability of the contractor to
    complete the priority facility by the stated move-in date." (Id. at 16, question 73)
    7. Highland submitted a proposal by the proposal deadline of 13 April 2009
    and on 3 June 2009, the Corps awarded Contract No. W917PM-09-C-0049 (the
    contract) to Highland (R4, tab 11 at 1). At the time of award, the total value of the
    contract was $26,749,757.62 (id. at 2). The project was to be entirely completed
    within 420 days of receiving notice to proceed (id. at 1, 70). However, priority tasks,
    including the site electrical distribution system, the barracks, the DF AC, and the
    4
    toilet/shower/ablution/laundry facility, needed to be completed by no later than
    300 days after receiving notice to proceed (id. at 70). Appellant required notice to
    proceed on 28 July 2009 (R4, tab 37), thereby requiring completion of the priority
    tasks by 24 May 2010, and the entire project by 21 September 2010. 2
    8. The contract incorporated by reference several standard fixed-price
    construction clauses relevant to the parties' dispute, including FAR 52.232-5,
    PAYMENTS UND~R FIXED-PRICE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (SEP 2002);
    FAR 52.233-1, DISPUTES (JUL 2002); FAR 52.236-7, PERMITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
    (Nov 1991); FAR 52.236-11, USE AND POSSESSION PRIOR TO COMPLETION (APR
    1984); FAR 52.236-15, SCHEDULES FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (APR 1984);
    FAR 52.243-4, CHANGES (JUN 2007); and FAR 52.249-10, DEFAULT (FIXED-PRICE
    CONSTRUCTION) (APR 1984) (R4, tab 11 at 29-30).
    9. The Payments clause, FAR 52.232-5, states in pertinent part:
    (a) Payment ofprice, The Government shall pay the
    Contractor the contract price as provided in this contract.
    (b) Progress payments. The Government shall make
    progress payments monthly as the work proceeds, or at
    more frequent intervals as determined by the Contracting
    Officer, on estimates of work accomplished which meets
    the standards of quality established under the contract, as
    approved by the Contracting Officer.
    (1) The Contractor's request for progress payments shall
    include the following substantiation:
    (i) An itemization of the amounts requested, related to
    the various elements of work required by the contract
    covered by the payment requested.
    (ii) A listing of the amount included for work
    performed by each subcontractor under the contract.
    (iii) A listing of the total amount of each subcontract
    under the contract.
    2   These dates were subsequently extended by mutual agreements for reasons not
    relevant to this decision.
    5
    (iv) A listing of the amounts previously paid to each
    such subcontractor under the contract.
    (v) Additional supporting data in a form and detail
    required by the Contracting Officer.
    (c) Contractor certification. Along with each request for
    progress payments, the Contractor shall furnish the
    following certification, or payment shall not be made ....
    I hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
    that-
    (I) The amounts requested are only for performance in
    accordance with the specifications, terms, and conditions
    of the contract;
    (2) All payments due to subcontractors and
    suppliers from previous payments received under the
    contract have been made, and timely payments will be
    made from the proceeds of the payment covered by this
    certification, in accordance with subcontract agreements
    and the requirements of chapter 39 of Title 31, United
    States Code; [Bold added]
    (3) This request for progress payments does not include
    any amounts which the prime contractor intends to
    withhold or retain from a subcontractor or supplier in
    accordance with the terms and conditions of the
    subcontract; ...
    (e) Retainage. If the Contracting Officer finds that
    satisfactory progress was achieved during any period for
    which a progress payment is to be made, the Contracting
    Officer shall authorize payment to be made in full.
    However, if satisfactory progress has not been made, the
    Contracting Officer may retain a maximum of I 0 percent
    of the amount of the payment until satisfactory progress is
    achieved.
    6
    10. The Schedules for Construction Contracts clause, FAR 52.236-15, states in
    pertinent part:
    (a) The Contractor shall, within five days after the work
    commences on the contract or another period of time
    determined by the Contracting Officer, prepare and submit
    to the Contracting Officer for approval...a practicable
    schedule showing the order in which the Contractor
    proposes to perform the work, and the dates on which the
    Contractor contemplates starting and completing the
    several salient features of the work (including acquiring
    materials, plant, and equipment). The schedule shall be in
    the form of a progress chart of suitable scale to indicate
    appropriately the percentage of work scheduled for
    completion by any given date during the period. If the
    Contractor fails to submit a schedule within the time
    prescribed, the Contracting Officer may withhold approval
    ofprogress payments until the Contractor submits the
    required schedule. [Emphasis added]
    11. The Default clause, FAR 52.249-10, states in pertinent part:
    (a) If the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the
    work or any separable part, with the diligence that will
    insure its completion within the time specified in this
    contract including any extension, or fails to complete the
    work within this time, the Government may, by written
    notice to the Contractor, terminate the right to proceed
    with the work (or the separable part of the work) that has
    been delayed ....
    (b) The Contractor's right to proceed shall not be
    terminated nor the Contractor charged with damages under
    this clause, if-
    ( 1) The delay in completing the work arises from
    unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the
    fault or negligence of the contractor. Examples of such
    causes include-
    (i) Acts of God or of the public enemy,
    7
    (ii) Acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual
    capacity,
    (iii) Acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract
    with the Government,
    (iv) Fires,
    (v) Floods,
    (vi) Epidemics,
    (vii) Quarantine restrictions,
    (viii) Strikes,
    (ix) Freight embargoes,
    (x) Unusually severe weather, or
    (xi) Delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from
    unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or
    negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers ....
    ( d) The rights and remedies of the Government in this
    clause are in addition to any other rights and remedies
    provided by law or under this contract.
    12. The contract included in full text "SPECIAL" clause 1.22, Time Extensions,
    which prescribed the procedure to be used for determining time extensions due to
    unusually severe weather for purposes of the Default clause. The Time Extensions
    clause stated that the contracting Officer (CO) should determine entitlement to time
    extensions for unusually severe weather based on the occurrence of "actual unusually
    severe weather days." These were defined as "days actually impacted by unusually
    severe weather," with weather severe enough to "prevent work for fifty percent (50%)
    or more of the Contractor's workday and delay work critical to the timely completion
    of the project." (R4, tab 11 at 155-56)
    13. The contract stated that if the soldiers' barracks, the dining facility (DF AC),
    and the priority life-support systems were not completed by 1 January 2010, appellant
    would be responsible for providing temporary facilities or systems to support 700 soldiers
    until the permanent facilities or systems were in place (R4, tab 11 at 54, 58, 61, 63 ).
    Regarding the site electrical distribution system, or power system, the contract stated:
    "Power system must be operational by January 01, 2010. If the power system is not
    completed by this date, the contractor will be required to supply temporary power to the
    compound" (id. at 54).
    14. Per the contract, Highland was required to take partial designs provided by
    the government and complete the design work so as to meet all requirements and
    applicable criteria and codes (R4, tab 11 at 47-48). The Corps also furnished Highland
    8
    with minimum design standards and product requirements, including for acceptable
    equipment and materials (id. at 71-143 ). Highland was encouraged to propose
    alternate designs or products that were more commonly used in the region, provided
    that such alternate designs or products would be equally or more cost effective or
    allow for more timely completion and would furnish the same system safety,
    durability, ease of maintenance, and environmental capability as the government's
    minimum requirements. In proposing such an alternate design or product, appellant
    was required to submit such information as would allow the CO to make a comparison
    of the proposed alternate design or product to the Corps' minimum requirements.
    Once a design or product was approved, any variations would require prior approval
    by the CO. (Id. at 71, ii 1.2)
    15. The contract required Highland to design and construct all electrical
    systems for the CSB, including providing all necessary labor, equipment, and material
    to install a fully-functional system that would interface with Camp Hero's existing
    electrical system. All major components of electrical equipment were required to bear,
    securely attached to the equipment, a non-corrosive and non-heat-sensitive plate
    identifying the manufacturer's name and address; the type or style of the equipment
    and its voltage and current rating; and the item's catalog number. All such equipment
    was to be in "new condition, undamaged and unused," and prior to installation such
    equipment was to be "protected from the weather, humidity and temperature variation,
    dirt and dust, and any other contaminants." (R4, tab 11 at 131, ii 9 .3 .1) For long
    lead-time power system components, including transformers, appellant was required to
    schedule its submittals to allow for "approvals, procurement, delivery and installation
    to establish permanent power as soon as possible" (id. at 132, ii 9.4.1.1). The contract
    established the following minimum requirement for transformers, in relevant part:
    Primary side load-break disconnecting means shall be
    provided with all transformers. All transformers shall
    match existing. Transformer substations shall be dead
    front, loop-feed, pad-mounted, compartmental, self-cooled
    type. Transformers shall come complete from
    manufacturer; use of third party transformer housings or
    add-on transformer housings shall not be permitted.
    Transformers shall have no exposed live components.
    (Id. at 134, ii 9 .4.5) (Emphasis added)
    16. The contract required Highland, after coordinating with the CO, to connect
    the CSB's power distribution system to Camp Hero's existing, active electrical system.
    To do this, Highland was to install underground "raceways," or conduits, no less than
    four inches in diameter, consisting either of thin-wall PVC that would be encased in
    concrete or, in the case of street lighting circuits, hard-wall ("Schedule 40") PVC that
    9
    would be directly buried without concrete encasement except when passing under
    paved areas or road crossings. (R4, tab 11 at 134, `` 9.4.3, 9.4.4)
    17. Between 17 August 2009 and 30 March 2011, the parties engaged in
    negotiations to expand the utility systems requirements of the contract to accommodate
    4,300 soldiers instead of the contract's original 1,640. At one point the parties discussed
    a change to the contract's original requirements regarding the Camp Hero power plant: a
    requirement for Highland to build an entirely new power plant (R4, tabs 13, 19, 237, 302,
    416). These negotiations ultimately proved unsuccessful and concluded on 30 March
    2011 with Change Order No. A00004. Change Order No. A00004 reestablished the
    contract's original requirements regarding the site electrical distribution system,
    generator fuel storage/distribution, and expansion work to be done on the Camp Hero
    power plant. (R4, tab 19 at 1-2)
    2. Arrival ofANA Corps Support Battalion Personnel
    18. The ANA soldiers arrived at the CSB site and occupied their quarters and
    barracks on 3 February 2011 (R4, tab 185, vol. 1, Rpt. 552). Following the ANA
    battalion's arrival, Highland leased generators and purchased fuel to provide
    temporary power to the ANA soldiers' quarters and barracks and their
    toilet/shower/ablution facilities (R4, tab 185, vol. 2, Rpt. 652).
    19. Effective on 13 January 2011, the Corps issued Change Order No. A00003
    for temporary power to eleven buildings on the CSB site: the three buildings
    comprising the Bachelor Officer Quarters, the six buildings of the Enlisted Barracks,
    the Toilet and Shower building, and the DFAC (R4, tab 18 at 1-2). Due to the "urgent
    nature" of the requirement to provide temporary power for the ANA soldiers' quarters
    and barracks and their toilet/shower/ablution facilities, Change Order No. A00003 was
    issued as an undefinitized contract action with a not-to-exceed amount of
    $1,748,740.00 (id. at 2). Of that amount, $575,080.59 would be used to lease
    generators and pay for their maintenance for three months under a newly-added CLIN,
    while the balance would be used to pay for generator fuel under a separate CLIN (id.
    at 4). The fuel CLIN was a "Materials" type CLIN, meaning that the Corps would pay
    for fuel on an at-cost basis without profit or overhead (id. at 2, 3, 5), in accordance
    with FAR 52.232-7, PAYMENTS UNDER TIME-AND-MATERIALS AND LABOR-HOUR
    CONTRACTS (FEB 2007), which Change Order No. A00003 also added to the contract
    (id. at 6). The Corps anticipated that Change Order No. A00003 would be definitized
    within three months (id. at 2), and expected that the definitized contract action would
    consist of a single negotiated, firm-fixed-price CLIN for generator leasing and
    maintenance as well as fuel (id. at 7).
    10
    3. Subcontractor Issues
    20. On 1 February 2011, one of Highland's principal subcontractors informed
    the Corps that Highland owed it a "large amount of money" (R4, tab 185, vol. 1,
    Rpt. 550). The Corps issued Highland a show cause notice, Serial Letter No. C-0049,
    on 20 April 2011. The Corps identified several "critical items that have yet to be
    addressed appropriately and continue to hinder current progress," including "[t]he
    payment of subcontractors, along with a list provided to [the Corps] of all
    subcontractors and outstanding balances owed to them by [Highland]." (R4, tab 61
    at 1) The show cause notice further stated, in relevant part:
    [W]e have noticed that your employee[ s] and
    subcontractors are not on the job site on a regular basis.
    We have been advised that this is due to your failure to pay
    them. We have requested that you pay your
    subcontractor[ s] and employees, so that construction could
    continue. Your subcontractors and your employees still
    have not received payments to them for work already
    completed for which the Government has made progress
    payment to your organization. As a result, they have not
    returned to work and any progress is insignificant.
    (Id. at 2)
    21. On 4 May 2011, the Corps again heard reports that Highland had not paid
    one of its principal subcontractors. The subcontractor reported that its employees had
    not been paid for three months and, as a result, many had quit. The subcontractor also
    reported that there were insufficient funds to pay for materials, food for the workers, or
    manpower. (R4, tab 185, vol. 2, Rpt. 642)
    22. On 14 May 2011, the owner of the generators that were providing
    temporary power to the CSB reported to the Corps that Highland had not been paying
    him and he was considering removing the generators, but that the ANA colonel had
    threatened to lock down the CSB site if he tried (R4, tab 185, vol. 2, Rpt. 652). The
    next day, a meeting was held between the Corps, Highland, and three of Highland's
    principal subcontractors to discuss nonpayment issues (id. at 653). Then, on 29 May
    2011, a violent protest involving employees of several of Highland's subcontractors
    and even Highland's own security personnel erupted in Highland's man camp (id. at
    667; tr. 3/322-27). Two days later, appellant's project manager, Mr. Douglas Seaman,
    was arrested and briefly detained by the ANA battalion commander (id. at 669). Upon
    his release, Mr. Seaman promptly departed the country (tr. 3/304).
    11
    4. The Parties' Global Settlement: Modification Nos. POOOJO-POOOJ4
    23. On 19 September 2011, the parties executed bilateral contract Modification
    No. POOOlO, the first in a series of five modifications implementing the parties'
    "Global Claims Settlement for CSB" (R4, tabs 25-28, 30). Modification No. POOO 10
    resolved any outstanding requests for equitable adjustment relating to work on the
    CSB (R4, tab 25 at 2). It also significantly redefined the scope of the CSB utility
    requirements, particularly the requirements regarding the site electrical distribution
    system and the existing Camp Hero power plant, thereby "establish[ing] an
    unequivocal starting point for any future changes if required." Respecting the
    contract's permanent power requirements, Modification No. POOOlO stated:
    b. Permanent Power: Provide an electrical ductbank of 6"
    PVC conduits in accordance with the Electrical
    Distribution/Duct Bank modification (Mod. No. POOO 11 ) ....
    c. [Camp] Hero Power Plant: With the exception of the
    15kV, 250A CSB feed breaker at the power distribution
    switchgear, delete all other work within the Camp Hero
    Powerplant. This includes any plant expansion to include
    the design, purchase and installation of new generators and
    associated equipment.
    (Id. at 2-3) Highland was directed to submit to the CO by 3 October 2011 "a proof of
    purchase and/or similar documents ... of all DFAC equipment, long-lead items, and
    other materials/equipment as contractually required to complete this project" (R4,
    tab 25 at 2, tab 336).
    24. The Electrical Distribution/Ductbank modification, Modification
    No. POOO 11 stated in pertinent part:
    A. (SJCOPE OF WORK
    Provide an electrical ductbank of 6" PVC conduits ....
    Install a new 250A breaker in the MVl31 load distribution
    switchgear at the existing [Camp] Hero Powerplant.
    Provide electrical cabling (120 mm - 2 minimum) from the
    [Camp] Hero Powerplant MV switchgear to the CSB
    distribution switchgear. Delete all other work within the
    [Camp] Hero Powerplant to include the design, purchase
    3   "MV" means "medium voltage" (R4, tab 903 at 281, 289).
    12
    and installation of new generators and all required
    equipment to support the expansion of the power capacity.
    (R4, tab 26 at 1-2) Highland was directed to submit for the CO's approval a redesign
    incorporating the revised duct bank requirements. In order to effectuate Modification
    No. POOO 11, the parties agreed to extend the performance period by a total of
    421 days, from 4 January 2011 to 1March2012. (Id. at 2)
    25. Bilateral Contract Modification Nos. P00012 and P00014 had the same
    effective date, 30 September 2011, and both appear to have been intended to
    accomplish the same thing: definitize Change Order No. A00003, Temporary Power
    (see finding 18; R4, tab 27 at 1-2, tab 30 at 1-2). 4 We find that, between them,
    Modification Nos. P00012 and P00014 definitized Change Order No. A00003 by
    adding firm-fixed-price CLIN 0016 with a value of $204,626.41 (R4, tab 27 at 2-3,
    tab 30 at 2-3).
    26. On 12 October 2011, the parties held a "Red Zone" meeting to discuss the
    path forward with respect to the remaining buildings under construction. The parties
    agreed that, due to the high costs of providing temporary power to the CSB, the Corps
    would not accept any more buildings beyond those it had already accepted, namely the
    ANA quarters and barracks and the showers/toilet/ablution facilities, until appellant
    had finished connecting the CSB to the Camp Hero power plant as required by
    Modification No. POOOl 1. (R4, tab 185, vol. 2, Rpt. 803)
    27. The last of the global settlement modifications, with an effective date of
    8 November 2011, was bilateral Modification No. P00013 (R4, tab 28 at 1).
    Modification No. P00013 established the parties' approach to providing temporary
    power "until permanent power can be supplied to the CSB via a [Highland-]installed
    ductbank to the Camp Hero power plant (contract modification [POOOl l])." The
    parties agreed that the Corps would pay the costs of leasing and maintaining the
    generators and keeping them fueled, but only until the parties' revised contract
    completion date, 1 March 2012:
    The effective date [of the requirement to provide
    temporary power] is the date both parties sign the
    modification to the contract and the end date of temporary
    power is 1March2012. The maximum duration of this
    4   The record is silent as to why Modification No. P00014 had the same effective date
    and purpose as Modification No. P00012, although some handwritten notes
    appearing on the copy of Modification No. P00012 in the record indicate that
    No. P00014 was simply correcting some errors made in the earlier modification
    (R4, tab 27 at 2, tab 30 at 2).
    13
    requirement is until 1 March 2012, at which time
    [Highland] is required to have permanent power in place,
    and the government will no longer be responsible for
    temporary power. Should temporary power still be
    required after this date, the contractor shall continue to
    provide all necessary power at their own cost until the
    permanent power system is functioning.
    (Id. at 2) (Emphasis added) Witnesses for the government and for Highland both
    testified to their mutual understanding that Modification No. P00013's requirement to
    provide temporary power would be satisfied when the duct bank system was connected
    to the existing power plant, regardless of whether the power plant was then capable of
    generating enough power to supply the entire CSB (tr. 1/84-85, 4/294-95, see also R4,
    tab 380).                              ·
    28. Highland submitted the redesign required by Modification No. POOOl l on
    3 December 2011 5 (R4, tab 903, vol. I at 277). Highland's design submission included
    drawings showing duct banks that consisted of 6-inch Schedule 40 PVC encased in
    concrete in accordance with the requirements described in Modification No. POOO 11,
    (R4, tab 903, vol. I at 285), as well as an electrical distribution system that included ten
    transformers with circuit-switching mechanisms that would allow power to be shut off to
    any particular transformer while still allowing power to flow "downstream" to the rest of
    the system (R4, tab 903, vol. I at 281). Such a circuit-switching mechanism is known as
    a "load-break" mechanism (tr. 1/280, 2/17). Also attached to Highland's submission was
    a "100% Resubmittal" design document, dated 3 October 2011, which included a section
    describing "THREE-PHASE PAD-MOUNTED TRANSFORMERS" (R4, tab 903, vol. II
    at 888, vol. III at 1399-1406). In it Highland reiterated the contract's requirement for
    "Dead-Front," "Load-break switch" transformers, as follows in pertinent part:
    2.2.1.1    High Voltage, Dead-Front
    High-voltage compartment shall contain the incoming
    line, insulated high-voltage load-break connectors,
    bushing well inserts, feed-thru inserts, six high-voltage
    bushing wells configured for loop feed application,
    load-break switch handle(s), access to tap changer
    handle, connector parking stands with insulated stands
    with insulated standoff bushings and ground pad.
    5   Although the cover page to appellant's 3 December 2011 design submission indicates
    ·    that it was submitted as required by Modification No. POOO 10 (R4, tab 903,
    vol. I at 277), Modification No. POOO 11 required the redesign submittal
    (finding 24).
    14
    c. Load-break switch
    Loop feed sectionalizer switches: Provide three,
    two-position, oil-immersed type switches to permit
    closed transition loop feed and sectionalizing.
    (Id., vol. III at 1399) (Emphasis added) The Corps approved Highland's 3 December
    2011 submission on 10 December 2011 (R4, tab 864 at 2).
    29. The record is silent as to whether Highland furnished to the CO any proof
    of having purchased the transformers as required by Modification No. POOOlO.
    Nonetheless, the record does include Highland's invoice for the ten transformers,
    dated 1 May 2011, which shows that Highland ordered ten "Front Dead End, Pad
    Mounted," "Load Break Switch" transformers (R4, tab 546).
    5. Post Global Settlement Events
    a. November Flooding
    30. On 10 November 2011 it rained at the CSB for nearly two hours, resulting
    in significant flooding at the site (R4, tab 185, vol. 2, Rpt. 833; tr. 1/137-138). It is not
    apparent from the record, however, which portions of the work were affected or for
    how long. Highland's witness, Mr. Reardon, testified the duct bank system was
    impacted because the soil was too wet to dig trenches (tr. 4/254). However, there was
    no testimony about the length of such delay. Additionally, there is no evidence in the
    record confirming the exact length of delay or impact, if any, on the overall installation
    of the duct bank system. For instance, the record includes numerous undated
    photographs of the flooded worksite around some of the buildings in the northwestern
    area of the CSB (app. supp. R4, tab 21 at 1-12). However, the "Chronology of
    Significant Events" for October-November 2011 in Highland's Camp Hero Duct Bank
    Progress Report for November 2011 does not even mention the 10 November 2011
    rainstorm; indeed, according to the Duct Bank Progress Report Highland did not even
    have a permit to dig inside Camp Hero until 17 November 2011, and digging
    manholes and trenches for the duct bank system did not actually begin until
    19 November 2011 (app. supp. R4, tab 5 at 4-5). The Duct Bank Progress Report
    includes several photographs, dated 17 November 2011, of trenches and manholes dug
    on the CSB site, none of which appear to be muddy or to have any water in them (id.
    at 13-20). Photographs of digging-work taking place inside Camp Hero on
    19 November 2011 show the earth-moving machine stirring up clouds of dust (id. at
    23-46). Highland's "Subsidiary Report for Duct Bank Work," dated 18 November
    15
    2011, makes no mention of flooding or damp conditions but rather reports that, with
    respect to beginning excavation work for the duct bank system, there are "[ n]o
    problems[;] ok to continue work" (app. supp. R4, tab 6). Both the government's daily
    Quality Assurance Reports (QARs) and the contractor's daily Quality Control Reports
    (QCRs) agree that there was work stoppage on 10 November 2011 due to a rain storm.
    However, although there is mention of damage to buildings, etc., there is no specific
    mention of delay to proceeding with the duct bank system resulting from the rain.
    (R4, tabs 184-85)
    b. Pakistani Border Closure/Hijacked Transformers
    31. The Pakistan border with Afghanistan was closed from November 2011
    through July 2012. Highland had ordered the ten transformers required for the site
    electrical distribution system sometime prior to the border closure. By letter dated
    4 December 2011, Highland informed the Corps that three of the ten transformers ordered
    had been hijacked and stolen in Pakistan and that delivery of the remaining seven
    transformers would be delayed by the closing of the border (app. supp. R4, tab 9). Despite
    the border closure, supplies could still enter Afghanistan by air and by other land routes
    (app. supp. R4, tab 12; tr. 2/15). In fact, despite the Pakistan border closure, seven of the
    transformers were delivered to the CSB on 4 February 2012. However, when the Corps
    inspected the transformers upon their arrival, three of them were found to be dead-break
    transformers, rather than the load-break transformers required by the contract.
    (R4, tab 185 vol. 2, Rpt. 918) Moreover, the transformers were not in the new, protected
    condition specified in the contract, but faded by the sun; some were rusty, some were
    leaking oil (tr. 2/17). The Corps issued Highland a deficiency notice, dated 11 March
    2012, for the nonconforming transformers and MV cable disconnects (R4, tab 383). By
    letters dated 25 March 2012 and 31March2012, Highland requested a variance to the
    approved load-break design in order to use the three dead-break transformers (R4,
    tabs 385, 389). The Corps denied Highland's variance request by letter dated 3 April
    2012 (R4, tab 390).
    6. Progress Payments: Retainage and Withholding
    32. By letter dated 19 March 2011, the Corps directed Highland to submit a
    revised schedule for the site electrical distribution system by 21 March 2011 (R4,
    tab 307 at 2). By subsequent letter dated 24 March 2011, the Corps informed
    Highland that it was past due in submitting a revised schedule and reminded Highland
    that its failure to provide a revised schedule for review and approval by the CO might
    delay future progress payments (R4, tab 60). From the latter part of November 2011
    through February 2012, every progress payment was subjected to ten percent retainage
    16
    due to failure to make progress, lack of performance, failure to submit sufficient
    resources, or failure to submit an acceptable schedule. 6
    33. The generators providing temporary power to the CSB ran out of fuel on
    26 November 2011. In the Corps' report of the incident, the Corps noted that the
    sporadic availability of water and electricity for its facilities, both dependent upon the
    temporary power, was causing disciplinary problems among the ANA soldiers at the
    CSB. (R4, tab 185 vol. 2, Rpt. 848) Mr. Mark Stephenson, who was the resident
    engineer and a CO's representative on the project from December 2011 until
    December 2013, testified that without power to those facilities, "it would have been,
    pretty much, a riot" (tr. 3/201).
    34. By letter dated 7 December 2011, the Corps advised Highland that an
    unsigned, proposed revised schedule that had been delivered to the Corps at the
    preceding weekly progress meeting was not up-to-date or complete and therefore it
    was rejected. The Corps advised Highland that "[l]ack of an approved schedule or
    scheduling personnel shall result in an inability of the [CO] to evaluate Contractor
    progress for the purposes of payment." (R4, tab 358) Highland submitted another
    proposed schedule revision, which was also rejected. By letter dated 13 December
    2011, the Corps explained that Highland's proposed revision was "very optimistic
    based on placement to date and anticipated resources for the remaining duration" and
    "not up to date or complete." The Corps again reminded Highland that lack of an
    approved schedule might adversely affect the ability of the CO to approve progress
    payment requests. (R4, tab 360)
    35. The generators providing temporary power to the CSB ran out of fuel again
    on 17 December 2011 (R4, tab 185 vol. 2, Rpt. 869). In a letter dated 25 December
    2011, Highland cited maintenance problems, fuel delays, and cash flow issues as
    6   Progress Payment No. 37, covering 28-30 November 2011, due to "poor performance"
    (R4, tab 141 at l); Progress Payment No. 38, covering 1-15 December 2011, due
    to "lack of performance" (R4, tab 142 at l); Progress Payment No. 39, covering
    16-30 December 2011, due to "lack of progress" (R4, tab 143 at l); Progress
    Payment No. 40, covering 31 December 2011 through 1 January 2012, due to
    "lack of progress" (R4, tab 144 at 1); Progress Payment No. 41, covering
    2-31 January 2012, due to appellant's failure to submit an acceptable completion
    schedule, "lack of progress," and "failure to commit sufficient resources (R4,
    tab 145 at 1, tab 374); Progress Payment No. 42, covering 1-15 February 2012,
    due to "lack of progress" (R4, tab 146 at l); and Progress Payment No. 43,
    covering 16-29 February 2012, due to appellant's failure to submit an acceptable
    completion schedule, "lack of progress," and "failure to commit sufficient
    resources" (R4, tab 147 at 1, tab 3 81 ).
    17
    causes for the temporary power supply disruptions. The Corps responded by letter
    dated 28 December 2011 reminding Highland that such matters were Highland's
    responsibility, not the Corps'. (R4, tab 368)
    36. The Corps' QARs for 22 January 2012 noted that Highland's latest
    progress payment request asked for 50-80% of payment on items the work on which
    had either not yet begun or had just started. The Corps' QAR for 2 February 2012
    noted that Highland had renamed several of the pay activities in its latest progress
    payment request and included some pay activities the requirements for which were not
    part of the contract (e.g., hescoes; wash rack fence). The Corps' QARs for 2-4 March
    2012 reported that "workers for AZAD[,] a subcontractor for [Highland,] have not
    been paid in over three months." (R4, tab 185 vol. 2, Rpts. 905, 916, 944-47 at 2)
    37. Highland's Prompt Payment Certification and Supporting Data for
    Contractor Payment Invoice (Progress Payment Request) No. 44, dated 15 March
    2012, sought $238,690.88 (R4, tab 182 at 1, 31). Highland represented that the
    following subcontractor payment amounts, totaling $569,350, were listed in Progress
    Payment Request No. 44: Akbar Mirzad Group, $20,000; AZAMEL, $25,000; Baktiar
    Company, $20,000; Ehsan Company, $20,000; HKCC Company, $35,000;
    JanosFarkas Eng. Supt., $7,000; Kar Neeroo Electrical Co. Ltd. 7 , $50,000; Leading
    Co., $44,350; Malik Express LLC, $25,000; Mumtaz Iqbal Logistic & Supply Co.
    LTD, $20,000; Omran Consulting, Construction & Engineering, $21,000; Platenuim
    Co. (PECC), $25,000; SIGC, $247,000; and ZABUL, $10,000. Highland further
    certified that, as of 15 March 2012, it had never retained any subcontractor earnings.
    (Id. at 1-3) Highland did not invoice for the costs of fuel or maintenance for the
    temporary power generators (id. at 4). The Corps received appellant's Progress
    Payment Request No. 44 on 25 March 2012 (R4, tab 148 at 1).
    38. The Corps did not retain any of Progress Payment No. 44. Instead, the
    Corps withheld Progress Payment No. 44 in its entirety "because of a lack of progress
    on site and failure to pay sub-contractors." (R4, tab 148 at 1) The Corps further
    explained its rationale for withholding all of Progress Payment No. 44 in Serial Letter
    No. C-0111, dated 25 March 2012. The Corps cited, as the basis for withholding,
    Highland's failure to submit an acceptable schedule; Highland's lack of progress and
    failure to commit sufficient resources; and appellant's failure to pay its subcontractors
    and to provide the Corps with evidence of payment. As authority for its decision to
    withhold the entire progress payment, the Corps referred to FAR 52.232-5(e) and
    "paragraph (2) of the Prompt Payment Certificate." (R4, tab 75)
    7
    Kar Neeroo Electrical Engineering (Kar Neeroo) was the subcontractor responsible for
    digging the trenches, installing the conduits, and pulling the cable for the site
    electrical distribution system (R4, tab 185, vol. 2 Rpt. 978; app. supp. R4, tab 5).
    18
    39. The Corps issued Highland a cure notice, dated 28 March 2012, for failing
    to complete several facilities by the 1March2012 construction-completion date. The
    first item identified by the Corps in its list of incomplete facilities was the power
    distribution system. (R4, tab 77 at 1) The Corps notified Highland that it considered
    Highland's failure to complete the facilities to be a condition endangering the timely
    completion of the contract and directed Highland to submit a revised construction
    schedule "that is reasonable and agreeable to the Government" within 10 days of
    appellant's receipt of the cure notice (id. at 2).
    40. By letter dated 28 March 2012, Highland responded to the Corps' Serial Letter
    No. C-0111 objecting to the Corps' decision to withhold all of Progress Payment No. 44 on
    the basis of FAR 52.232-5(e), which Highland argued only allows retainage of up to 10%
    of a progress payment, and "point[ed] out that [the Corps'] withholding of payment could
    add additional delays to the project...[ and] that there will undoubtedly be more complaints
    as withholding [the] payment will directly impact the subcontractors that are expecting
    payment from [the] proceeds" (R4, tab 76).
    41. ·At some point in early April 2012, Highland provided the CO with
    "Confirmation[ s] of Cash Receipt" signed by the representatives of several of its
    subcontractors and by Highland's Construction Manager, Mr. John Reardon, all of which
    were dated 1 April 2012 (R4, tab 78). The subcontractors whose representatives signed
    "Confirmation[s] of Cash Receipt" were the Azad Company, whose representative
    Mr. Nestor A. Bersula confirmed receipt of $75,000 for "labor against contract" (id. at l);
    Zabul Pashton, whose representative Mr. Bashir Ahmad confirmed receipt of $77 ,000 for
    "DEF AC contract work" (id. at 2); and "EKCC," or Ehsahullah Karimi Construction
    Company, whose representative Mr. Jay-ar G. Maglalang confirmed receipt of $50,000 for
    "Agreement between HLH/COE/EKCC" (id. at 3). Attached to EKCC's "Confirmation of
    Cash Receipt" were two spreadsheets purporting to be its employee-payroll for CSB work
    for January and February 2012 (id. at 4-7). Of these subcontractors, only Zabul Pashton,
    presumably listed as "ZABUL," was identified in Highland's Progress Payment Request
    No. 44 as being included in the payment estimate, and that was only $10,000; EKCC did
    not even appear among the subcontractors listed (R4, tab 182 at 1, 31 ).
    42. On 4 April 2012, a meeting was held between the Corps, Highland, and
    Highland's electrical duct-bank system subcontractor, Kar Neeroo, regarding
    non-payment issues. The subcontractor reported that it was owed approximately
    $680,000. (R4, tab 185 vol. 2, Rpt. 978)
    43. Highland responded to the Corps' 28 March 2012 cure notice by letter, dated
    7 April 2012, with a proposed revised schedule attached. Highland informed the Corps,
    however, that unspecified "delays and interruptions with progress payments could adversely
    affect the submitted time schedules." Highland also advised the Corps that it intended to
    "submit a comprehensive report within the next seven to ten days, detailing all pertinent
    19
    issues relating to the project with particular emphasis [on] subcontractor payments and
    progress on Permanent Power to the site." (R4, tab 80) Highland's proposed revised
    schedule stated that procurement of the transformers should have been completed by
    9 April 2011 (R4, tab 79 at 4); that excavation of trenches for the duct bank system, laying
    of conduits, construction of manholes/handholes, and backfilling and compaction had
    already been completed on 6 April 2012; that installation of "transformers 7" and
    "transformers 3" would be done by 21 May 2012; that execution of the work specified in
    Modification No. P00010 8 would begin on 22 May 2012 and be completed by 10 June
    2012; that the MV load distribution switchgear work added by Modification No. POOOl l
    had already been completed on 1April2012 (id. at 32); that cable pulling to the CSB would
    be complete on 16 May 2012 (id. at 33); and that all of the electrical distribution system
    work would be completed by 22 June 2012 (id. at 9). Although Highland's proposed
    revised schedule did not contemplate the energization of the site electrical distribution
    system until 3 July 2012, it inexplicably provided that temporary power would cease on
    21 May 2012 and that provision of diesel fuel for the generators would end on 2 9 April
    2012 (id. at 33). Highland's proposed revised schedule did not identify anything as being
    on the critical path, nor did it identify any delay to any part of the work - whether occurring
    before, during, or since November 2011 - or give any indication whatsoever as to the
    duration of such a delay or its effect upon the schedule (id.).
    44. Highland's Progress Payment Request No. 45, dated 31 March 2012,
    sought $76,829.81 (R4, tab 183 at 1, 31). Highland represented that subcontractor
    payment amounts, totaling $202,000, were listed in Progress Payment Request No. 45
    as follows: AZAD AFGHANISTAN Construction Company, $75,000; HKCC
    Company, $50,000; and ZABUL, $77,000 (id. at 1-3). Notably, except for HKCC and
    EKCC the subcontractors and amounts identified correspond to the Confirmations of
    Cash Receipt that appellant had previously provided to the Corps (see finding 41 ). As
    it did in its Progress Payment Request No. 44 (see finding 40), appellant certified that
    it had not, to date, retained any subcontractor earnings (R4, tab 183 at 1-3). Appellant
    did not invoice for the costs of fuel or maintenance for the temporary power generators
    (id. at 4). The Corps received Progress Payment Request No. 45 on 10 April 2012
    (R4, tab 149 at 1).
    45. As with Progress Payment No. 44, the Corps did not retain any of Progress
    Payment No. 45 but rather withheld the progress payment altogether. The Corps
    withheld all of Progress Payment No. 45 for "lack of payment to subcontractors, lack
    of approved schedule, and lack of progress." (R4, tab 149 at 1)
    8   It is unclear what work Highland was referring to in this portion of its schedule; as
    previously discussed, Modification No. POOOl l, not No. POOOlO, established
    additional work for the site electrical distribution system (see finding 25).
    However, the work added by Modification No. POOO 11 is identified elsewhere
    in appellant's schedule (R4, tab 79 at 32-33).
    20
    7. Termination and Appeal
    46. By Serial Letter No. H-0007, dated 14 April 2012, Highland notified the
    Corps that "as of April 20, 2012 [Highland] will no longer be fueling or paying the
    lease for the generators that were used to provide temporary power" to the site.
    Highland continued as follows:
    We feel this is most unfortunate but regrettably we cannot
    afford to fund your modification. If you would like this
    temporary service to continue please pay our invoices for
    this service.
    We do not feel that the delay in delivering the permanent
    power is something we could have controlled and we do
    not feel that there is any precedent for your refusal to pay
    for this modification until the issues of permanent power
    can be worked out. We need to know as soon as possible
    of your intentions for this service so we can coordinate the
    requirements for this MOD; if it is your desire for this
    service to continue uninterrupted.
    (R4, tab 81)
    47. In Serial Letter No. H-0004, dated 14 April 2012 - about a week after
    submitting its proposed revised schedule - Highland argueq that its ability to complete
    the work on time had been hampered by numerous "unforeseen and uncontrollable"
    causes of delay. Highland identified "Incident A" as "Delay in Power to the Site,"
    which consisted of"[a] NATO action at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border [that] caused
    Pakistan to close the border" that "delayed the delivery of key components to the
    underground electrical system" and "also allowed 3 of the transformers to be hijacked
    while the shipment sat idle for weeks at the border." Also, Highland asserted that the
    requirement for a 250A breaker in the MV load distribution switchgear required by
    Modification No. POOOl l was "not what is required," and "[w]hen we tried to get
    clarification we met resistance and an uncooperative attitude." Finally, there was the
    matter of the nonconforming transformers:
    [T]he transformers [that were delivered to] the site do not
    meet the specified ... configuration; we have researched
    the difference between what is there and what was
    specified and find that what we have delivered is superior
    to the specified type especially considering the remote
    location. We submitted a request for variance only to
    21
    have it flatly rejected; no explanation or comment.. ..
    This will add additional delay to the power as we will
    have to bring a factory[ -]trained technician to the site to
    make the changes.
    (R4, tab 82 at 1) (Emphasis added) Highland identified "Incident B" as "ANA Project
    Interference," which consisted of "disruption and delay [the ANA battalion] routinely
    brings to the project, locking up our managers, and harassing our employees whenever
    something in [the barracks or shower/toilet/ablution facilities] goes wrong," including
    "one encounter when a member of the ANA assaulted one of our employees."
    Additionally, Highland argued that the close proximity of the site to the ANA barracks
    precluded Highland from making up lost time by means of night work, and the ANA
    "[would] not allow any Pakistani workers on the CSB site." Highland's "Incident C,"
    "Poor Subcontractor Performance," ranged from its alleged inability to terminate even
    non-performing subcontractors due to the nature of the Afghan legal system, to
    outright fraud and bribery by subcontractors, to subcontractors with "hidden agendas"
    who had been overpaid yet still complained to the Corps about lack of payment. (Id. at
    2) Finally, "Incident D," which Highland identified as "Weather Delays," referred to
    the heavy rainfall during the second week of November 2011, but did not identify how
    many days were actually impacted by unusually severe weather, as required by the
    contract's Time Extensions clause (see finding 10) (id. at 2-3). Highland did not
    identify whether any critical path work was delayed by the alleged "incidents," nor did
    appellant indicate the duration of any such delays.
    48. The Corps responded with Serial Letter No. C-0116, dated 15 April 2012.
    The Corps asked Highland to "[p]lease clarify ... that as of April 20, 2012, [Highland]
    will refuse to supply the fuel and generators that supply temporary power for the ANA
    [CSB] project as required by modification P00013" by no later than noon, Afghanistan
    time, on 16 April 2012. (R4, tab 83)
    49. Highland responded to the Corps' letter on 16 April 2012 stating:
    We have informed the [Corps] that 100% withholding of
    all payments for CSB will have serious consequences to
    the project. In your letter C-0116 you state we are
    "refusing" to supply the fuel and generators for
    temporary power; we do not wish to enter into a battle of
    semantics but we are not refusing. We simply do not
    have the money to pay for this. The MOD POOO 13, if it is
    still active[,] requires that we be compensated for the
    supply of the generators and the fuel to run them. We
    have not received the compensation for ... supplying this
    service as our approved invoice has been denied.
    22
    Therefore[,] as you are refusing to pay for this service[,]
    we will no longer be able to supply it according to the
    terms of MOD P00013.
    (R4, tab 84)
    50. By Serial Letter No. C-0117, dated 18 April 2012, the Corps advised
    Highland that "[a] Government inspection of the CSB project site over the last several
    days has revealed that [Highland] is only averaging approximately 25 construction
    personnel working mainly on the 7 buildings near completion." The Corps noted that it
    had not observed any of Highland's workers on some of the larger buildings and stated
    that the "lack of work force makes it apparent that [Highland] has abandoned its
    worksite, or is preparing to do so." The Corps directed Highland, if it "disagree[ d] that
    [it had] no interest in continuing with the [work]," to "provide a corrective action plan to
    mitigate the issue oflack of progress." Finally, the Corps advised Highland that "it has
    been brought to the Government's attention that select [Highland] employees have not
    recently received their payrolls" and ordered Highland to "immediately show evidence of
    employee payments." (R4, tab 85)
    51. The parties held a progress meeting on 20 April 2012 (R4, tab 86). Whi'le the
    meeting minutes reflect that Mr. Reardon stated that Highland was "currently financially
    insolvent from his perspective" (id. at 1), Mr. Reardon subsequently contested that
    portion of the meeting minutes (R4, tab 800 at 5, tab 805; tr. 4/279). Mr. Reardon did
    not, however, dispute the following portion of the meeting minutes:
    a) Without financing, continued power via the
    generators and storage tanks leased from an outside
    supplier was no longer feasible beyond 22 APR 2012.
    b) Extra fuel was currently available for 2 days
    of power. No further provisions have been made by the
    contractor beyond that period. It is expected that the
    current fuel will run out on 22 APR 2012.
    c) Power outages were principally caused by
    mechanical failure. The personnel in charge of
    maintaining the generators have not been paid for two
    months. Without personnel to perform maintenance
    function[ s], a higher likelihood and occurrence of these
    events would occur.
    Mr. Reardon also informed the government that
    [Highland] headquarters had instructed him to pull the
    generators on 20 APR 2012. However, Mr. Reardon had
    23
    not done so due to the safety concerns of the personnel on
    site and those that occupy the man camp.
    (R4, tab 86 at 1) The meeting minutes reflect that when asked about appellant's plans
    to finish the project, Mr. Reardon stated:
    [H]e could not complete the project. He informed the
    Government that without financing from his company he
    could not complete the electrical wire for primary power
    distribution. He also stated that he and his personnel have
    not been paid for two months and that if their workers were
    not funded they intended to leave the site sometime around
    May 1st, 2012.
    ~ 6, tab 800 at 5, tab 805) According to the meeting minutes, the area
    (Id. at 2,
    engineer, Mr. Tony Oby, then informed Mr. Reardon that:
    [H]e was to contact his company and inform them that the
    Government considers [Highland] as having abandoned the
    job site. As such, the government will not disburse any
    funding on CSB ... until [a Highland] principal presents
    himself to [the Corps] to explain their company's plan for
    completion of the CSB ... project.
    Mr. Oby further informed Mr. Reardon that this principal should present himself by no
    later than Sunday, 22 April 2012. (R4, tab 86 at 3)
    52. Highland responded to the Corps' Serial Letter No. C-0117 and the minutes
    of the parties' 20 April 2012 meeting with its Serial Letter No. S-0010. Highland
    objected to the Corps' assertions that it had abandoned the site and to the Corps'
    direction to produce a principal by 22 April 2012, stating: "If it is your desire that a
    principal return to the site you should provide proper notification with a reasonable
    date." Highland accused the Corps of "using tactics that are not supported by the
    FAR' s [sic] and showing bad faith in negotiations and agreements made at the local
    level," and of "deliberately trying to destroy our business ... using an ends justifies the
    means mentality to accomplish this goal." Highland concluded its letter, however, by
    stating that "we are committed to completing our Kandahar projects." (R4, tab 87)
    53. Highland emailed its Serial Letter No. S-0010 on 21 April 2012 to the
    Corps at 10:07 local time. The Corps responded by email an hour later, directing
    appellant to "notify the Government as to exactly when the generators and fuel tanks
    will be removed." (R4, tab 88 at 4)
    24
    54. On 22 April 2012, Highland sent the Corps Serial Letter No. S-0110
    summarizing a "LIFE SUPPORT TAKE OVER PLAN" discussed during a meeting
    between appellant and the Corps that occurred on 21 April 2012. The letter, signed by
    Mr. Reardon, cautioned the Corps that:
    I am ordered by the HLH headquarters to remove the rental
    generators (4) ... as of Sunday the twenty second of April or
    before.
    Any and all disruptions in [the three major life support
    systems: power, water, and waste removal] elicit[] an
    immediate response from the ANA where they are very
    angry and demand resolution forthwith.
    (R4, tab 803 at 1)
    55. By email on 22 April 2012, at 8:18 local time, Highland's Engineer Mujtaba
    informed the Corps that Highland had "decided to displace the generators and fuel tank
    today," and that he would give the Corps an update when they were displaced (R4, tab 88
    at 3-4 ). Within five minutes, the Corps responded by email to remind Highland that,
    "[a]s discussed with John Reardon yesterday, [Highland] shall not remove the fuel tanks,
    they are Government property." The Corps reiterated its concerns regarding the fuel
    tanks with another email ten minutes later: "[Y]ou are not to touch the fuel tanks as they
    are government property. You are to notify immediately once your guys set foot on
    ground to disrupt the power generation at the CSB." (Id. at 3)
    56. At 9:01 local time on 22 April 2012, appellant sent the Corps an email
    stating: "To let you know with the disrupt of power for CSB; our guys are standby to
    disconnect the power now so [w ]e are waiting for your kind response in this regard."
    The Corps responded by email at 9:06 local time, notifying Highland that "it is your
    contractual obligation to keep power running to the barracks and occupied facilities at
    the CSB" and asking "how are you planning to rectify the situation?" (R4, tab 88 at 2)
    Highland did not respond to the Corps' 9:06 email, and at 10:22 the Corps sent appellant
    an email that stated in pertinent part:
    I have been notified that the fuel for the temporary
    generation has run out at the CSB construction site. I
    reiterate that it is your contractual obligation to provide
    temporary power to the project site until you are able to
    complete the remaining construction. Please respond to
    25
    this email ASAP with your corrective action to restore
    temporary power.
    If I don't receive a response from you within the next
    hour, I will take your non-response as concurrence that
    you do not have a corrective action. I await your response
    by 11:21 AM.
    (Id. at 1-2) At 11:23, the Corps sent appellant the following email:
    John, Willie, Bill & Sabah, as of 11 :21 AM we have
    received no response from you providing a corrective course
    of action, with respect to continuing to provide temporary
    power to the CSB project. With that being said, it is this
    office's position that you have breached your contract.
    (Id. at 1) Highland responded to the Corps' 11 :23 email at 1:41, stating: "As far we are
    in progress [Highland] HQ has already sent the attached serial letters regarding this
    issue." Attached to Highland's 1:41 email were Highland's Serial Letter No. H-0004
    (see finding 50); appellant's Serial Letter No. H-0008 (see finding 52); a document titled
    "CS45 (Revise Schedule)"9 ; and appellant's Serial Letter No. H-0007 (see finding 49).
    (R4, tab 88 at 1)
    57. At 2:24 local time on 22 April 2012, the Corps issued the following
    direction to another contractor, ITT Exelis Mission Systems (ITT), to take over the
    task of providing temporary power to the CSB:
    Please proceed with the hookup, testing, startup, etc. of the
    new system. The Commander wants to emphasize safety
    and if ITT feels threatened or is threatened, please
    withdraw immediately and let us know.
    (R4, tab 90 at 1-2) At 3:02, ITT informed the Corps by email that:
    We went to hook up the power to the CSB just now and
    found that [Highland] had turned their generator back on
    and was supplying power.
    We directed our people to stop and wait for additional
    guidance.
    9
    It is not apparent from the record whether this is the same proposed revised schedule
    that was attached to appellant's Serial Letter No. H-0005 (see finding 46).
    26
    At 3: 15, ITT sent the Corps another email: "[Highland] just switched the power back
    off. We're working with the [Corps] to resolve this issue." (Id. at 1)
    58. The Corps' Quality Assurance Report for 22 April 2012 states: "It is unclear
    who shut the electrical power off for the barracks and latrine. [Highland] claims that they
    didn't [and] that the O&M contractor did so" (R4, tab 185, vol. 2, Rpt. 996).
    59. At 10:38 on 23 April 2012, Highland's Safety Manager, Willie Fouche,
    sent the Corps the following email:
    I like to inform you that we run out of diesel for the
    generator at the ANA barracks.
    We have a small amount of diesel in our generator to
    supply water for the ANA.
    We don't have any person that will supply us with diesel
    without any money to pay for it.
    (R4, tab 91)
    60. On 23 April 2012, the Corps issued Serial Letter No. C-0119 terminating the
    contract for default. The justification given by the CO for the default termination was
    appellant's failure "to provide temporary power ... according to the agreement signed by
    both parties on November 10, 2011," bilateral Modification No. P00013 (R4, tab 2 at 6;
    see finding 27). The CO offered the following explanation in the termination decision:
    [Highland] first informed the Government on
    April 14, 2012, via serial letter H-0007, that as of April 20,
    2012 [Highland] would no longer fuel or pay the lease for
    the generators that were being used to provide temporary
    power to CSB site. In serial letter H-0007 [Highland]
    claimed that ifthe Government continued to refuse payment
    on [Highland's] pay requests numbered 44 and 45 temporary
    power service would be interrupted. Further, when the
    Government, on April 15, 2012 requested adequate
    assurances that [Highland] would continue to provide
    temporary power [Highland] again reiterated that unless the
    Government compensated [Highland,] service would not be
    supplied according to the terms of modification POOO 13.
    [Highland's] assertion that the Government's failure to
    approve pay requests numbered 44 and 45 would lead to a
    27
    disruption in temporary power is uncontainable [sic].
    According to our records [Highland] has been paid for
    [CLIN] 0017 in the amount of$1,782,790.76 out of the
    $1,916,895.14. No further disbursements have been made
    due to the overpayment on this project. [Highland] has
    completed 86.5% of project; however, [Highland] has been
    paid 89% of the contract value. There is currently 2.5%
    ($903,553.79) of uncompleted work that has been paid, this
    is considered overpayment.
    [Highland] has given the Government many excuses
    as to why the permanent power was not in place as of
    March 1, 2012. Irrespective of any excuse [Highland] had
    a contractual obligation to provide temporary power and
    [Highland] stopped providing temporary power ....
    [Highland's] failure to provide temporary power to the
    CSB site is a breach of [Highland's] contractual duties ....
    (R4, tab 2 at 6)
    61. On 29 April 2012, HLH responded by letter to the termination notice taking
    exception to the notice (R4, tab 92).
    62. On 19 July 2012, appellant timely appealed to this Board from the default
    termination.
    DECISION
    A termination for default is a "drastic sanction ... which should be imposed (or
    sustained) only for good grounds and on solid evidence." JD. Hedin Constr. Co. v.
    United States, 
    408 F.2d 424
    , 431 (Ct. Cl. 1969); see also MIC/CCS, JV, 
    ASBCA No. 58242
    , 14-1 BCA, 35,612 at 174,434. The government bears the initial burden of
    proving the propriety of the default termination. Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
    
    828 F.2d 759
    , 765 (Fed. Cir. 1987); New Era Contract Sales, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 56661
    et al., 11-1BCA,34,738 at 171,022. If the government carries its burden, the burden
    then shifts onto appellant to show that the default was excusable, ADT Constr. Grp., Inc.
    by Timothy S. Cory, Ch. 7 Tr., 
    ASBCA No. 55358
    , 13 BCA, 35,307 at 173,312, either
    because the government materially breached the contract thereby discharging appellant's
    duty to perform, McDonald Welding & Mach. Co., 
    ASBCA No. 36284
    , 94-3 BCA
    , 27,181 at 135,442; the failure was beyond appellant's control and without its fault or
    negligence or that of its subcontractors or suppliers; or the CO's default decision was
    arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, Shubhada Indus., Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 54016
    , 08-1BCA,33,733 at 167,017.
    28
    The government argues that it was justified in exercising its right under
    common law to terminate the contract for default because appellant anticipatorily
    repudiated the contract by refusing to provide temporary power to the ANA barracks
    without additional compensation (gov't br. at 65-67) and by failing to respond
    adequately to the government's 28 March 2012 cure notice (id. at 59, 69-70), and
    because appellant actually repudiated the contract by interrupting the temporary power
    on 22 April 2015 (id. at 59, 68-69). The government argues alternatively that the
    default termination was proper because appellant's refusal to provide temporary power
    breached its duty to proceed under the Disputes clause (id. at 67) and because the CO
    reasonably believed that appellant failed to prosecute the work with the diligence
    necessary to ensure its completion by the date agreed upon (id. at 50-57, 61-62).
    Appellant contends that its refusal to provide temporary power to the ANA
    barracks was excused because the government improperly withheld two entire progress
    payments, thus materially breaching the contract and rendering appellant financially
    unable to buy fuel to run the temporary generators (app. br. at 43-50). Alternatively,
    appellant argues that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment of time totaling "at least
    5.5 months (from March 1, 2012 to August 28, 2012)" (id. at 50, 57), due to numerous
    "excusable delays," including severe flooding in November 2011; the Afghanistan
    government's expulsion of skilled Pakistani workers in the fall of 2011; the closure of the
    border between Afghanistan and Pakistan from November 2011 through July 2012,
    which resulted in a "freight embargo"; the hijacking of critical transformers along the
    Pakistani border in November 2011; security issues; and "substantial ongoing changes to
    the power, potable water and sanitary sewer systems, which were never resolved" (id. at
    51, 55-56, 64). Appellant also argues that, by waiting until 23 April 2012 to terminate
    the contract, the government waived its right to terminate the contract for delay (id. at
    58-59). Finally, appellant argues that the government's termination decision was
    improper because the CO failed to provide a cure notice prior to terminating the contract
    (id. at 63 ); failed to consider potential "excusable delays" (id. at 60-61 ); and failed to
    perform an analysis of the factors set forth at FAR 49.402-3 (id. at 62).
    A. Anticipatory Repudiation
    1. Appellant anticipatorily breached the contract by refusing to continue
    providing temporary power without additional compensation
    Paragraph (d) of the contract's Default clause states that the government's
    termination rights and remedies as set forth in paragraph (a) "are in addition to any other
    rights and remedies provided by law or under this contract" (finding 11). Paragraph (d) of
    the Default clause thus reserves the government's common law rights, All-State Constr.,
    Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 50586
    , 06-2 BCA ii 33,344 at 165,341-42, including its summary right to
    terminate a contract for default following a contractor's anticipatory repudiation of its
    29
    contractual obligations, G&G W Painting, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 50492
    , 01-2 BCA ii 31,492 at
    155,484 (citing DWS, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 33245
    , 87-3 BCA ii 19,960); cf Scott Aviation,
    
    ASBCA No. 40776
    , 91-3 BCA ii 24,123 at 120,726 ("The Government, however, retains its
    common law right to terminate the contract. .. when the contractor has anticipatorily
    repudiated the contract.").
    In order to demonstrate an anticipatory repudiation, the government must show
    appellant "communicated an intent not to perform in a positive, definite, unconditional
    and unequivocal manner, either by ( 1) a definite and unequivocal statement by the
    contractor that it refuses to perform or (2) actions which constitute actual abandonment
    of performance. Production Services & Technology, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 53353
    , 02-2
    BCA ii 32,026 at 158,293 (quoting Jones Oil Co., 
    ASBCA No. 42651
     et al., 98-1 BCA
    ii 29,691at147,150).
    The record clearly shows that appellant positively, definitely, unconditionally,
    and unequivocally refused to continue providing temporary power without additional
    fuel payments by the government. Here, appellant by its 14 April 2012 letter and
    communications and actions through 23 April 2012 positively, definitely,
    unconditionally, and unequivocally refused to provide power as required by
    Modification No. POOO 13 unless it received additional payment for doing so
    (findings 46, 49, 51, 54-55, 59). Appellant's attempt to suggest in its 16 April 2012
    letter that it is somehow not refusing to provide temporary power, while demanding
    additional payment for it (finding 49), does not change the character of its earlier
    letter. A party's refusal to perform its contractual obligations in the future without a
    change to the contract has been held to constitute anticipatory repudiation. Free &
    Ben, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 56129
    , 11-1BCAii34,719 at 170,954 (refusing to perform
    without a change to the contract is anticipatory repudiation); Howell Tool and
    Fabricating, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 47939
    , 96-1BCAii28,225 at 140,941 (anticipatory
    repudiation where contractor manifested a positive and unequivocal intention not to
    render performance until it received a contract price increase). We conclude that
    appellant's correspondence of 14-23 April 2012 was an anticipatory breach of
    appellant's obligation to provide power. Appellant did not refuse to perform the
    contract altogether, however, so whether appellant's refusal to provide power was an
    anticipatory repudiation depends on whether the obligation to provide power was a
    material requirement of the contract.
    2. Appellant's anticipatory breach was material and thus it was a repudiation
    A breach is material if it relates to a matter of vital importance or goes to the
    essence of the contract. Tzell Airtrak Travel Grp. Corp., 
    ASBCA No. 57313
    ,
    11-2 BCA ii 34,845 at 171,410 (citing Thomas v. HUD, 
    124 F.3d 1439
    , 1442 (Fed. Cir.
    1997)). "The standard of materiality for the purposes of deciding whether a contract
    has been breached 'is necessarily imprecise and flexible."' Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v.
    30
    United States, 
    973 F.2d 1548
    , 1550-51 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting RESTATEMENT
    (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 241 cmt. a). In determining the materiality of a breach,
    we may consider some or all of the "significant" circumstances from THE
    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241:
    (a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of
    the benefit which he reasonably expected;
    (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
    compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be
    deprived;
    (c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to
    offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
    ( d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to
    offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all
    the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
    (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to
    perform or to offer to perform comports with the standards
    of good faith and fair dealing.
    Consumers Oil Co., 
    ASBCA No. 24172
    , 86-1BCA~18,647 at 93,713-14. "[I]t is not to
    be expected that, in every case, each of the five[§ 241] circumstances will be pertinent.. ..
    It is to be expected, however, that circumstance (a) ('the extent to which the injured party
    will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected') will always be a pertinent
    consideration." Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 
    367 F.3d 1297
    , 1312 (Fed. Cir.
    2004); see also Consumers Oil, 86-1 BCA ~ 18,647 at 93,713-14 (it is "important" to
    consider the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit of the
    exchange). Ultimately, whether a breach is a material breach depends on the nature and
    effect of the violation in light of how the particular contract was viewed, bargained for,
    entered into, and performed by the parties. Stone Forest, 973 F .2d at 15 51.
    The record before us indicates that the obligation to provide power was material.
    We first begin with an examination of the plain language of the contract, construing the
    contract so as to effectuate its spirit and purpose and giving reasonable meaning to all of
    its parts. ECCI-C Metag, JV, 
    ASBCA No. 59031
    , 15-1BCA~36,145 at 176,420. From
    the outset, the contract identified the site electrical distribution system as a priority
    life-support system and required appellant to provide temporary power to the soldiers'
    facilities on the CSB until they were connected to a permanent power source (Finding 13 ).
    The parties reaffirmed the essentiality of this requirement with their bilateral Modification
    No. P00013 which, while allocating the risk of providing temporary power to the
    31
    government up to a specified date and thereafter to appellant, established beyond cavil that
    temporary power would be provided to the CSB until permanent power was connected
    (see finding 27). That the parties agreed not to turn over any more buildings to the
    government until the CSB power system was connected to the Camp Hero power plant
    (see finding 26) underscores the importance of providing temporary power to the soldiers'
    facilities: while the parties had some latitude to determine when power could be provided
    to non-life-essential facilities, they had no such latitude with respect to essential
    life-support systems such as power, water, and waste removal. A failure to any of those
    systems would render the CSB quarters, barracks, and shower/toilet/ablution facilities
    unusable to the ANA soldiers and thereby wholly deprive the government of its
    expectations under the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)§ 241(a). Moreover, the
    parties were aware that the ANA soldiers had, on repeated occasions, reacted to
    short-duration power interruptions, and both the government and appellant had good cause
    to believe that a longer power interruption might result in rioting and mayhem (see
    findings 33, 54). In short, the government could not be adequately compensated for the
    harm could result from a failure to provide power. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
    CONTRACTS § 241 (b ). Providing temporary power to the CSB was a material requirement
    of the contract; appellant's refusal to do so was therefore an anticipatory repudiation. 10
    3. The requirement to provide power was non-severable
    Whether the repudiation of one contract requirement justifies termination of the
    entire contract depends on whether that requirement is severable from the rest of the
    contract work. When a contract requirement is severable or divisible and a contractor is
    delinquent in only that one aspect of the contract work, it is improper for the CO to
    terminate for default the entire contract. Overhead Elec. Co., 
    ASBCA No. 25656
    , 85-2
    BCA ii 18,026 at 90,470-71, aff'd, 
    795 F.2d 1019
     (Fed. Cir. 1986) (table). In Stone
    Forest, 
    973 F.2d at
    1552 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 237, 240),
    the court stated:
    If only a severable portion of a contract was breached, the
    non-breaching party can recover damages for that portion
    of the contract but its remaining contractual duties are not
    discharged. However, if a contract is not clearly divisible,
    in accordance with the intention of the parties, the
    breaching party cannot require the non-breaching party to
    continue to perform what is left of the contract."
    10   Although the government argued anticipatory repudiation (gov't br. at 65-69),
    appellant did not address anticipatory repudiation in either its post-hearing brief
    or surreply brief. Appellant does not contend that the temporary power
    requirement is severable from the remainder of the contract.
    32
    Determining whether portions of the work under a single contract are divisible from the
    balance of the contract is not an easy question, as there is no bright line rule for
    determining contract severability. Aptus Co. v. United States, 
    62 Fed. Cl. 808
    , 812 (2004)
    (citing JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT
    CONTRACTS 963 (3d ed. 1995)). Contracts may be considered severable or divisible where
    corresponding parts of the performances promised by each party may be regarded as agreed
    equivalents. Consumers Oil, 86-1BCA,18,647 at 93,709. This principle, which is meant
    to mitigate the risk of unjust forfeiture, is expressed in section 240 of the RESTATEMENT
    (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, as follows:
    If the performances to be exchanged under an exchange of
    promises can be apportioned into corresponding pairs of
    part performances so that the parts of each pair are
    properly regarded as agreed equivalents, a party's
    performance of his part of such a pair has the same effect
    on the other's duties to render performance of the agreed
    equivalent as it would have if only that pair of
    performances had been promised.
    Several factors guide the analysis of severability, such as whether the requirements
    are capable of being performed separately and whether the conduct of the parties suggests
    that they are "separate in character." Bulova Techs. Ordnance Sys. LLC, 
    ASBCA No. 57406
    , 14-1 BCA, 35,521 at 174,098-99. In determining the severability of contract
    requirements, we look to "the intent of the parties, as gleaned from the four comers of the
    instrument," Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Corp. v. United States, 
    108 Ct. Cl. 236
    , 250
    (1947), "the nature of the work required by the contract, and the contract's overarching
    purpose," Aptus, 62 Fed. Cl. at 812. See, e.g., Bulova, 14-1BCA,35,521 at 174,099;
    Plum Run, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 46091, 49203, 05-2 BCA, 32,977 at 163,365-66
    (considering interrelatedness of construction subCLINs ); Overhead Elec., 85-2 BCA
    , 18,026 at 90,471-72 (considering line-item pricing structure in a lump sum construction
    contract); R.E. Lee Elec. Co., ASBCA Nos. 6195, 6447, 61-1BCA,3002 at 15,606
    (considering parties' communications during performance, as well as the structure of the
    reprocurement contract).
    The record indicates that the requirement to provide power was not severable from
    the rest of the work under the contract. Again, we begin our analysis with the contract.
    As discussed, the contract terms of the site electrical distribution system and of bilateral
    Modification No. POOO 13 clearly established the requirement to provide temporary power
    to the CSB until permanent power was connected (findings 13, 27). The original site
    electrical distribution system requirement wholly and inseparably included this
    requirement to provide temporary power (see finding 13). Although Change Order
    No. A00003 (finding 19) and the subsequent Modification No. P00013 (finding 27)
    established a complicated series of subCLINs to cover the costs of leasing generators,
    33
    paying for fuel and maintenance, and moving or demobilizing generators, those CLIN
    structures did not create a separate, agreed-equivalent pair of obligations capable of
    standing alone apart from appellant's requirement to connect the site electrical
    distribution system to the power plant. By the very terms of Modification No. P00013,
    the subCLINs related to leasing, maintaining, and fueling the generators expired on
    1March2012 regardless of whether temporary power was still required. The
    overarching obligation to provide temporary power to the CSB could be discharged only
    by the connection of the site electrical distribution system to the Camp Hero power plant
    (finding 27). Thus, the requirement to provide temporary power is inextricable from the
    requirement to complete the site electrical distribution system. Accordingly, we hold that
    the requirement to provide temporary power is not severable from the requirement to
    connect the site electrical distribution system to the Camp Hero power plant. Cf Aptus,
    62 Fed. Cl. at 813 (contract not severable given the "interdependent nature of the several
    tasks, and the unified purpose to which they are a part"); Overhead Elec., 85-2 BCA
    ~ 18,026. Nor is the site electrical distribution system requirement severable from the
    rest of the contract. During their global settlement negotiations, and prior to executing
    Modification No. P00013, the parties agreed that the government would not accept any
    more buildings until the CSB power system was connected to the Camp Hero power plant
    (see finding 26). Based on this record, the conduct of the parties and the contract terms,
    the site electrical distribution system was critical and therefore was not severable.
    Appellant positively, definitely, unequivocally, and unconditionally refused to
    provide power unless it was paid more, above and beyond the amount agreed upon by
    the parties in Modification No. P00013, and this refusal amounted to a material breach
    of a non-severable contract requirement. We conclude that appellant anticipatorily
    repudiated the contract and the government was therefore justified in summarily
    terminating the contract for default. 11
    4. Appellant's anticipatory repudiation was inexcusable
    The government having carried the burden of proving the propriety of the default
    termination, appellant must now show that its default was excusable. See ADT, 13 BCA
    ~ 35,307 at 173,315. As discussed above, to do so appellant must demonstrate either that
    there exists some excusable cause for its default beyond its control and without its fault
    or negligence or that, as a result of a prior material breach by the government, appellant
    had a legal right of avoidance, thereby discharging its duty to perform and relieving it of
    the default termination. See, e.g., McDonald, 94-3 BCA ~ 27,181 at 135,442; Thomas S.
    11   Because we find that the government was justified in terminating the contract for
    default because appellant anticipatorily repudiated the contract, we need not
    and do not consider the government's alternative arguments. Cf Cox & Palmer
    Constr. Corp., ASBCA Nos. 38739, 38746, 92-1BCA~24,756 at 123,528.
    34
    Rhoades, ENG BCA No. 6025 et al., 97-1BCA~28,672. We consider each of
    appellant's arguments in tum.
    a. The government did not materially breach by withholding progress
    payments
    Appellant argues that the government's failure to make progress payments was a
    material breach that excused appellant's further performance (app. br. at 44-50). As
    appellant states, a prior material breach by the government would discharge appellant's
    duty to perform and relieve appellant of the default termination and its consequences.
    See Malone v. United States, 
    849 F.2d 1441
    , 1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also
    Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 
    360 F.3d 1319
    , 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A later
    breach 'is justified ... by the other party's [prior] failure."') (quoting RESTATEMENT
    (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 237 cmt. b (1981)); Stone Forest, 
    973 F.2d at 1550
     ("Upon
    material breach of a contract the non-breaching party has the right to discontinue
    performance of the contract, and to seek redress in accordance with law."). The
    government's failure to make progress payments when they are due is a classic example
    of such a prior breach. See, e.g., Frank Pigeon v. United States, 
    27 Ct. Cl. 167
    , 175-76
    (1892) (government's wrongful withholding of 100% of two consecutive progress
    payments as an indemnity against the chance of possible failure on the part of the
    contractor was a material breach); DWS, 87-3 BCA ~ 19,960 at 101,050 ("if the
    Government unjustifiably fails to pay amounts indisputably due and owing under the
    contract, the contractor may declare the Government to be in breach of contract and stop
    its performance."). Additionally, if appellant establishes that the CO breached the
    contract by wrongfully withholding progress payments, appellant must then demonstrate
    that the government's breach is material. TRS Research, 
    ASBCA No. 51712
    , 01-1 BCA
    ~ 31,149; Consumers Oil, 86-1BCA~18,647 at 93,713-14.
    In order to show that the government breached the contract by wrongfully
    withholding progress payments, appellant must first show that the progress payments
    were, in fact, due. See, e.g., ADT, 13 BCA ~ 35,307 at 173,316-17; Versar, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 56857
     et al., 12-1 BCA ~ 35,025 at 172, 126. There is no absolute right to progress
    payments. Davis Group, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 48431
    , 95-2 BCA ~ 27,702 at 138,092.
    Progress payments are authorized by statute, 
    10 U.S.C. § 2307
    , which requires that "any
    payment for work in progress (including materials, labor, and other items) under a
    defense contract that provides for such payments is commensurate with the work
    accomplished that meets standards established under the contract." 
    10 U.S.C. § 2307
    (e)(l); see also Fortec Constructors, 
    ASBCA No. 27480
    , 83-2 BCA ~ 16,727 at
    83,186. The Payments clause for this contract (finding 7), therefore requires the
    contractor to substantiate and certify its requests for progress payments and payment
    under the clause "is subject to such things as contract compliance, substantiation of work
    done, and the CO's exercise of discretion in certain respects." Versar, 12-1 BCA
    ~ 35,025 at 172,126.
    35
    A CO's discretion in deciding whether or not to withhold a progress payment is
    very broad. US. Fid. & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 
    676 F.2d 622
    , 630-31 (Ct. Cl.
    1982). In addition to showing that it met all of the contractual conditions precedent to
    receiving a progress payment, appellant must also demonstrate that the CO abused his or
    her "considerable discretion" by withholding the payment. TGC Contracting Corp. v.
    United States, 
    736 F.2d 1512
    , 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (appellant's burden to show that
    progress payments were erroneously withheld); Carro & Carro Enterprises, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 59485
    , 15-1BCAii35,915 at 175,572-73 (appellant's burden to show government
    failed to pay amounts due under the Payments clause for fixed-price construction); ADT,
    13 BCA ii 35,307 at 173,316 (citing Technocratica, 
    ASBCA No. 44347
     et al., 94-1 BCA
    ~ 26,584 at 132,288). For example, the Schedules clause, FAR 52.236-15, gives the CO
    discretion to withhold approval of progress payments if the contractor fails to provide the
    CO with an acceptable work schedule within a specified time frame (finding 10). The
    Payments clause (finding 9), too, gives the CO considerable discretion in deciding
    whether payment is warranted given the amount of work completed and the quality of the
    work. ADT, 13 BCA ii 35,307 at 173,316 (withholding proper where contractor failed to
    adequately substantiate work performed); see also Morganti Nat'l., Inc. v. United States,
    
    49 Fed. Cl. 110
    , 142 (2001), aff'd, 
    36 F. App'x 452
     (Fed. Cir. 2002) (withholding proper
    under FAR 52.232-5(b) for deficiencies in work); ON! Constr., Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 45394
    et al., 96-2 BCA ~ 28,277 at 141,184 (withholding proper where contractor made no
    progress in the time frame leading up to the unpaid invoice). Furthermore, where matters
    affecting progress payments are in dispute, the CO is entitled to give the government the
    benefit of the doubt in exercising his or her discretion. Davis Grp., 95-2 BCA ii 27,702 at
    138,093 (citing Fortec, 83-2 BCA ii 16,727).
    Appellant has not established that it was actually due the payments which the
    government withheld. At the time the government decided to withhold Progress Payment
    Nos. 44 and 45, there was no approved schedule (findings 32, 34, 39, 45). Under such
    circumstances, the Schedules clause permits a CO to withhold a progress payment
    (finding 8). Although not required by the Payments clause, the government notified
    appellant on multiple occasions that its failure to provide the CO with an up-to-date and
    complete schedule could have an adverse effect on its receiving progress payments
    (findings 32, 34).
    Additionally, the many and varied instances, over an extended period of time, in
    which subcontractors brought issues of non-payment to the government's attention
    provided ample justification to withhold progress payments until the issues were
    investigated and the matters resolved to the CO's satisfaction (see findings 20-22, 36, 42).
    We have previously upheld the CO's discretion to withhold progress payments when,
    despite a contractor's certification that payments to subcontractors had been made from
    previous progress payments, the CO received complaints of nonpayment from one, then
    several, sub~ontractors and suppliers. See Dan F. Harrison Constr., Inc., ASBCA
    36
    No. 41572, 91-2 BCA ii 23,949 at 119,926 ("In light of [the contractor's certification
    regarding payments to subcontractors], it was reasonable for the [CO] to bring to
    appellant's attention and to investigate the subcontractor's nonpayment complaint prior to
    further processing of [the progress payment]."). We hold this to be such a case.
    The government was justified in withholding progress payments after appellant
    repeatedly and consistently failed to provide a practicable schedule conforming to the
    requirements of the Schedules clause. Additionally, the government was justified in
    withholding progress payments in order to investigate the subcontractors' numerous
    and extended complaints of non-payment despite appellant's certifications to the
    contrary. We conclude that withholding Progress Payment Nos. 44 and 45 was a
    reasonable exercise of discretion, and thus the government did not breach by doing so.
    b. Appellant's anticipatory repudiation was not otherwise excusable
    Appellant contends that in the time between the parties' global settlement
    modifications (see findings 23-27) and the default termination (see finding 60), numerous
    events occurred that constituted "excusable delays" under the Default clause and the
    Other Changes in Contract Performance clause (app. hr. at 50-57). 12 This, appellant
    argues, entitles appellant to 5.5 months excusable delay, which would extend the
    completion date for establishing permanent power from 1 March 2012 to 28 August 2012
    and excuse the default (app. hr. at 50-51, 55,).
    Assuming, arguendo, that appellant proves entitlement to excusable delay, it
    would only entitle appellant to an extension of time; it would not excuse appellant's
    anticipatory repudiation. The government did not default appellant for failing to provide
    permanent power by 1 March, it invoked its common law remedy under the Default
    clause for anticipatorily repudiating its obligation under Modification No. P00013 to
    provide temporary power until a permanent power system was functioning (see finding
    60). This repudiation was a material breach of the contract. Accordingly, in order to
    prove that its anticipatory repudiation was excused by one or more "excusable delays,"
    appellant must show that such "excusable delays" entirely discharged its remaining
    duties. B.F. Goodrich Co., 
    ASBCA No. 19960
    , 76-2 BCA ii 12,105 at 58,157-58;
    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 261 cmt. e ("[I]fthe performance remains
    practicable and it is merely beyond the party's capacity to render it, he is ordinarily not
    discharged."). This requires appellant not only to prove the "excusable delay," but also
    to prove that it constituted the non-occurrence of a basic assumption of the contract and
    rendered performance impracticable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261; cf
    A-Greater New Jersey Movers, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 54745
    , 06-1 BCA ii 33,179 at 164,433;
    Howell Tool, 96-1BCAii28,225 at 140,941 (appellant's anticipatory
    12
    Appellant refers to the Other Changes in Contract Performance clause (finding 3) as
    the "Combat" clause.
    37
    repudiation was not excusable "within the meaning of the Default clause" where
    appellant failed to prove financial inability to perform).
    Appellant has not alleged, much less proven, that any of its asserted "excusable
    delays" constituted supervening circumstances that rendered performance
    impracticable and thus could have discharged its duty to provide power. Appellant
    argues that the cable for the site electrical distribution system was "not available," and
    that "[i]t was not possible to fly in the cable because the cost would have been in the
    millions of dollars" (app. br. at 25). However, appellant does not provide even rough
    calculations to support its conclusory "millions of dollars" assertion or explain why
    such an amount would render performance impracticable, nor does appellant address
    why it would have been impracticable, to bring the cable overland from any of the
    several other countries that share a border with Afghanistan. Argument is not proof.
    Shubhada, 08-1BCA~33,733 at 167,019; Harvex Trading Co., 
    ASBCA No. 38279
    et al., 92-3 BCA ~ 25,027 at 124,756.
    Neither has appellant demonstrated the extremity of its resultant financial
    difficulties or established a causal link between any of its asserted "excusable delays"
    and its alleged inability to buy fuel or pay for generator maintenance. Both in writing
    and during his testimony, Mr. Reardon stressed that appellant was not insolvent during
    the time leading up to appellant's repudiation, but only that appellant needed
    additional funding from the government (finding 51). Appellant has not identified any
    evidence that appellant's financial situation during the time leading up to the default
    termination was dire, much less that it was dire as the result of any of its asserted
    "excusable delays." We are not required to scour the voluminous record, numbering
    as it does in the tens of thousands of pages, to discern if any proof might exist. Webb
    Elec. Co. ofFla., Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 54293
    , 07-2 BCA ~ 33,717 at 166,947. "It is
    well-established that the contractor assumes the risk of providing resources sufficient
    to perform a contract. Undercapitalization will not excuse a failure to perform."
    Rhoades, 97-1BCA~28,672 at 143,232 (citing Willems Indus., Inc. v. United States,
    
    295 F.2d 822
     (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 
    370 U.S. 903
     (1962)); see also Cosmic
    Constr. Co., ASBCA Nos. 24014, 24036, 88-2 BCA ~ 20,623. When it signed
    Modification No. P00013, appellant agreed to assume the costs of fueling and
    maintaining the generators that provided temporary power to the ANA barracks until
    such time as it connected the CSB power system to the Camp Hero power plant if it
    had not yet done so by 1 March 2012 (finding 27). Appellant failed to connect the
    CSB power system to the power plant, and on 1March2012 the government stopped
    paying for fuel to run the generators. From that point on, it was solely appellant's
    obligation to fuel and maintain the generators until the CSB was connected to the
    power plant. By agreeing to Modification No. P00013, appellant assumed the risk of
    paying for generator fuel and maintenance after 1March2012.
    38
    Likewise, appellant cannot attribute its financial difficulties to any fault on the
    part of the government. The government's failure or delay to make payments can
    constitute a defense to a default termination only if they rendered the contractor
    financially incapable of continuing performance; are the primary or controlling cause
    of appellant's default; or are a material, rather than insubstantial or immaterial, breach
    of the contract. Jones Oil, 98-1 BCA ~ 29 ,691 at 147,151; Consumers Oil, 86-1 BCA
    ~ 16,647 at 93,710. We have already held the government's withholding of progress
    payments was justified and thus did not constitute a breach, and appellant has not
    demonstrated that it was financially incapable of performing the contract. While the
    government's withholding of the two progress payments might have exacerbated
    appellant's financial difficulties, appellant has not shown that it was the primary or
    controlling cause. Indeed, to the extent that appellant was having trouble paying its
    subcontractors and suppliers, it appears from the record that such difficulties may have
    begun as early as 1 February 2011 (finding 20), long before the government ever
    withheld a progress payment. Thus, appellant has given us no reason to depart from
    the normal rule that the contractor's financial difficulties are not a legitimate excuse
    for its default. See, e.g., Danzig v. AEC Corp., 
    224 F.3d 1333
    , 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
    TGC, 
    736 F.2d at 1515
     (withholding of progress payments is no excuse when the
    contractor's failure to perform was "the direct result of its lack of working capital, its
    negligence, and its own actions").
    Appellant has failed to carry its burden of proving that its repudiation was
    excused within the meaning of the Default clause. We conclude that none of the
    "excusable delays" alleged by appellant discharged its obligation to provide power,
    nor did they render appellant's obligation impracticable; accordingly, they cannot
    excuse appellant's anticipatory repudiation.
    B. The Government Did Not Waive Its Right to Terminate for Default
    Appellant also contends that, given the parties' 1 March 2012 performance
    deadline, the government waived its right to terminate for default by waiting until
    23 April 2012 to terminate the contract (app. br. at 58-59). Invoking the waiver doctrine
    from De Vito v. United States, 413 F .2d 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1969), appellant argues that the
    government did not exercise its right to terminate in a reasonable time and that appellant
    relied to its detriment upon the government's forbearance by continuing with the contract
    (app. br. at 58-59). We note that there are significant differences between construction
    contracts and other contracts when it comes to the doctrine of waiver in the context of the
    government's right to terminate a contract for default. See MIC/CCS, 14-1 BCA ~ 35,612
    at 174,435 (noting that "the De Vito 'waiver' doctrine (sometimes referred to as an
    estoppel issue) normally does not apply to construction contracts absent unusual
    circumstances."). Setting those differences aside, however, it is obvious that the De Vito
    waiver doctrine is inapplicable to these facts. Appellant anticipatorily repudiated the
    contract on 22 April 2012, and for that its contract was immediately terminated. It is
    39
    immaterial that the deadline for performance had passed over a month previously without
    either termination or the establishment of a new schedule. Appellant's anticipatory
    repudiation gave the CO an independent right to terminate the contract for default.
    B.F. Goodrich, 76-2 BCA ii 12,105 at 58,158; see also MIC/CCS, 14-1BCAii35,612 at
    174,435 ("even ifthe government has waived a contract completion date, it may still
    terminate a contract for default ifthe contractor ... materially breaches other contract
    obligations"). The De Vito waiver doctrine is inapposite where, as here, the government
    exercised its right to summarily terminate the contract pursuant to a contractor's
    anticipatory repudiation.
    Under certain circumstances, the government might nevertheless waive its right to
    terminate on the basis of a contractor's anticipatory repudiation; however, appellant has
    not shown that such circumstances exist in this case. 13 The government does not waive
    its right to terminate a contract for default following a contractor's repudiation simply by
    urging the contractor to continue performing. Cf Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing
    Southeast, Inc. v. United States, 
    530 U.S. 604
    , 621-22 (2000); see also Amber Resources
    Co. v. United States, 
    538 F.3d 1358
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Consumers Oil, 86-1 BCA
    ii 18,647 at 93,708 n.14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)§ 257 ("The injured party does not
    change the effect of a repudiation by urging the repudiator to perform in spite of his
    repudiation or to retract his repudiation."). During the short time between appellant's
    repudiation and the termination of the contract, the government merely urged appellant's
    continued performance. After appellant continued to refuse to provide power without
    receiving additional payment, the CO finally terminated the contract for default.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the government did not waive its right to terminate the
    contract for appellant's anticipatory repudiation.
    C. The Default Termination was Neither Procedurally Inadequate nor an Abuse
    of Discretion
    Turning now to appellant's final defense, we conclude that appellant has failed to
    show that the default termination was procedurally inadequate or an abuse of discretion.
    The Default clause (finding 7) requires neither a cure notice nor a show-cause letter prior to
    terminating a construction contract for default. ON!, 96-2 BCA ii 28,277 at 141,180. Even
    so, a pre-termination cure notice would have been unnecessary in this case given appellant's
    anticipatory repudiation. See, e.g., Polyurethane Prods. Corp., 
    ASBCA No. 42251
    , 96-1
    13
    Although it does not, strictly speaking, bear on the question of waiver, we note that
    appellant never retracted its repudiation. See Mobil Oil, 
    530 U.S. at 621
    ;
    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 256 ("The effect of a statement as
    constituting a repudiation .. .is nullified by a retraction of the statement if
    notification of the retraction comes to the attention of the injured party before
    he materially changes his position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates to
    the other party that he considers the repudiation to be final.").
    40
    BCA ii 28,154 at 140,545 (cure notice requirement "dispensed with" by contractor's
    anticipatory repudiation); Mission Valve & Pump, 69-2 BCA ii 8010 at 37,243 (CO is not
    required to go through "useless motions").
    Nonetheless, the Default clause does not mandate termination; it merely gives the
    CO the discretion to terminate for default. US. Coating Specialties & Supplies, LLC,
    
    ASBCA No. 58245
    , 15-1 BCA ii 35,957 at 175,708 (citing Radar Devices, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 43912
    , 99-1 BCA ii 30,223 at 149,528). Such discretion must be reasonably exercised,
    even after a contractor anticipatorily repudiates a contract. McDonald, 94-3 BCA ii 27,181
    at 135,450 (citing Darwin Constr. Co. v. United States, 
    811 F.2d 593
    , 596-97 (Fed. Cir.
    1987)); A-Greater, 06-1BCAii33,179 at 164,432-33. The factors set forth in FAR
    49.402-3(±) alert the CO to areas of concern to possibly consider; however, the CO's
    consideration of the FAR factors is merely one element to be considered in evaluating the
    totality of the circumstances involved in the situation. Michigan Joint Sealing, Inc.,
    
    ASBCA No. 41477
    , 93-3 BCA ii 26,011at129,323-24. While consideration ofthe FAR
    factors may aid in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion in the
    decision to terminate, the regulation does not confer any rights on the defaulting contractor,
    All-State Constr., 06-2 BCA ii 33,344 at 165,342, and failure to consider one or more of the
    factors would not require a default termination to be converted into a termination for
    convenience, DCX, Inc. v. Perry, 
    79 F.3d 132
    , 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996). "In determining
    whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we examine whether there was subjective
    bad faith; whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision; the degree of discretion
    reposed in the CO; and whether applicable regulations and laws have been observed.''
    Shubhada, 08-1 BCA ii 33,733 at 167,019 (citing F&L Packing Corp., 
    ASBCA No. 42362
    ,
    93-1 BCA ii 25,305 at 126,063). The burden of proof is appellant's. American Renovation
    & Constr. Co., ASBCA Nos. 53723, 54038, 09-2 BCA ii 34,199 at 169,061.
    Here, appellant challenges only the CO' s rationale for terminating the contract and
    the extent to which she complied procedurally with regulations. In particular, appellant
    challenges the CO's failure to consider potential "excusable delays" (app. br. at 60-61 ).
    However, the record clearly shows that the CO gave due consideration to appellant's
    alleged excusable delays and adequately documented her rationale in the termination
    decision: "[Highland] has given the Government many excuses as to why the permanent
    power was not in place as of March 1, 2012. Irrespective of any excuse [Highland] had a
    contractual obligation to provide temporary power and [Highland] stopped providing
    temporary power .... [Highland's] failure to provide temporary power to the CSB site is a
    breach of [Highland's] contractual duties." (Finding 60) In alleging its excuses,
    appellant did not show how any of them had impacted work on the critical path or even
    how long any of the alleged excuses lasted. Moreover, to excuse appellant's repudiation,
    appellant would need to have at least alleged the existence of some supervening event
    that discharged its performance obligations, and did not do so. We hold that the CO's
    analysis of appellant's alleged excuses was appropriately detailed given the level of
    specificity with which appellant alleged them. Cf A-Greater, 06-1 BCA ii 33,179 at
    41
    164,433; Jones Oil, 98-1BCAii29,691at147,150-51. Moreover, the record indicates
    that the parties had long recognized an "urgent need" to provide temporary power to the
    CSB (findings 19, 27, 33), and that based on recent past experience both the CO and
    appellant's own project manager feared that an extended interruption to the power would
    result in rioting and havoc among the Afghan soldiers living in the barracks (findings 51,
    54). The record shows that the "urgency of the need" for continued temporary power was
    at the forefront of the CO's consideration. See FAR 49.402-3(f). Given appellant's
    refusal to perform and the availability of other contractors who could provide temporary
    power, we have no basis to conclude that the CO acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
    determining that terminating the contract was in the government's best interest.
    Cf David R. Levin, Tr. in Bankr.for Rosedale Dairy Co., 
    ASBCA No. 5077
    , 59-1 BCA
    ii 2061 at 8, 705 (prompt termination "fully justifie[d]" by the urgent need for milk to be
    supplied on a daily basis). Appellant has thus failed to carry its burden of proving the CO
    abused her discretion. In light of appellant's anticipatory repudiation and the perceived
    threat of grievous harm to health and security posed thereby, we conclude that the CO
    followed procedural requirements and her decision to terminate the contract for default
    was not an abuse of discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    The government has shown that appellant anticipatorily repudiated its
    obligation to provide temporary power to the ANA barracks, justifying the termination
    of the contract for default. Appellant has failed to show that its repudiation was
    excused by a prior material breach by the government, that its contractual duties were
    discharged by supervening circumstances, that the government waived its right to
    terminate or that the default termination was either procedurally inadequate or an
    abuse of discretion. Therefore, the appeal is denied.
    Dated: 30 March 2016
    dministrative Judge
    Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals
    (Signatures continued)
    42
    I concur                                         I concur
    MARK N. STEMPLER
    Administrative Judge
    ~SHACKLEFORD
    Administrative Judge
    Acting Chairman                                  Vice Chairman
    Armed Services Board                             Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals                              of Contract Appeals
    I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the
    Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in 
    ASBCA No. 58243
    , Appeal of
    Highland Al Hujaz Co., Ltd., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter.
    Dated:
    JEFFREY D. GARDIN
    Recorder, Armed Services
    Board of Contract Appeals
    43