John C. Grimberg Co., Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •                 ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
    Appeals of --                                )
    )
    John C. Grimberg Co., Inc.                   )      ASBCA Nos. 58791, 59717
    )
    Under Contract No. W912DR-09-C-0038          )
    APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT:                      Edward J. Parrott, Esq.
    Stephanie M. Rochel, Esq.
    Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP
    McLean, VA
    APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT:                     Michael P. Goodman, Esq.
    Engineer Chief Trial Attorney
    Scott C. Seufert, Esq.
    David B. Jerger, Esq.
    Engineer Trial Attorneys
    U.S. Army Engineer District, Baltimore
    OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PEACOCK
    ON THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
    The government timely moves for reconsideration of our decision in ASBCA
    No. 58791 and the relevant portion of ASBCA No. 59717, as issued in John C.
    Grimberg Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 58791 et al., 
    2018 WL 6113411
    (Oct. 25, 2018),
    contending that the Board erred in concluding that appellant encountered a Type I
    differing site condition (DSC). Familiarity with that decision is presumed. The ·
    government maintains that appellant failed to reasonably interpret contractual
    indications of the quantity of incompetent rock that would be encountered in drilling
    into the Karst prevalent at the site. Therefore, according to the government, appellant
    failed to establish all requisite elements essential to establish a DSC and satisfy its
    burden of proving entitlement. The government also challenges our use of a "jury
    verdict" approach in evaluating the quantity of rock drilling reasonably indicated and
    developing our "allowance" adjusting appellant's estimate to reflect the results of our
    evaluation, emphasizing that quantum was not an issue.
    Standards for resolving a motion for reconsideration are well established. Such
    motions do not provide a party an opportunity to reargue issues that were previously
    raised and decided. Precision Standard, Inc., ASBCA No. 58135, 16-1 BCA, 36,504
    at 177,860. A motion for reconsideration does not provide a litigant a "second bite at the
    apple" or the opportunity to advance arguments that properly should have been presented
    in an earlier proceeding. Dixon v. Shinseki, 
    741 F.3d 1367
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We
    grant motions for reconsideration "if we have made a genuine oversight that affects the
    outcome of the appeal." Relyant, LLC, ASBCA No. 59809, 18-1BCA137,146
    at 180,841. This is not such a case. The request for reconsideration is denied.
    The government continues to place great emphasis on a series of borings 300 to
    500 feet away from the site of the Biolab foundation, while ignoring more proximate
    and relevant borings, in particular DH-11 and DH-12, aligned on the site. Moreover,
    the government's analysis thereof was refuted. Appellant persuasively established that
    the actual Biolab subsurface drilling conditions were far worse (and different) than one
    would predict even based on the USAMRIID borings. JCG actually drilled through
    approximately 3.75 times the amount of rock that could have been anticipated based
    on the USAMRIID borings. Grimberg, 
    2018 WL 6113411
    at 29.
    In addition, the government's subsurface exploration and resultant boring data
    provided to offerors in the solicitation were flawed and deficient. They omitted
    specific data directly at the site where the drilling for the Biolab foundation would
    occur. Despite the emphasis on the highly variable nature of the karst generally in the
    solicitation 's Geotechnical Report, that report failed to take that emphasis "to heart"
    and provide meaningful, specific boring data (other than DH-11 and DH-12) at, or
    reasonably proximate to, the critical drilling site. The greater the variability of the
    subsurface, the greater the need for the latter data. In short, the government failed to
    put into practice what it preached. Moreover, despite the considerable variability of
    subsurface rock conditions inherent in Karst topography, the contract contained no
    provisions for pricing extreme variations in the quantity of rock drilling required.
    Although there was a plethora of generalized ( often repetitive) information concerning
    Karst variability, contributing significantly to development of our "allowance," there
    was a paucity of proximate, site-specific boring data, one factor contributing to our
    sustention of the appeal.
    With respect to developing our "allowance," we exercised our discretion and best
    judgment after careful consideration and analysis of the entire record with emphasis on
    particularly relevant findings identified in the principal opinion. That judgment, based
    as it was on numerous factors and findings necessarily was in the nature of a "jury
    verdict." The government now questions our judgment relying on essentially the same
    arguments that it made previously. We decline to revisit in detail the complete rationale
    for our determination (see, e.g., Grimberg, 
    2018 WL 6113411
    at 30). Although "jury
    verdict" determinations arise most commonly in the context of quantum determinations
    of final dollar amounts, there is nothing that prohibits or inhibits Board judges from
    performing similar equitable analyses in an "entitlement" context. Obviously, our
    allowance also provides guidance and has significant implications for quantum
    negotiations on remand. Rather than remand issues related to development and amount
    of the allowance for quantum negotiations, we deemed it more efficient to "jury verdict"
    2
    the allowance given the great disparity in the views of the parties as to what was
    reasonably indicated in the contract regarding subsurface rock.
    The primary contentions originally raised by the parties and considered by us in
    reaching our conclusions centered on whether an "allowance" constituted a disfavored
    "contingency." The concept and necessity of developing an "allowance" recognizing
    the extensive variability of rock was a primary tenet of the Corps' position. We
    essentially agreed with the government's position that such an allowance was a valid
    distinction with critical differences in the context of this case. Grimberg, 
    2018 WL 6113411
    at 30-31. On reconsideration, the Corps now argues that the Board should
    refrain from developing its own "allowance," in legal parlance denominated a "jury
    verdict," based on the same data furnished to offerors, supplemented by detailed
    testimony, expert analyses, and the complete documentary record developed at trial.
    The obvious relevance of our "allowance" to quantum phase negotiations illustrates
    that any line between "entitlement" and quantum "jury verdicts" is blurred and
    indistinct at best. There was no more reliable method of developing a precise estimate
    of the amount that should have been anticipated. Moreover, the Board considered
    numerous pertinent countervailing factors and the entire record in rendering its best
    judgment to fairly and reasonably approximate what it considered to be the appropriate
    "allowance" with patent implications for quantum phase negotiations on remand.
    Cf Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Wynn, 
    497 F.3d 1350
    , 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
    (citations omitted); see also Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., ENG BCA No. 5606,
    91-1 BCA il 23,613 at 118,339 (and cases cited). In appropriate cases such as this, our
    conclusory assessments are essential to rendering a fair judgment after careful scrutiny
    of pertinent factual considerations bearing on the issues in dispute, regardless of
    whether they may be classifiable as "entitlement-related" evaluations. Given the
    extensive poor rock encountered by appellant, rejection of appellant's claim for failure
    to reasonably interpret contractual indications as a whole was unfair and inequitable.
    On the other hand, failure to develop our "allowance" adjusting appellant's bid to
    reflect what the Board considered to be an amount reasonably indicated would have
    been unfair to the government. An "all or nothing" resolution of this case would have
    been overly legalistic and unjust.
    3
    The motion for reconsideration is denied.
    Dated: January 2, 2019                                              ,,/1
    /    //       /
    ````
    ~              V
    ROBERT T. PEACOCK
    Administrative Judge
    Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals
    I concur                                         I concur
    RICHARD SHACKLEFORD                              J. REID PROUTY
    Administrative Judge                             Administrative Judge
    Acting Chairman                                  Vice Chairman
    Armed Services Board                             Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals                              of Contract Appeals
    I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the
    Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 58791, 59717, Appeals of
    John C. Grimberg Co., Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter.
    Dated:
    JEFFREY D. GARDIN
    Recorder, Armed Services
    Board of Contract Appeals
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: ASBCA No. 58791, 59717

Judges: Peacock

Filed Date: 1/2/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/18/2019