Sanders 146274 v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Michael Martin Sanders, No. CV-18-01471-PHX-JAT (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Trinity Services Group Incorporated, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael M. Sanders’ (“Plaintiff”) Objection 16 (Doc. 110) to a pretrial order of Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine (Doc. 109). The Court 17 now rules on the Objection (Doc. 110). 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Trinity Services Incorporated, et al. 20 (“Defendants”) alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights 21 (Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that his Eight Amendment rights were violated when 22 he was not granted an exception to the prison’s mechanical restraint policy and was given 23 a nutritionally deficient diet while incarcerated. (See Doc. 1 at 4–12). To date, Magistrate 24 Judge Fine has granted two extensions for Plaintiff to respond to the Motions for Summary 25 Judgment (Docs. 107, 109). In his October 29, 2020 motion, Plaintiff asked for an 26 additional extension of thirty (30) days. Magistrate Judge Fine’s November 2, 2020 Order 27 granted Plaintiff’s request for an extension, but only granted an extension of eleven (11) 28 days. In all, Magistrate Judge Fine has granted extensions of seventy-four (74) days from 1 the initial response deadline of August 31, 2020. 2 Plaintiff seeks relief from Magistrate Judge Fine’s November 2, 2020 Order (Doc. 3 109) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 This Court may modify or set aside any part of a pretrial order issued by a magistrate 6 judge that “is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. 7 P. 72(a). The Court will overturn a magistrate judge’s decision only if it is the result of 8 “clear error.” Maisonville v. F2 Am., Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 9 omitted). Under this standard of review, the Court “may not simply substitute its judgment 10 for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 11 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Instead, the Court must have a “definite and firm 12 conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 13 (2001) (citation omitted). The burden of making this showing is on the objecting party. See 14 Kinkeade v. Beard, No. 215CV01375TLNCDK, 2017 WL 2813037, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 15 29, 2017). 16 III. ANALYSIS 17 Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 109) erred in two ways: 18 By not considering Plaintiff’s good cause showings, and by not considering that Plaintiff 19 must respond to multiple motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 110 at 2–4). The Court 20 will address each contention in turn. 21 a. Plaintiff’s Good Cause Showings 22 While it is not clear from Plaintiff’s Objection, Plaintiff’s primary argument appears 23 to be that Magistrate Judge Fine erred by not fully considering all of the circumstances 24 underlying Plaintiff’s multiple requests for extensions and only granting Plaintiff an 25 additional eleven-day (11) extension rather than the requested thirty-day (30) extension. 26 (See Doc. 110 at 2–5). Plaintiff asserts that the extension granted by Magistrate Judge Fine 27 fails to take into account the fourteen (14) days Plaintiff lost to a COVID-19 lockdown in 28 his unit (Doc. 105 at 4) and the twenty-one (21) days Plaintiff lost to “medical isolation” 1 (Doc. 105 at 2-3) for a total of thirty-five (35) lost days (Doc. 110 at 4). Essentially, 2 Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Fine has not granted sufficient relief to address the 3 litany of issues he has encountered when drafting his responses to the two motions for 4 summary judgment and statements of facts (Docs. 95, 96, 100, and 101). 5 To date, Magistrate Judge Fine has granted a total extension of seventy-four (74) 6 days from the original deadline of August 31, 2020 to the extended deadline of November 7 13, 2020. (See Docs. 107, 109). In examining the multiple extensions granted by Magistrate 8 Judge Fine, the Court does not see any evidence she erroneously neglected to consider the 9 thirty-five (35) days mentioned in Plaintiff’s Objection. When added to the days in August 10 Plaintiff was not locked down (August 14–31, 2020) (Doc. 105 at 4), the total number of 11 days granted to draft a response to the motions for summary judgment and new statements 12 of fact far exceeds the thirty-day (30) time limit given in the original order (Doc. 102). 13 Moreover, Magistrate Judge Fine granted an additional eleven-day (11) extension to 14 Plaintiff even though, “[p]laintiff ha[d] not shown diligence or good cause for another 15 extension.” (Doc. 109). After reviewing the totality of the record, Magistrate Judge Fine 16 did not err in granting an additional eleven-day (11) extension, rather than the requested 17 thirty-day (30) extension, and the extensions granted far exceed the thirty-five-days (35) 18 Plaintiff claims to have lost. 19 b. Responses to Multiple Motions for Summary Judgment 20 Plaintiff also seems to argue that the Magistrate Judge engaged in an “abuse of 21 discretion” by not allowing additional response time for Plaintiff to complete separate 22 responses to the two pending motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 110 at 4). Plaintiff 23 argues that “the Magistrate Judge has not considered that Sanders is laboring to perfect two 24 responses to two motions for summary judgment.” (Id. at 4) (emphasis omitted). It should 25 be noted that Magistrate Judge Fine’s orders specifically mention that both motions for 26 summary judgment are pending, so it appears to the Court that Magistrate Judge Fine did 27 consider that Plaintiff needed to respond to both. (See Docs. 107, 109). Even if Magistrate 28 Judge Fine did not consider that Plaintiff had to submit responses to two motions for 1 summary judgment, it would still not amount to clear error. Although the Court 2 acknowledges the challenges Plaintiff has encountered as an incarcerated, pro se litigant, 3 responding to multiple motions for summary judgment does not rise to the level of good 4 cause for an extension as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(A). See 5 Ashby v. Mortimer, No. 4:18-cv-00143-DCN, 2019 WL 1804440, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 24, 6 2019) (“[T]he fact that Plaintiffs must respond to two motions for summary judgment filed 7 days apart is hardly unique, inherent in litigation, and may not rise to the level of good 8 cause.”). Since answering two motions for summary judgment is an inherent aspect of 9 litigation—particularly in cases like this one where the Plaintiff has brought claims against 10 multiple defendants—Plaintiff is not entitled to an additional extension because he must 11 prepare two responses. 12 Further, Plaintiff asserts that his lack of “access to the modern tools of litigation” 13 due to his incarceration favors granting an additional extension. (Doc. 110 at 5). Plaintiff, 14 however, cites no legal precedent to support this argument. (See id.). The Supreme Court 15 has established the standard for legal research access that prison authorities must give to 16 prisoners as, “the (already well-established) right of access to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 17 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). Circuit courts have interpreted this standard as requiring a 18 plaintiff to show actual restriction of access to the court system (“actual injury”). See 19 Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1383–87 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that reduced library 20 time and limited legal resources in library did not restrict Plaintiff’s access to the courts); 21 see also Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a delay of access to 22 legal materials that forced Plaintiff to obtain deadline extensions did not deny Plaintiff 23 access to the courts). Plaintiff has not been prevented from filing his claim or multiple 24 motions for extensions of response deadlines. (See Docs. 1, 105, 108). While legal 25 resources available to Plaintiff may not be ideal, the record does not support a finding that 26 Plaintiff has been deprived of his right of access to the courts. 27 Finally, the Court notes that even if Plaintiff had received the full thirty-day (30) 28 extension requested in his October 29, 2020 motion, Plaintiff’s response would have still been filed late. 2|| IV. CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing, 4 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection (Doc. 110) is OVERRULED and the 5 || Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 109) is AFFIRMED. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED striking Plaintiff's late Responses and Statements 7\| of Facts (Docs. 113, 116, 117), Defendants’ Replies to the late Responses (Docs. 121, 123), 8 || and Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs late Statements of Facts (Doc. 122). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 95, 10 || 100) will be considered as unopposed. 11 Dated this 26th day of January, 2021. 12 13 i C 14 James A. Teilborg 15 Senior United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _5-