Chandler v. DeJoy ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 John W. Chandler, No. CV-20-00924-PHX-DWL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service 13 Defendant. 14 15 John W. Chandler (“Plaintiff”) has sued his former employer, the United States 16 Postal Service (the “Agency”),1 for disability, race, sex, and age discrimination. Now 17 pending before the Court is the Agency’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 18 (Doc. 10.) For the following reasons, the motion is granted. 19 BACKGROUND 20 I. Underlying Facts 21 The following facts are derived from the complaint and documents subject to 22 judicial notice.2 23 24 1 Megan Brennan, the original named defendant in this action, was the Postmaster General at the time the complaint was filed, but she has since stepped down. Louis DeJoy 25 is the current Postmaster General and is therefore automatically substituted as the defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See also 1 Gensler, Federal Rules 26 of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary, Rule 25, at 733 (2020) (“Under Rule 25(d), substitution is automatic when a public officer sued in his or her official capacity leaves 27 office and is replaced. No substitution order or motion is necessary.”) (footnotes omitted). 2 The Agency asks the Court to take judicial notice of five exhibits attached to its 28 motion: (1) an Agency “Information for Pre-Complaint Counseling” form dated April 15, 2016 (Doc. 10-2); (2) an “Acceptance for Investigation” letter from the Equal Employment 1 Plaintiff is a 51-year-old white male who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder 2 (“PTSD”), depression, and high anxiety. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 6.) The Agency has been aware of 3 Plaintiff’s PTSD since at least April 23, 2012, when Plaintiff informed the Agency’s 4 District Reasonable Accommodation Committee (the “Accommodation Committee”) of 5 his disability. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) Plaintiff’s Agency medical file contains “at least 58 records” 6 involving his PTSD, depression, and high anxiety dating from December 1, 2011 to April 7 27, 2016. (Id. ¶ 24.) 8 The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that he suffered disability, race, sex, and 9 age discrimination “when proper procedures were not followed in his EEO matters [and] 10 his requests for reasonable accommodation.” (Id. ¶¶ 7, 39.) Plaintiff alleges that on many 11 occasions “there was no provision of reasonable accommodation, nor denial and no 12 interactive process.” (Id.) He alleges that he was treated differently in this regard than 13 other unnamed “similarly situated” employees who were not of his protected class. (Id. 14 ¶¶ 15, 34, 38, 51, 57.) 15 In 2012, Plaintiff refrained from asking the Accommodation Committee for a 16 Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dated July 27, 2016 (Doc. 10-3); (3) a “Motion to 17 Amend and Restore Claims” filed in the EEOC Phoenix District Office dated July 6, 2018 (Doc. 10-4); (4) an “Order Denying Complainant’s Motion to Amend; Clarifying 18 Disability” from the EEOC Phoenix District Office dated August 17, 2018 (Doc. 10-5); and (5) a “Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint” from the EEOC dated December 27, 2018 19 (Doc. 10-6). Because Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the exhibits (Doc. 16 at 8-9), this request is granted. Lacayo v. Donahoe, 2015 WL 993448, *9 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 20 (“In the context of employment discrimination cases in particular, it is well established that courts may consider the administrative record of a plaintiff’s claims before the EEOC as 21 judicially noticeable matters of public record.”). And because these exhibits are properly subject to judicial notice, the Court may consider them when ruling on the Agency’s motion 22 to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, . . . [a] court may . . . consider 23 certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to 24 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”); Lacayo, 2015 WL 993448 at *10 (“The extrinsic evidence that Defendant submitted all pertains to Plaintiff’s administrative 25 proceedings with the EEO; thus, all are either referenced in the complaint or matters of public record and properly considered on either a 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”); 26 Leon v. Danaher Corp., 2011 WL 13190172, *3 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“[T]he Court takes judicial notice of the EEOC proceedings in Plaintiff’s case, including the EEOC Charge.”). 27 The Court takes notice only of the existence of the administrative proceeding documents and the presence of the statements from Plaintiff, the Agency, and the EEOC contained 28 therein and “does not credit the truth of any fact recounted or matter asserted in the documents.” Lacayo, 2015 WL 993448 at *10. 1 reasonable accommodation for his disabilities because he was able to address these issues 2 with his existing arrangements under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). (Id. 3 ¶ 47.) Plaintiff alleges that from this point forward, the Agency repeatedly failed to “enter 4 into the interactive process of accommodation” even though it was aware of his disabilities. 5 (Id. ¶ 19.) From June 2013 through April 2016, Plaintiff made over a dozen requests for a 6 reasonable accommodation, and on at least ten of these occasions Agency management did 7 not follow proper policies or procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 30.) The Agency in effect “failed 8 to even discuss reasonable accommodation.” (Id. ¶ 30.) 9 On December 16, 2013, a nurse employed with the Agency opined that Plaintiff did 10 not have a disability. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 45.) This opinion appears to have been premised on an 11 assertion by Plaintiff’s manager that Plaintiff had not provided any documentation of a 12 disability. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff alleges that the manager was incorrect because, although he 13 did not provide any new documentation, “his medical file shows at least 58 medical records 14 showing he had a mental disability.” (Id.) 15 On December 19, 2013, the Accommodation Committee denied Plaintiff’s request 16 for leave as a reasonable accommodation but did not make a formal denial, which 17 prevented Plaintiff from appealing the decision. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 43.) Kathy Holsome-Benion 18 (“Holsome-Benion”), an African-American woman who appears to have held a 19 supervisory role over Plaintiff, denied him the opportunity to have union representation at 20 the December 19, 2013 meeting, telling Plaintiff that the meeting could not be rescheduled 21 and that he must attend. (Id. ¶ 32; Doc. 10-2 at 3.) 22 On December 26, 2013, the Accommodation Committee issued a “Report of 23 Investigation” finding that Plaintiff did not have a disability. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) According to 24 Plaintiff, this finding was the product of “a total failure of due diligence.” (Id.) After 2013, 25 Plaintiff’s requests for accommodation were not forwarded to the Accommodation 26 Committee, as Plaintiff alleges they should have been. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 31.) 27 In December 2014, the Vice President of the National Association of Letter 28 Carriers—not a party here—shared Plaintiff’s unredacted medical records with Plaintiff’s 1 supervisor at the Agency. (Id. ¶ 26.) This sharing was “regular practice.” (Id.) Plaintiff 2 alleges that his supervisor “had no right to this information and [the supervisor’s] receipt 3 of it was discriminatory.” (Id.) Around this time, Plaintiff’s doctor responded to a medical 4 inquiry by stating that “the only issue having to do with any type of accommodation would 5 be the time he needed off work in order to get well from his issues.” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 44.) On 6 or around December 30, 2014, Agency management “failed to enact and engage in the 7 interactive reasonable accommodation process” in response to this statement from 8 Plaintiff’s doctor. (Id.) 9 Throughout 2015, Agency management continued not to follow proper policies and 10 procedures in response to Plaintiff’s requests for reasonable accommodation. (See, e.g., 11 id. ¶ 21.) Between February and September 2015, Plaintiff received four “letters of 12 warning” from his supervisors for unspecified reasons. (Id. ¶ 16.) While Plaintiff was on 13 unpaid sick leave during this period, Holsome-Benion omitted a date (April 9, 2015) in 14 Plaintiff’s leave records. (Id. ¶ 34.) 15 On March 2, 2016, an incident similar to the one described as happening on 16 December 30, 2014 occurred—that is, Agency management failed to engage in the 17 reasonable accommodation process after Plaintiff’s doctor responded to a medical inquiry 18 by stating that “the only issue having to do with any type of accommodation would be the 19 time [Plaintiff] needed off work in order to get well from his issues.” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 44.) On 20 March 9, 10, 30, and 31, 2016, “grievances were settled” regarding Plaintiff’s requests for 21 leave and accommodations. (Id. ¶ 18.) On March 21, 2016, a finding of fact “was issued 22 on Plaintiff while he was incapacitated due to his disabilities [and] unable to attend both 23 physically and telephonically.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff asked that the fact finding be postponed 24 but this request was denied. (Id.) On March 9, 2016 “Holsome-Benion responded to the 25 Plaintiff’s March 2, 2016 request for reasonable accommodation.” (Id. ¶ 37.) The 26 significance of this event is not clear, but it appears there was a clerical error regarding the 27 correct timing of these actions, as Plaintiff alleges that the Agency later identified April 4, 28 2016 as the date of the response to Plaintiff’s request for accommodation, when in fact that 1 was the date on which Plaintiff made a new request for accommodation. (Id.) 2 On April 4, 2016, one or more of Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his 3 accommodation requests were settled. (Id. ¶ 18.) On April 27, 2016, Plaintiff’s doctor 4 wrote a letter stating that “there are times where Plaintiff needs time off due to his 5 disability.” (Id. ¶ 29.) The doctor’s letter had a tone of frustration that “his previous notes 6 ha[d] not been read.” (Id.) Also on April 27, 2016, Agency management “did not follow 7 policies or procedures when the Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation.” (Id. 8 ¶¶ 21, 25, 30.) 9 On June 24, 2016, four of Plaintiff’s outstanding grievances regarding the 10 accommodations process were settled. (Id. ¶ 18.) 11 In addition to these specific events, Plaintiff also makes more general claims 12 regarding the alleged disability, race, sex, and age discrimination. For example, Plaintiff 13 asserts that “[u]pon information and belief in 2013 there has been a pattern and practice of 14 [the Agency’s] increase and removals and forced retirements for disabled persons on light 15 duty and limited duty compared to 2013 for older employees.” (Id. ¶ 14.) In a similar vein, 16 Plaintiff alleges that the Agency’s repeated failures to enter into an interactive process with 17 him regarding his leave requests amounted to “a continuous pattern and practice” based on 18 “deliberate ignorance of the policies and procedures that the [Agency] is obligated to use 19 and enforce and [a] violation” of those policies. (Id. ¶ 28.) Although the Agency insisted 20 that an “essential function” of Plaintiff’s position was that he comply with his assigned 21 work schedule, the Agency had “previously and continually” approved his requests for 22 intermittent leave. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff alleges that the Agency had “a continuing pattern 23 and practice” of not recognizing his disability and failing to enter into the interactive 24 process for reasonable accommodation. (Id. ¶ 42.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that the 25 discipline he received after requests for accommodation was “retaliatory.” (Id. ¶ 39.) 26 Plaintiff also alleges that Holsome-Benion misclassified the type of leave he took 27 “on several occasions,” including in April 2015, making it appear that he was on paid rather 28 than unpaid leave. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff asserts that Holsome-Benion did not take such 1 actions with female, African-American, or non-disabled employees. (Id.) On an 2 unspecified date, Holsome-Benion declared Plaintiff absent without leave even though he 3 had provided medical documentation for the absence. (Id. ¶ 35.) On several occasions, 4 Plaintiff informed Holsome-Benion and union representatives that he had a medical 5 condition or disability that required reasonable accommodation, but Holsome-Benion 6 failed to follow relevant procedures in response to these statements. (Id. ¶ 36.) Holsome- 7 Benion also addressed Plaintiff “in a different tone and a different accent than she used 8 with African Americans or Hispanics.” (Id. ¶ 38.) 9 Plaintiff alleges that Holsome-Benion also had a disability, and was otherwise 10 similarly situated to Plaintiff, but she, unlike Plaintiff, was reasonably accommodated and 11 “her situation was reviewed by the [Accommodation] Committee on a timely and recurring 12 basis.” (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff asserts that he suffered discrimination on the basis of sex and 13 race because Holsome-Benion, an African-American woman, received more favorable 14 treatment than he did. (Id. ¶¶ 48-52.) 15 Plaintiff also argues that at relevant times he was over the age of 40 and treated 16 differently on the basis of his age. (Id. ¶¶ 54-57.) Plaintiff was in “a top pay scale.” (Id. 17 ¶ 55.) Management allegedly favored younger employees and asked these younger 18 employees to perform the same duties that Plaintiff had performed. (Id.) 19 II. Procedural History 20 A. Administrative Proceedings 21 On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff completed an “Information for Pre-Complaint 22 Counseling” form. (Doc. 10-2.) This form states that on April 4, 2016, Plaintiff requested 23 an appointment with a dispute resolution specialist in the Agency’s Equal Employment 24 Office. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff attested on this form that on March 31, 2016, he received a 25 “notice of removal” from Holsome-Benion after requesting a reasonable accommodation. 26 (Id.) Plaintiff further stated that he had been asking for this accommodation since 27 December 19, 2013, yet the supervisor “just issued discipline and did not follow [proper] 28 procedures.” (Id.) In the form, Plaintiff identified Holsome-Benion and one person from 1 the Accommodation Committee as responsible officials. (Id. at 3.) As remedies, Plaintiff 2 requested immediate reinstatement, the removal of all discipline from his record, and 3 compensatory and punitive damages and back pay. (Id.) It appears that the National Equal 4 Employment Opportunity Investigative Services Office (“NEEOISO”) received this form 5 on April 19, 2016. (Id.) 6 On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff entered a formal complaint with the Agency regarding 7 his reasonable-accommodation contentions. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4; Doc. 10-3 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges 8 the Agency used the wrong policy to address his claims, which the Agency later admitted. 9 (Doc. 1 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff asserts that the policy was “switched” in order “to hinder the EEO 10 process.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that the Agency’s alternative dispute resolution 11 specialist failed to contact him, to make herself “available for processing,” or to adequately 12 discuss or investigate his claims and eventually closed the complaint even though he “gave 13 her an extension.” (Id. ¶ 27.) 14 On July 27, 2016, the Agency EEO office issued an “Acceptance for Investigation” 15 letter acknowledging receipt of Plaintiff’s complaint and accepting it for investigation. 16 (Doc. 10-3 at 2, 4.) The letter states that Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on race, 17 age, and physical disability. (Id. at 2.) The stated scope of the investigation was the denial 18 of Plaintiff’s requests for reasonable accommodations on March 9 and April 4, 2016, as 19 well as a March 31, 2016 letter of removal for failure to maintain regular attendance. (Id.)3 20 The complaint and judicially noticed documents do not explain what happened with 21 respect to Plaintiff’s claims over the remainder of 2016 and 2017. 22 On July 6, 2018, with the aid of counsel, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend and 23 Restore Claims” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) 24 Phoenix office. (Doc. 10-4 at 2, 14.) The motion reasserted disability, age, and race 25 discrimination and sought to add claims regarding retaliation and failure to reasonably 26 accommodate. (Id. at 2-3.) The motion also alleged instances of such discrimination 27 3 The March 31, 2016 letter had an effective date of May 7, 2016. (Doc. 10-3 at 2.) It thus appears that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on May 7, 2016. 28 1 outside the “narrow” events of March and April 2016, claiming that Plaintiff was 2 discriminated against on other instances in 2013, 2015, and 2016. (Id. at 3-13.) The motion 3 sought to include all of these claims in the EEOC’s review of Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. at 4 14.) 5 On August 17, 2018, the EEOC issued an “Order Denying Complainant’s Motion 6 to Amend; Clarifying Disability.” (Doc. 10-5.) The EEOC’s administrative judge stated 7 that a complainant may amend his complaint to include issues “like or related” to those in 8 the original complaint and that a claim “is like or related if it adds to or clarifies, or could 9 reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial complaint.” (Id. at 3.) The administrative 10 judge found that the “proposed claims, to the extent they are decipherable, do not add to or 11 clarify or current complaint” because the motion “sets forth incidents unrelated in time and 12 content to the original complaint.” (Id. at 4.) The EEOC thus ordered that, because 13 Plaintiff’s motion was denied, the Agency must “commence processing the new claims as 14 a separate EEO complaint,” using the filing date of the motion, July 6, 2018,4 “to determine 15 whether initial EEO counselor contact is timely pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a).” (Id.) 16 The order further noted that Plaintiff and the Agency agreed that Plaintiff’s disability is 17 mental, rather than physical, and that in the future Plaintiff’s disability should be classified 18 accordingly. (Id.)5 19 On November 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a new formal complaint with the Agency 20 EEO office regarding the claims he sought to add in the July 6, 2018 motion. (Doc. 10-6 21 at 2.) 22 On December 27, 2018, NEEOISO issued a “Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint.” 23 (Id.) This document explained that federal law provides a 45-day time limit for initiating 24 4 There appears to be a typographical error in this section of the order. It states that the filing date of the motion to amend is July 6, 2016, when the correct date is in fact July 25 6, 2018, as the order itself states in its first paragraph. (Doc. 10-5 at 2, 4.) NEEOISO also used the July 6, 2018 date as the basis for its “Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint.” (Doc. 26 10-6 at 3-4.) 27 5 The complaint seems to allege that the Agency’s misclassification of Plaintiff’s disability as physical rather than mental constitutes an independent basis for liability. (Doc. 28 1 ¶¶ 20, 39.) However, the complaint contains no specific allegations concerning the nature of any physical disabilities. 1 contact with an agency EEO counselor, yet Plaintiff’s motion to amend was filed “552 days 2 since the last day of the year in which the issues alleged to be discriminatory occurred,” 3 because the allegations addressed events occurring from 2013 through 2016. (Id. at 2-5.) 4 NEEISIO thus concluded that dismissal was proper. (Id. at 4-5.) The document instructed 5 Plaintiff that he had 30 days to appeal to the EEOC and, once the EEOC ruled, Plaintiff 6 would have 90 days to file a civil action in federal court. (Id. at 5-6.) 7 On February 14, 2020, an administrative law judge issued a decision. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4.) 8 On February 20, 2020, the Agency entered a final decision. (Id.)6 9 B. This Action 10 On May 13, 2020, Chandler initiated this action by filing a complaint. (Doc. 1.) 11 The complaint asserts three claims. Count One is a claim for disability-related 12 discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Americans with 13 Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), and the Rehabilitation Act. (Id. ¶¶ 41-47.) 14 Count Two is a claim for sex and race discrimination under Title VII. (Id. ¶¶ 48-52.) Count 15 Three is a claim for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 16 (“ADEA”). (Id. ¶¶ 53-57.) 17 On August 14, 2020, the Agency filed its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10.) 18 On September 18, 2020, Chandler filed a response. (Doc. 16.) 19 On September 25, 2020, the Agency filed a reply. (Doc. 17.) 20 DISCUSSION 21 I. Legal Standard 22 “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must allege 23 ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 24 face.’” In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 26 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 27 6 Although Plaintiff asserts that the final decision exhausted the administrative 28 prerequisites to filing this action (id. ¶ 5), it is unclear how the EEOC resolved Plaintiff’s original claims regarding conduct in March and April 2016. 1 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 2 “[A]ll well-pleaded allegations of material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and 3 are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. at 1144-45 (citation 4 omitted). However, the court need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual 5 allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-80. Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 6 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 679. 7 The court also may dismiss due to “a lack of a cognizable legal theory.” Mollett v. Netflix, 8 Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 9 II. Disability Claims 10 As noted, Count One of the complaint asserts claims under the ADA, the ADAAA, 11 and the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 1 at 10.) However, both parties now agree that Plaintiff, 12 as a federal employee, may not bring claims under the ADA or ADAAA and that his 13 disability-related claims may be brought only under the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 10 at 6; 14 Doc. 16 at 1, 14.) Plaintiff’s ADA and ADAAA claims are therefore dismissed without 15 leave to amend, because amendment would be futile. Cf. Daniels v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 16 1140401, *2 (D. Ariz. 2007) (“Under the ADA, the federal government is excluded from 17 the definition of ‘employer.’ Based on this exclusion, federal courts have concluded that 18 the ADA provides no remedy to federal employees.”) (citation omitted).7 19 III. Administrative Exhaustion 20 The Agency argues that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under 21 the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, and the ADEA must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed 22 to initiate contact with relevant officials “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged 23 to be discriminatory, or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective 24 date of the action,” as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). (Doc. 10 at 6-7.) Because 25 7 Plaintiff seeks “leave to amend Count One as necessary to include the gender and 26 race discrimination claims in Count One.” (Doc. 16 at 1.) This request is confusing because Count One asserts a disability-related discrimination claim under the 27 Rehabilitation Act while Count Two asserts a claim for sex and race discrimination under Title VII. (Doc. 1 at 10-12.) Therefore, although Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is 28 granted to the extent and for the reasons explained in more detail below, there is no basis to amend Count One to include sex and race discrimination claims. 1 Plaintiff first initiated contact with an Agency EEO counselor on April 4, 2016, the Agency 2 argues, only actions taken on or after February 19, 2016 were timely raised and all claims 3 outside this period are barred. (Id. at 6-11 & n.3.) 4 Plaintiff responds, in somewhat scattershot fashion, that his claims based on events 5 occurring before February 19, 2016 are not time-barred because (1) the Agency’s 6 discrimination against him constituted a continuous violation, (2) the different events 7 asserted in the complaint should not be “fragmented,” (3) the Agency manifested a “pattern 8 and practice” of discrimination, and (4) to the extent there are timeliness issues, equitable 9 tolling should apply. (Doc. 16 at 9-14, 17.) The Agency replies that, outside of a hostile 10 work environment claim, a plaintiff may not sweep in untimely claims under the 11 continuous violation theory, that individualized claims must be assessed individually for 12 purposes of administrative exhaustion, that a pattern-or-practice claim cannot be asserted 13 under these circumstances, and that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to 14 demonstrate an entitlement to equitable tolling. (Doc. 17 at 3-6.) The Court addresses 15 each argument in turn. 16 A. Regulatory Requirements 17 A plaintiff must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing a 18 Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, or ADEA claim in federal court. Kraus v. Presidio Tr. 19 Facilities/Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (Title VII); 20 Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2008) (ADEA); Cherosky v. 21 Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rehabilitation Act). For federal 22 employees, such administrative remedies begin at the Equal Employment Office (“EEO”) 23 of the employing agency, not at the EEOC. Kraus, 572 F.3d at 1042-43. Specifically, an 24 aggrieved federal employee “must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order 25 to try to informally resolve the matter” and “must initiate contact with a Counselor within 26 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). See 27 generally Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] federal 28 employee must notify an EEO counselor of discriminatory conduct within 45 days of the 1 alleged conduct, and then, if the matter is not resolved, the employee may submit a formal 2 administrative complaint.”). 3 Failure to initiate contact with an agency EEO counselor within 45 days is grounds 4 for dismissal, although the time limit may be extended pursuant to waiver, estoppel, or 5 equitable tolling. Kraus, 572 F.3d at 1043. Although the administrative exhaustion pre- 6 filing requirement “does not carry the full weight of statutory authority and is not a 7 jurisdictional prerequisite for suit in federal court,” the Ninth Circuit has “consistently held 8 that, absent waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling, failure to comply with this regulation is 9 fatal to a federal employee’s discrimination claim in federal court.” Id. (cleaned up). See 10 also Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019) (“Title VII’s charge-filing 11 requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription 12 delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.”). “The limitations-period analysis is 13 always conducted claim by claim” and “begins running on any separate underlying claim 14 of discrimination when that claim accrues.” Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1782 15 (2016). Untimely allegations may be considered, however, in the adjudication of the timely 16 claims. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). 17 Here, although the complaint alleges that the Agency discriminated against Plaintiff 18 from 2013 to 2016, it does not allege any contact with an Agency EEO counselor before 19 April 4, 2016. Nor does Plaintiff argue that his earlier interactions with Agency supervisors 20 or union personnel regarding his claims might satisfy the regulation’s “contact with a 21 Counselor” requirement. Compare Kraus, 572 F.3d at 1044-46 (“[A] complainant may 22 satisfy the criterion of EEO Counselor contact by initiating contact with any agency official 23 logically connected with the EEO process, even if that official is not an EEO Counselor, 24 and by exhibiting an intent to begin the EEO process.”) (emphases and internal quotation 25 marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims regarding discriminatory acts before February 19, 26 2016 (i.e., 45 days before Plaintiff’s first contact on April 4, 2016) are untimely. See, e.g., 27 Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1105 (“Because appellants initially contacted an EEO counselor on June 28 20, 1996, we hold that appellants’ claims arising out of incidents occurring before May 7, 1 1996 are time-barred.”); Pena v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2019 WL 634645, *9 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 2 (“Because he failed to contact an EEO counselor within the required 45-day limit, Pena’s 3 administrative Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims are untimely.”); Lacayo v. Donahoe, 4 2015 WL 993448, *11 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The allegations in the FAC and the judicially 5 noticeable documents indicate that Plaintiff did not formally initiate EEO counseling by 6 filing an ‘Information for Pre-Complaint Counseling’ until March 11, 2013—276 days 7 after the latest-dated adverse employment action mentioned in the 2013 EEO 8 Complaint. . . . Thus, her first actual request for EEO counseling was well outside the 45- 9 day window and her claims are time-barred.”). 10 Plaintiff’s only timely claims, therefore, are as follows: (1) the March 2, 2016 11 mishandling of Plaintiff’s accommodation request, including by ignoring a letter from 12 Plaintiff’s doctor stating that Plaintiff needed time away from work to address his 13 psychological issues (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21, 25, 30, 44); (2) the March 9, 2016 response from 14 Holsome-Benion to Plaintiff’s request for accommodation (id. ¶ 37; Doc. 10-3 at 2); (3) 15 the March 21, 2016 findings of fact issued against Plaintiff while he was incapacitated due 16 to his disability and unable to attend the proceeding, and the denial of his request for 17 postponement of the fact-finding proceeding (Doc. 1 ¶ 33); (4) the March 31, 2016 denial 18 of Plaintiff’s request for accommodation (id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 30); (5) the April 4, 2016 denial of 19 Plaintiff’s request for accommodation (id.); and (6) the April 27, 2016, failure to follow 20 policies or procedures (id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 29-30). The Agency does not contest the timeliness 21 of these claims. (Doc. 10 at 9.) 22 B. Continuous Violation 23 Plaintiff argues his earlier claims should be considered timely because the Agency’s 24 accommodation denials and other conduct were of a “continuous nature.” (Doc. 16 at 11.) 25 In a related vein, Plaintiff argues that fragmenting claims “is frowned upon by” the EEOC’s 26 Management Directive 110. (Id.) For these reasons, Plaintiff contends that because at least 27 one of his allegations was timely, his older allegations can also form a basis for relief. (Id. 28 at 10-12.) The Agency responds that Plaintiff’s continuing violation theory is barred by 1 Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. (Doc. 17 at 4-5.) 2 The Agency is correct. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 3 101 (2002), the Supreme Court held that “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if 4 time barred, even when they relate to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete 5 discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Id. at 113. 6 However, “[i]n contrast to discrete acts,” the Morgan Court “carved out an exception for 7 claims based on a hostile work environment.” Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1246. Thus, a hostile 8 work environment claim may encompass acts outside the limitation period “so long as all 9 acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at 10 least one act falls within the time period.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But 11 claims based on a series of discrete acts, rather than a hostile work environment, “are only 12 timely where such acts occurred within the limitations period.” Id. 13 Here, Plaintiff does not allege a hostile work environment, but instead a series of 14 discrete discriminatory acts occurring over a roughly three-year period. His claims based 15 on events occurring before February 19, 2016 thus remain untimely. See also Bird v. Dep’t 16 of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[A]fter [Morgan], little remains of the 17 continuing violations doctrine . . . [e]xcept for a limited exception for hostile work 18 environment claims. . . .”). 19 C. Pattern And Practice 20 Plaintiff argues, in a related vein, that his earlier claims are timely because all the 21 alleged discriminatory acts, spanning from 2013 to 2016, constituted a “pattern and 22 practice” of disability, sex, race, and age discrimination. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14, 28, 42; Doc. 16 at 23 3, 9-11, 13, 16-17.) The Agency responds that a pattern-or-practice claim is properly raised 24 only under limited circumstances and that as a general matter “the pattern and practice 25 method of proving discrimination is only available to class plaintiffs or the EEOC, and is 26 not available to individual plaintiffs.” (Doc. 10 at 11-12.) 27 The Agency is again correct. Although the Ninth Circuit has not conclusively 28 limited pattern-or-practice claims to class plaintiffs or the EEOC, Ninth Circuit precedent 1 suggests that a pattern-or-practice claim will not lie under these circumstances. In 2 Cherosky, the court affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment against 3 employees of the U.S. Postal Service who alleged a pattern and practice of disability 4 discrimination. 330 F.3d at 1244-45. The Postal Service had repeatedly denied these 5 plaintiffs’ requests to use respirators at work pursuant to a “policy of prohibiting respirators 6 except where air contaminants exceed the limits” established by statute. Id. The court 7 reasoned that “pattern-or-practice claims cannot be based on ‘sporadic discriminatory acts’ 8 but rather must be based on discriminatory conduct that is widespread throughout a 9 company or that is a routine and regular part of the workplace.” Id. at 1247. The court 10 noted that the plaintiffs did not attempt to show, by argument or statistical or other 11 evidence, “that the Postal Service widely discriminates against employees with disabilities 12 or even that it routinely discriminates with respect to respirator requests.” Id. Thus, even 13 though the plaintiffs’ accommodation requests were denied pursuant to a policy, the denials 14 amounted to “individualized decisions . . . best characterized as discrete acts, rather than 15 as a pattern or practice of discrimination.” Id. And because the challenged conduct 16 “remain[ed] divisible into a set of discrete acts, legal action on the basis of each of which 17 must be brought within the statutory limitations period.” Id. (quoting Lyons, 307 F.3d at 18 1108). 19 In short, the Ninth Circuit has “consistently refused to apply the [pattern-or-practice 20 theory] to rescue individualized claims that are otherwise time-barred,” while leaving open 21 the possibility that such a theory could extend the limitations period in class-wide claims. 22 Bird, 935 F.3d at 747-48. But here, Plaintiff does not assert a class-wide claim. Instead, 23 his claims are based on a series of discrete instances of denials of reasonable 24 accommodation requests. Even if such acts are related, they remain “divisible into a set of 25 discrete acts” and thus each “must be brought within the statutory limitations period.” 26 Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1247. The upshot is that, even to the extent Plaintiff asserts “that 27 this series of discrete acts flows from a company-wide, or systematic, discriminatory 28 practice,” he cannot “succeed in establishing the employer’s liability for acts occurring 1 outside the limitations period.” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1107. See also Comm. Concerning 2 Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 699, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2009) 3 (affirming dismissal of pattern-or-practice claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because “plaintiffs 4 had not shown the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination but rather ongoing 5 harm resulting from earlier discrete decisions”). 6 D. Equitable Tolling 7 Plaintiff argues the limitations period should be extended because the complaint 8 “clearly sets forth facts supporting waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.” (Doc. 16 at 13.) 9 Plaintiff asserts that the law “clearly supports equitable tolling is applicable 10 here . . . . where [Plaintiff] has alleged ongoing violations, [and has notified the Agency] 11 of his allegations through the years.” (Id. at 12.) The Agency responds that courts only 12 “sparingly” allow equitable tolling and that none of Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that 13 the 45-day period should be tolled. (Doc. 10 at 10-11.) 14 Plaintiff has failed to establish that equitable tolling, waiver, or estoppel apply here. 15 Plaintiff makes little effort to establish the applicability of waiver or estoppel, stating 16 merely that “facts supporting waiver, estoppel, or equitable” tolling are “clearly” present, 17 without indicating which, if any, allegations in the complaint actually support waiver or 18 estoppel. (Doc. 16 at 13.) In any event, it is hard to see how the Agency could have waived 19 the issue of timeliness when the Agency has consistently contested throughout this case— 20 and consistently contested throughout the EEOC proceedings—the timeliness of Plaintiff’s 21 claims. (Doc. 10 at 6-11; Docs. 10-5, 10-6.) See also Sager v. McHugh, 942 F. Supp. 2d 22 1137, 1145 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (“Waiver of the administrative deadlines is allowed only 23 in very limited circumstances, such as where the parties have agreed to extend the time 24 period, or where the agency or the EEOC has specifically ruled that an EEO complaint is 25 timely.”). 26 Equitable estoppel “focuses on the defendant’s wrongful actions preventing the 27 plaintiff from asserting his claim.” Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 28 A defendant may be estopped from asserting a timeliness defense “if the defendant takes 1 active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 2 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002). When considering claims of estoppel, courts consider such 3 factors as “(1) the plaintiff’s actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or 4 representations, (2) evidence of improper purpose on the part of the defendant, or the 5 defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct, and 6 (3) the extent to which the purposes of the limitations period have been satisfied.” Id. 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the Agency took 8 active steps to prevent him from bringing his claim. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he relied 9 on any representations—deceptive or otherwise—from the Agency that prevented him 10 from bringing suit. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that in 2016, presumably after he had 11 filed his administrative complaint, the Agency’s EEO counselor “failed to be in contact 12 with Plaintiff, was not available for processing, did not adequately discuss or investigate, 13 and closed the complaint even though Plaintiff gave her an extension.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 27.) This 14 allegation does not demonstrate an entitlement to equitable estoppel. Indeed, it is unclear 15 how the counselor’s unresponsiveness after Plaintiff filed his complaint could somehow 16 excuse Plaintiff’s failure to timely contact the counselor in the first instance. 17 Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that the limitations period should be equitably 18 tolled. “Equitable tolling focuses on a plaintiff’s excusable ignorance and lack of prejudice 19 to the defendant.” Leong, 347 F.3d at 1123. The doctrine “has been consistently applied 20 to excuse a claimant’s failure to comply with the time limitations where she had neither 21 actual nor constructive notice of the filing period.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 “If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within 23 the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations 24 for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.” Henderson, 314 25 F.3d at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted). Equitable tolling, like waiver and estoppel, 26 must “be applied sparingly.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113. 27 Plaintiff does not allege any facts that might support a claim of equitable tolling. 28 Nothing in the complaint addresses this issue, and in his response, Plaintiff does not give 1 provide reason that equitable tolling should apply other than “his notification of the 2 allegations throughout the years.” (Doc. 16 at 12.) The complaint does allege that Plaintiff 3 repeatedly requested accommodation and interacted with Agency management and union 4 personnel on a regular basis to resolve his issues. (See, e.g., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18, 25, 30.) But 5 these allegations indicate, if anything, that Plaintiff did have notice of his claims and of the 6 filing period and had significant experience with the reasonable accommodation request 7 process. This weighs against the application of equitable tolling. Cf. Pena, 2019 WL 8 634645 at *11 (“Here, Pena was not only familiar with the EEO process because of his 9 prior EEO mediation, he was also well aware of his claims. Pena requested disability 10 accommodation as early as 2011, and reported to his doctor in 2013 that ‘Lopez had been 11 forcing him, through intimidation and other tactics to perform tasks.’ There is no evidence 12 to show that Pena’s Title VII and Rehabilitation Act administrative claims should be tolled 13 because he lacked knowledge as to his claims or the 45-day limitations period.”); Lacayo, 14 2015 WL 993448 at *11 (“Plaintiff nowhere contends that she was unaware of the 45-day 15 timing requirement. To the contrary, throughout the administrative record she indicates 16 that she had knowledge of the 45-day requirement based on her past EEO experience and 17 the fact that her employer visibly posted a notice of these requirements in her break room, 18 and she does not contest this statement.”). Moreover, “many years have passed since the 19 alleged violations occurred and it would prejudice [the Agency] to be forced to defend 20 against them now.” Pena, 2019 WL 634645 at *11. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff must be held to the 45-day limitations period, barring 22 recovery on any claims arising before February 19, 2016. Plaintiff’s untimely claims are 23 therefore dismissed. The dismissal is with leave to amend, but only to the extent Plaintiff 24 can plead additional facts showing that he sought counseling within 45 days of the 25 challenged conduct and/or that might support a claim of waiver, equitable estoppel, or 26 equitable tolling. Cf. Lacayo, 2015 WL 993448 at *18. 27 … 28 … 1 IV. Claims Regarding Processing Of Administrative Complaints 2 The complaint seems to suggest that the Agency’s alleged missteps when handling 3 Plaintiff’s administrative claims constitute independent violations that may give rise to 4 liability. For example, the complaint alleges that the Agency used, and admits to using, 5 the wrong policy to address Plaintiff’s claims in 2016 and that the “EEO investigator, upon 6 information and belief, switched [the] policy to hinder the EEO process.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 12.) 7 The complaint also alleges that the Agency’s EEO counselor “failed to be in contact with 8 Plaintiff, was not available for processing, did not adequately discuss or investigate, and 9 closed the complaint even though Plaintiff gave her an extension” and that Plaintiff also 10 wrote to the counselor’s supervisor “t[o] no avail.” (Id. ¶ 27.) 11 The Agency argues that such claims are not independently actionable. (Doc. 10 at 12 12-13.) Plaintiff responds that under Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020), the Agency 13 as a federal employer must be held “to a higher standard” than private companies and thus 14 his mishandling claims are actionable. (Doc. 16 at 14-15.) The Agency replies that Babb 15 has no bearing on this question and that in fact “[i]t is well settled that allegations regarding 16 errors or mishandling during the administrative EEO claims process are not actionable 17 under the employment discrimination laws.” (Doc. 17 at 6-8.) 18 Neither party cites any Ninth Circuit decisions directly addressing whether a federal 19 employee like Plaintiff may state a viable claim for failure to correctly follow EEO 20 processes, nor has the Court identified any decisions in its own research. But district courts 21 within the Ninth Circuit that have addressed the issue have generally concluded that such 22 claims are not viable. In Sager, a plaintiff brought a claim against the U.S. Army that 23 “focuse[d] almost entirely on the administrative processing of his informal EEO 24 complaint.” 942 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. The Army sought dismissal of this claim because 25 “there is no cause of action that permits recovery for perceived imperfections in an 26 agency’s handling of an administrative complaint.” Id. The court, after noting the absence 27 of clear Ninth Circuit authority on the issue, agreed with the Army, reasoning that because 28 “a private plaintiff whose claim the EEOC mishandled [must] bring a lawsuit against the 1 plaintiff’s employer on the merits, not one against the EEOC,” a similar rule should apply 2 to claims brought by federal employees. Id. at 1147-48 (quoting Jordan v. Summers, 205 3 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 2000)). As the Seventh Circuit held in Jordan, “even if the EEO 4 Division botched the processing of her complaint, Jordan is now already in federal court 5 on the merits, and any earlier mishandling is essentially moot.” 205 F.3d at 342.8 6 Thus, Plaintiff is unable to assert a claim based on the mishandling of his 7 administrative claims. “Of course, evidence of the mishandling of an EEO complaint might 8 be admissible evidence of an employer’s discriminatory motive in the allegedly adverse 9 employment action . . . .” Hill, 2005 WL 3031136 at *3. But such allegations cannot serve 10 as an independent basis for relief under the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, or the ADEA.9 11 Accordingly, the aspects of Plaintiff’s claims related to the Agency’s alleged mishandling 12 of his administrative complaints are dismissed without leave to amend, because 13 amendment would be futile. 14 … 15 … 16 … 17 8 See also Harshaw v. Mnuchin, 2017 WL 5972718, *2-4 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“Plaintiff 18 has alleged violations of Title VII against her employer, the Secretary of the Treasury, for alleged discriminatory acts made by the EEO Personnel charged with handling her First 19 EEO Action. . . . Since the Defendant effectively stood in the same position as the EEOC when its EEO Personnel handled Plaintiff’s complaints, and Congress has not authorized 20 Title VII suits against the EEOC for acts taken by its employees while handling discrimination claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 21 12(b)(6).”); McDermott v. Potter, 2014 WL 4635444, *4 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Plaintiff appears to assert claims regarding the processing of EEO complaints. These claims are 22 generally not actionable in district court.”) (citation omitted); Hill v. England, 2005 WL 3031136, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“[A]n independent claim based on the mishandling of an 23 EEO complaint cannot be stated under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act. . . . [P]laintiff cannot rely on the allegations of mishandling of his EEO complaints by employees of the 24 defendant as constituting, of itself, a violation of Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act.”). 25 9 Babb does not compel a different result. In Babb, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the federal-sector provision of the ADEA may recover 26 certain remedies even if the plaintiff is unable to prove but-for causation. 140 S.Ct. at 1171. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected “the argument that it is anomalous to 27 hold the Federal Government to a stricter standard than private employers or state and local governments,” explaining that “[t]hat is what the statutory language dictates.” Id. at 1176. 28 Nothing in Babb addresses whether a federal public-sector employee may assert a cause of action premised on the administrative mishandling of a discrimination claim. 1 V. Failure To State A Claim Under Title VII And The ADEA 2 Based on the preceding analysis, Plaintiff’s only remaining claims arise from events 3 on or after February 19, 2016. These claims are: (1) the Agency’s March 2, 2016 4 mishandling of Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation request and ignoring of a letter from 5 Plaintiff’s doctor stating that Plaintiff needed time away from work (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21, 25, 30, 6 44); (2) Holsome-Benion’s March 9, 2016 response to Plaintiff’s request for reasonable 7 accommodation (id. ¶ 37; Doc. 10-3 at 2); (3) the March 21, 2016 findings of fact that were 8 issued against Plaintiff while he was incapacitated due to his disability (Doc. 1 ¶ 33); (4) 9 the March 31, 2016 and April 4, 2016 denials of reasonable accommodation (id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 10 30); and (5) Agency management’s April 27, 2016 failure to follow policies or procedures 11 (id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 29-30). These events form the basis for Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act, Title 12 VII, and ADEA claims. 13 In addition to the timely allegations recounted above, Plaintiff makes general 14 assertions—without providing specific dates—regarding the race, sex, and age 15 discrimination he suffered. With respect to race and sex discrimination, for example, 16 Plaintiff claims he “was treated differently than Ms. Holsome-Benion (African American, 17 female) who on information and belief was similarly situated and received reasonable 18 accommodation from USPS for her disability. Upon information and belief her situation 19 was reviewed by the [Accommodation Committee] on a timely and recurring basis.” (Id. 20 ¶ 50.) He also alleges that Holsome-Benion misclassified the type of leave he took “on 21 several occasions,” making it appear that he was on paid rather than unpaid leave, and that 22 Holsome-Benion did not take such actions with female, African-American, or non-disabled 23 employees. (Id. ¶ 34.) He claims that “Ms. Holsome-Benion spoke to him in a different 24 tone and a different accent than she used with African Americans or Hispanics.” (Id. ¶ 38.) 25 As for the ADEA, Plaintiff claims that while he was experienced and classified in a 26 top pay scale, “[y]ounger, less experienced persons were brought on to fulfill the same 27 duties he had.” (Id. ¶ 55.) He also alleges that “other younger employees were granted 28 leave, intermittent leave and without pay,” unlike himself. (Id. ¶ 57.) 1 The Agency does not move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the 2 Rehabilitation Act (Count One) but does move for dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of 3 Plaintiff’s claims for race and sex discrimination under Title VII (Count Two) and for age 4 discrimination under the ADEA (Count Three). (Doc. 10 at 13-14.) The Agency argues 5 that to state a valid claim under those statutes, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case 6 of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas10 framework or provide “direct or 7 circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff does not respond 8 to the Agency’s argument that his Title VII claims must be dismissed and instead asserts, 9 in conclusory fashion, that he has adequately stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act 10 and the ADEA. (Doc. 16 at 15-17.) 11 Whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under Title VII and the ADEA is governed by 12 Rule 8, not the McDonnell Douglas framework. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 13 506, 508 (2002). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, that framework “is an evidentiary 14 standard, not a pleading requirement.” Id. at 510. It therefore does not govern Plaintiff’s 15 claims at this stage of litigation. Instead, ordinary pleading standards apply. “All factual 16 allegations are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of 17 the plaintiff.” Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019). 18 To be sure, a plaintiff still must make “sufficient, nonconclusory allegations” 19 linking the challenged actions to discrimination. Id. at 1138. Further, although plaintiffs 20 do not have the burden of establishing a prima facie case at the pleading stage, courts in 21 the Ninth Circuit continue to review discrimination complaints under the McDonnell 22 Douglas framework “so as to decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, 23 whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 24 state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. 25 Supp. 3d 781, 797 (N.D. Cal. 2015). See, e.g., Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 26 F.3d 1045, 1048-1050 (9th Cir. 2012) (age discrimination); Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F. Supp. 27 3d 1290, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (sex discrimination); Rivera v. Coventry Health & Life 28 10 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 1 Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3548763, *4 (D. Ariz. 2016) (race discrimination). 2 A. Age Discrimination 3 To plead a claim for age discrimination, “a plaintiff must allege in her complaint 4 that: (1) she was at least forty years old; (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) 5 discharged; and (4) ‘either replaced by [a] substantially younger [employee] with equal or 6 inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an 7 inference of age discrimination.’” Sheppard, 694 F.3d at 1049 (alterations in original) 8 (quoting Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008)). 9 Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he is over forty years old. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 6.) He has 10 also alleged, albeit obliquely, that he was discharged. (Id. ¶ 22.) But he does not allege 11 how the discharge itself was discriminatory. This omission, alone, may suggest that he has 12 failed to state an ADEA claim. Rivera, 2016 WL 3548763 at *4 (“Rivera fails to establish 13 a prima facie case of disparate treatment age discrimination . . . . [because] Rivera fails to 14 satisfy the third and fourth prong, as she does not allege how her employment with Aetna 15 came to end, and she fails to allege that she was replaced by a substantially younger 16 employee with equal or inferior qualifications.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 However, some courts, reviewing cases where the challenged employment acts did not 18 involve discharge, have instead analyzed prongs three and four of this test by determining 19 whether the employee (3) “was subject to an adverse employment action” and (4) 20 “similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably.” 21 Longariello v. Phx. Union High Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 4827014, *3 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“In 22 order to establish a claim of discrimination under [Title VII, the ADEA, and the ACRA], 23 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that: . . . (3) he was subject to an adverse employment 24 action; and (4) similarly-situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more 25 favorably.”). 26 Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either framing of the test. First, Plaintiff does 27 not allege that he was performing his job duties satisfactorily. True, he alleges that he “had 28 worked as a city carrier [and] was in a top pay scale.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 55.) He also alleges that 1 he “performed the essential functions of his position.” (Id. ¶ 10.) But these statements are 2 not allegations that his performance was satisfactory or better. Compare Sheppard, 694 3 F.3d at 1050 (plaintiff alleged a plausible claim of age discrimination where, inter alia, she 4 claimed that “her performance was satisfactory or better” and “she received consistently 5 good performance reviews”); Rivera, 2016 WL 3548763 at *4 (satisfactory performance 6 prong satisfied where plaintiff alleged “that she was ‘an exceptionally good customer 7 service representative’ according to her performance review”). Moreover, Plaintiff 8 acknowledges elsewhere in the complaint that he received four “letters of warning” from 9 his supervisors for unspecified reasons. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16.) 10 Plaintiff also fails to state a claim because his allegations regarding others who 11 received more favorable treatment are vague and conclusory. Although Plaintiff alleges 12 that “[y]ounger, less experienced persons were brought on to fulfill the same duties he had” 13 and that these “younger employees were favored by management” and “were granted leave, 14 intermittent leave and without pay” (id. ¶¶ 55, 57), Plaintiff fails to identify any of these 15 “younger employees” by name, fails to provide even a rough approximation of how many 16 of these “younger employees” received the favorable treatment, and does not allege that 17 these “younger employees” were “substantially younger” than him. Brazill v. Cal. 18 Northstate Coll. of Pharmacy, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1052-53 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 19 (“[T]he replacement of a slightly younger employee will not give rise to a successful 20 ADEA claim. . . . [A] ten-year age difference would be considered substantial.”). 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADEA claim is dismissed. The dismissal is with leave to 22 amend because it may be possible for Plaintiff to cure the aforementioned defects. 23 B. Title VII Race And Sex Discrimination 24 To plead a claim under Title VII for race or sex discrimination, a plaintiff must 25 allege that: “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) 26 he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals 27 outside his protected class were treated more favorably.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 28 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 1304 1 (applying this test to sex discrimination claim at pleading stage); Rivera, 2016 WL 2 3548763 at *4 (applying this test to race discrimination claim at pleading stage). 3 An initial problem with Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is that, in his response brief, he 4 did not respond to the Agency’s arguments regarding the insufficiency of that claim. The 5 Agency therefore argues that summary dismissal of that claim is warranted. (Doc. 17 at 6 9.) The Agency is correct that “the Court is entitled to treat Plaintiff[’s] failure to respond 7 as waiver of the issue and consent to Defendant[’s] argument.” Doe v. Dickenson, 2008 8 WL 4933964, *5 (D. Ariz. 2008). See also Burk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2017 9 WL 4676588, *3 (D. Ariz. 2017) (“Failure to respond to an argument is a basis upon which 10 to grant Defendant’s motion.”). 11 The Court nonetheless will review the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim on 12 its merits. Based on that review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a Title 13 VII claim. Plaintiff alleges that he is a white male (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 6), so he has successfully 14 pleaded that he belongs to a protected class for race and sex discrimination purposes. 15 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII’s prohibition 16 of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ protects men as well as women . . . .”) (first 17 alteration in original); Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 18 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is well-established that Title VII applies to any racial group, whether 19 minority or majority.”). But as with the age discrimination claim, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim 20 begins to founder on prong two, because nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege 21 that he was sufficiently qualified for his position. Compare Sumera v. Holder, 2014 WL 22 3058278, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding plaintiff’s allegations that he “was qualified,” 23 “was ably performing his job,” “was recognized as having done the job without problem,” 24 and received a positive performance evaluation “sufficiently address Plaintiff’s 25 qualifications for his position”). 26 Further, as for prong four, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support his conclusory 27 assertion that Holsome-Benion, who seems to have held a supervisory role over Plaintiff 28 (Doc. 1 ¶ 32; Doc. 10-2 at 2), was in fact similarly situated to him. Bekkem v. Wilkie, 915 1 F.3d 1258, 1275 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege, for instance, 2 that she did not receive an employment benefit that similarly situated employees received. 3 A plaintiff’s assertion that she is similarly situated to other employees is just a legal 4 conclusion—and a legal conclusion is never enough.”) (citation and internal quotation 5 marks omitted); Barrett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Nw., 2015 WL 1491037, *3 (D. 6 Or. 2015) (allegation “that Defendant treated one similarly situated non-African American 7 employee, Mark Bennet, more favorably than Plaintiff ‘under similar, or more egregious, 8 circumstances . . . . provides no more than a conclusory assertion that Plaintiff and Mr. 9 Bennett were similarly situated, and further fails to allege any facts related to the 10 circumstances of Mr. Bennett’s discipline”). See also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 11 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Employees in supervisory positions are generally 12 deemed not to be similarly situated to lower level employees.”). Plaintiff similarly fails to 13 allege that the other comparators—unspecified female or African American employees— 14 were similarly situated. 15 Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is therefore dismissed. The dismissal is with leave to 16 amend because it may be possible for Plaintiff to cure the aforementioned defects. 17 Accordingly, 18 IT IS ORDERED that the Agency’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is granted. The 19 ADA and ADAAA claims are dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s claims 20 regarding the processing of his administrative complaint are also dismissed without leave 21 to amend. Plaintiff’s untimely claims and his claims under Title VII and the ADEA are 22 dismissed with leave to amend, as discussed above. 23 … 24 … 25 … 26 … 27 … 28 … 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file and serve a First Amended □□ Complaint (‘FAC’) within 14 days from the date of this order. If Plaintiff files a FAC, the 3|| changes shall be limited to curing the deficiencies raised in this order and Plaintiff shall, consistent with LRCiv 15.1(a), attach a redlined version of the pleading as an exhibit. 5 Dated this 22nd day of February, 2021. 6 7 fom ee” Dominic W. Lanza 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -27-