Payne v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Bonnie Payne, No. CV-19-08254-PCT-GMS 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Bonnie Payne’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 17 Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 19.) For the following reasons, the Motion 18 is granted in part and denied in part. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff filed this action on August 29, 2019, seeking review of the denial of her 21 application for benefits under the Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff 22 filed her opening brief on January 15, 2020. (Doc. 11.) Subsequently, the parties stipulated 23 to remand the matter to the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for further administrative 24 proceedings, (Doc. 14), and the Court remanded the matter pursuant to the stipulation, 25 (Doc. 15.) Upon remand, the ALJ issued a favorable decision and awarded past-due 26 benefits. 27 On April 27, 2020, the Court awarded Plaintiff $3,109.54 in attorney’s fees under 28 the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees in the 1 amount of $22,725.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). 2 DISCUSSION 3 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment 4 favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 5 attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for 6 such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which 7 the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment[.]” Section 406(b) “does not displace 8 contingent-fee agreements” but rather “calls for court review of such arrangements as an 9 independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” 10 Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 11 In determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, courts must 12 “approach fee determinations by looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing 13 it for reasonableness.” Id. at 808. Courts may reduce the amount requested in the 14 contingent-fee agreement “if the attorney provided substandard representation or delayed 15 the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 16 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 Here, Plaintiff contracted to pay 25 percent of her past-due benefits on a contingency 18 fee basis, in accordance with Section 406(b), (Doc. 1–2), and there is no evidence of 19 substandard performance or delay by Plaintiff’s counsel. However, $22,725.00 for 15.15 20 hours worked, which translates to an effective hourly rate of $1,500 per hour, in a case 21 resolved without full briefing is unreasonably high. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 22 (explaining that downward adjustment is appropriate where “the benefits are large in 23 comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case”). The Court finds that an 24 award of $18,180.00 is appropriate. This award represents an effective hourly rate of 25 $1,200.00, which falls within the range of effective hourly rates deemed reasonable by 26 other Arizona district courts. See, e.g., Norden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV- 27 19-00373-PHX-JAT, 2020 WL 3472551, at *1–3 (D. Ariz. June 25, 2020) (reducing a 28 requested award of $28,500.00, representing an effective hourly rate of $1,295.45, to 1 || $26,400.00 because the award fell “slightly outside the range of reasonableness that this 2|| Court, and others in this district, have found reasonable in recent cases resolved by a 3 || stipulation to remand without full briefing”); Demand v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4|| CV-18-08063-PCT-DLR, 2020 WL 1659898, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 3, 2020) (awarding || $18,660.00, instead of $25,266.00, because “an effective hourly rate of $1,624.82 is too 6|| high considering this case resolved through a stipulated remand without full briefing”). 7|| This award also considers the risks involved in a contingent-fee case while adjusting 8 || downward for the relatively short amount of time spent on the case. 9 Additionally, as the Court awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the |} Court orders that Plaintiff's counsel refund the EAJA award of $3,109.54 to Plaintiff. In 11 || Gisbrecht, the United States Supreme Court specified that fee awards may be made under □□ the EAJA and §406(b) but “the claimant’s attorney must refun[d] to the claimant the 13 || amount of the smaller fee.” 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 14 Accordingly, 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Attorney’s Motion for Attorney || Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Attorney’s 17 || Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 19) is GRANTED in part and |) DENIED in part. Plaintiff's counsel is awarded $18,180.00 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 19} 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)C1). 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the EAJA award of $3,109.54. 22 Dated this 29th day of March, 2021. 23 Wi 24 A Whacrsay Sooo) 25 Chief United States District Judge 26 27 28 -3-