Irvine v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Crystal Irvine, No. CV-20-01086-PHX-JAT 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Crystal Irvine’s appeal from the Commissioner 16 of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of social security disability benefits. 17 The appeal is fully briefed (Doc. 12, Doc. 15, Doc. 16), and the Court now rules. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 The issues presented in this appeal are whether substantial evidence supports the 20 Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination that Claimant was not disabled beginning 21 on April 19, 2016 and whether the ALJ committed legal error in its analysis. (Doc. 12 at 22 1–2; AR 17, 197, 212). 23 A. Factual Overview 24 Plaintiff was born in December 1982 (AR 48) and earned a bachelor’s degree in 25 2008 (AR 50). She has past relevant work experience as receptionist, quality assurance 26 manager, mortgage clerk, and customer service representative. (AR 30). Plaintiff filed her 27 social security disability claim on June 26, 2016, alleging disabilities including dissociative 28 identity disorder, depression, anxiety, and fibromyalgia. (AR 17, 218). An ALJ denied 1 Plaintiff’s claim on May 22, 2019. (AR 32). The SSA Appeals Counsel denied a request 2 for review of that decision and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final decision. 3 (AR 1). 4 B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process 5 To qualify for social security benefits, a claimant must show she “is under a 6 disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). A claimant is disabled if she suffers from a medically 7 determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging “in any 8 substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 423(d)(1)–(2). The SSA has created a five-step process 9 for an ALJ to determine whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). 10 Each step is potentially dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4). 11 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial 12 gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Substantial 13 gainful activity is work activity that is both “substantial,” involving “significant physical 14 or mental activities,” and “gainful,” done “for pay or profit.” Id. § 404.1572(a)–(b). 15 At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant’s 16 impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have “a severe medically 17 determinable physical or mental impairment,” the claimant is not disabled. Id. A “severe 18 impairment” is one which “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability 19 to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities are “the abilities and 20 aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” Id. § 404.1522(b). 21 At the third step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment or 22 combination of impairments “meets or equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 23 Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. 24 Id. If not, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s “residual 25 functional capacity” (RFC). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). The RFC represents the most a claimant 26 “can still do despite [her] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing the claimant’s 27 RFC, the ALJ will consider the claimant’s “impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such 28 as pain, [that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [the claimant] 1 can do in a work setting.” Id. 2 At the fourth step, the ALJ uses the RFC to determine whether the claimant can still 3 perform her “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ compares the 4 claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. 5 Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform her past relevant work, the ALJ will find 6 that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 7 At the fifth and final step, the ALJ determines whether—considering the claimant’s 8 RFC, age, education, and work experience—she “can make an adjustment to other work.” 9 Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ finds that the claimant can make an adjustment to other 10 work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the ALJ finds that the claimant cannot make 11 an adjustment to other work, then the claimant is disabled. Id. 12 C. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors 13 Here, at the first step, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had not engaged in 14 substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of her disability. (AR 19). 15 At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, hypertension, 16 thyroid disorder, borderline personality disorder, major depressive disorder with psychosis, 17 anxiety disorder, and alcohol dependence constituted severe impairments under 20 C.F.R. 18 404.1520(c). (AR 19). 19 At the third step, the ALJ determined that Claimant’s impairments did not meet the 20 severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 21 (AR 21). After evaluating Claimant’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform 22 light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) “except she is able to perform simple 23 routine work involving simple work related decisions and simple instructions, involving 24 no public contact, can have occasional contact with coworkers, and is unable to drive as a 25 work responsibility.” (AR 24). 26 At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant 27 work. (AR 30). 28 At the fifth and final step, the ALJ concluded that given Plaintiff’s age, education, 1 work experience, and RFC, a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy 2 that she could have performed. (AR 24). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 3 was not disabled. (AR 31). 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 This Court may not overturn the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits absent legal error 6 or a lack of substantial evidence. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). 7 “Substantial evidence means . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 8 as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) 9 (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). 10 On review, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the 11 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion, and may 12 not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (quoting 13 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ, not this Court, draws 14 inferences, resolves conflicts in medical testimony, and determines credibility. See 15 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 16 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, the Court must affirm even when “the evidence admits of more 17 than one rational interpretation.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). The 18 Court “review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and 19 may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 20 1010. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 Plaintiff raises three claims of error: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion 23 of Plaintiff’s examining doctor, Dr. Brent Geary, PhD; (2) the ALJ improperly discounted 24 Plaintiff’s testimony and the testimony of Plaintiff’s husband and mother-in-law; and (3) 25 the ALJ erred by accepting the testimony of a vocational expert based on an incomplete 26 hypothetical question. The Court addresses each in turn. 27 A. Medical Evidence 28 First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by assigning “little weight” to the opinion of 1 Dr. Geary, who examined Plaintiff on September 14, 2017 and concluded that “[g]iven the 2 multiplicity and pervasiveness of [Plaintiff’s] problems, it is difficult to conjure a rationale 3 whereby she would be able to sustain a job on a consistent basis.” (AR 910). The ALJ 4 addressed Dr. Geary’s opinion as follows: 5 The undersigned assigns little weight to Dr. Geary’s opinion as it is generally inconsistent with his own assessments, primarily 6 based on [Plaintiff’s] own subjective allegations, and inconsistent with the longitudinal record. Dr. Geary 7 determined that through the administration of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV, the claimant had a full scale IQ of 8 99, indicating average intelligence. Further, on the Wechsler Memory Scale-IV, it was determined that [Plaintiff] had 9 normal results in all subareas of memory and overall. The record also indicates that [Plaintiff] has been able to maintain 10 eye contact with others. She has also generally exhibited insight and judgment in the normal to fair range with some less 11 than frequent abnormalities. Accordingly, based upon the inconsistencies inherent in his testing, evaluations, and 12 assessments, the undersigned assigns little weight to the opinion of Dr. Geary. 13 (AR 29) (citations omitted). 14 15 Under the circumstances of this case, an ALJ may reject the opinion of an examining 16 doctor by offering clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 17 record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). 18 The ALJ met this standard here, and Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 19 First, relying on Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2008), 20 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Geary’s opinion merely because he recorded 21 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Doc. 12 at 10). In Ryan, an ALJ discounted the 22 claimant’s psychiatric assessment after concluding that the assessment was “based more 23 upon the claimant’s subjective complaints which are not fully supported in the record.” Id. 24 at 1198. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and noted that in addition to recording the claimant’s 25 subjective complaints, the psychiatrist also “recorded several of his own clinical 26 observations,” including that the claimant’s “[b]ehavior and mannerisms [we]re somewhat 27 odd”; “[s]he [wa]s easily agitated and appear[ed] to be very angry”; and her affect was 28 “anxious, distraught, nervous, shaky, and edgy.” Id. at 1199. The court held that “an ALJ 1 does not provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting an examining physician’s 2 opinion by questioning the credibility of the patient’s complaints where the doctor does not 3 discredit those complaints and supports his ultimate opinion with his own observations” 4 Id. at 1199–20. The court further noted that “nothing in the record to suggest[ed] that [the 5 psychiatrist] disbelieved [the claimant’s] description of her symptoms, or . . . relied on 6 those descriptions more heavily than his own clinical observations in reaching the 7 conclusion.” Id. at 1200. 8 Unlike Ryan, here, Dr. Geary’s report did rely more heavily on Plaintiff’s 9 descriptions than his own clinical observations. Indeed, Dr. Geary’s ultimate conclusion 10 seems to rely on little to none of his own clinical observations. Dr. Geary’s report indicates 11 that Plaintiff “arrived 15 minutes early for her appointment” and “maintained a somber but 12 involved demeanor throughout the time required to complete the assessment process.” (AR 13 903–904). Dr. Geary noted that Plaintiff’s “[f]acial expression was unremarkable,” “eye 14 contact and attention span were satisfactory,” “motor level was normal,” and her “speed of 15 speech was normal and associations were logical.” (AR 904). He further noted that Plaintiff 16 “appeared mildly tense but she was able to focus on topics at hand,” and “there were no 17 observed difficulties with judgment.” (AR 904). Further, as both Dr. Geary and the ALJ 18 acknowledged, most of Plaintiff’s test results were within normal limits. (AR 19, 910).1 19 Yet, Dr. Geary concluded that Plaintiff would not be able to sustain a job on a 20 consistent basis based on a review of records from other medical providers and other 21 information of which Plaintiff was the “sole source.” (AR 904). Under these circumstances, 22 the ALJ did not err by considering that Dr. Geary’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s own 23 subjective allegations. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 24 2010) (holding that an ALJ articulated sufficiently specific and legitimate reasoning for 25 rejecting a treating doctor’s opinion where the opinion was “based almost entirely on the 26 1 Plaintiff argues that these tests, such as IQ and Wechsler Memory Scale-IV, are inconsequential because Plaintiff’s disabilities are the result of personality disorders rather 27 than cognitive dysfunction. (Doc. 11). But this argument does not negate the fact that Dr. Geary’s ultimate conclusion was not supported by the tests he conducted. In other words, 28 Plaintiff performing within the normal range on cognitive functioning tests does not support Dr. Geary’s finding of severe personality disorders. 1 claimant’s self-reporting” and the opinion did not offer “any independent analysis or 2 diagnosis”). 3 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Geary’s opinion was 4 inconsistent with the longitudinal record is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 12 5 at 11). In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites brief statements from Dr. Douglas 6 Stockwell, M.D., and Dr. Brent Nadella, D.O., which state that Plaintiff is unable to drive 7 or work due to her medical condition.2 (AR 345–46, 818). But the ALJ gave sufficiently 8 specific and legitimate reasons to discount the statements of Drs. Stockwell and Nadella. 9 Specifically, the ALJ noted that these opinions “are based in part upon the claimant’s 10 alleged black outs which have not been substantiated by the objective medical evidence.” 11 (AR 30). Further, the ALJ stated that these opinions were inconsistent with the fact that 12 Plaintiff has “generally exhibited intact concentration,” “has been assessed as having an 13 intact recent and remote memory,” and her ability to “engage in hobbies such as caring for 14 her pet, going on vacation, making art, and watching television.” (Id.). The ALJ 15 appropriately considered these factors, which are supported by the record, to determine 16 how much credit to afford opinions the contrary. See Ruckdashel v. Colvin, 672 Fed. App’x 17 745, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons . . . by 18 stating that [an] opinion was conclusory, contradicted by the objective medical evidence, 19 and relied heavily upon [the claimant’s] subjective reports regarding the severity of her 20 disability.”). 21 Plaintiff also asserts that “the longitudinal record is voluminous and full of 22 examples” of serious symptoms resulting from Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety. (Doc. 12 23 at 12). But “[e]ven when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 24 interpretation, [the Court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by 25 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 26 Cir. 2012). Here, the ALJ’s findings are supported by the record and the Court does not 27 find that the record evidence pointing in the opposite direction compels a conclusion 28 2 Plaintiff attributes one of these letters to Dr. David Engstrom, D.O., but it appears that Dr. Nadella signed the letter rather than Dr. Engstrom. (AR 818). 1 contrary to the ALJ’s. 2 In sum, the ALJ did not err by affording “little weight” to Dr. Geary’s opinion. 3 B. Testimonial Evidence 4 1. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 5 Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 6 testimony. The Court disagrees. 7 The Ninth Circuit has established a two-step analysis for an ALJ to determine 8 whether to credit a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. “First, the ALJ must 9 determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 10 impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 11 alleged.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garrison, 759 12 F.3d at 1014–15). If the claimant presents such evidence, the ALJ then evaluates the 13 claimant’s subjective complaints. See id. “In evaluating the credibility of pain testimony 14 after a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ 15 may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical 16 evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 17 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Instead, an ALJ must provide “specific, clear, and convincing 18 reasons” for doing so. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 Claimant testified that she could sit in a chair for 30 minutes to two hours at a time, 20 stand for 30 minutes to an hour at a time, walk about a mile at a time, and lift 10 to 14 21 pounds. (AR 64–65). She further stated that she attempts to do chores, but these attempts 22 are often unsuccessful due to her anxiety, and she does not go grocery shopping. (AR 65). 23 At the first step, the ALJ determined that “[C]laimant’s medically determinable 24 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (AR 25). At 25 the second step, however, the ALJ determined that “[C]laimant’s statements concerning 26 the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 27 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.). 28 After a considerable discussion of the record evidence in this case, the ALJ 1 concluded: 2 It follows that in consideration of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms associated with . . . borderline personality disorder, major 3 depressive disorder with psychosis, anxiety disorder, and alcohol dependence, and the record hearing, [Plaintiff] is 4 generally able to perform work at the light exertional level. Considering that [Plaintiff] has been able to understand health 5 care instructions, has been able to perform most of the activities of daily living, has intact concentration, and almost 6 completed her Master’s degree, she is able to perform simple routine work involving simple work related decisions and 7 simple instructions. Due to the claimants past suicidal ideations, reported hallucinations, and intermittent decreased 8 mood and affect, [Plaintiff] can have no public contact. However, as [Plaintiff] has been able to attend events at her 9 son’s school, has been able to go to Goodwill to shop, has gone on vacations, has taken in her cousin’s family to live with her, 10 and has [a] positive relationship with her family, [Plaintiff] can have occasional contact with co-workers. In accepting 11 [Plaintiff’s] statements that she experiences panic attacks when driving and the below opinions, [Plaintiff] can perform work 12 which does not have driving as a work responsibility. 13 (AR 28). 14 Relying on Garrison, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by selectively citing her 15 more normal psychiatric records to “reject [her] testimony merely because symptoms wax 16 and wane in the course of treatment.” See 759 F.3d at 1017. (Doc. 12 at 14). Plaintiff further 17 argues that the ALJ erred by relying on evidence of her daily activities to conclude that she 18 was capable of working full-time. See id. at 1016 (“We have repeatedly warned that ALJs 19 must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with 20 testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and 21 all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than 22 merely resting in bed all day.”). 23 The ALJ, however, did not discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony “merely” 24 because her symptoms waxed and waned over time or because she could complete some 25 chores during the day. “The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s 26 credibility, including (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the 27 claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 28 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 1 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 2 treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 3 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 4 404.1529(a) (“In evaluating the intensity and persistence of your symptoms, including 5 pain, we will consider all of the available evidence, including your medical history, the 6 medical signs and laboratory findings, and statements about how your symptoms affect 7 you.”). 8 The ALJ considered these factors here, and Plaintiff’s improvement during the 9 course of treatment and completion of daily activities were but two factors in a 10 comprehensive analysis. The ALJ noted that although Plaintiff testified that she had 11 difficulty recalling information, she had normal results in the subarea of memory on the 12 Wechsler Memory Scale-IV and that she had been generally able to recall her personal and 13 health history. (AR 26). Further, contrary to her testimony that she was unable to 14 concentrate, understand information, and complete tasks, the ALJ cited record evidence 15 indicating that Plaintiff had exhibited a normal or coherent thought processes and had been 16 able to understand health care and discharge instructions and engage in conversations and 17 answer questions appropriately. (AR 26). The ALJ further noted that although Plaintiff 18 alleged that she had hallucinations since her youth, she had been able to “maintain full time 19 employment, get a Bachelor’s degree, and almost finish her Master’s degree.” (AR 27). 20 Further, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had been previously voluntarily hospitalized 21 for psychosis and attempting suicide in 2016, but has not had required hospitalization since 22 then and commonly denied suicidal ideations. (AR 27). Considering these findings 23 together, which are supported by substantial record evidence, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s 24 subjective symptom testimony. The ALJ did not err by doing so. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 25 1039. 26 2. Lay Witness Testimony 27 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the testimony of Brent 28 Irvine, Plaintiff’s husband, and Denise Irvine, Plaintiff’s mother-in-law. 1 Mr. Irvine completed a questionnaire describing Plaintiff’s limitations. He stated 2 that due to Plaintiff’s illness, she could not drive, work, be social with groups of people, or 3 control food-related urges. (AR 247). He further stated that Plaintiff had vivid nightmares 4 that prevented her from sleeping and had memory issues that prevented her from paying 5 bills or remembering to turn off the stove. (AR 247–49). The ALJ assigned “little weight” 6 to this assessment, reasoning as follows: 7 [Plaintiff’s] husband . . . submitted a Third Party Function report in which he detailed that [Plaintiff] exercised regularly, 8 han[g]s out with her friends, cares for her son, but has difficulty paying attention for longer than thirty minutes, following 9 instructions, and handling stress. Mr. Irvine lacks the medical training necessary to make exacting observations as to dates, 10 frequencies, types, and degrees of medicals signs and symptoms or the frequency or intensity of unusual mood or 11 mannerisms. However, based upon his relationship to [Plaintiff] and consistent observations, the undersigned assigns 12 little weight to his assessments. 13 (AR 30) (citation omitted). The ALJ did not specifically address the questionnaire 14 completed by Plaintiff’s mother-in-law, which also stated that Plaintiff suffered from 15 memory issues and was unable to complete tasks due to lack of focus. (AR 304–06). 16 The applicable regulations require the ALJ to consider testimony from a claimant’s 17 family and friends. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 404.1545(a)(3). The regulations, 18 however, “do not require the ALJ to provide express reasons for rejecting testimony from 19 each lay witness.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (clarifying that contrary to the statement in 20 Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993), that “[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount 21 the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness,” 22 an ALJ is not required to “discuss every witness’s testimony on a individualized, witness- 23 by-witness basis”). 24 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly required Mr. Irvine to have medical 25 expertise in order to comment on Plaintiff’s ability to perform activities. (Doc. 12 at 17). 26 The Court, however, does not read the ALJ decision as requiring Mr. Irvine to have medical 27 expertise. Rather, the ALJ stated that she was not relying on Mr. Irvine’s conclusions 28 regarding Plaintiff’s medical conditions, which would require medical expertise. Nor does 1 it appear that the ALJ discounted Mr. Irvine’s statement in its entirety. Instead, the ALJ 2 considered Mr. Irvine’s relationship to Plaintiff and determined that Mr. Irvine’s statements 3 merited “little weight” when considered in light of the remaining evidence. Further, 4 because Plaintiff’s mother-in-law’s statements were similar in nature to Mr. Irvine’s, the 5 ALJ did not need to specifically address her testimony to afford it little weight. See Molina, 6 674 F.3d at 1114. 7 But even assuming the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to these opinions was 8 erroneous, the Court concludes that any error was harmless. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 9 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015); Johnston v. Astrue, No. CV 11-8121-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 10 3108838, at *11 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2012) (applying harmless error review to an ALJ’s 11 disregarding of competent lay witness testimony). The limitations and disabilities 12 contained in these questionnaires were consistent with Plaintiff’s own testimony, which 13 the ALJ discounted for reasons supported by substantial evidence. At best, the lay witness 14 testimony corroborates Plaintiff’s properly discredited testimony, and, accordingly, the 15 Court finds that this evidence would not have changed the ALJ’s disability determination. 16 See Marsh, 792 F.3d at 1173 (“ALJ errors in social security cases are harmless if they are 17 ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 18 Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006))). 19 C. Vocational Expert Testimony 20 Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by posing improper hypotheticals to the 21 vocational expert. (Doc. 12 at 18). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ 22 improperly discounted the evidence discussed above, the questions posed to vocational 23 expert did not adequately set forth all of Plaintiff’s limitations. (Id.). Because the Court 24 concludes that the ALJ did not err in reaching its determinations, the ALJ did not err in 25 posing its hypothetical questions. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 26 2005) (“The hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the limitations that 27 the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record.”). 28 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, 3 IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court shall 4|| enter judgment accordingly. 5 Dated this 16th day of April, 2021. 6 7 ' = James A. CO 9 Senior United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -13-