Brogdon v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 George Brogdon, et al., No. CV-20-00566-TUC-JAS (MSA) 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs George Brogdon, Lauro Garcia, and Diana 16 Almader-Douglas’s amended motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 31.) Defendant Roman 17 Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson (“Diocese”) filed an objection to Plaintiffs’ 18 motion and a request for a ruling on its pending motion to dismiss. (Docs. 22, 32, 33.) 19 Defendants Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (“Archbishop”) and St John’s 20 Seminary (“Seminary”) each filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and a 21 response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. (Docs. 34, 35, 41.) Also 22 pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to respond to the 23 Diocese’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 39.) For the following reasons, Plaintiffs will be granted 24 leave to amend, and the motions to dismiss and motion for an extension of time will be 25 denied as moot. See Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1164, 1165 n.8 (9th Cir. 2015) 26 (explaining that a “magistrate judge’s decision to grant a motion to amend is not generally 27 dispositive” and that a magistrate judge may deny a motion as moot because that is a 28 “quintessential housekeeping matter”). 1 I. Background 2 The first amended complaint contains the following allegations: Plaintiffs, who are 3 residents of southern Arizona, are victims of sexual abuse committed by members of the 4 Roman Catholic clergy. (Doc. 17 at 13–20.) Their abuse is the result of a pattern of 5 misconduct by the Seminary, the Archbishop, and the Diocese. (Id. at 3.) Specifically, some 6 or all of the abusive clergymen attended the Seminary, which has produced a 7 disproportionately large number of alleged sexual abusers; when these clergymen are 8 accused of sexual abuse in California, the Archbishop protects them by transferring them 9 to other states, including Arizona; and when clergymen are accused of sexual abuse in 10 Arizona, the Diocese fails to report the accusations and protects the accused clergymen by 11 moving them to different parishes. (Id.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs allege a claim 12 under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) as well 13 as various claims under state law. (Id. at 20–32.) 14 In the proposed second amended complaint, Plaintiffs seek to add two additional 15 plaintiffs, both of whom are also alleged victims of abuse committed in Arizona by 16 members of the clergy. (Doc. 31-1 at 16–17, 25–27.) In addition to providing details about 17 these individuals’ abuse and the Diocese’s response, Plaintiffs supplement their RICO 18 claim with allegations that Defendants’ racketeering activities include victim and witness 19 tampering. (Id. at 33.) Aside from these and other, lesser changes, Plaintiffs’ allegations 20 and legal theories remain the same. (Doc. 31 at 2.) 21 II. Legal Standard 22 The district court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny leave to 23 amend, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), but leave should freely be given “when 24 justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “When considering whether to grant leave to 25 amend, a district court should consider several factors including undue delay, the movant’s 26 bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 27 previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility.” Brown v. Stored 28 Value Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). 1 III. Discussion 2 The Foman factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs leave to amend. In 3 determining whether to grant leave, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 4 party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 5 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). Significantly, Defendants do not argue that they would 6 be prejudiced if leave is granted. Nor is there any indication that allowing the amendment 7 would cause prejudice. To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment does not alter the 8 character of this lawsuit, which is still at an early stage. See United States v. United 9 Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding no prejudice where 10 the request for leave to amend was made “at a very early stage” in the litigation, and the 11 amendment did not include new legal theories); cf. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network 12 Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that prejudice would occur if leave 13 to amend were granted because discovery would need to be reopened). 14 There is also no indication that Plaintiffs are acting in bad faith or with a dilatory 15 motive, or that Plaintiffs unduly delayed in requesting leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ counsel 16 asserts that the two putative plaintiffs contacted her after she filed the original motion for 17 leave to amend, and that she diligently investigated whether it would be appropriate to join 18 them. The amended request was filed soon after counsel’s investigation was complete. 19 Under these circumstances, the factors of bad faith and undue delay weigh in favor of 20 granting leave to amend. Cf. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 986 (finding the plaintiff unduly 21 delayed in requesting leave to amend because it had considered the amendment several 22 months before making the request). 23 The next factor, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 24 allowed, also weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs leave to amend. The Court has not 25 “allowed” any previous amendments: Plaintiffs amended their original complaint as a 26 matter of course and now, for the first time, seek permission of the Court to amend once 27 more. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). And while Defendants vigorously contend that Plaintiffs’ 28 claims are without merit and should be dismissed, and that Plaintiffs have previously failed to correct legal defects brought to their attention, the simple fact is that the Court did not 2|| have an opportunity to examine whether the original complaint was legally defective, and || it has not yet determined whether the first amended complaint is defective. This factor 4|| therefore supports Plaintiffs.! 5 Defendants rely primarily on the contention that amendment would be futile. It is 6|| true that “[fJutility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to 7\| amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “[o]rdinarily, 8 || courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Murphy v. Fisher, No. CV-19-04526-PHX, 2019 WL 5388039, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Fair Hous. Council of Cent. Cal., Inc. v. Nunez, No. 10cv02073, 2012 WL 217479, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012)). As the remaining Foman factors support 13} granting leave to amend, the Court finds it would be most efficient to grant Plaintiffs leave || to amend and then consider any motions to dismiss filed in response. Plaintiffs are advised || that, if a motion to dismiss is filed, further requests for leave to amend will not be 16 || considered until after the motion has been resolved. 17 IT IS ORDERED that the amended motion for leave to amend (Doc. 31) is 18 || granted. Plaintiffs shall file a clean copy of their second amended complaint within three days of the date of this Order. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions to dismiss (Docs. 22, 34, 35) and || the motion for an extension of time (Doc. 39) are denied as moot. 22 Dated this 21st day of April, 2021. 23 a XS onorable Maria suilera 24 United States Magistrate Judge 1 The Archbishop and the Seminary additionally argue that, by not filing a timely response to the Diocese’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have consented to the granting of that motion. See LRCiv 7.2(1). Upon further examination, however, it appears that the Diocese’s motion is not accompanied by a “certification that, before ling the motion, the movant notified the opposing party of the issues asserted in the motion and the parties were unable to agree that the pleading was curable in any part by a permissible amendment 28 || offered by the pleading party. LRCiv 12.1(c). A motion that does not include this certification “may be stricken summarily.” Jd. -4-