Kraft v. Arizona, State of ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 Rune K raft, ) No. CV-20-02004-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) State of Arizona, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 ) 15 Before the Court is Defendants’ State of Arizona, James P. Beene, Robert M. 16 Brutinel, William G. Montgomery, John R. Lopez, IV, Kent E. Cattani, David B. Gass, 17 David D. Weinzweig, Douglas Gerlach, and David W. Garbarino (“State Defendants”) 18 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31), as well as Defendant Reagan’s1 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48). 19 Having considered the briefing (Docs. 50, 51, & 56),2 the Motions will be granted. 20 1 The Court is unclear as to whether this Defendant is Michael Reagan, a male, or 21 Michele Reagan, a female. In Defendant Reagan’s Motion to Extend (Doc. 60), counsel refers to her client as Michele Reagan and indicates that, as a direct critique of Plaintiff’s 22 assertions and the docket, “[t]he name of the judge presiding over the case that Plaintiff 23 complains of is Michele Reagan.” (Doc. 60 at 2 n.1). However, in her subsequent Reply, counsel refers to her client as Michael Reagan and indicates that “Michael Reagan is the 24 appropriate Defendant as noted by Plaintiff in the Complaint and in his Response.” (Doc. 25 63 at 1). Because the Court is unclear, the Court will simply refer to this Defendant as Defendant Reagan. 26 2 The Court is also in receipt of Defendant Reagan’s Motion to Extend Time to File 27 his/her Reply in Support of his/her Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 60) and late-filed lodged proposed Reply (Doc. 63). Because the Court finds that the motions to dismiss are fit for 28 decision without the reply, the Court will deny the extension as moot. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This case arises from a proceeding in state justice court in which the Gainey Ranch 3 Community Association (“GRCA”) alleged that Plaintiff owed monthly assessments. 4 (Doc. 1 at 3-5). The GRCA filed a breach of contract action against Plaintiff in August of 5 2015, and following a jury trial the action was dismissed without prejudice on January 4, 6 2017. (Doc. 1 at 5). The GRCA filed a motion to transfer venue to the Maricopa County 7 Superior Court when the fees in the action exceeded the justice court’s jurisdictional 8 limitation of ten thousand dollars. (Doc. 31 at 3). Plaintiff maintains that the Maricopa 9 County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter after it had been dismissed 10 by the justice court. (Doc. 1 at 12). The Superior Court disagreed, and default judgment 11 was entered against Plaintiff. (Doc. 31 at 3). Plaintiff’s appeals to the Court of Appeals, 12 Division One and the Arizona Supreme Court were also unsuccessful. (Doc. 1 at 13). 13 Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant civil suit against the judges and justices who 14 presided over the original lawsuit against him. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges these judges 15 lacked jurisdiction over all proceedings, and thus were engaged in a “fraudulent scheme” 16 to cover up the corruption in the Arizona Court System. As a result, Plaintiff maintains that 17 these officials deprived him of his rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1981, and § 1982 and he is thus entitled to relief. (Doc. 1 at 2). 19 On March 31, 2021, State Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 20 Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 31). Similarly, on May 25, 2021 21 Defendant Reagan filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 40). 22 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 23 A complaint may be challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), lack of subject-matter 24 jurisdiction, based on either facial or factual grounds. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 25 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the 26 allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal 27 jurisdiction.” Id. In analyzing a facial challenge, the court assumes that the allegations are 28 true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 1 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject- 2 matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 3 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon 4 which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 5 claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief” so the defendant is given fair notice of the 6 claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 7 (2007) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim 8 under Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient 9 facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 10 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When deciding a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material 11 fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 12 nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 III. DISCUSSION3 14 State Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the 15 Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. 31 6-8). Defendant Reagan 16 argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim as the judges and justices are protected by judicial 17 immunity. (Doc. 48 2-5). Plaintiff argues that this Court does have subject matter 18 jurisdiction over this matter, and that the judges and justices are not protected by judicial 19 immunity because they did not have jurisdiction over his previous lawsuit. (Doc. 50). 20 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 21 State Defendants assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 22 Plaintiff’s claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 31 6-7). Under the Rooker- 23 3 As an initial matter, the Court is in receipt of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike in which 24 he argues that this Court cannot consider the documents from the underlying state court 25 case which State Defendants attach to their Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 32, 31-2, 31-3, 31-3, 31-4, & 31-5). However, “[a] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record 26 without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee v. City 27 of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted); Fed. R. Evid. 201. Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the existence of those documents, and 28 the Motion to Strike will be denied. 1 Feldman Doctrine, a losing plaintiff in state court may not bring a suit in federal district 2 court asserting erroneous state court rulings as legal wrongs and seeking to vacate the 3 judgment of that court. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Such a federal 4 action is considered a de facto appeal and is forbidden. Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 5 781 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that framing a federal complaint as a constitutional challenge 6 to a state court’s decision was a de facto appeal and thus barred). 7 Plaintiff seeks to vacate the default judgment of the state court and to declare the 8 judgment void. Plaintiff’s request amounts to a de facto appeal and is barred by the Rooker- 9 Feldman doctrine. It is immaterial that Plaintiff alleges the state court judges acted without 10 jurisdiction because “allegations that the state court lacked jurisdiction do not preclude 11 application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Thomas v. Zelon, No. CV 16-6544 JAK 12 (AJW), 2017 WL 6017343, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (citing Doe & Assoc. Law 13 Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a complaint 14 for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the state court lacked jurisdiction to 15 terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights and approve her child’s adoption was “within the 16 traditional boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine” and was a de facto appeal of a state 17 court judgment); Fletcher v. Gilbert, 262 Fed. Appx. 791, 791 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting 18 the argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the state court lacked 19 subject matter jurisdiction and rendered a void judgment); Safouane v. Fleck, 226 Fed. 20 Appx. 753, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 21 should not apply because the state court proceedings were “a legal nullity and void” and 22 holding that Rooker-Feldman precluded an action in federal court seeking a declaratory 23 judgment that all state court orders and judgments against the plaintiffs were void). 24 It is also immaterial that Plaintiff frames his jurisdictional argument as an allegation 25 of fraud, asserting that “Defendants committed extrinsic fraud upon the court.” (Doc. 50 26 at 15). It is true that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff alleges 27 that an adverse party in a state court proceeding committed extrinsic fraud that caused the 28 state court to rule for that adverse party. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 1 (9th Cir. 2004). But the adverse party in the underlying state court proceedings here was 2 the GRCA, not the state court and justice court judges who acted in the case. “Extrinsic 3 fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that court. It is, rather, a wrongful act 4 committed by the party or parties who engaged in the fraud.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 5 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004). To make out a claim for extrinsic fraud, therefore, a 6 plaintiff must “not alleg[] a legal error by the state court; rather, he or she [must allege] a 7 wrongful act by the adverse party.” Id.; see also Lewis v. L.A. Metro. Transit Auth., No. 8 CV-19-1456-PSG-JPR-X, 2019 WL 6448944, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019) (“While 9 Rooker-Feldman bars allegations that a state court erred, it does not bar jurisdiction where 10 an adverse party acted illegally. . . . A plaintiff successfully alleges extrinsic fraud when 11 he details how an adverse party, rather than a court, committed ‘an allegedly illegal act or 12 omission’ that prevented him from presenting his claim.”) (emphasis added) (citing Noel, 13 341 F.3d at 1164). Here, Plaintiff merely alleges a wrong by the state court judges—that 14 they acted without jurisdiction. Such a claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Accordingly, 15 this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims in this case. 16 B. Judicial Immunity 17 Both State Defendants and Defendant Reagan argue that judicial immunity bars 18 Plaintiff’s claim against them. (Docs. 31, 48). Plaintiff counters that these Arizona state 19 judges and justices lacked jurisdiction over the original lawsuit against him. (Doc. 50). 20 Judges are immune from civil liability for judicial actions taken within the 21 jurisdiction of their courts. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). A 22 “judicial” act is one that is normally performed by a judge and taken in the capacity of their 23 official duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The Supreme Court has held 24 that judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. Mireles v. 25 Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see Ashelman, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (holding that a 26 conspiracy between a judge and a prosecutor was clearly improper but was still protected 27 from civil action by judicial immunity). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because 28 the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” 1 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57. Judicial immunity is only inapplicable when the actions of 2 judges occur in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. 3 Plaintiff’s complaint states that the actions which entitle him to relief are the various 4 decisions and rulings made by the Arizona state judges and justices. (Doc. 1 at 3). Making 5 rulings and judgments on cases are clearly functions normally performed by judges. See 6 Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 (holding that whether an act is a function normally performed by a 7 judge is the first of two factors used to determine if an act is a “judicial” one). It is also 8 clear that these officials were acting in the capacity of their official duties when they made 9 these rulings, as the cases were before their court at the time of their decisions. (Docs. 31- 10 2, 31-3, 31-3, 31-4, and 31-5). Plaintiff does not contest any of this in his Response to the 11 Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 50). 12 Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not protected by judicial immunity 13 because they acted without jurisdiction. (Doc. 50). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that these 14 judges lost jurisdiction once Plaintiff was dismissed as a defendant without prejudice in 15 justice court. However, “[a]n order of dismissal without prejudice is not a final 16 determination of the controversy on its merits, and is no bar to the prosecution of another 17 suit timely commenced, founded upon the same cause of action.” State ex rel. Hess v. 18 Boehringer, 16 Ariz. 48, 51 (1914); see also Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr., Inc., 240 19 Ariz. 597, 600, ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (acknowledging that dismissal without prejudice “is not a 20 final judgment because the plaintiff can refile the action”). Because the dismissal was 21 without prejudice, even after the justice court dismissed the case against Plaintiff GRCA 22 remained free to amend its complaint to reassert claims against Plaintiff. Neither the justice 23 court, nor the superior court, acted without jurisdiction in this case. Their actions are 24 therefore protected by judicial immunity. 25 Because this Court finds grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under Rooker- 26 Feldman and judicial immunity, the Court need not address State Defendants’ remaining 27 arguments. The case will be dismissed. 28 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31) and Defendant Reagan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48) are granted. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 40) is denied 5 | for reasons stated in this Order. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is denied as moot. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Reagan’s Motion to Extend (Doc. 60) is denied as moot. 10 Dated this 28th day of June, 2021. 11 12 Honorable Teven P. Légan B United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28