Biddings v. Frias ( 2021 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Stonney Biddings, No. CV-20-00037-TUC-RM 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Eric Frias, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended 16 Complaint. (Doc. 53.) Defendants did not file a Response, and the time for doing so has 17 expired. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion. 18 I. Background 19 On January 23, 2020, Plaintiff Stonney Biddings, who is confined in the Arizona 20 State Prison Complex-Eyman in Florence, Arizona, filed through counsel a civil rights 21 Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, 22 among other things, sexual abuse and retaliation from staff at the Arizona Department of 23 Corrections Tucson Complex while he was housed there. (Id.) On February 28, 2020, the 24 Court ordered Defendants Eric Frias, Captain Baker, and Sergeant Segura to answer the 25 Complaint or respond by appropriate motion. (Doc. 7.) All three Defendants answered 26 the Complaint. (Docs. 9 and 18.) On September 15, 2020, the Court issued a Scheduling 27 Order setting September 28, 2020 as the deadline for joining parties and amending 28 pleadings. (Doc. 16.) 1 II. Discussion 2 In his Motion—filed on May 26, 2021—Plaintiff seeks leave to file a First 3 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (currently lodged at Doc. 54), arguing that he satisfies the 4 standards set forth in Rules 15 and 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend 5 his original complaint at this stage in the proceedings. (Doc. 53.) In his proposed FAC, 6 Plaintiff seeks to join Juli Roberts, the Warden of ADOC’s Tucson facility, as a 7 defendant in this action and to add claims against her in both her individual and 8 supervisory capacity for violating Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 2.) 9 Plaintiff avers that his new claims against Warden Roberts were recently discovered 10 during discovery in this case and two other cases involving similar allegations by other 11 incarcerated individuals of sexual abuse and retaliation by Defendant Frias. (Id. at 2; see 12 also Doc. 1 in 19-CV-350 and Doc. 1 in 19-CV-351.) In all three cases, the plaintiffs are 13 represented by the same attorneys and law firm; likewise, Defendant Frias is represented 14 by the same attorney in each case, and the other defendants are represented by the same 15 attorneys from the Arizona Attorney General’s Office. See 19-CV-350 and 19-CV-351. 16 Warden Roberts is a named defendant in 19-CV-350 and 19-CV-351. 17 Plaintiff alleges in the proposed FAC, in part, that: (1) Warden Roberts failed to 18 adequately train and supervise prison officials, including Defendant Frias, on the 19 standards set forth in the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) and the rights of 20 inmates to be free from sexual abuse; (2) a PREA Audit, conducted in 2018 at ADOC’s 21 Tucson facility, found that the facility under Warden Roberts’ control failed to comply 22 with numerous PREA standards; (3) despite having express notice of the results of the 23 PREA Audit, and notice of Defendant Frias’ sexual abuse of inmates, Warden Roberts 24 failed to make the required changes within the time allotted by the PREA Audit’s 25 corrective action plan, even eight months after the initial Audit; (4) Warden Roberts’ 26 inadequate training and supervision was the moving force behind Defendant Frias’ sexual 27 abuse of Plaintiff and demonstrated deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and 28 other inmates to be free from sexual abuse by state actors while in the state’s custody; 1 and (5) Warden Roberts encouraged Defendant Frias to resign rather than fire him. (Doc. 2 53 at 2, 7–8; Doc. 53-1 at 2, 8–10.) 3 A party seeking leave to amend his complaint after expiration of the deadline set 4 forth in the court’s scheduling order must first show good cause under Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) as to why that deadline was not met; then, if good cause is 6 shown, the party must additionally show that amendment is proper under Federal Rule of 7 Civil Procedure 15(a). Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th 8 Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (“[The] standard primarily considers the diligence of the 9 party seeking the amendment.”). 10 A. Good Cause Under Rule 16(b)(4) 11 Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to amend his complaint, despite the deadline 12 having expired, because the only deadline that will be adjusted in the Court’s scheduling 13 order is the deadline to amend the pleadings. (Doc. 53 at 5.) Plaintiff states that no further 14 discovery is needed, as Warden Roberts’ deposition has already been taken. (Id.) 15 Additionally, Plaintiff argues that “the results of the PREA Audit and Warden Roberts’ 16 express knowledge thereof has only been recently discovered by [him].” (Id.) Lastly, 17 Plaintiff argues that Warden Roberts will not be prejudiced in defending this lawsuit, as 18 the factual record for any claim against her has already been fully developed and 19 discovery is still ongoing in the aforementioned two cases and in the instant case. (Id.) 20 Under Rule 16(b)(4), good cause exists when the moving party demonstrates that 21 he could not reasonably meet the deadline despite exercising due diligence. Johnson, 975 22 F.2d at 609. “[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 23 modification.” Id. However, “the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing 24 the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion.” Id. “Moreover, 25 carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant 26 of relief.” Id. If the party seeking the modification “was not diligent, the inquiry should 27 end” and the request to modify the scheduling order should not be granted. Id. 28 To determine whether the moving party exercised diligence, “courts typically 1 consider the amount of time between the discovery of new information and when the 2 party requested leave to amend.” Leibel v. City of Buckeye, No. CV-18-01743-PHX- 3 DWL, 2019 WL 4736784, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2019) (citing Zivkovic v. S. Cal. 4 Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2002)).1 “Allowing parties to amend based 5 on [new] information obtained through discovery is common and well established, ” Fru- 6 Con Const. Corp. v. Sacramento Mun. Utility Dist., No. CIV.S-05-583LKKGGH, 2006 7 WL 3733815, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006); however, “new information alone is not 8 good cause for modifying a scheduling order,” Story v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 3:15- 9 CV-0194-AC, 2016 WL 5868077, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2016). That is, “[a] party must 10 also show diligence in seeking amendment of the scheduling order.” Id. 11 “Ideally, a party will move to amend within weeks of learning new information.” 12 Id. at *3; see also Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, No. C 06-02231 WHA 3533039, at *2 13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006) (plaintiff showed diligence by seeking leave to amend her 14 complaint approximately two weeks after learning the basis of her new claims). However, 15 “[a] longer delay can still be consistent with diligence, depending on the circumstances of 16 the delay.” Story, 2016 WL 5868077, at *3. “Delay based on attempts to avoid 17 unnecessary time and expense, such as pursuing settlement and avoiding unnecessary 18 motions practice, is consistent with diligence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) 19 (determining plaintiff was diligent despite a three-month delay between the discovery of 20 new information and moving to amend because, during that time, she engaged in 21 “ongoing settlement negotiations and [s]ought Defendants’ stipulation to [the] 22 amendment”). Moreover, delay based on attempts to obtain and review necessary records 23 to assist in determining whether amendment should be pursued is likewise consistent with 24 diligence. See Leibel v. City of Buckeye, No. CV-18-01743-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL 25 4736784, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2019) (concluding that plaintiff was diligent despite a 26 1 Courts may, “under case-specific circumstances,” consider a party’s diligence “before the deadline for amendments, between the deadline and the motion to amend, between 27 the discovery of new information and the motion to amend, or in all of these time frames. Aldan v. World Corp., 267 F.R.D. 346, 357 (D. N. Apr. 30, 2010). Given the 28 circumstances in this case, the Court will focus on the third aforementioned time frame for purposes of evaluating the present Motion. 1 seven-week delay between his discovery of new facts and motion to amend, as he first 2 sought to obtain and review the transcript of a deposition where the new facts were 3 discovered). 4 Here, Plaintiff does not specify the exact date that he received the report of the 5 PREA Audit. Instead, Plaintiff cites to his March 29, 2021 filing of the report in this case 6 (Doc. 34-3) and a May 3, 2021 filing of it by Warden Roberts in 19-CV-350 (Doc. 64-2 7 in 19-CV-350). (Doc. 53 at 2, 5.) The Court will assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff 8 discovered the PREA Audit report on or about March 29, 2021, which means Plaintiff 9 waited approximately two months after the discovery of the report before moving to 10 amend. Plaintiff does not specify the reason(s) for this delay; however, the Court notes 11 that the report of the PREA Audit is 94 pages long and thus its review to first determine 12 whether an amendment should be pursued is consistent with diligence. See Leibel, 2019 13 WL 4736784, at *3. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s engagement in the 14 exchange of settlement offers in this case, as well as in 19-CV-350 and 19-CV-351 (see 15 Doc. 72 in 19-CV-350), is likewise consistent with diligence. See Story, 2016 WL 16 5868077, at *3. Furthermore, the Court finds that the delay from late March to late May, 17 during a period in which COVID-19-related restrictions at detention facilities remained in 18 place, does not demonstrate a lack of diligence. See Aldan v. World Corp., 267 F.R.D. 19 346, 358 (D.N. Apr. 30, 2010) (finding a plaintiff diligent where there was a month-and- 20 a-half delay between discovery of new information and motion to amend because of 21 circumstances within that period: “the holiday season”). Therefore, in light of the 22 foregoing, the Court concludes that the delay between Plaintiff’s discovery of the PREA 23 Audit report and his filing of his motion to amend is consistent with diligence. 24 B. Leave to Amend Under Rule 15 25 Plaintiff argues, first, that there is no bad faith or undue delay because he only 26 recently discovered the new information involving Warden Roberts. (Doc. 53 at 6.) 27 Second, Plaintiff argues that granting him leave to amend will not prejudice Warden 28 Roberts, given that the factual record against her has already been developed and 1 discovery in the instant case is still ongoing. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff argues that his claims 2 against Warden Roberts are not futile, as his proposed amended complaint has stated a 3 claim against her in both her individual and supervisory capacity. (Id. at 7.) Lastly, citing 4 Rule 15(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff argues that his 5 amendment against Warden Roberts should relate back to the filing of his original 6 complaint. (Id. at 9–10.) 7 District courts have discretion to determine whether to grant or deny leave to 8 amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure “advises [] court[s] that ‘leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” 10 Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, LLC., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth 11 Circuit has directed that the above-stated policy “be applied with extreme liberality.” 12 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). “This 13 liberality in granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether the amendment will add 14 causes of action or parties,” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 15 1987); instead, in ruling on a motion to amend, a court must consider certain factors, such 16 as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 17 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 18 party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Eminence 19 Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). “Futility alone can justify 20 the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 21 2004). However, of these factors, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 22 party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. Therefore, 23 “[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there 24 exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend. Id. 25 Here, the Court finds no evidence in the record indicating a wrongful motive on 26 Plaintiff’s part in moving to amend his complaint. See Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. 27 Enhanced Athlete, Inc., 2019 WL 1429549, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019) (“A motion 28 to amend is made in bad faith where there is ‘evidence in the record which would indicate 1 a wrongful motive” on the part of the litigant requesting leave to amend.”) (quoting DCD 2 Programs, 833 F.2d at 187.) Instead, the record supports a legitimate motive on 3 Plaintiff’s part to identify an additional defendant and new claims for relief. Likewise, for 4 the reasons discussed above, see discussion supra p. 5, the Court finds no evidence in the 5 record indicating that Plaintiff unduly delayed his attempt to amend his complaint, as the 6 new information discovered stems from results of a PREA Audit that were recently 7 discovered. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) 8 (“Relevant to evaluating [] [undue delay] is whether the moving party knew or should 9 have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.”). 10 Further, the Court cannot conclude that Warden Roberts and the other named 11 defendants in this action will be prejudiced if Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is 12 granted. First, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion while the case was still at the discovery 13 stage, with no trial date pending and no pretrial conference scheduled. See DCD 14 Programs, 833 F.2d at 187–88 (rejecting defendant’s argument that it would be 15 prejudiced by the delay in naming it to the suit; “there [was] no evidence that [the 16 defendant] would be prejudiced by the timing of the proposed amendment,” since “the 17 case [was] still at the discovery stage with no trial date pending . . . [and no] pretrial 18 conference [had] been scheduled”). Second, Plaintiff states that the factual record against 19 Warden Roberts is “fully developed.” See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 20 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that it is less prejudicial when a motion to 21 amend does not require reopening discovery). Defendants have not responded to 22 Plaintiff’s Motion nor shown how granting Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend 23 prejudices them in any way. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187 (the non-moving 24 parties “bear[] the burden of showing prejudice”). 25 Moreover, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to be futile, as 26 the facts alleged therein state valid claims against Warden Roberts in both her individual 27 and supervisory capacity. See Miller v. Rykoff,-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 28 1988), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (“[A] 1 proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment 2 to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.”); see also 3 Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] prison 4 official in a supervisory position may be held liable under § 1983 if [she] was personally 5 involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between 6 [her] unlawful conduct and the constitutional deprivation. This causal connection can 7 include: 1) the supervisors’ own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, 8 or control of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of 9 which a complaint is made; or 3) their conduct that showed a reckless or callous 10 indifference to the rights of others.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations 11 omitted)). Furthermore, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not previously moved to amend 12 his complaint. Therefore, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend is appropriate 13 under the liberal standard of Rule 15, as all five of the above-listed factors favor 14 amendment. As such, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his 15 complaint, and will order the Clerk of Court to file Plaintiff’s FAC. 16 III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 17 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 18 against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). On review, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it if 20 a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim 21 upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 22 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 23 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 24 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 25 not demand detailed factual allegations, it does “demand[] more than an unadorned, the 26 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 27 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. 1 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 2 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 3 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 4 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 5 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 6 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 7 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific 8 factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess 9 whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 10 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s FAC states valid claims against Warden Roberts in 11 her individual and supervisory capacity, and the Court will accordingly require Warden 12 Roberts to answer the FAC. 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended 15 Complaint (Doc. 53) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to file Plaintiff’s First 16 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (currently lodged at Doc. 54). 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must serve Defendant Warden 18 Roberts or seek a waiver of service. If Plaintiff does not obtain a waiver of service of the 19 Summons or complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant Roberts 20 within 90 days of the filing of the FAC, the action may be dismissed as to Defendant 21 Roberts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 22 . . . . 23 . . . . 24 . . . . 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond 2|| to the FAC within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the 3|| Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any answer or response must state the specific 4|| Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, 5 || response, or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name 6 || on whose behalf it is filed. 7 Dated this 30th day of July, 2021. 8 9 10 —, Dl Lvajcn,) ll MNYAC Honorable Rostsiary □□□□□□□ 12 United States District □□□□□ 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -10-