Scott v. Phoenix Municipal Court ( 2022 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Gene Edward Scott, II, No. CV-22-00597-PHX-DWL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Phoenix Municipal Court, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 On April 11, 2022, Gene Edward Scott, II (“Plaintiff”), who has filed at least 25 16 unsuccessful lawsuits in this Court over the last two decades, filed a pro se complaint 17 (Doc. 1) and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). For the following 18 reasons, the application is granted and the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 19 I. IFP Application 20 Plaintiff’s application indicates that Plaintiff has insufficient funds to prepay the 21 filing fee for this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application is granted. 22 II. Statutory Screening Of IFP Complaints 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought in forma pauperis. 1 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has 25 raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 27 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 28 1 Although § 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, § 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 2 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand 3 detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 4 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 6 statements, do not suffice.” Id. 7 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 8 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 10 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 11 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 12 claim for relief [is]. . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 13 its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 14 The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “continue to construe pro se 15 filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint 16 [filed by a pro se individual] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal 17 pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 18 (per curiam)). Conclusory and vague allegations, however, will not support a cause of 19 action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 20 A liberal interpretation may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 21 initially pled. Id. 22 III. The Complaint 23 Plaintiff names Maricopa County, City of Phoenix, State of Arizona, and the 24 United States Army as defendants. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The complaint alleges that “The 25 Defendants falsely accused Alcohol DUIs to Plaintiff who never consumed alcohol 26 (Alcohol nor Narcotic) nor used a weapon no broken law ever, but humbly request[s] 27 diplomatic immunity and a legal passport.” (Id. at 4.) The complaint further alleges that 28 “Plaintiff ‘submissively’ suffers defamation of character” and requests “elimination” of 1 Plaintiff’s “criminal records.” (Id.) 2 A. Jurisdiction 3 The Court must determine sua sponte whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. 4 Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the 6 court must dismiss the action.”). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of 7 proving its existence. Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 8 2008). Here, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint fails to 9 allege either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. 10 Plaintiff checked the “federal question” box as the basis for federal court 11 jurisdiction and lists the basis as “‘VIII Amendment of the United States Constitution’ to 12 ‘Civil Rights Act of 1964 As Amended.’” (Doc. 1 at 3.) However, nowhere else in the 13 complaint does Plaintiff allege how his Eighth Amendment rights or civil rights were 14 violated, who violated them, or whether he is asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 15 Woods v. City of Scottsdale, 2013 WL 614421, *4 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“While the United 16 States Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful 17 pleading’ of pro se litigants, it is not enough to simply mention a clause in the 18 Constitution.”) (citation omitted). 19 Although Plaintiff marked the “federal question” box in the complaint, what 20 appears to be his underlying cause of action—defamation—is a state law claim. (Doc. 1 21 at 4.) Thus, Plaintiff must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 22 diversity jurisdiction exists. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 23 McNatt v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 972 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1992). Diversity jurisdiction exists 24 when there is complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and the defendants 25 and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1332. A controversy meets this requirement when “all the persons on one side 27 of it are citizens of different states from all the persons on the other side.” Strawbridge v. 28 Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 1 Here, the complaint fails to affirmatively set forth the facts necessary to determine 2 the parties’ citizenship, complete diversity, or that the controversy exceeds $75,000, 3 exclusive of interests and costs. Plaintiff does not allege his citizenship, the Defendants’ 4 citizenship, or that the controversy exceeds the statutory amount. (Id. at 4-5.) To the 5 extent Plaintiff was intending to allege that both he and at least one of the defendants are 6 citizens of Arizona, there would not be complete diversity. “Absent unusual 7 circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege 8 affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert 9 Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 Moreover, some of the named defendants possess immunity from suit. The State 11 of Arizona is “protected by the Eleventh Amendment from suits brought by citizens in 12 federal court,” Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 13 2001), and federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over suits brought against the 14 federal government or its entities unless there exists a specific, express waiver of 15 sovereign immunity. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981) (the United States is 16 immune from suit except as it consents to be sued); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 17 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its 18 agencies from suit.”). 19 B. Rule 8 20 As explained above, a claim must be stated clearly enough to enable a defendant 21 to frame a responsive pleading. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of 22 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Each 23 averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). 24 Here, the complaint falls far short of satisfying the requirements of Rule 8. 25 Plaintiff does not provide a “short and plain statement” for any claim. Although Plaintiff 26 lists the Eighth Amendment, Civil Rights Act, and appears to allege a defamation claim, 27 he fails to allege facts that would support any such claim. Myers-Armstrong v. Actavis 28 Totowa, LLC, 382 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal for failure to 1 || state a claim in part because the complaint gave “no notice of the alleged illegal act and, 2|| therefore, fail[ed] to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), because it [did] not set || forth ‘a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to □□□□□□□□□□□ IV. Leave To Amend 5 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity, if he so chooses, to amend his complaint to || make clear his allegations in short, plain statements with each claim for relief identified in separate sections. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must write out the rights he 8 || believes were violated, the name of the person and/or entity who violated the right, 9|| exactly what that individual or entity did or failed to do, how the action or inaction of that 10 || person is connected to the violation of Plaintiffs right, and what specific injury Plaintiff 11 || suffered because of the other entity’s conduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). Each claim of an alleged violation must be set forth in a separate count. Any 13} amended complaint filed by Plaintiff must conform to the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which includes “a short and plain statement of the 15} grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). 16 Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that: 18 1. Plaintiff's Application To Proceed In forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 19 2. Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed, with leave to file an amended 20 complaint by May 27, 2022. 21 3. If Plaintiff elects not to file an amended complaint by May 27, 2022, the 22 Clerk is directed to dismiss this action without further order of the court. 23 Dated this 6th day of May, 2022. 24 25 Am ee 26 i t _o——— Dominic W. Lanza a7 United States District Judge 28 _5-