Mehlos v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration ( 2022 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Daniel Dennis Mehlos, No. CV-20-02454-PHX-MTL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Daniel Dennis Mehlos’ application for disability 16 insurance benefits by the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 17 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial. The Court now addresses 18 Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 20, “Pl. Br.”), Defendant Social Security Administration 19 Commissioner’s Answering Brief (Doc. 23, “Def. Br.”), and Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (Doc. 20 24, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record (Doc. 19, 21 “R.”), and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision.1 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed an application for Title II benefits on November 30, 2018, alleging 24 disability beginning February 28, 2016. (Doc. 19, R. at 18.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied 25 initially on February 1, 2019, and subsequently denied upon reconsideration on April 12, 26 2019. (R. at 18.) On May 18, 2020, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ for a hearing on his 27 1 Both parties have submitted legal memoranda and oral argument would not have aided 28 the Court’s decisional process. See Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see also LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). 1 claim. (R. at 18, 483.) On June 18, 2020, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. (R. at 30.) 2 Plaintiff appealed this denial, but was subsequently denied by the Appeals Council on 3 October 20, 2020, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 4 at 2.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 5 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1.) 6 The Court has reviewed the medical evidence and will discuss the pertinent 7 evidence in addressing the issues raised by the parties. Upon considering the medical 8 evidence and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following 9 severe impairments: cervical spine disorder, lumbar spine disorder, bipolar disorder, 10 history of schizoaffective disorder, anxiety and depression. (R. at 20.) 11 Ultimately, the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and concluded 12 that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged disability onset date through the date of the 13 ALJ’s most recent decision. (R. at 30.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an 14 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 15 one of the listed impairments of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 21.) Next, 16 the ALJ calculated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”): 17 [Plaintiff] has the [RFC] to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the [Plaintiff] can perform 18 simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; can perform simple work- 19 related decisions; can tolerate few changes in a routine work setting, defined as performing the same duties at the same 20 station or location day to day; can have occasional interaction 21 with supervisors; can have occasional contact with co-workers with no tandem tasks or team type activities; and can have no 22 contact with the public. 23 (R. at 23.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that “[c]onsidering the [Plaintiff’s] age, education, 24 work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 25 numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (R. at 29.) 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 28 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 1 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 2 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 3 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 4 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 5 record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the 6 Court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 7 “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is 8 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 9 decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 10 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 11 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 12 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but 13 the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 14 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently 15 engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant 16 is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the 17 claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. 18 § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 19 three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 20 meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 21 Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be 22 disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines whether the 23 claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 24 If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the 25 fifth and final step, where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other 26 work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 27 experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiff raises two arguments in his challenge of the ALJ’s decision. Firstly, 3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 4 psychiatrist. (Pl. Br. at 13–17.) Secondly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting 5 his symptom testimony. (Id. at 17–23.) For the following reasons, the Court rejects 6 Plaintiff’s arguments and affirms the ALJ’s decision.2 7 A. Medical Opinion Evidence 8 Plaintiff first argues that remand is required because the ALJ improperly rejected 9 the opinions of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Coira. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff also takes issue with 10 the ALJ determining the administrative medical findings of Drs. Gross and Paxton to be 11 only “partially persuasive.” (Id. at 16–17.) In response, the Commissioner argues that the 12 ALJ properly explained the factors of supportability and consistency when determining the 13 persuasiveness of Dr. Coira’s opinions and the administrative findings of Dr. Gross and 14 Dr. Paxton. (Def. Br. at 10, 16–17.) 15 In 2017, the rules for evaluating medical evidence were revised. For claims filed on 16 or after March 27, 2017, the revised rules apply. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the 17 Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). As Plaintiff’s 18 claim was filed on November 30, 2018, the revised rules apply to this case. (R. at 18.) 19 Under the revised rules, all evidence an ALJ receives is considered, but the rules create 20 specific articulation requirements regarding how medical opinions and prior administrative 21 medical findings are considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)–(b), 416.920c(a)–(b). The 22 revised rules do not require an ALJ to defer to or assign every medical opinion a specific 23 evidentiary weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ determines 24 the persuasiveness of the piece of evidence’s findings based on factors outlined in the 25 regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)–(b), 416.920c(a)–(b). 26 2 Because the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision, discussion of Plaintiff’s “credit-as-true” 27 arguments is unnecessary. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the first step in determining whether the credit-as- 28 true rule applies is whether the ALJ “failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence”). 1 Recently, the Ninth Circuit definitively ruled that the revised regulations “are 2 clearly irreconcilable with our caselaw according special deference to the opinions of 3 treating and examining physicians on account of their relationship to the claimant.” Woods 4 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). To that effect, the Ninth Circuit stated that 5 its requirement that ALJs provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting a treating 6 or examining doctor’s opinion is incompatible with the revised regulations. Id. 7 Nevertheless, “[e]ven under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or 8 treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation 9 supported by substantial evidence.” Id. This means that an ALJ “must ‘articulate . . . how 10 persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source, and 11 ‘explain how it considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these 12 findings.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), (b)(2)) (internal citation omitted) 13 (alteration in original). 14 Under the new regulations, the most important factors considered by an ALJ are 15 “consistency” and “supportability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability is defined 16 as how “relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by 17 a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative 18 medical findings.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency means “the extent to which a 19 medical opinion is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and 20 nonmedical sources in the claim.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 21 404.1520c(c)(2)). The ALJ should also treat opinions as more persuasive if they are more 22 consistent with “other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” 240 C.F.R. 23 § 404.1520c(c)(2). Lastly, the ALJ can also consider, to a lesser degree, other factors, such 24 as the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the kinds of examinations 25 performed, and whether the medical source actually examined the claimant. See Woods, 32 26 F.4th at 792. 27 1. Dr. Roberton Coira 28 The ALJ did not err when assessing Dr. Coira’s medical opinion. Dr. Coira opined 1 that Plaintiff had a variety of marked or extreme mental limitations. (R. at 27, 1786–91.) 2 This included marked limitations in maintaining socially appropriate behavior and extreme 3 limitations in understanding, remembering, interacting with others and completing a 4 normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based 5 symptoms. (R. at 27.) Furthermore, Dr. Coira opined that Plaintiff remained “with severe 6 anxiety, episodes of mood swings, and irritability affecting his ability to interact with 7 others.” (Id.) The ALJ found this opinion contradictory with the normal mental status 8 findings in the treatment record. Specifically, the ALJ highlighted records indicating that 9 Plaintiff’s depression/anxiety was stable and that he had no signs or symptoms of mania, 10 OCD, or psychosis. (Id. at 27-28.) Moreover, the ALJ pointed to medical examinations in 11 the record indicating that Plaintiff was pleasant and cooperative, denied suicidal ideation, 12 had linear and organized thought processes and was alert and oriented. (Id. at 28.) Based 13 on this evidence, the ALJ determined that the record did not support “the degree of 14 limitations opined by Dr. Coira.” (Id.) Further, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily 15 activities in taking care of his sons, taking them to school, taking care of the dogs, shopping 16 in stores and driving, contradicted Dr. Coira’s opinion that Plaintiff has extreme 17 limitations. (R. at 28, 434–42.) While a claimant is not required to be completely 18 incapacitated to be found disabled, an ALJ may consider the Plaintiff’s daily activities to 19 determine whether they are “inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” See Brown-Hunter 20 v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court finds that the ALJ provided 21 sufficient contradictory evidence to support the treatment of Dr. Coira’s opinion as 22 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s overall medical record. 23 2. Dr. Gross and Dr. Paxton 24 The Court also finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Gross and Dr. Paxton’s 25 administrative findings. The doctors opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff should be able to 26 understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, should be able to make simple 27 judgments and work-related decisions, as well as deal with changes in a routine work 28 setting. (R. at 27.) The ALJ found these opinions to be only partially persuasive. (Id.) 1 Notably, the ALJ found that other evidence in the record indicated that Plaintiff’s mental 2 impairments are severe and that he had nonexertional mental limitations. (Id.) In other 3 words, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was more restricted than Drs. Gross and Paxton had 4 opined. Therefore, it is difficult for the Court to follow Plaintiff’s objections to the ALJ’s 5 treatment of Drs. Gross and Paxton’s opinions. If anything, the ALJ’s treatment of the 6 opinions increased the likelihood of an award of disability benefits. For these reasons, the 7 Court finds the ALJ did not err in its treatment of Dr. Gross and Dr. Paxton’s medical 8 opinions. 9 B. Symptom Testimony 10 Plaintiff also argues that, given the lack of malingering present, the ALJ erred by 11 rejecting his symptom testimony without clear and convincing reasons. (Pl. Br. at 17.) The 12 Commissioner counters that the ALJ did not err by rejecting the symptom testimony 13 because the ALJ provided “very serious mental restrictions in [its] RFC finding and 14 properly determined that the record did not support the full extent of Plaintiff’s subjective 15 complaints of debilitating and disabling symptoms.” (Def. Br. at 17, R. at 23.) 16 An ALJ employs a two-step process in evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony. 17 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). Initially, “the ALJ must determine 18 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 19 impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the . . . symptoms alleged.’” 20 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 21 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 22 Then, provided there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant’s 23 statements in context of (1) the objective medical evidence and (2) other evidence in the 24 record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(3). At this step, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s 25 testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 26 convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014-15 (internal quotation marks 27 omitted) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). This requirement 28 prevents an ALJ from “arbitrarily discredit[ing]” the claimant’s subjective symptom 1 testimony. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. Despite the “clear and convincing standard [being] 2 the most demanding required in Social Security cases,” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the ALJ need not “believe every allegation 4 of disabling pain.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, when 5 assessing the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider “inconsistencies either in 6 claimant’s testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, claimant’s daily activities, 7 claimant’s work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the 8 nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which claimant complains.” Thomas, 278 9 F.3d a 958-59 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Should a district court find 10 that the ALJ’s specific, clear and convincing reasons are supported by substantial evidence, 11 the court must not second-guess the ALJ’s judgment, and should affirm the ALJ’s decision. 12 See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. 13 Here, the ALJ found no evidence of malingering and that Plaintiff’s “medically 14 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged 15 symptoms.” (R. at 24.) Thus, step one of the analysis is satisfied. As a result, the relevant 16 inquiry is whether the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony was based on 17 specific, clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. For the ensuing 18 reasons, the Court finds that it was. 19 1. Objective Medical Record 20 In rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ properly relied on objective 21 medical evidence. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony concerning the intensity, 22 persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms was “not entirely consistent with the 23 medical evidence . . . in the record.” (Id.) In reaching this determination, the ALJ 24 considered and detailed a litany of objective physical and mental medical examination 25 results. 26 As to physical symptoms, the ALJ found that while both CT and MRI scans revealed 27 mild degenerative changes in Plaintiff’s spine, physical exam findings suggested that 28 Plaintiff “retained functional abilities.” (Id.) More specifically, the ALJ pointed to 1 numerous examination results that found Plaintiff had “no acute distress, had clear lungs 2 to auscultation bilaterally, had regular heart rate and rhythm, had normal range of motion 3 of the back as expected for age, had normal, full range of motion, had no edema in the 4 extremities, had normal gait, had normal strength, tone, and reflexes, and had an intact 5 sensory exam.” (Id.) Furthermore, the ALJ pointed to examination results showing that 6 Plaintiff “had 5/5 strength in all 4 extremities, had full active range of motion of all 4 7 extremities, had intact sensation and motor movement, and had a soft, nontender 8 abdomen.” (R. at 24-25.) In all, the ALJ considered six physical medical examination 9 reports in finding that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not entirely consistent with the 10 objective medical record. (Id.) 11 The ALJ also considered objective medical reports regarding Plaintiff’s mental 12 impairments. The ALJ found that while certain records assessed Plaintiff as depressed, 13 anxious, distracted, and with delusions and paranoia, multiple others indicated him as 14 “pleasant and cooperative with normal mood and affect.” (R. at 25.) Moreover, the ALJ 15 listed results finding Plaintiff to have been exhibiting normal behavior, satisfactory 16 attention span, logical, linear, goal-directed thought processes, and no gross deficits in 17 memory or barriers to communication. (Id.) In addition, the ALJ discussed mental 18 examination results showing Plaintiff’s psychosis to have been resolved and that Plaintiff 19 no longer had signs or symptoms of mania. (Id.) The ALJ’s recitation of Plaintiff’s most 20 recent mental examination in the record indicated that Plaintiff “was adequately groomed, 21 was polite, was cooperative, was pleasant, had normal speech rate, denied suicidal ideation, 22 had linear/organized thought process/content, had adequate insight/judgment for treatment 23 plan, and was alert and oriented.” (Id.) In sum, the ALJ used nine mental examination 24 results as context when evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 25 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions that the ALJ merely relied on boilerplate language 26 to summarily reject the symptom testimony (Pl. Br. at 19.), the ALJ explicitly listed 27 Plaintiff’s symptoms before highlighting results that tended to contradict their claimed 28 impact and severity. (R. at 24.) The ALJ specifically “accounted for the combination of 1 [Plaintiff’s] impairments and symptoms, such as pain, anxiety, panic attacks, irritability, 2 mood swings, and difficulty concentrating” before detailing the objective medical evidence 3 that contradicted the symptom testimony. (R. at 28.) The Court finds that the ALJ did not 4 err in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, in part, because it was inconsistent with 5 the objective medical evidence in the record. Rather, the ALJ properly analyzed Plaintiff’s 6 testimony in the context of objective medical evidence and provided specific examples of 7 results tending to contradict Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018 8 (holding that an ALJ “must rely on examples to show why they do not believe that a 9 claimant is credible”). 10 2. Plaintiff’s Daily Activities 11 The ALJ also properly relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities when discounting 12 Plaintiff’s allegations. (R. at 28–29.) An ALJ may consider “many factors in weighing a 13 claimant’s subjective symptom testimony,” including “the claimant’s daily activities.” 14 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 20 C.F.R. § 15 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (permitting consideration of claimant’s daily activities when weighing 16 symptoms). A district court “must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the evidence is 17 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 18 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995). 19 The ALJ primarily focused on Plaintiff’s self-reporting “that he takes care of his 20 sons, gets the kids up and takes them to school, takes care of dogs, prepares his own meals, 21 drives, shops in stores, spends time with family, and is able to count change and use a 22 checkbook.” (R. at 25.) Where the “record reflects that the claimant has normal activities 23 of daily living including cooking, house cleaning . . . [this] suggest[s] that the claimant may 24 still be capable of performing the basic demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled 25 work on a sustained basis.” Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 26 2008). While it is true that a “person’s ability to do minimal household tasks” is not by 27 itself indicative of that person’s non-disability (Pl. Br. at 21), the ALJ did not err by merely 28 considering Plaintiff’s ability to conduct basic daily activities in weighing Plaintiff’s 1 || symptom testimony. As explored above, the ALJ considered many factors when assessing 2|| Plaintiffs testimony, and there is no evidence that the ALJ rejected the symptom testimony || based solely on the daily activities evidence. A claimant’s daily activities serve as proper 4|| context to an ALJ’s credibility determinations, and the ALJ did not err in considering them 5|| here. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that an ALJ || may discredit symptom testimony when daily activities contradict claims of a completely debilitating impairment). 8 The ALJ properly utilized objective medical evidence and Plaintiff's self-reported 9|| daily activities to contextualize Plaintiff's symptom testimony. Having viewed it in the || appropriate context, the ALJ found the testimony was not entirely consistent with the 11 || medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (R. at 24.) The Court finds that the ALJ 12 || provided specific, clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 13 || As such, the Court will not second-guess the ALJ’s judgment. See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. 14] IV. CONCLUSION 15 Accordingly, 16 IT IS ORDERED affirming the June 18, 2020 decision of the Administrative Law || Judge (R. at 30), as upheld by the Appeals Council on October, 20 2020 (R. at 2). 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 19 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 20 Dated this 26th day of August, 2022. 21 Wichal T. Hburde Michael T. Liburdi 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 -ll-