IFIXITUSA LLC v. Ifixit Corporation ( 2022 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 10 IFIXITUSA LLC; and Sarkes Mrkdichian LLC, No. CV-21-00887-PHX-DGC 11 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, ORDER 12 v. 13 iFixit Corporation, 14 Defendant/Counterclaimant. 15 16 17 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the parties have filed a stipulated 18 motion for a protective order. Doc. 61. The parties seek protection to facilitate the 19 exchange of sensitive business information during discovery. Id. at 1. The Court will deny 20 the motion without prejudice. 21 “It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a 22 court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. 23 Dist. Ct. – N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 24 “Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to override this presumption where ‘good cause’ is 25 shown.” Id.; see Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] ‘good 26 cause’ standard ‘applies to private materials unearthed during discovery[.]’”) (quoting 27 Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010)); Foltz v. State Farm 28 Mut. Auto. Ins., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Any [Rule 26(c)] order . . . requires 1 that the court’s determination ‘identify and discuss the factors it considered in its ‘good 2 cause’ examination[.]’”) (quoting Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 3 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)). 4 “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing 5 specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips, 307 F.3d 6 at 1210-11 (emphasis added); see Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 7 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 8 examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”). “If a court finds 9 particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances 10 the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Phillips, 11 307 F.3d at 1211; see Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th 12 Cir. 2006) (“We reasoned in Phillips that when a district court grants a protective order to 13 seal documents during discovery, ‘it already has determined that ‘good cause’ exists to 14 protect this information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for 15 discovery against the need for confidentiality.’”). 16 The parties’ one-page motion does not identify specific prejudice or harm that will 17 result from public disclosure of the unidentified business information. Doc. 61 at 1. Nor 18 does the motion otherwise show good cause for a protective order as required by Rule 19 26(c). The motion asserts only that the proposed order “will protect against undue 20 disclosure of such information and undue burden and expense associated with litigation 21 involving such information.” Id. This generalized claim does not show good cause under 22 Rule 26(c). And the proposed “blanket” protective order permitting each party to 23 unilaterally designate documents as “confidential” or “attorneys eyes only” (Doc. 61-1) 24 “does not provide sufficient judicial scrutiny to determine whether each particular 25 document should [be protected from public disclosure].” Carrillo v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 26 No. 20-CV-06973-BLF, 2021 WL 3633847, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2021); see also Holtz 27 v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “a party 28 seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order typically does not make a || ‘good cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document’); || Stevenson v. Holland, No. 1:16-cv-01831-AWI-JLT, 2021 WL 4318122, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 3|| Sept. 23, 2021) (“As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a stipulated blanket protective order generally does not by itself demonstrate ‘good cause’ for sealing specific information and 5 || documents.”) (citing Kamakana, Foltz, and Beckman). 6 The Court will deny the motion without prejudice to the parties filing a motion that makes the required showing. The parties should at a minimum identify specific categories 8 || of information they seek to protect and provide a sufficient factual basis for the Court to 9|| engage in the scrutiny required by Rule 26(c) and Ninth Circuit law, as described above. || Of course, the parties are also free to enter into their own agreement about the handling 11 || and disclosure of information produced in discovery. See Allen v. Farmer, No. CV-20- 01298-PHX-SPL, 2021 WL 2454444, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2021) (denying a joint 13 || motion for a protective order and explaining that the parties “remain free to mutually enter 14]| into a written agreement to facilitate the exchange of confidential disclosures without court 15 || approval or supervision”). 16 IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulated motion for entry of protective order 17 || (Doc. 61) is denied without prejudice. 18 Dated this 28th day of September, 2022. 19 = Daal Cot 21 aw : pil David G. Campbell Senior United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 -3-