Aguilar 191257 v. Wynn ( 2022 )

1 JL 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Daniel CV Aguilar, No. CV 22-08185-PCT-JAT (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Charles Wynn, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 I. Procedural History 16 On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff Daniel CV Aguilar, who is confined in the Arizona 17 State Prison Complex-Yuma, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983 and a deficient Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In an October 12, 2022 19 Order, the Court denied the Application to Proceed with leave to refile within 30 days. 20 On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Application to Proceed In Forma 21 Pauperis. In a November 4, 2022 Order, the Court granted the Amended Application to 22 Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The 23 Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies 24 identified in the Order. 25 On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9). The 26 Court will order Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski to answer the First Amended 27 Complaint and will dismiss Defendant Winn without prejudice. 28 . . . . 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 III. First Amended Complaint 2 In his one-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Chino Valley Police 3 Department Chief Charles Wynn, Sergeant Winn, and Officers Syzmanski and Pizzi. 4 Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of due process and “judicial 5 deception.” He seeks monetary relief. 6 Plaintiff alleges the following: 7 On May 3, 2021, Defendant Wynn had Plaintiff arrested on a failure-to-appear 8 warrant. Until that time, Plaintiff had never had contact with the Chino Valley Police 9 Department or any other Yavapai County law enforcement agency. During the arrest, 10 Defendant Pizzi forcefully threw Plaintiff against his truck and then to the ground and 11 handcuffed him. Defendant Pizzi told Plaintiff he was under arrest for a failure-to-appear 12 warrant and placed him into a police vehicle. Defendants Pizzi and Syzmanski asked 13 Plaintiff for permission to enter his residence and search it for items that belonged to a 14 friend who had been staying with Plaintiff for a few days. Plaintiff refused, and he was 15 told he was also being charged with petty theft for items his friends had brought into his 16 residence. Plaintiff was taken to the Chino Valley Police Department while “they” waited 17 to obtain a search warrant for his residence. The failure-to-appear and petty theft charges 18 ultimately were dismissed. 19 Plaintiff claims the events described above “all c[a]me about based upon the judicial 20 deception of a bogus failure to appear warrant.” He asserts that due to the “manufacturing 21 of the failure to appear warrant,” his arrest was “committed under false probable cause.” 22 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Winn “approved this conduct because when [Plaintiff] told 23 [Winn] he did nothing.” Plaintiff claims Defendant Wynn “has approved [the] conduct 24 because he has refused to discipline these officers[’] prior similar conduct.” 25 IV. Failure to State a Claim 26 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 27 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 28 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 2 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 3 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 4 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 5 72, 377 (1976). 6 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 7 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 8 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a 9 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 10 pled. Id. 11 Plaintiff designates his claim as a one for “judicial deception,” but his allegations 12 suggest he intends to assert a false arrest claim. “False arrest, a species of false 13 imprisonment, is the detention of a person without his consent and without lawful 14 authority.” Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1064 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting 15 Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)), aff’d sub nom. Stapley 16 v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Arizona law, false imprisonment and 17 false arrest consist of non-consensual detention of a person “without lawful authority.” 18 Slade v. City of Phx., 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975). “Reflective of the fact that false 19 imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once 20 the victim becomes held pursuant to such process—when, for example, he is bound over 21 by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) 22 (emphasis in original). 23 To state a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show that Defendants made 24 the arrest without probable cause or other justification. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 25 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had 26 knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient 27 to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a 28 crime.’” Id. at 1097-98 (quoting Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th 1 Cir. 2012)); see also Edgerly v. City & County of S.F., 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) 2 (“To determine whether the Officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest, we 3 consider ‘whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the Officers’] 4 knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had 5 committed or was committing an offense.’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 6 (1964))). “[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable 7 cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the 8 arrest.” Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added). “If an officer has probable cause to 9 believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his 10 presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater 11 v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 12 “[A] claim for false arrest turns only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a 13 defendant, and . . . it is not relevant whether probable cause existed with respect to each 14 individual charge, or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the 15 time of arrest.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Price v. Roark, 16 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Claims for false arrest focus on the validity of the 17 arrest, not on the validity of each individual charge made during the course of the arrest.”). 18 “Thus . . . ‘[i]f there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest 19 was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.’” Price, 256 F.3d at 20 369 (quoting Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Barry v. Fowler, 21 902 F.2d 770, 773 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (no unconstitutional seizure where police had 22 probable cause to arrest plaintiff for one offense, even if police lacked probable cause to 23 arrest for a second offense). 24 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Winn are too vague and conclusory to state 25 a claim. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Winn was in any way involved in the 26 issuance of the failure-to-appear warrant, Plaintiff’s arrest, or his subsequent charges. 27 Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Winn, who will be dismissed. 28 . . . . 1 V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 2 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim 3 against Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski. The Court will require Defendants 4 Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski to answer the First Amended Complaint. 5 VI. Warnings 6 A. Release 7 If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not 8 been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court 9 that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or 10 (2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may 11 result in dismissal of this action. 12 B. Address Changes 13 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 14 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other 15 relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this 16 action. 17 C. Copies 18 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 19 copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 20 certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff 21 must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure 22 to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff. 23 D. Possible Dismissal 24 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these 25 warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 26 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure 27 to comply with any order of the Court). 28 . . . . 1 IT IS ORDERED: 2 (1) Defendant Winn is dismissed without prejudice. 3 (2) Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski must answer the First Amended 4 Complaint. 5 (3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First 6 Amended Complaint (Doc. 9), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms 7 for Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski. 8 (4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 9 within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 10 provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 11 (5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 12 complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 90 13 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever 14 is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 15 LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 16 (6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First 17 Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 18 (7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of 19 this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(j)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 21 and Rule 4.1(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must 22 include a copy of this Order. 23 (8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First 24 Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 25 the Plaintiff, within 30 days of the date of the notice and request for waiver of service 26 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(F) to avoid being charged the cost of 27 personal service. 28 (9) The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 1 summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned 2 by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, 3 the Marshal must: 4 (a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, 5 and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 6 Procedure; and 7 (b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 8 service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 9 service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 10 upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 11 form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 12 photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this 13 Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 14 required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 15 pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 16 ordered by the Court. 17 (10) Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski must answer the First Amended 18 Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the 19 applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 (11) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose 21 behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that 22 does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 23 . . . . 24 . . . . 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 (12) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Michael T. Morrissey pursuant to 2| Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 3 | authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 4 Dated this 8th day of December, 2022. 5 6 ' g James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28