Brightly v. Corizon Health Incorporated ( 2023 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 7 8 Christopher Brightly, No. CV-21-00127-TUC-JCH 9 Plaintiff, ORDER 10 v. 11 Corizon Health Incorporated, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order, filed on 15 December 22, 2022. (Doc. 217.) Defendants Centurion of Arizona, LLC, Laura Elliott, NP, 16 Alicia Ferguson, Dorothy Hines, MD, and David Shinn (collectively "Centurion 17 Defendants") filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 223.) Defendant Corizon filed a joinder 18 to the Centurion Defendants' response. (Doc. 226.) Also before the Court is the parties 19 Stipulation to Extend Dispositive Motion Deadline. (Doc. 215.) 20 I. Plaintiff's Motion 21 The Court's Amended Scheduling Order set the written discovery deadline to 22 October 21, 2022, and the fact discovery deadline to December 5, 2022. (Doc. 199.) After 23 both deadlines elapsed, Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking to amend the Amended 24 Scheduling Order as follows: (1) to extend written discovery up to and including January 25 27, 2023; and (2) to extend fact discovery up to and including February 6, 2023. (Doc. 217 26 at 1.) Plaintiff requests the "future disclosures…forthcoming from Defendant Shinn," and 27 his medical records since October 1, 2022, the date NaphCare, Inc. became the healthcare 28 services contractor for ADCRR. (See id.) 1 A. Legal Standard 2 A scheduling order may be "modified only for good cause and with the judge's 3 consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The "good cause" standard primarily considers the 4 diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 5 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). A court may modify the scheduling order "if it cannot 6 reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Id. If the party 7 was not diligent, the inquiry should end. Id. 8 An extension of a deadline sought after its expiration requires a showing of 9 "excusable neglect," not merely "good cause." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); see also 10 Mireles v. Paragon Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-122-L (BGS), 2014 WL 575713, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 11 Feb. 11, 2014) ("a party moving to amend a pleading after a scheduling order deadline has 12 passed must support the motion by demonstrating both excusable neglect and good cause") 13 (citation omitted); Almaraz v. City of Mesa, No. CV-10-1348-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 14 1661535, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2011) (applying excusable neglect standard to motion to 15 reopen scheduling order deadline); Hernandez v. Maricopa Cty., No. CV-07-272-PHX- 16 JAT, 2009 WL 77647, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2009) (explaining that "excusable neglect is 17 the standard that must be met by the parties to receive an extension of an expired deadline"). 18 Four factors determine whether neglect is excusable: (i) the danger of prejudice to the 19 opposing party; (ii) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (iii) 20 the reason for the delay; and (iv) whether the movant acted in good faith. See Bateman v. 21 U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. 22 v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). 23 B. Analysis 24 Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), Centurion Defendants argue that neither good 25 cause nor excusable neglect exists for the request extension. (Doc. 223 at 2.) Centurion 26 Defendants further explain, "[e]ven assuming NaphCare is added to address the Court's 27 injunctive order, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why that would impact discovery 28 on the claims at issue in this case. NaphCare would not be joined as a Defendant for any 1 damages claims. For the purposes of discovery and trial, the change in healthcare 2 contractors is irrelevant, and cannot serve as a basis for reopening discovery." (Doc. 223 3 at 3.) 4 The Court finds that the balance of relevant factors weighs in favor of denying 5 Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 217) as to Centurion Defendants and Defendant Corizon. First, 6 granting Plaintiff's request will prejudice the Centurion Defendants and Defendant Corizon 7 by extending the discovery period, which has been modified numerous times, (Docs. 68, 8 95, 113, 199), without any explanation why Plaintiff could not complete discovery before 9 the deadline. 10 Further, Plaintiff has not shown diligence to justify his delay. Plaintiff was advised 11 in advance of the healthcare provider change but took no steps to join NaphCare before the 12 transition and did not subpoena any records from NaphCare as a non-party under Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 45. (Doc. 223 at 3.) On November 23, 2022, the Court held a hearing where Plaintiff 14 first requested that NaphCare be joined. (See Doc. 211). Parties were directed to meet and 15 confer and file a joint stipulation. (See id. at 1.) At the time of the hearing, the written 16 discovery deadline had elapsed, but the fact discovery deadline had not. The parties did not 17 file their stipulated motion to join NaphCare until two months later, on January 23, 2023, 18 (Doc. 227), after both deadlines had elapsed. 19 Nor does Plaintiff show that additional discovery is necessary for trial preparation 20 or to resolve the case on the merits. In the immediately preceding order, (Doc. 228), the 21 Court added NaphCare as a Defendant, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2), because Defendant 22 Centurion is no longer the contracted healthcare provider for the Arizona Department of 23 Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry (ADC) and is therefore incapable of providing 24 injunctive relief. To the extent Plaintiff seeks medical records after October 1, 2022, he has 25 not shown how such discovery is relevant to his claims against either Centurion Defendants 26 or Defendant Corizon. Nor has Plaintiff moved to amend or supplement his Complaint to 27 allege any similar allegations against NaphCare.1 Accordingly, his request is denied. 28 1 By denying Plaintiff's Motion the Court does not prejudice Plaintiff's ability to sue Defendant NaphCare if allegations supporting a claim arise. Il. Parties’ Stipulation 2 The parties request that the dispositive motions deadline be extended from January || 9, 2023, up to and including March 13, 2023. (Doc. 215). The Stipulation was filed on 4|| December 19, 2022, before the deadline elapsed. (See Doc. 199.) Parties submit good cause 5 || exists for the requested extension based on NaphCare’s potential addition to the action, Plaintiff’s counsel’s ongoing efforts to secure a guardian ad litem to represent □□□□□□□□□□□ interest, and the implications of these events on any dispositive motions or settlement 8 || conversations. The Court agrees that good cause exists, and grants the Stipulation. 9| Il. Order 10 IT IS ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order || (Doc. 217); 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the parties’ Stipulation to Extend 13 || Dispositive Motion Deadline (Doc. 215). The parties shall have up to and including March 14]| 13, 2023 to file dispositive motions. 15 Dated this 31st day of January, 2023. 16 17 18 es MH. Lherebe □ onorable John C. Hinderaker 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -4-