Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Schuff Steel Company ( 2023 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Equal Employment Opportunity No. CV-22-01653-PHX-JJT Commission, 10 ORDER Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 Schuff Steel Company, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is Defendant Schuff Steel Company’s Motion to Dismiss Count 2 and 16 partially dismiss Counts 3 and 4 of the Complaint (Doc. 11, “MTD”), to which Plaintiff 17 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a Response (Doc. 14, 18 “Resp.”) and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 15). The Court finds these matters appropriate 19 for resolution without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). For the reasons that follow, the 20 Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Kyle Barnett, an African American man (“Mr. Barnett”), filed charges with Plaintiff 23 alleging that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 24 § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), by discriminating against him because of his race. (Doc. 1, 25 Compl. ¶¶ 6, 10.) Following Plaintiff’s investigation of Mr. Barnett’s charge, Plaintiff 26 believed that Defendant had violated Title VII’s prohibitions on both race and national 27 origin discrimination. (Compl. ¶¶ 10–67.) Subsequently, Plaintiff issued a letter of 28 determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Defendant committed unlawful 1 discrimination, including discrimination against Latino employees on the basis of national 2 origin. (Resp. at 2.) After failed conciliation efforts, Plaintiff initiated this action. (Compl. 3 ¶¶ 7–8.) 4 Plaintiff raises four claims against Defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 5 of 1964 as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race-Based Hostile Work 6 Environment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Count 1); National Origin-Based Hostile 7 Work Environment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Count 2); Constructive Discharge under 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Count 3); and Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Count 4). 9 (Compl. ¶¶ 56–80.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant now moves 10 to dismiss Count 2 and partially dismiss Count 3 and Count 4 to the extent those Counts 11 relate to national origin discrimination. (MTD at 1–2.) 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to “test[] the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. 14 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 15 state a claim can be based on either: (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) the 16 absence of sufficient factual allegations to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. 17 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When analyzing a complaint for 18 failure to state a claim, the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in 19 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 20 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 21 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has 22 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 23 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility 25 standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 26 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 27 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed 28 factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief 1 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 2 cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up and citations omitted). 3 Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth 4 and therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Iqbal, 5 556 U.S. at 679-80. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a 6 savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that ‘recovery is very remote 7 and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 8 (1974)). 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 Defendant argues that Counts 2, 3, and 4 should be dismissed to the extent they 11 allege discrimination on the basis of national origin. (MTD at 1.) To support its argument, 12 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims impermissibly exceed the scope of the initial 13 charge filed by Mr. Barnett. (MTD at 2.) Here, Defendant argues, Plaintiff’s authority was 14 limited to bringing claims relating to Mr. Barnett’s charge of racial discrimination. (MTD 15 at 2.) However, Plaintiff asserts, and Defendant concedes, that Ninth Circuit precedent 16 forecloses Defendant’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s authority. (Resp. at 1; MTD at 2.) 17 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “the original charge is sufficient to support 18 EEOC administrative action, as well as an EEOC civil suit, for any discrimination stated 19 in the charge itself or discovered in the course of a reasonable investigation of that 20 charge.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Hearst Corp., Seattle Post-Intelligencer 21 Div., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). The EEOC only needs to provide 22 notice to the employer by including the alleged discrimination in the EEOC’s cause 23 determination and by proceeding with conciliation procedures. Id; see Equal Emp. 24 Opportunity Comm’n v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 535 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 25 1976) (discussing adequate notice and the scope of EEOC claims), aff’d, 432 U.S. 355, 97 26 S. Ct. 2447, 53 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1977). 27 Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff exceeded its authority by bringing claims 28 related to national origin discrimination, which were not included in Mr. Barnett’s initial charge. However, Defendant acknowledges that its argument is contrary to Ninth Circuit || precedent since Plaintiff found cause for the national origin claims while investigating the original charge, included the national origin claims in its cause determination, and proceeded with conciliation procedures on those claims. (MTD at 2.) Defendant 5 || acknowledges that the Court is bound by this controlling Ninth Circuit precedent (id.) and 6|| has failed to provide the Court with legal authority upon which it may dismiss □□□□□□□□□□□ 7\| national origin claims. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A 8 || district court bound by circuit authority .. . has no choice but to follow it’). Defendant seeks to preserve this issue for appeal. (MTD at 2—3; Reply at 2.) For these reasons, the 10 || Court finds that Defendant fails to demonstrate that any of Plaintiff's claims are legally 11 || deficient and denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 13 |} (Doc. 11.) 14 Dated this 3rd day of March, 2023. CN 16 folee— Unifga StatesDistrict Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -4-