Glenn v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration ( 2023 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Mia Glenn, No. CV-21-01840-PHX-MTL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mia Glenn’s Counsel’s Motion for Approval 16 of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). (Doc. 22.) Section 406(b)(1) 17 authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney fees from the award of past-due benefits: 18 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant 19 under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its 20 judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to 21 which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and 22 the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to 23 subsection (d) of this section, certify the amount of such fee for 24 payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 25 26 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 27 Plaintiff prevailed in the appeal to this Court from the administrative law judge’s 28 decision. In its Notice of Award, the Social Security Administration withheld $18,602 from Plaintiffs past-due benefits, representing 25 percent of that amount, to satisfy a potential 2|| attorney fee award. 3 Having successfully litigated this case, Plaintiff's Counsel seeks an award of $18,602.00 in fees from Plaintiff's recovery. The Court previously awarded Plaintiff || $5,463.16 in attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act □□□□□□□□□ 6|| (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff's Counsel acknowledges that a § 406(b)(1) fee award must be offset by the previously awarded EAJA attorney fee. 8 The Court finds that the representation agreement between Plaintiff and his Counsel represents a lawful contingency fee agreement. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002). The fee agreement provides that, if successful, Ms. Glenn would pay her counsel 11 || “a fee equal to twenty-five (25) percent of the past-due benefits resulting from my claim(s).” (Doc. 22-3.) The Court further finds that the hourly rate of $784.89 for work 13 || performed before the District Court is a reasonable hourly rate considering the type of || work, Counsel’s experience, and the contingency nature of the fee agreement. The Court 15 || finds that the hours expended by Counsel at the District Court (23.7 hours) is reasonable. || Finally, the Court finds that the requested fee award does not exceed the statutory cap of 25 percent of the total past-due benefits. 18 Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED that the Motion (Doc. 22) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Counsel is || awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $18,602.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Counsel shall reimburse Plaintiff in || the amount of $5,463.16, representing the EAJA fees previously awarded. 23 Dated this 5th day of December 2023. 24 WMichak T. Shure 76 Michael T, Liburdi 27 United States District Judge 28 _2-