Young v. Shinn ( 2019 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Ronald Kelly Young, No. CV-18-00036-TUC-CKJ (MSD) 10 Petitioner, ORDER 11 v. 12 Charles L Ryan, et al., 13 Respondents. 14 15 This matter is on referral pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil 16 Procedure. Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ronald Kelly Young’s motion to 17 supplement his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 43.) Respondents partially oppose 18 Young’s request to the extent Young raises an ineffective-assistance claim not alleged in 19 the original or amended petitions. (Doc. 51.) For the following reasons, Young’s motion 20 will be granted in full.1 21 I. Legal Standard 22 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2242 provides that habeas petitions “may be amended or 23 supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” Thus, 24 amendments to habeas petitions are analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, 25 the rule governing pleading amendments in civil cases. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 26 1 “[A] magistrate judge may hear and determine nondispositive matters but not 27 dispositive ones.” Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015)). The “decision to grant a 28 motion to amend is not generally dispositive.” Id. at 1164 (emphasis in original). Therefore, Young’s motion will be resolved without a report and recommendation. 1 655 (2005). Under Rule 15(c), “a petitioner may add an otherwise untimely claim to her 2 habeas petition if it relates back to a timely-filed claim.” Alfaro v. Johnson, 862 F.3d 1176, 3 1183 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim relates back if it “ar[ises] out of the conduct, transaction, or 4 occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 15(c)(1)(B). “An amended habeas petition . . . does not relate back . . . when it asserts a 6 new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the 7 original pleading set forth.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. 8 II. Discussion 9 The ineffective-assistance claim in dispute is an adjunct to one of Young’s timely 10 filed Brady claims. In his petitions, Young alleges that the prosecution violated Brady by 11 withholding the “exculpatory expert opinion” of FBI Special Agent Kelly Goldsmith. 12 (Doc. 1 at 36–42; Doc. 17-1 at 24–29.) In his supplemental brief, Young alleges that trial 13 counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate Agent Goldsmith’s work and to 14 ultimately call Agent Goldsmith to testify as a defense witness. (Doc. 45 at 9.) 15 Respondents argue that this ineffective-assistance claim was not raised in the original or 16 amended petitions and must be rejected because it does not relate back to any timely filed 17 claim. (Doc. 51 at 1–3.) Apparently conceding that he did not raise the claim earlier, 18 Young contends that it indeed relates back. (Doc. 52 at 1–3.) 19 The Court finds that Young’s ineffective-assistance claim is timely because it relates 20 back to the timely filed original and amended petitions. The “conduct, transaction, or 21 occurrence” underlying Young’s claim is straightforward: first, Agent Goldsmith’s 22 opinions rebutted the opinions of the prosecution’s expert and thus were favorable to 23 Young; and, second, trial counsel were deficient in failing to identify Agent Goldsmith as 24 a favorable witness and to call Agent Goldsmith at trial. (Doc. 45 at 9.) Young did not 25 sufficiently set forth the foregoing facts and ground for relief in the original and amended 26 petitions. However, an amended pleading can also relate back if it “ar[ises] out of the 27 conduct, transaction, or occurrence . . . attempted to be set out in the original pleading.” 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Young plainly attempted to set out his || ineffective-assistance claim in the original and amended petitions. 2 First, Young raised a factually related Brady claim (described above). (Doc. | at 3|| 36-42 (original petition); Doc. 17-1 at 24-29 (amended petition).) Young prefaced his 4|| Brady claims by asserting the claims “also serve as legal grounds for Young’s additional claims of .. . ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 37; Doc. 17-1 at □□□□□□□ 6 || Second, Young raised various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including one based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate his case adequately, either personally 8 || or through supervision of the defense investigator. (Doc. 1 at 57-58; Doc. 17-1 at 45-46.) In this broad sub-claim, Young expressly incorporated the facts from his Brady claim relating to Agent Goldsmith’s exculpatory opinions. (Doc. | at 58; Doc. 17-1 at 46.) 11 These allegations evince an intent to allege an ineffective-assistance claim based on 12 || counsel’s failure to identify Agent Goldsmith as a favorable defense witness. Thus, the 13 || new ineffective-assistance claim arises from the conduct, transaction, or occurrence that Young attempted to set out in the original and amended petitions (not from the Brady claim || Young did set out, as Respondents argue). As such, the claim is timely. 16 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to supplement (Doc. 43) is granted. The Clerk 17 || of Court is directed to file Petitioner’s supplemental memorandum (lodged at Doc. 45). 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 14 days of the date of this Order, □□ Respondents shall file an answer to Petitioner’s new claim of ineffective assistance of || counsel. Petitioner may file a reply within 7 days of service of the answer. The answer and reply shall not exceed five pages in length or address any other issue. 22 Dated this 16th day of September, 2019. 23 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28 -3-