Ruggles v. Scottsdale, City of ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 Bradley J. Ruggles, ) No. CV-18-02950-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) City of Scottsdale, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 ) 15 Before the Court is City of Scottsdale’s (the “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss 16 Plaintiff’s Third Complaint (the “Motion”). (Doc. 44) The Motion was fully briefed on 17 August 5, 2019, and the Plaintiff requested oral argument. (Docs. 53, 54) Because it 18 would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motion is 19 suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 20 Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). For the reasons that follow, the 21 Motion will be granted. 22 I. Background 23 This case arises out of a domestic dispute involving Bradley J. Ruggles (the 24 “Plaintiff”) in November 2016. (Doc. 38 at 2; Doc. 44 at 3) As a result of the domestic 25 dispute, the Plaintiff was arrested by a City of Scottsdale police officer and charged with 26 assault and disorderly conduct. (Doc. 44 at 4) The charges against the Plaintiff were 27 dismissed on July 14, 2017. (Doc. 44 at 6) The Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 13, 28 1 2018 in the Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging claims for violations of his 2 constitutional rights and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 1-3) On April 29, 2019, the 3 Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging identical causes 4 of action related to his arrest and prosecution for assault and disorderly conduct. (Doc. 5 38) 6 II. Legal Standard 7 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 8 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” such that the 9 defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 10 rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The Court may dismiss a complaint 12 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a 13 cognizable legal theory, and (2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. 14 Balistreri v. Pacificia Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 15 In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded 16 allegations of material fact, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non- 17 moving party.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). In 18 comparison, “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 19 unreasonable inferences” are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and “are insufficient 20 to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.; In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 21 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff need not prove the case on the pleadings to 22 survive a motion to dismiss. OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1078 (9th Cir. 23 2012). 24 A court ordinarily may not consider evidence outside the pleadings in ruling on a 25 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Zemelka v. Trans Union LLC, 2019 WL 2327813, at 1 26 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2019) (citing United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 27 2003)). “A court may, however, consider materials—documents attached to the 28 complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial 1 notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 2 Id. Additionally, “[e]ven if a document is not attached to a complaint, it may be 3 incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the 4 document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” Lovelace v. Equifax 5 Info. Servs. LLC, 2019 WL 2410800, at 1 (D. Ariz. June 7, 2019) (citing Ritchie, 342 6 F.3d at 908). A plaintiff need “not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the 7 complaint” for the court to consider it, as long as the “plaintiff’s claim depends on the 8 contents of [the] document, the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, 9 and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 10 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]he district court may treat such a document as part 11 of the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion 12 to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. 13 III. Analysis 14 A. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 In the Complaint, the Plaintiff generally asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 16 § 1983, but the Plaintiff does not clearly identify the basis of this claim. (Doc. 38 at 4) 17 Instead the Plaintiff states that this claim arises out of the “alleged constitutional 18 violations of [his] rights” as he has been denied “arrest without probable cause, right to 19 remain silent, the right to counsel, and provide safe guards to the atmosphere and 20 environment of the incommunicado interrogation to give plaintiff choice to give a 21 statement freely.” (Doc. 38 at 4–5) The Defendant clarifies that the Plaintiff is using the 22 § 1983 claim to allege the violation of his 4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th 23 Amendment and 14th Amendment rights. (Doc. 44 at 6) The Defendant argues that the 24 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must be dismissed because the Plaintiff has not alleged that any 25 particular municipal policy caused or resulted in the violation of the Plaintiff’s 26 constitutional rights. (Doc. 44 at 4) 27 A local government entity is liable under § 1983 when action pursuant to official 28 municipal policy of some nature causes a constitutional tort. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 1 250 F.3d 668, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473–74 2 (9th Cir. 1992)). In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 3 that: (1) he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the defendant and its employees 4 acting under color of state law; (2) that the defendants have customs or policies which 5 amount to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights; and (3) that these policies 6 are the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Lee, 250 F.3d at 681–82. 7 In the Complaint, the Plaintiff generally alleges that the Defendant’s police officer 8 violated his constitutional rights by arresting the Plaintiff without probable cause and 9 interrogating him. (Doc. 38 at 4–5) At no point in the Complaint does the Plaintiff allege 10 that his injuries arise out of the Defendant’s customs or policies. Accordingly, the Court 11 finds that the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12 § 1983, and the Motion will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. 13 B. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 14 The Plaintiff generally asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, but the 15 Plaintiff does not clearly identify the basis of this claim. (Doc. 38 at 4) Instead the 16 Plaintiff states that this claim arises out of the “alleged constitutional violations of [his] 17 rights” as he has been denied “arrest without probable cause, right to remain silent, the 18 right to counsel, and provide safe guards to the atmosphere and environment of the 19 incommunicado interrogation to give plaintiff choice to give a statement freely.” (Doc. 38 20 at 4–5) The Defendant clarifies that the Plaintiff is using the § 1985 claim to allege the 21 violation of his 4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th Amendment and 14th Amendment 22 rights. (Doc. 44 at 6) The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim must be 23 dismissed because the Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendant’s actions were 24 motivated by class-based discrimination. (Doc. 44 at 15) 25 The Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint most closely align with a 26 claim pursuant to §1985(3) because the Plaintiff does not make any allegations related to 27 (i) preventing an officer of the United States from performing his or her duties or 28 (ii) witness or juror intimidation. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1–2). Therefore, the Court focuses its 1 analysis on the requirements of a § 1985(3) claim. In order to successfully plead a claim 2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege a claim “based upon a conspiracy 3 to violate a protected right,” and “there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class- 4 based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Scott v. 5 Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1269–1270 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 6 403 U.S. 88 (1971)). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant’s employees were biased 7 against him based on his twin brother’s criminal record. (Doc. 38 at 7–8, 9) At no point 8 in the Complaint does the Plaintiff allege that the Defendant’s employees discriminated 9 against him based on his race or any other protected category. Accordingly, the Court 10 finds that the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 11 § 1985, and the Motion will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim. 12 C. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 13 42 U.S.C. 1986 imposes liability on every person who knows of an impending 14 violation of § 1985 but neglects or refuses to prevent the violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1986. A 15 claim can be stated under § 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under 16 § 1985. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) 17 (citing Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985)). Because the Court 18 finds that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Court also 19 finds that the Complaint does not contain a valid claim under § 1986. Thus, the Motion 20 will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s § 1986 claim. 21 D. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 22 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows a court to award attorneys’ fees and expert fees to a party 23 that has prevailed on a claim pursuant to § 1983, § 1985 or § 1986. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b- 24 c); Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 2019 WL 4308874, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2019). 25 Because the Court has found that the Plaintiff has not successfully pleaded claims 26 pursuant to § 1983, § 1985 or § 1986, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to 27 successfully plead the elements sufficient to establish a claim for attorneys’ fees under 28 § 1988. Accordingly, the Motion will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s § 1988 claim. 1 E. Claim Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 2 The Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241. It is well settled 3 that 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not provide a plaintiff with a private cause of action in a civil 4 case. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the 5 Motion will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241. 6 F. Claim Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-541(1) 7 The Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-541(1) for malicious 8 prosecution. It is well settled that all claims brought pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-541(1) have 9 a one-year statute of limitations. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-541. The Plaintiff’s cause of 10 action arose in November 2016 when he was arrested and charged with disorderly 11 conduct and assault. (Doc. 38 at 7) The Plaintiff did not file his claim pursuant to A.R.S. 12 § 12-541(1) until July 13, 2018, after the statute of limitations had expired. (Doc. 1-3 at 13 5) Accordingly, the Motion will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to A.R.S. 14 § 12-541(1). 15 G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 16 Under Arizona law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has 17 three elements: “first, the conduct by the defendant must be ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’; 18 second, the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or recklessly 19 disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct; and third, 20 severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant’s conduct.” 21 Andermann v. Kluwer, 2010 WL 3808985, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2010) (citing Ford v. 22 Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (1987)). Additionally, in order to prove intentional infliction 23 of emotional distress, the conduct complained of must have been “so outrageous in 24 character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and 25 to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community . . . in which 26 . . . an average member of the community would . . . exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Id. 27 In the Complaint, the Plaintiff argues that (i) the Defendant’s officer’s action of 28 filing charges against him, (ii) the officer’s failure to file charges against Randall Owen, 1 another participant in the domestic dispute, and (iii) the proceedings before the City of 2 Scottsdale municipal court and the court’s implementation of an order of protection, 3 serve as the basis of his emotional distress claim. (Doc. 38) The Defendant argues that 4 the Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed 5 because intentional infliction claims against public entities have a one-year statute of 6 limitations under Arizona law. (Doc. 44 at 17) 7 Under Arizona law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has a 8 two-year statute of limitations. Serrano v. Serrano, 2012 WL 75639, at *7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 9 Jan. 10, 2012); Cecala v. Newman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2007); Walker 10 v. Botezatu, 2016 WL 1625733, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 25, 2016). However, claims against 11 public entities have a one-year statute of limitations, and the Court has consistently held 12 that the one-year statute of limitations governs claims for intentional infliction of 13 emotional distress against public entities. Hernandez v. Brewer, 658 F. App’x 837, 839 14 (9th Cir. 2016); Montelongo v. City of Phoenix, 2009 WL 73665, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 15 2009); Dema v. City of Mesa, 2007 WL 9723280, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d, 16 338 F. App’x 596 (9th Cir. 2009). The Plaintiff did not file his intentional infliction of 17 emotional distress claim until July 13, 2018, after the statute of limitations had expired. 18 (Doc. 1-3 at 5) Accordingly, the Motion will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s intentional 19 infliction of emotional distress claim. 20 H. Injunctive Relief and Damages 21 Because the Court finds that all of the Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed 22 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court declines to address the 23 issue of injunctive relief or punitive damages at this time. 24 I. Futility of Amendment 25 Because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 26 Court considers whether dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. The Plaintiff’s first 27 complaint was filed with the Maricopa County Superior Court in July 2018, and it is the 28 Court’s understanding that the original complaint was amended in state court in August 1| 2018. (Doc. 1-3) After removal to this Court in September 2018, the Plaintiff filed a 2} motion to amend his complaint, which was denied by the Court. (Docs. 13, 20) The 3 | Court granted the Defendant’s first motion to dismiss (Doc. 19), but allowed the Plaintiff 4| an opportunity to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 36) The Complaint is the Plaintiff's second amended complaint. To provide the Plaintiff with a third opportunity 6 | to potentially save his complaint would violate the Court’s commitment to expeditious 7 | resolutions, docket management, and fairness to the Defendant. Therefore, for the 8 | reasons stated in both the present and previous dismissal, the Court dismisses the 9| Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 10 Accordingly, 11 1. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 44) is 12| granted, and the Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 38) is dismissed with prejudice; 13 2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this case and enter judgment accordingly; and 15 3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Set Rule 26(f) 16 | Conference (Doc. 48) is denied as moot. 17 Dated this 30th day of September, 2019. 18 19 20 2 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28