Gaines v. Stenson ( 2022 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Steven L. Gaines, Jr., No. CV-21-01774-PHX-JJT 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Yolanda C. Stenson, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 At issue is Defendant United States’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 20), in which 17 the United States asks the Court to reconsider its Order (Doc. 19) remanding this case for 18 a failure to demonstrate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 19 As the Court stated in its prior Order, this case arises out of a workplace dispute 20 between two postal workers at a U.S. Postal Service facility in Phoenix. (Doc. 8 at 3-4; 21 Doc. 19.) On September 23, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Steven L. Gaines, Jr. filed a Petition for 22 Injunction Against Harassment in Phoenix Municipal Court. The Petition alleges that 23 Plaintiff suffered repeated instances of workplace harassment at the hands of one of his 24 supervisors, Yolanda C. Stenson, and seeks a protective order against Stenson. 25 On October 20, 2021, one day before the scheduled municipal court hearing, the 26 United States on behalf of Stenson filed a Notice of Removal in this Court pursuant to 27 28 U.S.C. § 1442. (Doc. 1.) The United States subsequently filed a Brief on Subject Matter 28 Jurisdiction (as well as a Motion to Dismiss) explaining that it had stepped into Stenson’s 1 shoes as Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679. (Doc. 13.) The United States’ basis for 2 removal was federal question jurisdiction. Upon removal, Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction 3 Against Harassment became the operative Complaint in this case. 4 In its Brief, the United States contended that Plaintiff’s Petition can properly be 5 characterized as a claim that falls under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), or 6 alternatively under Title VII. (Doc. 13 at 2-4.) According to the United States’ Brief, 7 Plaintiff’s Petition not only can be characterized as an FTCA claim, but in fact must be so 8 characterized because the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act 9 of 1988 (the Westfall Act) makes the FTCA the exclusive remedy for tortious acts and 10 omissions committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. 11 Furthermore, the Westfall Act makes the federal district court the exclusive venue for such 12 claims. Thus, according to the United States, because Plaintiff’s Petition sounded in tort, 13 and because Stenson was acting within the scope of her employment, Plaintiff’s state law 14 claim was an FTCA claim and removal to federal district court was required by the Westfall 15 Act. In the same Brief, the United States asked the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s FTCA (or 16 Title VII) claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), because he failed to 17 exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim. 18 In its Order (Doc. 19), the Court noted that the United States removed this case 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), but the Supreme Court has explained that section 1442(a) 20 is a “pure jurisdictional statute” that cannot independently support federal jurisdiction. 21 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). A federal question must still be raised. Id. 22 The purpose of section 1442(a) is merely “to overcome the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule 23 which would otherwise preclude removal even if a federal defense were alleged.” Id. 24 The Court disagreed with the United States’ characterization that Plaintiff’s 25 municipal court Petition stated a claim falling within the ambit of the FTCA because, by 26 its own terms, the FTCA applies only to claims for money damages. 27 [T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 28 claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of 1 property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 2 scope of his office or employment. 3 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (emphasis added). The Westfall Act also limits its preclusion regime 4 to suits for money damages. 5 The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 6 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 7 of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment 8 is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or 9 omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any 10 other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is 11 precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred. 12 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that 13 a claim is “cognizable” under § 1346(b) only if it alleges six specific elements, one of 14 which is being “for money damages.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994). Because 15 Plaintiff’s Petition seeks only injunctive relief, his claim does not fall under the FTCA or 16 Westfall Act. 17 The Court also noted that the United States put forth Title VII as an alternative 18 jurisdictional basis. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against 19 any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 20 employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). According to the United States, Plaintiff’s Petition should be 22 construed as a continuation of previous complaints that Plaintiff lodged with the EEOC in 23 which Plaintiff apparently complained of racial and medical discrimination. (Doc. 13 at 24 8-9.) However, Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege any harassment predicated on any 25 animus relating to a class protected by Title VII. Rather, Plaintiff alleges workplace 26 harassment of a more generic nature. While a hostile workplace can constitute a form of 27 racial harassment, a hostile workplace is not ipso facto racial discrimination when it is not 28 pled as such. Plaintiff’s previous dealings with the EEOC are irrelevant where his 1 complaint does not expressly or impliedly relate to them.1 The Court thus declined to 2 construe Plaintiff’s Petition as a claim falling within Title VII. 3 Because the Court did not agree with the United States that Plaintiff’s claim 4 implicated a federal question under either the FTCA or Title VII—the only jurisdictional 5 bases the United States proffered to substantiate its removal of this case—the Court 6 remanded this case. 7 The United States has now filed a Motion for Reconsideration to argue a different 8 jurisdictional basis—the Supremacy Clause. (Doc. 20 at 3 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause 9 precludes state courts from entering or enforcing orders that interfere with the performance 10 of federal officers.”).) 11 Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. 12 Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). A motion for 13 reconsideration is appropriate where the district court “(1) is presented with newly 14 discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, 15 or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 16 Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration 17 “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could 18 reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 19 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 Here, the United States’ arguments in its original Brief that Plaintiff’s claim was 21 either an FTCA or Title VII claim did not suffice to demonstrate that the Court had subject 22 matter jurisdiction in this case. The United States, as the removing party, had the burden 23 of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, and a failure to meet that burden must result in 24 remand to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 25 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). That the United States may now be able to demonstrate a proper basis 26 for this Court’s jurisdiction is not enough. As stated above, the United States may not use 27 1 Moreover, the previous EEOC filing referenced by the United States did not allege racial 28 animus, was not directed at the same employee, and did not arise out of the same fact pattern. (Doc. 13-2.) 1 || a Motion for Reconsideration to raise an argument for the first time that it reasonably could 2|| have raised when the Court originally required a demonstration of the Court’s jurisdiction 3 || supporting the United States’ removal of this case. Accordingly, the Court must deny the Motion for Reconsideration.” 5 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying the Motion for Reconsideration 6|| (Doc. 20). 7 Dated this 14th day of June, 2022. CN 9 wefhelee— Unifgd State#District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 || 2 Nothing precludes the United States from raising its Supremacy Clause defense to the municipal court’s jurisdiction in municipal court. _5-