Jungblut v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District ( 2022 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Christina Jungblut, No. CV-19-05837-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement 16 and Power District’s (“SRP”) Motion for Summary Judgment, which is fully briefed. 17 (Docs. 23, 27, 28.) The Court grants the motion because Plaintiff Christina Jungblut fails 18 to make out a prima facie case for her Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 19 Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”) claims. 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff began working in SRP’s Vegetation Management Department (“VM 22 Department”) as a Scheduling Coordinator in 2015. (Doc. 23-2 at 2.) That department is 23 responsible for maintaining or removing customer-owned vegetation that encroaches on 24 SRP’s power lines. (Id.) 25 Around that time, the VM Department transitioned from one software platform to 26 another and underwent restructuring. (Id. at 2-3.) Notably, the Engineering Technician 27 position was eliminated, and its duties were distributed to the Scheduling Coordinator, 28 among other positions. (Doc. 27-2 at 2.) 1 The VM Department expected the Scheduling Coordinator to implement the new 2 software platform when it launched. (Doc. 23-2 at 4.) Until it launched, the Scheduling 3 Coordinator provided support for the Business Analyst at the VM Department, scheduling 4 the ad-hoc maintenance work that took place between regularly scheduled maintenance 5 work. (Doc. 27-2 at 4.) 6 A year into Plaintiff’s tenure as the Scheduling Coordinator, her supervisor met with 7 her and provided a draft of her job expectations, which included scheduling preventative 8 maintenance for tree crews and providing support for that work using the new software 9 platform. (Doc. 23-2 at 4; Doc. 23-1 at 7.) Plaintiff balked at these new expectations, so 10 her job description was revised, and a one-on-one training on the new software platform 11 was established. (Doc. 23-2 at 4-5.) At no point did scheduling duties disappear from her 12 job description, which listed duties alphabetically rather than by priority. (Doc. 23-1 at 9; 13 Doc. 27-5.) 14 The parties dispute how well Plaintiff took to the new responsibilities and software 15 platform. SRP claims that Plaintiff never achieved a satisfactory level of performance with 16 the new software platform and fell behind in her work. (Doc. 23 at 9-10.) Plaintiff 17 emphasizes the accolades she received on certain projects as well as the new software 18 platform’s “hiccups and inaccuracies.” (Doc. 27 at 5.) Further, she claims that the one- 19 on-one training was inadequate. (Id. at 4-6.) 20 In October 2016, while in this training period, Plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal 21 tunnel syndrome, and her doctor required that she take a 20-minute break every hour to 22 perform stretches and, if necessary, ice her wrists. SRP granted this accommodation, which 23 ultimately limited Plaintiff’s workday to 4.5 working hours. (Doc. 23-2 at 5.) Plaintiff 24 disputes that this was a true accommodation because SRP still expected her to complete 25 eight hours’ worth of work, supervisors and colleagues regularly interrupted her breaks, 26 and she was required to answer the phone during breaks (Doc. 23-1 at 10-11.) 27 That December, Plaintiff’s doctor placed her on sick leave for about a month. 28 During that period, SRP’s employees found “numerous errors” with her work, which 1 Plaintiff does not dispute. (Doc. 23-2 at 6.) She returned to work the same 4.5 hour 2 schedule as before. Supervisors met with her about the errors and temporarily offloaded 3 her ad-hoc scheduling duties so that she could spend more time improving her skills 4 scheduling preventative maintenance. (Id.) 5 From then on, Plaintiff’s work schedule continued to oscillate with her doctor’s 6 orders, but Plaintiff never performed her duties to SRP’s satisfaction (Doc. 23-2 at 7), and 7 Plaintiff admitted to her shortcomings on several of her job duties (Doc. 23-1 at 16). SRP 8 terminated Plaintiff in May 2017. (Doc. 23-2 at 7.) 9 Plaintiff filed this suit, alleging violations of the ADA and the ACRA. (Doc. 1.) 10 Defendant moved for summary judgment on both claims. (Doc. 23.) 11 II. Standard 12 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any 13 material fact and, viewing those facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the 14 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material 15 if it might affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could 16 find for the nonmoving party based on the competing evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 17 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 18 (9th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment may also be entered “against a party who fails to make 19 a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 20 and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 21 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 22 The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 23 the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 24 which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. 25 The burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of a genuine and 26 material factual dispute. Id. at 324. The non-movant “must do more than simply show that 27 there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts[,]” and instead “come forward 28 with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. 1 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal quotation and citation 2 omitted). 3 III. Analysis 4 To survive summary judgment on an ADA or an ACRA1 claim, a Plaintiff must 5 show that she was: (1) disabled within the meaning of the ADA or ACRA; (2) qualified to 6 perform the essential functions of her position; and (3) suffered an adverse employment 7 action. Samber v. Providence St. Vincent Medical Center, 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 8 2012). Defendant concedes that genuine disputes of fact exist as to elements one and three. 9 (Doc. 23 at 11.) The analysis, then, will proceed with whether Plaintiff was qualified to 10 perform the essential functions of her position. 11 The “essential functions” of a position are “the fundamental job duties of the 12 employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 13 1630.2(n)(1). A function may be essential if it (1) is the reason the position exists; (2) 14 cannot be easily distributed among other employees; or (3) the function is highly 15 specialized such that the incumbent was hired specifically for his or her ability to perform 16 it. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). “Evidence of whether a particular function is essential 17 includes, but is not limited to: (i) [t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are 18 essential; (ii) [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing 19 applicants for the job; (iii) [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function; 20 . . . and/or (vii) [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 21 1630.2(n)(3). Reading Plaintiff’s Response charitably, Plaintiff either fails to identify the 22 essential functions of her job or else those essential functions overwhelmingly resemble 23 the essential functions of the Engineering Technician position, for which she was 24 unqualified. She cannot survive summary judgment under either interpretation. 25 Defendant argues that the essential functions of the “Scheduling Coordinator” 26 position was to “schedule[] preventative maintenance,” pointing to SRP’s judgment, the 27 current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs, and written draft job descriptions. 28 1 Courts apply the same analysis whether for an ADA or ACRA claim. See Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 3d 761, 762 (D. Ariz. 2019). 1 (Doc. 23 at 12.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant presented her with a final job description 2 over a year after she began working as the Scheduling Coordinator (and after she was 3 diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome), and even the draft job descriptions failed to 4 identify which of her duties was essential. (Doc. 27 at 7.) But Plaintiff never suggests 5 what her position’s essential functions were. And in the same breath, she contends that she 6 was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job—whatever they were. (Id. at 8.) 7 Without identifying essential functions, Plaintiff cannot support her claim that she 8 performed those essential functions, and unsupported statements cannot create a triable 9 issue of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (“The non- 10 movant’s bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact 11 and defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). It is Plaintiff’s burden to show that she was 12 qualified to perform the essential functions of her position. See Samber, 675 F.3d at 1237. 13 She cannot carry that burden without identifying what those essential functions are. 14 But, maybe, while Plaintiff does not specifically identify which of the tasks listed 15 on the job description as essential, she still identifies the essential functions by inference, 16 which the Court must draw in her favor. Here, Plaintiff characterizes the “Scheduling 17 Coordinator” position as an “Engineering Technician” position in all but name, with “a 18 large portion of [her] daily work” being “a large portion” of the previous Engineering 19 Technician’s duties. (Doc. 27 at 7.) Defendant does not dispute this. 20 Was Plaintiff qualified to perform the Engineering Technician duties, then? No. 21 Plaintiff concedes “I’m not qualified to do an engineering tech position . . . it’s because I 22 didn’t have the schooling, education with a degree; I didn’t have the knowledge or 23 experience that our engineering tech did.” (Doc. 23-1 at 34; accord Doc. 27 at 7.) And 24 missing requisite education renders a person unqualified for the job: 25 [A]n individual who fails to satisfy the job prerequisites cannot be considered “qualified” within the meaning of the ADA 26 unless she shows that the prerequisite is itself discriminatory in effect. Otherwise, the default rule remains that “the 27 obligation to make reasonable accommodation is owed only to an individual with a disability who . . . satisfies all the skill, 28 experience, education and other job-related selection criteria. 1|| Johnson v. Bd. of Trustees of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561, 567 (9th 2|| Cir. 2011) (quoting 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. to § 1630.9(a)). Because it is undisputed that 3|| Plaintiff lacked the requisite education to perform the Engineering Technician duties, 4|| which comprised a “large portion” of Plaintiff's duties as the Scheduling Coordinator, she 5 || fails to show that she was qualified to perform the essential duties of her position as she 6 || describes them. 7\| IV. Conclusion 8 Plaintiff either cannot identify the essential duties of her position (as is her burden), 9|| orelse the essential duties of her position aligned with the Engineering Technician position, 10 || for which, she concedes, she was not qualified. Consequently, she fails to make out a prima 11 |} facie claim under the ADA and the ACRA, and any claim for punitive damages must fail as well. Therefore, 13 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23) is 14]| granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate 15 || this case. 16 Dated this 19th day of January, 2022. 17 18 19 {Z, 20 _- Ch 21 Ueited States Dictric Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-