Amaya v. Future Motion Incorporated ( 2022 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Juan Amaya, No. CV-21-08243-PCT-MTL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Future Motion Incorporated, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 I. 16 The matter comes before the Court on Defendant Future Motion Incorporated’s 17 (“Future Motion”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23). Plaintiff Juan Amaya filed a 18 response (Doc. 27), and Future Motion filed a reply (Doc. 29). The instant action originated 19 in Coconino County Superior Court where Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 28, 20 2021. (Doc. 1-3 at 11.) Future Motion subsequently filed a Notice of Removal with this 21 Court. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint against Future Motion asserts claims for Respondeat 22 Superior, Negligence, Strict Liability, Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 23 Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention and Supervision, and Punitive Damages. (Doc. 1-3 24 at 5-10.) For the following reasons the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary 25 Judgment in its entirety.1 26 27 1 The parties have submitted legal memoranda, and oral argument would not have aided 28 the Court’s decisional process. See Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see also LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). 1 II. 2 Future Motion designs, manufactures, and sells a one-wheeled motorized 3 skateboard known as the “Onewheel.” (Doc. 9 at 2; Doc. 23 at 2-3.) Plaintiff’s claims stem 4 from a May 6, 2020 accident involving his use of the Onewheel. (Doc. 27 at 3.) Plaintiff 5 alleges that, as he was riding his Onewheel uphill, “the speed began to drastically fluctuate 6 suddenly and without warning, and without his input to change the speed.” (Id.) Plaintiff 7 alleges that “[t]hese erratic and sudden speed fluctuations caused him to be thrown from 8 the [Onewheel] and become injured.” (Id.) He contends that he “was thrown because the 9 [Onewheel] was not properly calibrated upon delivery.” (Id.) First Motion maintains that 10 Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence in support of his claims. (Doc. 29 at 2-5.) 11 Plaintiff responds that his sworn declaration is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to 12 determine that First Motion is strictly liable for his injuries. (Doc. 27 at 6.) Plaintiff further 13 argues that whether “an unresponsive, mis-calibrated, motorized skateboard constitutes an 14 unreasonably dangerous defect” is genuine issue of material fact within the sole province 15 of the jury. (Id. at 7.) For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 16 to meet his burden at the summary judgment stage. 17 III. 18 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 19 to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 20 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 21 genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 22 return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect 23 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 24 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant 25 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Id. at 255; 26 see also Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The 27 court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted but only 28 determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”). To prove its burden, however, “the 1 moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition 2 excerpts) [and] may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 3 party’s case.” Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 A party opposing summary judgment must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the 5 record” establishing a genuine dispute or show “that the materials cited do not establish the 6 absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Court has no independent 7 duty “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 8 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 9 IV. 10 A. 11 Plaintiff’s response indicates that he seeks to bring a strict liability claim for 12 manufacturing defect, and his briefing relates only to that claim. (Doc. 27 at 6.) Arizona 13 law provides that “the theory of liability under implied warranty has been merged into the 14 doctrine of strict liability.” D’Agnese v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 880, 890 15 (D. Ariz. 2013) (citation omitted).2 Therefore, Plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty of 16 merchantability claim merges with his strict liability claims, and the Court’s reasoning with 17 respect to the strict liability claim—as articulated below—applies equally to the implied 18 warranty of merchantability claim. See Canning v. Medtronic Inc., No. CV-19-04565- 19 PHX-SPL, 2022 WL 1123061, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2022) (stating the same). Similarly, 20 as to Plaintiff’s negligence theory, the Court will first address Plaintiff’s strict liability for 21 manufacturing defect because “if Plaintiff cannot prove his case in strict liability, he cannot 22 prove it in negligence either.” Canning, 2022 WL 1123061, at *5 (citing Gomulka v. 23 Yavapai Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 241-42 (Ct. App. 1987)). 24 To establish a case of strict product liability under Arizona law, Plaintiff must prove 25 that: (i) the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous; (ii) the defective condition 26 existed at the time the product left the defendant’s control; and (iii) the defective condition 27 2 The Court applies substantive state law to a products liability claims brought pursuant to 28 diversity jurisdiction. See Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). 1 is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See Canning, 2022 WL 1123061, at *5 2 (citing St. Clair v. Nellcor Puritan Bennett LLC, No. CV-10-1275-PHX-LOA, 2011 WL 3 5331674, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2011)). The elements of a negligence theory differ only 4 in that Plaintiff must also show that First Motion breached its duty of care. See Cox v. 5 Yamaha Motor Corp., No. CV-06-519-TUC-DCB, 2008 WL 2328356, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 6 4, 2008). The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that his 7 Onewheel was defective. 8 Plaintiff’s conclusory declaration is insufficient to survive summary judgment.3 9 Plaintiff’s declaration merely restates his previous allegations that because the Onewheel 10 “was not properly calibrated upon delivery[,]” an “erratic and sudden speed fluctuation” 11 caused him to be thrown and injured. (Doc. 28 at 6.) Plaintiff has never explained what he 12 means by the word “calibration” or how the Onewheel was “not properly calibrated upon 13 delivery.” Further, Plaintiff is not an expert and fails to provide any facts demonstrating 14 his knowledge of, or use of reliable principles and methods of testing, the calibration of 15 motorized skateboards. See Cox, 2008 WL 2328356, at *6 (finding a similarly situated 16 plaintiff unqualified to present expert opinion for failure to provide facts showing 17 specialized knowledge in a product’s components). Although Plaintiff is not required to 18 produce expert testimony to survive summary judgment on his strict product liability claim, 19 he must show “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cox, 2008 WL 20 2328356, at *7 (internal marks and citation omitted). The declaration’s conclusory 21 allegations are insufficient. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) 22 (reasoning that the object of Rule 56(e) is “not to replace conclusory allegations of the 23 complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit”). Rather than point to 24 specific facts showing that there are genuine, product liability claims for trial, Plaintiff’s 25 declaration offers only the conclusory statement that he “was thrown because the 26 3 Plaintiff filed his declaration as part of a separate statement of facts “[p]ursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c).” (Doc. 28 at 1.) Not only is this Court is not bound by Arizona’s 27 Rules of Civil Procedure, but Plaintiff also filed his separate statement of facts in clear violation of the Court’s Scheduling Order prohibiting parties from filing separate 28 statements of fact to their dispositive motions. (See Doc. 16 at 5.) In any event, the filings submitted do not alter the Court’s analysis. 1 [Onewheel] was not properly calibrated upon delivery.” This bare and speculative 2 allegation does not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Cox, 2008 3 WL 2328356, at *7. 4 Plaintiff maintains that there is evidence that the Onewheel was defectively 5 calibrated at the time it left First Motion’s control. (Doc. 27 at 8.) Specifically, Plaintiff 6 argues that his use of “the product the day after it arrived” provides a reasonable inference 7 that the product was sold in a defective condition. (Id.) Arizona courts permit plaintiffs “to 8 rely on circumstantial evidence to establish that a defect existed at the time the product left 9 the defendant’s control caused the injuries.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 10 No. CV-13-01228-PHX-JZB, 2015 WL 5693525, at *15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2015) (citing 11 Reader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 P.2d 1388, 1393-94 (Ariz. 1971)). But “Arizona courts 12 limit reliance on such evidence to situations where the product is unavailable or otherwise 13 incapable of inspection.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 5693525, at *15 (citation 14 omitted). Plaintiff admits that his Onewheel is available for inspection. (Doc. 27 at 9.) 15 Plaintiff, however, maintains that an “[i]nspection of the [Onewheel] could not reveal the 16 timeline of miscalibration.” (Id. at 8.) But Plaintiff provides no reasoning behind this 17 assertion and the Court is unconvinced that an inspection and examination of the Onewheel 18 would be a fruitless endeavor. Thus, Plaintiff may not rely on circumstantial evidence 19 dealing with the timing of his receipt of the Onewheel. Considering the foregoing, 20 Plaintiff’s claims of strict liability for manufacturing defect, negligence, and breach of 21 implied warranty of merchantability fail as a matter of law. 22 B. 23 As noted above, Plaintiff’s arguments in his responsive briefing related solely to his 24 strict liability for manufacturing defect claim. But Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged six causes 25 of action. (Doc. 1-3 at 5-10.) Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for punitive damages, 26 respondeat superior, and negligent hiring, training, retention and supervision. As First 27 Motion notes, Plaintiff has offered no evidence in support of these claims. As to the 28 respondeat superior and negligent hiring, training, retention and supervision claims, 1 Plaintiff has not provided evidence of any employees’ conduct relevant to this case. 2 Plaintiff’s pleadings do not name any employee and go no further than the bare recitations 3 of each claim’s elements. Plaintiff appears to have abandoned these claims entirely. 4 Moreover, because the Court has found that First Motion is not liable for strict liability 5 manufacturing defect, negligence, or breach of implied warranty, there is no underlying 6 wrongful conduct that could serve the basis for the respondeat superior and negligent 7 hiring, training, retention and supervision claims. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet its 8 burden and summary judgment in favor of First Motion is warranted on these claims. See 9 Fairbank, 212 F.3d at 532 (reasoning that a “moving defendant may shift the burden of 10 producing evidence to the nonmoving plaintiff merely by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out 11 through argument—the absence of evidence to support plaintiff’s claim”). 12 Lastly, Arizona law does not provide a separate cause of action for punitive 13 damages. See Brill v. Lawrence Transportation Co., No. CV-17-01766-PHX-JJT, 2018 14 WL 6696815, *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2018) (“[T]he right to an award of punitive damages 15 must be grounded upon a cause of action for actual damages.”) (citation omitted). “The 16 primary question where punitive damages are concerned is motive.” Id. Again, Plaintiff 17 has failed to produce any evidence regarding an improper motive, and there is no actual 18 damages cause of action remaining. Therefore, Plaintiff’s punitive damages arguments fail 19 as a matter of law. 20 C. 21 Plaintiff has failed to point the Court to any particular materials in the record 22 establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. Instead of coming forward with specific 23 facts showing that there are genuine, manufacturing-defect claims for trial, Plaintiff rests 24 on his conclusory declaration restating the allegations set forth in his Complaint and Initial 25 Disclosures. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s responsive briefing abandons the remainder of his 26 claims and offers no evidence in support thereof. As a result, the Court will enter summary 27 judgment in favor of First Motion on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 28 1 V. 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant Future Motion Incorporated’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23). 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor || of Defendant on all claims and close this case. 7 Dated this 28th day of December, 2022. 8 ° Wichal T. Hburde 10 Michael T. Liburdi 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7-