Brown v. Kemper Insurance United Alliance Human Resources Management ( 2023 )

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Steven Douglas Brown, No. CV-21-02143-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Kemper Insurance United Alliance Human Resources Management, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 At issue is Defendant Merastar Insurance Company’s1 motion for judgment on the 17 pleadings (Doc. 22), which is fully briefed2 (Docs. 24, 25) and will be granted. 18 A motion for judgment on the pleadings “is properly granted when, taking all the 19 allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to 20 judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cty. of L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 “Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally identical’ to Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . ‘the same standard of 22 review’ applies to motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 23 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 24 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989)). A motion for judgment on the pleadings therefore should 25 1 The complaint erroneously identifies Merastar as Kemper Insurance-United 26 Alliance-Human Resources Management, which evidently is not a legal entity. (Doc. 22 n.1.) 27 2 Merastar’s motion to strike Plaintiff Steven Brown’s sur-reply (Doc. 27) is granted. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor this District’s Local Rules 28 contemplate sur-replies, and Mr. Brown did not ask permission to file one. Because his sur- reply was not authorized by rule or court order, it is stricken. 1 not be granted if the complaint is based on a cognizable legal theory and contains 2 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 3 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). 4 In October 2019, Plaintiff Steven Brown sued Merastar in Maricopa County 5 Superior Court asserting discrimination and retaliation claims. Merastar removed the case 6 to federal court, where the parties stipulated to dismissal in favor of arbitration. (Doc. 12 7 in CV-19-5600-PHX-SMB.) In February 2021, the arbitrator ruled in Merastar’s favor. 8 (Doc. 1-2 at 60-74 in CV-21-02152-PHX-DLR.) 9 In November 2021, Mr. Brown filed this lawsuit against Merastar in Maricopa 10 County Superior Court, raising issues that were or could have been raised in the prior 11 arbitration. (Doc. 1-3 at 6-9.) Merastar removed the case to this Court and also filed a 12 separate action seeking confirmation of the arbitration award. (Doc. 1 in CV-21-02152- 13 PHX-DLR.) Merastar moved to consolidate the two cases, which the Court granted. (Docs. 14 12, 14.) The Court later granted Merastar’s petition to confirm the favorable arbitration 15 award and entered judgment accordingly. (Doc. 20.) 16 Merastar now moves for judgment on Mr. Brown’s second case, arguing claim 17 preclusion. (Doc. 22.) Claim preclusion bars recovery for claims that were or could have 18 been asserted in a prior lawsuit between the same parties based on the same transaction or 19 occurrence. See Gregory v. Windnall, 153 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998). “Claim 20 preclusion is designed ‘to force a plaintiff to explore all the facts, develop all the theories, 21 and demand all the remedies in the first suit.’” Rinehimer v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 22 CV 10-347-PHX-MHB, 2012 WL 13019463, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sep. 18, 2012) (quoting 18 23 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 24 Procedure, § 4408 (2000)). Both of Mr. Brown’s lawsuits are against Merastar, and the 25 first resolved in a judgment in Merastar’s favor. In his first lawsuit, Mr. Brown accused 26 Merastar of tolerating workplace harassment; in this one, he accuses Merastar of retaliating 27 against him for reporting that same harassment. These claims arise out of the same 28 transactional nucleus of facts, and Mr. Brown could and should have raised his retaliation 1 || claims the first time around. A straightforward application of claim preclusion bars Mr. || Brown from this second bite at the apple. 3 IT IS ORDERED as follows: 4 1. Merastar’s motion to strike (Doc. 27) is GRANTED. Mr. Brown’s unauthorized 5 sur-reply (Doc. 26) is STRICKEN. 6 2. Merastar’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 22) is GRANTED. The 7 Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate this 8 case. 9 Dated this 11th day of August, 2023. 10 11 12 {Z, 13 _- Ae 14 Used States Dictric Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -3-