UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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BAP No. MB 99-100
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IN RE: V & M MANAGEMENT,
Debtor.
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ALPHONSE MOURAD
Appellant,
v.
HAROLD B. MURPHY, DONALD F. FARRELL, JR.,
HANIFY & KING, P.C., AND
STEPHEN S. GRAY
Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Massachusetts
(Hon. Carol J. Kenner, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge)
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Before
VOTOLATO, GOODMAN, DEJESUS, U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges
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Alphonse Mourad, Pro Se.
Paul D. Moore, Anthony J. Fitzpatrick & Richard M. Wong, and
Duane Morris & Heckscher, LLP, on brief for Appellee Stephen S. Gray
Harold B. Murphy, Andrew G. Lizotte and Hanify & King, P.C. ,
on brief for Appellees Harold B. Murphy, Donald F. Farrell, Jr.,
and Hanify & King, P.C.
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February 26 , 2001
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Per Curiam.
This is an appeal from an opinion by a bankruptcy judge
denying motions for recusal and remand of a removed complaint,
and dismissing all but one count of the complaint, which was
remanded to the Courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.1
After reviewing the briefs and documents submitted in the
appendices, and having heard the parties, we conclude that the
bankruptcy court’s ruling entered on November 10, 1999, correctly
resolves the three issues on appeal.2 We only add the following.
Appellant attempts to show a deep seated judicial antagonism
based on final rulings given in the case and on his arrest when
he deliberately violated the judge’s order excluding him from the
court’s premises due to unruly and disruptive behavior. Final
judicial rulings entered during the course of a bankruptcy case,
without more, are hardly ever a valid basis for recusal on
1
This bankruptcy appellate panel considers the
bankruptcy court’s opinion denying motions for recusal and remand
joined by a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss most
causes of action in the removed complaint a final order. Cf. In
re Eastport Associates,
935 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 1991). We
exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
11 U.S.C. §
158 (a)(1) and § 159 (b)(1).
2
We applied the following standards of review. We
reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and reviewed that court’s conclusions
of law de novo. Grella v. Salem Five Cent Sav. Bank,
42 F.3d 26,
30 (1st Cir. 1994). We reviewed the bankruptcy court’s order
denying the request for recusal applying the abuse of discretion
standard. Christo v. Padgett,
223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir.
2000).
2
account of judicial bias or partiality. Liteky v. U.S.,
510 U.S.
540,
554-55 (1994)(“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.... Almost
invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for
recusal.”) The rulings and the provocation which led to
Appellant’s arrest do not show the judge who issued these orders
“display[ed] a clear inability to render a fair judgment” in
other matters brought before her for consideration by the
arrested litigant. Id. at 551.
The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to order the reopening
of a closed case under
11 U.S.C. Section 350(b) and to adjudicate
matters pending in a complaint removed after a Chapter 11 plan
was confirmed. In the Matter of Southmark Corporation,
163 F.3d
925 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
527 U.S. 1004 (1999); 8
Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 1142.04[2] pp. 1142-7 (15th ed. rev.)
(1998).
We therefore affirm the bankruptcy court’s opinion of
November 10, 1999, adopting as our own its factual findings and
conclusions of law.
3
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