In re: Sharon Kay King ( 2018 )


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  •                                                             FILED
    FEB 02 2018
    1                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
    U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    2                                                         OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    3                  UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    4
    5   In re:                        )      BAP No. CC-17-1029-LKuF
    )
    6   SHARON KAY KING,              )      Bk. No. 2:15-bk-20254-BR
    )
    7                  Debtor.        )      Adv. No. 2:16-ap-01544-BR
    ______________________________)
    8                                 )
    SHARON KAY KING,              )
    9                                 )
    Appellant,     )
    10                                 )
    v.                            )      M E M O R A N D U M*
    11                                 )
    HSBC BANK USA, N.A. as Trustee)
    12   for Fremont Home Loan Trust   )
    2006-C, Mortgage-Backed       )
    13   Certificates, Series 2006-C; )
    OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC;    )
    14   PLATINUM HOLDING GROUP,       )
    )
    15                  Appellees.     )
    ______________________________)
    16
    Submitted Without Argument on January 25, 2018
    17
    Filed - February 2, 2018
    18
    Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    19                   for the Central District of California
    20            Honorable Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
    _________________________
    21
    Appearances:     Appellant Sharon Kay King, pro se on brief; Robert
    22                    W. Norman, Jr. and Kaitlyn Q. Chang of Houser &
    Allison, APC on brief for Appellees HSBC Bank USA,
    23                    N.A. as Trustee for Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-
    C, Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-C and
    24                    Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.
    _________________________
    25
    26        *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication.
    27   Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may
    have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.
    28   See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
    1
    2   Before: LAFFERTY, KURTZ, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.
    3
    4        Debtor appeals the bankruptcy court’s order remanding a
    5   removed superior court action.   The bankruptcy court remanded the
    6   action because Debtor’s chapter 71 case was closed.   On appeal,
    7   Debtor offers no argument relevant to the order on appeal, and we
    8   discern no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s ruling.
    9   Therefore, we AFFIRM.
    10                                  FACTS2
    11        Debtor filed the subject chapter 7 case on June 26, 2015.
    12   This was Debtor’s second chapter 7 filing and her sixth
    13   bankruptcy filing; the four chapter 13 cases she filed were all
    14   dismissed before completion.   Debtor had previously owned real
    15   property in Long Beach, California (the “Property”), but the
    16   Property was sold at a trustee’s sale on June 1, 2011, during a
    17   period when no automatic stay was in effect.
    18        Both before and after she filed the 2015 chapter 7 case,
    19   Debtor initiated numerous court proceedings, including state
    20
    1
    Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section
    21   references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
    .
    22   “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
    Procedure.
    23
    2
    In her excerpts of record, Debtor submitted no documents
    24   relevant to the order on appeal. Appellees provided relevant
    excerpts, and we have also exercised our discretion to review
    25   independently relevant imaged documents from the bankruptcy
    26   court’s electronic docket in the bankruptcy case and related
    adversary proceedings. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co.
    27   (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 
    887 F.2d 955
    , 957–58 (9th Cir. 1989);
    Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 
    293 B.R. 28
       227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
    -2-
    1   court cases, appeals, bankruptcies, and bankruptcy adversary
    2   proceedings related to issues involving the loan against the
    3   Property.   During this bankruptcy, Debtor attempted to sue the
    4   original lender, Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-C, and its
    5   successors, HSBC Bank USA National Association as Trustee
    6   Under the Pooling and Service Agreement Dated as of September 1,
    7   2006 (“HSBC”) and Litton Loan Servicing LP, for fraud, deceit,
    8   and unjust enrichment in asserting in Debtor’s 2010 bankruptcy
    9   that she was obligated on a loan and deed of trust encumbering
    10   the Property.   Debtor sought to quiet title and prayed for
    11   injunctive relief requiring defendants to reconvey the Property
    12   to her; she also sought compensatory and punitive damages.     For
    13   reasons that are not reflected in the record, Debtor voluntarily
    14   dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
    15        A discharge was issued on November 2, 2015, and the case was
    16   closed.   In July 2016, Debtor moved to reopen her case so that
    17   she could file an adversary proceeding identical to the one
    18   Debtor had voluntarily dismissed.     The bankruptcy court denied
    19   the motion to reopen and dismissed the adversary proceeding on
    20   grounds that the Debtor had had multiple opportunities to have
    21   her claims litigated and heard in bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
    22   forums.   The court found that there was no purpose in reopening
    23   the bankruptcy case because Debtor could seek relief in
    24   non-bankruptcy fora.   Debtor moved for reconsideration, which the
    25   bankruptcy court denied.   She then appealed both orders to this
    26   Panel, but the appeals were dismissed for lack of prosecution.
    27        On December 12, 2016, without concurrently moving to reopen
    28   the main bankruptcy case, Debtor filed a notice of removal of an
    -3-
    1   unlawful detainer action brought against her by HSBC in
    2   Los Angeles County Superior Court in August 2016.    The next day,
    3   without a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order
    4   remanding the action to superior court.    The order stated:
    5             [D]ebtor states in the pleading that she wants to
    remove a Superior Court action to the United States
    6        Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit
    Court. At the Intake window, she filed this notice of
    7        removal at the United States Bankruptcy Court.
    8             On August 3, 2016, the debtor’s motion to reopen
    her bankruptcy case was denied and an order denying the
    9        motion for reconsideration was denied on November 2,
    2016. The debtor’s bankruptcy case has been closed
    10        since November 3, 2015.
    11             Given that the bankruptcy case is closed, the
    Court remands the removed action back to the Superior
    12        Court of the State of California, County of Long Beach
    because the Superior Court action cannot be removed in
    13        a closed case.
    14        Debtor timely appealed the remand order.
    15                               JURISDICTION
    16        The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    17   §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1).   We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    18   § 158.
    19                                    ISSUE
    20        Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in
    21   remanding the unlawful detainer action to the state court.
    22                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
    23        We review the bankruptcy court’s remand order for abuse of
    24   discretion.   United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 
    242 F.3d 25
       1102, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2001).    A bankruptcy court abuses its
    26   discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard or misapplies
    27   the correct legal standard, or if its factual findings are
    28
    -4-
    1   clearly erroneous.    TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc.,
    2   
    653 F.3d 820
    , 832 (9th Cir. 2011).
    3                                 DISCUSSION
    4   A.   Appellees’ Request for Judicial Notice
    5        Appellees request that the Panel take judicial notice of 21
    6   documents.    These include recorded documents relating to the
    7   disputed loan and foreclosure as well as documents and dockets
    8   related to the extensive litigation between the parties.
    9        These documents may be helpful in understanding the history
    10   between the parties, but they are not necessary to the Panel’s
    11   disposition of this appeal.    Accordingly, the Request for
    12   Judicial Notice is DENIED.
    13   B.   Merits
    14        Removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases is governed by
    15   
    28 U.S.C. § 1452
    , which provides:
    16        (a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in
    a civil action other than a proceeding before the
    17        United States Tax Court or a civil action by a
    governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s
    18        police or regulatory power, to the district court for
    the district where such civil action is pending, if
    19        such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or
    cause of action under section 1334 of this title.
    20
    (b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is
    21        removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any
    equitable ground. An order entered under this
    22        subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a
    decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or
    23        otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d),
    1291, or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme Court of
    24        the United States under section 1254 of this title.
    25   
    28 U.S.C. § 1452
    .
    26        Rule 9027 sets forth the procedural requirements for
    27   removal.   Under that rule, a notice of removal of a civil action
    28   initiated after the commencement of a bankruptcy case must be
    -5-
    1   filed within the shorter of 30 days after receipt of the initial
    2   pleading or 30 days after receipt of the summons.
    3        One may remove a state court action only into an open
    4   bankruptcy case.    See Miller v. Cardinale (In re Deville),
    5   
    280 B.R. 483
    , 496 (9th Cir. BAP 2002), aff’d, 
    361 F.3d 539
     (9th
    6   Cir. 2004) (“The filing of a bankruptcy petition is a condition
    7   precedent for proper removal of an action to bankruptcy court.”).
    8   See also Poole v. Money Mortg. Corp. of Am. (In re Hofmann),
    9   
    248 B.R. 79
    , 86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that defendant
    10   could have moved to reopen closed bankruptcy case to accomplish
    11   the removal within the Rule 9027 deadline); In re Iannacone,
    12   
    21 B.R. 153
    , 155 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (removal is not possible
    13   absent a reopening); In re McNeil, 
    13 B.R. 743
    , 747 (Bankr.
    14   S.D.N.Y. 1981) (removal may only be had during the pendency of a
    15   bankruptcy case).
    16        A bankruptcy court may remand a removed action sua sponte.
    17   AEG Liquidation Tr. on behalf of Am. Equities Grp., Inc. v.
    18   Toobro N.Y. LLC (In re Am. Equities Grp., Inc.), 
    460 B.R. 123
    ,
    19   128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
    20        Given that the bankruptcy case was closed, the bankruptcy
    21   court did not abuse its discretion in remanding the removed
    22   action.3   Debtor does not address the propriety of the bankruptcy
    23
    3
    24         Even if the bankruptcy case had been open, Debtor’s notice
    of removal would have been untimely. Debtor states in paragraph
    25   2 of her notice of removal that she received a copy of the
    26   summons and complaint on August 6, 2016. Under Rule 9027, she
    would have had no more than 30 days after that to file her notice
    27   of removal. She did not file the notice of removal until
    December 12, 2016, more than three months after she received the
    28                                                      (continued...)
    -6-
    1   court’s remand order in her opening brief.    Rather, she cites the
    2   July 29, 2016 order denying her motion to reopen and the
    3   October 28, 2016 order denying her motion for reconsideration,
    4   and she seems to be arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in
    5   not giving her an opportunity to present her claims.    However,
    6   these matters have been finally disposed and bear no relation to
    7   the order from which Debtor appeals.    In short, Debtor has
    8   presented no basis for the Panel to find error in the bankruptcy
    9   court’s remand order.
    10                              CONCLUSION
    11        For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
    12
    13
    14
    15
    16
    17
    18
    19
    20
    21
    22
    23
    24
    25        3
    (...continued)
    26   summons and complaint.
    27        Also, it is difficult to imagine on what basis the
    bankruptcy court could have exercised jurisdiction to hear the
    28   unlawful detainer action.
    -7-