In re: Mortgage Fund '08 LLC ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                     FILED
    AUG 15 2016
    1                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
    2                                                                 U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    3                  UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    4                            OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    5   In re:                        )        BAP No. NC-15-1408-JuKiTa
    )
    6   MORTGAGE FUND ‘08 LLC,        )        Bk. No. 11-49803
    )
    7                  Debtor.        )        Adv. No. 13-04194
    ______________________________)
    8   SUSAN L. UECKER, Liquidating )
    Trustee of the Mortgage Fund )
    9   ‘08 Liquidating Trust,        )
    )
    10                  Appellant,     )
    )
    11   v.                            )        M E M O R A N D U M*
    )
    12   WILLIAM M. BENNETT,           )
    )
    13                  Appellee.      )
    ______________________________)
    14
    Argued and Submitted on July 28, 2016
    15                       at San Francisco, California
    16                          Filed - August 15, 2016
    17             Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    for the Northern District of California
    18
    Honorable Roger L. Efremsky, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
    19                       _________________________
    20   Appearances:     Ben G. Young of Jeffer Mangels Butler and
    Mitchell LLP argued for appellant Susan L.
    21                    Uecker; Martha J. Simon argued for appellee
    William M. Bennett.
    22                         _________________________
    23   Before:   JURY, KIRSCHER, and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.
    24
    25
    26       *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication.
    27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may
    have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.
    28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
    -1-
    1           Appellant Susan L. Uecker is the liquidating trustee
    2   (Trustee) appointed under the confirmed chapter 111 plan for
    3   debtor, Mortgage Fund ‘08 LLC (MF08).     Trustee filed an
    4   adversary proceeding against appellee, William M. Bennett
    5   (Bennett), seeking to avoid and recover as a fraudulent transfer
    6   under § 544 and California state law a $213,535.65 payment made
    7   to Bennett by The Mortgage Fund, LLC (TMF).2    TMF was the sole
    8   owner, manager, and member of MF08.
    9           Bennett answered the complaint and pleaded several
    10   affirmative defenses, including settlement and release based
    11   upon an agreement between MF08 and its affiliate, chapter 11
    12   debtor R.E. Loans, LLC (REL).     The agreement settled disputes
    13   between the parties regarding MF08's $66 million proof of claim
    14   (POC) filed in REL’s bankruptcy case that was commenced in
    15   Texas.     As an investor and noteholder in REL’s bankruptcy case,
    16   Bennett’s claim, and payment on that claim, was affected by the
    17   settlement.     The Texas bankruptcy court approved the settlement
    18   agreement (SA), which was incorporated into REL’s confirmed
    19   plan.     Trustee and Bennett filed cross-motions for summary
    20   judgment.     Trustee moved for summary judgment on her
    21   constructive fraudulent transfer claim for relief, and Bennett
    22
    23
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section
    24 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
    ,
    “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
    25 Procedure, and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules
    26 of Civil Procedure.
    2
    27        On April 8, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered a
    scheduling order which consolidated this adversary with Uecker v.
    28 Montgomery, Adv. No. 13-04190, for purposes of trial.
    -2-
    1   moved for summary judgment on, among other things, his twelfth
    2   affirmative defense of settlement and release.     After a hearing,
    3   the bankruptcy court took the matters under advisement.
    4           The bankruptcy court subsequently issued a decision finding
    5   that the SA covered Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claim against
    6   Bennett and that all other issues raised in the summary judgment
    7   motions were moot.     The court entered an order granting
    8   Bennett’s motion for summary judgment (MSJ) and denying
    9   Trustee’s MSJ.     Trustee appeals from that order.3
    10           The SA provides that California law governs its
    11   construction.     Applying California law, we determine that the
    12   record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Trustee,
    13   shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the
    14   proper construction of the terms “REL Transfer,” “Paid by REL,”
    15   and “Any Third Party” as used in the SA.     Therefore, Bennett was
    16   entitled to judgment as a matter of law.     Accordingly, we
    17   AFFIRM.
    18
    19
    20
    21
    22
    23
    24
    25       3
    Trustee also appealed the bankruptcy court’s order
    26 granting summary judgment in favor of Montgomery in the related
    adversary proceeding, BAP No. NC-15-1415. Trustee filed a notice
    27 of related appeals and a request for consolidation of the two
    appeals for oral argument. On March 4, 2016, a one-judge order
    28 set the related appeals before the same merits panel.
    -3-
    1                              I.     FACTS4
    2   A.   The MF08 and REL Bankruptcy Cases
    3        On September 12, 2011, several investors filed a chapter 7
    4   involuntary bankruptcy petition against MF08 in the bankruptcy
    5   court for the Northern District of California.    The bankruptcy
    6   court converted the case to chapter 11 and entered an order for
    7   relief on September 28, 2011.   As of the petition date, MF08 had
    8   about 472 noteholders who were owed approximately $80 million
    9   and held a real estate portfolio valued at around $72 million.
    10        The bankruptcy court approved MF08's disclosure statement
    11   and confirmed its plan by order entered on February 3, 2012.
    12   The confirmation order established the MF08 liquidating trust;
    13   Trustee has been in place since that time.
    14        REL commenced its chapter 11 case in the Northern District
    15   of Texas on September 13, 2011.5    At the time of its filing, REL
    16   had about 2,900 noteholders who were owed approximately
    17   $646 million (REL Noteholders).    On September 22, 2011, the
    18   United States Trustee appointed the Official Committee of
    19   Noteholders (Noteholders Committee) in REL’s bankruptcy case.
    20
    4
    We borrow heavily from the comprehensive facts set forth
    21 in the bankruptcy court’s memorandum decision on this matter and
    22 its published decision in the related matter, Susan L. Uecker,
    Trustee of the Mortgage Fund ‘08 Liquidating Trust v. Montgomery
    23 (In re Mortgage Fund ‘08 LLC), 
    541 B.R. 467
     (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
    2015).
    24
    5
    Capital Salvage, a California corporation, and R.E.
    25 Future, LLC (RE Future), also filed chapter 11 cases on the same
    26 date as REL. Capital Salvage and RE Future were entities that
    owned most of the real property obtained through foreclosure
    27 sales by REL. REL is the sole shareholder of Capital Salvage and
    the sole member of RE Future. Those cases were jointly
    28 administered with REL’s case.
    -4-
    1   B.   Ownership and Operation of MF08 and REL
    2        Walter Ng and his sons, Kelly Ng and Barney Ng, owned,
    3   managed, and controlled, directly or indirectly, MF08 and REL
    4   and their related entities.
    5        Walter and Kelly Ng formed REL in January 2002.       REL was an
    6   investment company that issued secured loans to real estate
    7   developers.   To raise money, REL sold unregistered securities to
    8   investors in exchange for making the investors “members” of REL.
    9   Bennett was an investor and member in REL.
    10        In 2007, REL faced liquidity problems due to decreasing
    11   values in the real estate market.     Its attorneys also advised
    12   REL that that it had been violating state and federal securities
    13   laws by selling securities without registration as required by
    14   the Securities and Exchange Commission.     Due to these
    15   violations, the attorneys urged REL to immediately stop
    16   soliciting new investments.   As a result, by June 2007 REL had
    17   $20 million in loan commitments, had only $1 million cash on
    18   hand and could not meet the withdrawal requests from its
    19   investors.
    20        In November 2007, REL made its members into noteholders in
    21   what is referred to as the “Exchange Transaction” and the
    22   issuance of “Exchange Notes.”
    23        To address REL’s severe cash flow problems, in December
    24   2007, Walter and Kelly Ng created MF08 for the stated purpose of
    25   raising capital through the issuance of notes to investors and
    26   making loans secured by real estate with the funds raised.      In
    27   reality, MF08 was part of a scheme perpetrated by the Ngs in
    28   which investors’ money was funneled from MF08 to REL.      According
    -5-
    1   to Trustee, MF08 transferred over $66 million of the
    2   approximately $80 million raised from MF08 investors to REL.
    3            As mentioned above, TMF was MF08's sole owner, manager, and
    4   member.      Walter Ng and Kelly Ng were the sole members of TMF and
    5   thus controlled MF08.
    6   C.       MF08's $66 Million POC in the REL Case
    7            Prior to Trustee’s appointment as liquidating trustee, MF08
    8   filed a POC in the REL case for $66,226,496.      The attachment to
    9   the POC stated:
    10            [B]etween December 4, 2007, and February 4, 2009, the
    Ngs caused the aggregate sum of $66,226,496 to be
    11            transferred from MF08's bank account to [REL] (the
    “Cash Transfers”). The Cash Transfers were made
    12            either (1) directly to [REL], (2) indirectly through
    [TMF] or Bar-K, or (3) to [REL’s] borrowers to enable
    13            such borrowers to service or repay loans extended to
    them by [REL]. (Emphasis added).
    14
    15   The POC alleged that the Ngs caused the “Cash Transfers” and
    16   that they were made with the “actual intent to hinder, delay or
    17   defraud entities to whom MF08 was or became, on or after the
    18   dates that such transfer[s] were made, indebted.”     Also included
    19   with the POC was a “Table of Cash Transfers from MF08 to the
    20   Debtor” which detailed the dates, check numbers, and amounts
    21   purportedly transferred by MF08 to REL from December 4, 2007, to
    22   February 4, 2009.6     Trustee continued to assert the POC in the
    23
    6
    24          To be clear, the list of cash transfers showed only those
    transfers made from MF08 to REL and did not identify those
    25   transfers that REL made to the holders of the Exchange Notes,
    26   either directly or indirectly through TMF or Bar-K. MF08
    maintained that if it could trace the funds to the holders of the
    27   Exchange Notes, it might have the right to pursue recovery from
    them. Due to the settlement of its POC, tracing became
    28                                                      (continued...)
    -6-
    1   REL bankruptcy case after her appointment.
    2   D.       MF08's Settlement with REL and Confirmation of the REL Plan
    3            REL informally objected to MF08's POC.     On April 24, 2012,
    4   Trustee, REL, and other principle stakeholders in the REL case —
    5   Wells Fargo Capital Finances, LLC (REL’s secured lender) and the
    6   Noteholders Committee (representing Bennett’s interests as a REL
    7   Noteholder), participated in a judicial mediation regarding the
    8   dispute over the POC and other disputes related to confirmation
    9   of a plan.7        Having failed to reach a settlement on that date,
    10   the parties continued to negotiate and eventually reached an
    11   agreement regarding the validity and priority of MF08's POC.
    12            Prior to the execution of the SA, the Noteholders Committee
    13   sent a letter to the REL Noteholders, including Bennett, dated
    14   May 16, 2012.         The committee recommended that the noteholders
    15   vote to accept the plan, explaining:
    16            [T]he Plan Compromise8 represents a favorable outcome
    for Noteholders when weighed against the risk,
    17            uncertainty and potential cost of litigating against
    objections to the allowance or priority of the
    18            Noteholders’ claims. The proposed Plan Compromise
    resolves the debtors’ and MF08's potential claims
    19            against Noteholders to recover prepetition
    distributions as alleged fraudulent conveyances,
    20            ensures that current Noteholders will not be at risk
    of being sued by the Liquidating Trustee for the
    21
    22            6
    (...continued)
    23 unnecessary. To the extent that Trustee’s counsel asserted at
    oral argument that the list defined the universe of Noteholders
    24 entitled to the waiver in question, the list could not do so,
    25 since it showed transfers to, not from, REL.
    7
    26        Development Specialists, Inc. (DSI) also participated in
    the all-day mediation. Other than DSI, all the parties agreed to
    27 the terms of the modified plan and the SA.
    28        8
    The “Plan Compromise” is explained below.
    -7-
    1        recovery of distributions paid out years ago, and
    insulates Noteholders from the expense of defending
    2        against such litigation.
    3   The parties, including Trustee, executed the SA on May 30, 2012.
    4   The SA allowed REL to proceed with confirmation of its plan.
    5        REL filed a motion for approval of the SA under Rule 9019
    6   (Motion).   At the same time, REL filed its Modified Fourth
    7   Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, dated June 1,
    8   2012, which had been amended to comply with the requirements of
    9   the SA with MF08.
    10        In the Motion seeking approval, REL generally reiterated
    11   the provisions set forth in the SA.   REL stated that MF08
    12   contended, based on various theories, including that the
    13   transfers may have constituted intentional or constructive
    14   fraudulent transfers, that REL was liable to it for the
    15   $66 million received.   The Motion defined the “REL Transfers” as
    16   the transfer of $66 million made between December 2007 and
    17   “approximately August of 2008” and REL’s commingling of that
    18   amount in its general account with other REL funds.   The Motion
    19   also stated that MF08 contended that “if it [could] trace the
    20   funds that it transferred to REL from REL to any given [REL]
    21   Noteholder, MF08 might have the right to pursue recovery from
    22   that [REL] Noteholder as a subsequent transferee pursuant to
    23   Bankruptcy Code § 550(b).”   This potential right to assert
    24   claims against noteholders that received REL Transfers was
    25   defined as the “MF08 Potential Avoidance Actions.”
    26        The Motion then described the response by REL and the
    27   Noteholders Committee to MF08's contentions:
    28        [REL] and the Noteholders Committee contend that
    -8-
    1        Noteholders who received the REL Transfers who were
    not insiders of [REL] cannot be liable to MF08 because
    2        (a) it is not possible to trace the dollars received
    from MF08 to any specific REL Transfer or transferee;
    3        and (b) each [REL] Noteholder that received an REL
    Transfer, with the possible exception of insiders of
    4        [REL], received any such REL Transfer on account of a
    debt payable by [REL] for value, in good faith, and
    5        without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer
    from MF08 to [REL] (even assuming that transfer is
    6        avoidable) and, therefore, would be shielded from
    liability pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 550(b).
    7
    8        The Motion also described the “prior plan compromise” which
    9   had been negotiated by REL and the Noteholders Committee and the
    10   change to it which was now required by the proposed settlement
    11   with MF08.   The prior plan compromise provided that if the REL
    12   Noteholders voted to accept the plan, the REL Noteholders' lien
    13   on REL assets would be released, they would share pro rata with
    14   holders of general unsecured claims and their claims would not
    15   be “subordinated or challenged,” but each REL Noteholders’ claim
    16   would be reduced by 50% of any cash received after the November
    17   2007 Exchange Transaction through the REL petition date.
    18        The proposed agreement with MF08 made one change to the
    19   “prior plan compromise.”   Instead of the REL Noteholders sharing
    20   pro rata with the REL general unsecured creditors, the first
    21   $5 million distributed was to go to the REL general unsecured
    22   creditors before the REL Noteholders would share pro rata.    This
    23   change increased the distribution to general unsecured
    24   creditors, primarily benefitting MF08 as the largest such
    25   creditor, and reduced the distribution to REL Noteholders
    26   through reallocation of the first $5 million.   In exchange for
    27   this “enhancement,” MF08 agreed to vote its $66 million claim in
    28   favor of the plan.   Per the agreement, MF08 would also waive its
    -9-
    1   right to pursue all MF08 Potential Avoidance Actions against REL
    2   Noteholders, and MF08 would be appointed to the trust oversight
    3   committee of the liquidating trust to be created under the REL
    4   Plan.
    5        In seeking court approval for this agreement, REL explained
    6   that, absent this agreement, the parties would be forced to
    7   litigate the merits of the MF08 POC, the merits of the final
    8   plan compromise, the relative priorities and rights as between
    9   the holders of general unsecured claims and the REL Noteholders,
    10   and the merits of the MF08 Potential Avoidance Actions.    This
    11   was an unattractive proposition because it would “consume
    12   substantial cash that would otherwise be distributable to REL
    13   Noteholders and MF08's creditors.”
    14        As further support, REL mentioned that many REL Noteholders
    15   were also investors in MF08 and paying the professionals to
    16   redistribute the limited funds available as between MF08 and REL
    17   would reduce the total amount received by all creditors.
    18   Litigating MF08's Potential Avoidance Actions would also likely
    19   be complex and could require expensive efforts to trace funds,
    20   and every dollar spent on professionals would reduce the amount
    21   available for distribution to creditors.   The modified plan
    22   eliminated these issues and was supported by all stakeholders,
    23   including the committee of MF08's noteholders.
    24        On June 18, 2012, the REL bankruptcy court confirmed REL’s
    25   plan and approved the SA.
    26   E.   The Relevant Sections of the SA
    27        The Recitals in section 2 of the SA state:
    28        2.01.   MF08 transferred cash in an amount equal to
    -10-
    1        $66,226,496 to R.E. Loans during the period from
    December of 2007 and through 2008.
    2
    2.02. MF08 contends that R.E. Loans is liable to MF08
    3        for the monies received on various theories, including
    without limitation based upon the contention that the
    4        transfers may have constituted fraudulent transfers.
    5        2.03. During the time period from December of 2007
    through approximately August of 2008, R.E. Loans
    6        received cash and deposited that cash into its general
    account from multiple sources, including without
    7        limitation (a) the transfers from MFO8 described in
    2.01, above, (b) payoffs by R.E. Loans’ borrowers of
    8        principal and interest, (c) sales of assets, and
    (d) advances by Wells Fargo Capital Finance, LLC
    9        (“Wells Fargo”).
    10        2.04. During the time period from December of 2007
    through approximately August of 2008, R.E. Loans made
    11        payments out of its general account to many different
    parties, including without limitation payments to
    12        various creditors, including without limitation the
    holders of Exchange Notes issued to R.E. Loans’
    13        Noteholders (REL Transfers).
    14        2.05. MF08 contends that if it could trace the funds
    that it transferred to R.E. Loans as described in
    15        Paragraph 2.01 from R.E. Loans to the holders of
    Exchange Notes, MF08 might have the right to pursue
    16        recovery from the holders of Exchange Notes as
    “subsequent transferees” pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
    17        § 550(d). R.E. Loans contends that holders of
    Exchange Notes who received the REL Transfers cannot
    18        be liable to MF08 because (a) it is not possible to
    trace the dollars received from MF08 to any specific
    19        REL Transfer; and (b) each holder of an Exchange Note
    that received an REL Transfer, with the possible
    20        exception of insiders who may have received an REL
    Transfer, received any such REL Transfer on account of
    21        a debt payable by R.E. Loans for value, in good faith,
    and without knowledge of the voidability of the
    22        transfer from MF08 to R.E. Loans (even assuming that
    transfer is avoidable) and, therefore, would be
    23        shielded from liability pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
    § 550(b).
    24
    2.06. MF08's potential right to assert claims against
    25        holders of Exchange Notes that received REL Transfers
    shall be referred to herein as “MFO8's Potential
    26        Avoidance Actions”.
    27        Section 3.01-3.03 of the SA dealt with the allowance of
    28   MF08's claim in the REL case.   If REL’s modified plan was
    -11-
    1   confirmed and the “Plan Compromise” approved by the Texas
    2   bankruptcy court, then MF08's POC “shall be allowed as a general
    3   unsecured claim against R.E. Loans in the amount of
    4   $66,226,496. . . .”
    5        Section 4 of SA, titled “Waiver of Right to Pursue MF08
    6   Potential Avoidance Actions,” provides:
    7        4.01. If the MF08 Claim is Allowed pursuant to
    Paragraph 3, above, MF08 waives the right to pursue
    8        any MFO8 Potential Avoidance Actions; provided,
    however, that this Agreement shall not limit or
    9        restrict the right of MF08 to bring any action against
    any third party, including any manager, member,
    10        insider or professional of MF08. This provision shall
    be void and of no further force or effect if the MF08
    11        Claim is not Allowed pursuant to Paragraph 3, above.
    12        4.02. With respect to the claims released herein,
    MF08 acknowledges that it has been advised by its
    13        attorneys concerning, and is familiar with,
    California Civil Code Section 1542 and it expressly
    14        waives any and all rights under California Civil Code
    Section 1542 and under any other federal or state
    15        statute or law of similar effect with respect to the
    claims released herein. Section 1542 of the
    16        California Civil Code provides as follows:
    17             A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS
    WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT
    18             TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF
    EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM
    19             OR HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR
    HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.
    20
    21        Finally, section 8 provided that the SA be interpreted
    22   according to California law.
    23   F.   The Transfer at Issue
    24        As noted, Bennett was an investor in REL, an affiliate of
    25   MF08.   Bennett was not an investor in, or a creditor of, MF08.
    26        On August 14, 2008, MF08 wrote check no. 1175 from its
    27   account payable to TMF for $237,000.   TMF deposited this check
    28   into its bank account on the same date.   This was the only
    -12-
    1   deposit made into this TMF account during August 2008.    On
    2   August 15, 2008, TMF wrote its check no. 1027 to Bennett for
    3   $213,535.65.   TMF’s bank honored this check on Monday August 18,
    4   2008.
    5        Bennett’s REL investor portfolio account statement
    6   describes the $213,535.65 payment as a “note decrease” and shows
    7   a balance in the account of $2,404 as of October 25, 2011.
    8   According to Bennett, Walter Ng handed him the $213,535.65 check
    9   at Mr. Ng’s home.   REL’s amended schedule D showed that REL owed
    10   Bennett $3,027.22 as of its September 2011 petition date.
    11   G.   The Underlying Adversary Proceeding
    12        On October 6, 2014, Trustee filed an amended complaint
    13   seeking to avoid and recover the $213,535.65, alleging that
    14   amount was fraudulently transferred by MF08 to TMF and then paid
    15   to Bennett on August 15, 2008, with funds that could be traced
    16   to MF08.   The amended complaint further alleged that the
    17   $213,535.65 transfer to Bennett was both intentionally and
    18   constructively fraudulent under California law.
    19        On November 6, 2014, Bennett answered the complaint.
    20   Bennett denied that the $213,535.65 transfer to him by MF08 was
    21   intentionally or constructively fraudulent and alleged twelve
    22   affirmative defenses, including that the court-approved SA in
    23   REL’s bankruptcy case and REL’s confirmed plan operated as a
    24   settlement and release of any fraudulent transfer claims MF08
    25   could assert against him.   Attached to his answer as Exhibit “B”
    26   was a copy of Bennett’s investor account with REL that reflected
    27   the payment as a “note decrease.”
    28
    -13-
    1   H.   The MSJs
    2        On July 27, 2015, Bennett filed his MSJ alleging that there
    3   were no material issues of fact in dispute and that he was
    4   entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his fourth
    5   affirmative defense (good faith transferee) and his twelfth
    6   affirmative defense (the SA’s release).    In connection with the
    7   motion, Bennett requested the court to take judicial notice of
    8   (1) the SA; (2) the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
    9   order confirming REL’s modified Fourth Amended Joint Chapter 11
    10   Plan of Reorganization, dated June 1, 2012; and (3) the order
    11   approving the SA between REL and MF08.
    12        On August 13, 2015, Trustee filed a MSJ on the
    13   constructively fraudulent claim under § 544 and Cal. Civ. Code
    14   § 3439.04(a)(2)(A).    Trustee argued that the undisputed facts
    15   showed that MF08 was entitled to avoid the transfer of $237,000
    16   from MF08 to TMF and may recover $213,565 of it from Bennett as
    17   either the initial transferee or the immediate transferee of the
    18   initial transferee as permitted under § 550(a).    She also argued
    19   that Bennett’s interpretation of the SA was incorrect.
    20        In opposition, Bennett argued that Trustee’s evidence
    21   showed that the Ngs intentionally co-mingled investors’ money in
    22   the entities they controlled.    He also pointed out that the
    23   language in the SA showed that the inability to trace was a
    24   predicate for the settlement and that the release language in
    25   the SA applied to him.    Finally, Bennett asserted that the
    26   entities themselves treated the return of his investment in REL
    27   as a payment by REL.   In this regard, Bennett pointed to
    28   (1) REL’s amended schedule D filed in 2011 which showed he was
    -14-
    1   owed approximately $3,000, and (2) his REL account statements.
    2          The bankruptcy court heard the motions on September 10,
    3   2015.    At the hearing, Trustee’s counsel asserted that the
    4   primary question raised in the motions was whether MF08 released
    5   the avoidance action claims against Bennett under the SA.
    6   Counsel argued that only a narrow category of claims were
    7   settled through the SA as shown by sections 2.04 and 2.05 of the
    8   SA.    That is, only those avoidance claims that were paid by REL
    9   and not claims paid by TMF.     He also maintained that the release
    10   in the SA under 
    Cal. Civ. Code § 1542
     was a “general release,”
    11   and section 4.01 of the SA preserved unknown claims by
    12   authorizing Trustee to file any action against any “third
    13   party.”    Following argument, the bankruptcy court took the
    14   matter under submission.
    15          On November 6, 2015, the bankruptcy court issued its
    16   memorandum decision finding that the release in the SA covered
    17   Trustee’s claims in the adversary proceeding and that all other
    18   issues were moot.    On November 13, 2015, the bankruptcy court
    19   entered an order granting Bennett’s MSJ and denying Trustee’s
    20   MSJ.    Trustee filed a timely notice of appeal from that order.
    21                            II.    JURISDICTION
    22          The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    23   §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(H).      We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    24   § 158.
    25                               III.    ISSUE
    26          Whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the SA
    27   between MF08 and REL barred MF08's fraudulent transfer claims
    28   against Bennett.
    -15-
    1                       IV.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    2        We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision on cross-
    3   motions for summary judgment, applying the same standard used by
    4   the bankruptcy court.   Brown v. City of L.A., 
    521 F.3d 1238
    ,
    5   1240 (9th Cir. 2008); Furnace v. Sullivan, 
    705 F.3d 1021
    , 1026
    6   (9th Cir. 2013).
    7        We also review de novo determinations of whether contract
    8   language is ambiguous, Tyler v. Cuomo, 
    236 F.3d 1124
    , 1134 (9th
    9   Cir. 2000), and “whether the written contract is reasonably
    10   susceptible of a proffered meaning.”   Brinderson-Newberg Joint
    11   Venture v. Pac. Erectors, Inc., 
    971 F.2d 272
    , 277 (9th Cir.
    12   1992); see also Winet v. Price, 
    4 Cal.App.4th 1159
    , 1165 (1992)
    13   (the court reviews determinations of whether contract language
    14   is ambiguous de novo); Scheenstra v. Cal. Dairies, Inc.,
    15   
    213 Cal.App.4th 370
    , 393 (2013) (even where uncontroverted
    16   evidence allows for conflicting inferences to be drawn,
    17   interpretation of contract is solely a judicial function);
    18   Sunniland Fruit, Inc. v. Verni, 
    233 Cal.App.3d 892
    , 898 (1991)
    19   (de novo review “where the interpretation [of the contract] does
    20   not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence” and “where
    21   the extrinsic evidence points only one way, or is
    22   uncontested.”); Wolf v. Super. Ct., 
    114 Cal.App.4th 1343
    , 1351
    23   (2004) (where the extrinsic evidence points only one way, or is
    24   uncontested, the meaning of the language in question may be
    25   ascertained as a matter of law).
    26                             V.   DISCUSSION
    27   A.   Legal Standards for Summary Judgment
    28        “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
    -16-
    1   that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    2   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”    Civil
    3   Rule 56(a), made applicable here by Rule 7056.    Material facts
    4   are those necessary to establish the elements of a party’s cause
    5   of action.     Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248
    6   (1986).     A genuine issue for trial exists only if “the evidence
    7   is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” for the
    8   party opposing summary judgment.    
    Id. at 248
    ; see also Aguilar
    9   v. Atl. Richfield Co., 
    25 Cal.4th 826
    , 856 (2001) (on summary
    10   judgment a court “does not decide on any finding of its own, but
    11   simply decides what finding such a trier of fact could make for
    12   itself.”).
    13           When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may
    14   not weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the
    15   evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
    16   justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”    Anderson,
    17   
    477 U.S. at 255
    .9    The court is not precluded from drawing
    18   inferences against the non-moving party as long as the
    19   underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to that
    20   party.     Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
    21   
    475 U.S. 574
    , 588 (1986).    In the end, the court “must determine
    22   whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to
    23   the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of
    24   material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
    25
    26       9
    Trustee has not argued on appeal that the bankruptcy court
    27 erred by weighing the extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, those
    arguments are deemed waived for purposes of this appeal. Smith
    28 v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
    -17-
    1   as a matter of law.”   Brown, 
    521 F.3d at 1240
    .
    2        A court may grant summary judgment regarding the
    3   interpretation of ambiguous language in a contract if the
    4   non-moving party fails to point to any relevant extrinsic
    5   evidence supporting that party’s interpretation of the language.
    6   Compagnie Financiere de CIC et de L'Union Europeenne v. Merrill
    7   Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
    232 F.3d 153
     (2nd Cir.
    8   2000); see also Torres Vargas v. Santiago Cummings, 
    149 F.3d 29
    ,
    9   33 (1st Cir. 1998) (summary judgment appropriate where extrinsic
    10   evidence presented to the court supports only one of the
    11   conflicting interpretations).
    12        Under California law and summary judgment standards,
    13   Bennett had the burden of proof on his affirmative defense to
    14   show that the SA waiver operated as a complete defense to MF08's
    15   fraudulent transfer claims against him.
    16   B.   Is the SA ambiguous?
    17        This appeal involves the interpretation of the SA under
    18   California law.   The threshold question is whether the SA is
    19   ambiguous; that is, reasonably susceptible to more than one
    20   interpretation.   Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1165.   The question of
    21   ambiguity is a question of law subject to de novo review.    Id.
    22        “Whether the contract is reasonably susceptible to a
    23   party’s interpretation can be determined from the language of
    24   the contract itself,” United Teachers of Oakland v. Oakland
    25   Unified Sch. Dist., 
    75 Cal.App.3d 322
    , 330 (1977), or from
    26   extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.   Winet, 
    4 Cal.App.4th 27
       at 1165.   In California, courts are required to receive
    28   provisionally any proffered extrinsic evidence that is relevant
    -18-
    1   to show whether the contractual language is reasonably
    2   susceptible to a particular meaning.     Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
    3   G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc., 
    69 Cal.2d 33
    , 39–40
    4   (1968) (rational interpretation of a contract requires at least
    5   a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to
    6   prove the intention of the parties).     Such extrinsic evidence
    7   might expose a latent ambiguity when the contract appears
    8   unambiguous on its face.   
    Id.
     at 40 & n.8.    “An appellate
    9   analysis of the threshold question concerning whether the
    10   contractual language is ambiguous—that is, reasonably
    11   susceptible to more than one interpretation—usually involves the
    12   examination of competing interpretations offered by the
    13   parties.”   Scheenstra, 213 Cal.App.4th at 393.
    14        In seeking reversal of the bankruptcy court’s order in
    15   favor of Bennett, Trustee repeats many of the arguments that she
    16   made before the bankruptcy court.     Trustee relies upon the
    17   language of the SA itself for her interpretation.     In a
    18   nutshell, she contends that Bennett was not protected under the
    19   terms of SA because he was paid by TMF and not from REL’s
    20   general account.   Thus, according to Trustee, he was not part of
    21   the protected class of REL Transferees under the SA, making
    22   MF08's waiver of avoidance claims inapplicable as to him.
    23        To support her argument, she urges us to look at the
    24   defined terms in sections 2.04-2.06 of the SA.     Section 2.04
    25   defines a “REL Transfer” as payments made out of REL’s general
    26   account to the holders of Exchange Notes issued to REL’s
    27   Noteholders.   Trustee asserts that this provision plainly shows
    28   that MF08 released only its claims against REL Noteholders for
    -19-
    1   recovery of amounts paid by REL and that these are the MF08
    2   Potential Avoidance actions MF08 agreed to release under
    3   section 2.06.   She also relies on section 4.01 which states that
    4   “this Agreement shall not limit or restrict the right of MF08 to
    5   bring any action against any third party.” (Emphasis added).
    6   According to Trustee, the phrases “any action” and “any third
    7   party” are broad and include her avoidance action against
    8   Bennett.
    9        In his opposing brief, Bennett argues that that he was an
    10   REL Transferee within the meaning of the SA and therefore
    11   protected by MF08's waiver of the avoidance claims.   In this
    12   regard, Bennett contends that Trustee ignores the “plain
    13   meaning” of section 2.04 of the SA which states that REL made
    14   payments “. . . . to many different parties, including without
    15   limitation, payments to various creditors, including without
    16   limitation the holders of Exchange Notes issued to R.E. Loans’
    17   Noteholders (‘REL Transfers’).”   According to Bennett, the words
    18   “many different parties,” “various creditors” and “including”
    19   are plain:   the payments made by [REL] between December 2007 and
    20   August 2008 made to “many different parties” include any and all
    21   payments [REL] made to MF08.   These payments are REL Transfers.
    22   Bennett further maintains that the sourcing and co-mingling of
    23   MF08's money supports the fact that he received an REL Transfer.
    24   Bennett points out that Trustee presented no evidence of how the
    25   money came into MF08's bank account because of the inherent
    26   tracing problems which were acknowledged in the SA.
    27        The bankruptcy court admitted extrinsic evidence to inform
    28   its decision on the meaning of the SA:   (1) Bennett’s REL loans
    -20-
    1   account statement; (2) REL’s amended schedule D which showed it
    2   owed approximately $3,000 to Bennett; (3) REL’s motion seeking
    3   approval of the SA between REL and MF08 along with the SA; (4) a
    4   letter from the REL Noteholders Committee to REL Noteholders;
    5   and (5) TMF’s REL investor portfolio account statement.
    6         In conducting our independent review into whether an
    7   ambiguity exists, we examined the SA and the POC and considered
    8   the admitted extrinsic evidence.    Based upon our review, we
    9   determine that the bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that
    10   the SA was ambiguous with respect to the terms “REL Transfer,”
    11   “Paid by REL,” or “Any Third Party,” as those terms were
    12   reasonably susceptible to the parties’ competing
    13   interpretations.   Accordingly, the bankruptcy court properly
    14   admitted the extrinsic evidence to aid it in interpreting the
    15   SA.   Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 
    69 Cal.2d at 37
    .
    16   C.    Interpretation of the SA
    17         This determination does not end our inquiry.   Although the
    18   above-referenced terms are ambiguous, we still must consider
    19   whether the bankruptcy court appropriately resolved the
    20   ambiguity.   The parties do not challenge the SA itself and
    21   presented no extrinsic evidence as to their intent at the time
    22   the SA was signed.   This is not surprising since Bennett was not
    23   a party to the SA and the negotiations and as the court ruled
    24   that the communications regarding the settlement of MF08's POC
    25   made during the mediation held in REL’s bankruptcy case were
    26
    27
    28
    -21-
    1   confidential.10
    2           Nonetheless, as mentioned above, to inform its decision on
    3   the meaning of the SA, the bankruptcy court admitted extrinsic
    4   evidence.     Although Trustee disputes the inferences to be drawn
    5   from the extrinsic evidence, the evidentiary facts themselves
    6   are undisputed.     The meaning of the terms “REL Transfer,” “Paid
    7   by REL,” and “Any third Party,” was not dependent on the
    8   credibility of conflicting evidence.     There were thus no factual
    9   issues for the bankruptcy court to resolve.     Accordingly, we
    10   review the SA in the context of the extrinsic evidence presented
    11   and make our own independent determination of its meaning.      See
    12   Wolf, 114 Cal.App.4th at 1351; Scheenstra, 213 Cal.App.4th at
    13   390.
    14           We determine the meaning of the ambiguous language by
    15   applying the appropriate canons of construction governing
    16   contracts.     “‘[W]here the language of the contract is ambiguous,
    17   it is the duty of the court to resolve the ambiguity by taking
    18   into account all the facts, circumstances and conditions
    19   surrounding the execution of the contract.’”     Frankel v. Bd. of
    20   Dental Exam’rs, 
    46 Cal.App.4th 534
    , 544 (1996); Pac. Gas & Elec.
    21   Co., 
    69 Cal.2d at 40
     (court may consider the circumstances under
    22   which the agreement was made, including its object, nature and
    23   subject matter).     The goal is to interpret the contract to give
    24   effect to the mutual intent of the parties as it existed when
    25   they contracted.     
    Cal. Civ. Code § 1636
    ; see also Pac. Gas &
    26
    10
    27        Trustee filed a motion seeking to prohibit the use of
    mediation documents for any purpose in the litigation. The
    28 bankruptcy court granted that motion.
    -22-
    1   Elec. Co., 
    69 Cal.2d at 38
    .   It is the outward expression of the
    2   agreement, rather than a party's unexpressed intention, which
    3   the court will enforce.   Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1165.
    4        1.    “REL Transfer” and “Paid by REL”
    5        We begin with the ambiguous terms “REL Transfer” and “Paid
    6   by REL.”   Relying on the plain language of the SA, Trustee
    7   maintains that since Bennett was paid by TMF from its bank
    8   account, he was not “paid by REL.”    Therefore, he did not
    9   receive a “REL Transfer” within the meaning of the SA and is not
    10   protected by MF08's waiver of avoidance actions.
    11        This interpretation is not supported when we consider the
    12   admitted extrinsic evidence and the context under which
    13   settlement of MF08's POC was reached.    First, it is undisputed -
    14   as the MF08 POC stated - that the Ngs controlled MF08, TMF, and
    15   REL and had a pattern of treating them as they wished:    “the Ngs
    16   caused the $66 million in transfers to be made, either directly
    17   or indirectly.”   Thus, in this Ponzi-like scheme, MF08
    18   acknowledged in its POC that the Ngs did not differentiate
    19   between REL, MF08, or TMF.
    20        The evidence also shows that by all appearances, Bennett
    21   had been paid by REL and received a REL Transfer.    As the
    22   bankruptcy court properly noted: (1) Bennett was paid during the
    23   time period described in the POC (i.e., December 2007 – February
    24   2009), and in the time period in section 2.04 of the SA (i.e.,
    25   December 2007 – August 2008); (2) his investor portfolio account
    26   statement showed REL took credit for making the $213,535.65
    27   payment when it was made; and (3) REL’s amended schedule D
    28   showed it took credit for making this payment.    The bankruptcy
    -23-
    1   court also correctly observed that TMF’s investor portfolio
    2   account statement for REL showed REL treated the $213,535.65
    3   payment as a purchase by TMF of an interest in REL that
    4   corresponded - to the day and to the penny - with this
    5   $213,535.65 payment to Bennett.
    6          In addition, the Noteholders’ Committee’s letter sent to
    7   Bennett and other REL Noteholders is consistent with the
    8   documentation Bennett received from REL before any controversy
    9   arose.    See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Super. Ct., 
    37 Cal.App.4th 10
       839, 851 (1995) (“The rule is well-settled that in construing
    11   the terms of a contract the construction given it by the acts
    12   and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, and
    13   before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is
    14   admissible on the issue of the parties’ intent.”).
    15          In the end, the evidence which does appear in the record
    16   shows that the parties necessarily intended that the waiver by
    17   MF08 of its right to sue any REL investor for a fraudulent
    18   transfer included anyone paid directly or indirectly by REL.
    19   Although Trustee urges us to adopt her competing interpretation
    20   of the SA, she has offered no evidence in support of her
    21   position.    Given the lack of evidence supporting Trustee’s
    22   inferences and interpretation, the bankruptcy court reasonably
    23   concluded that Bennett was entitled to judgment as a matter of
    24   law.    See Anderson, 
    477 U.S. at 249
     (holding that “there is no
    25   issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
    26   nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party”).
    27          Indeed, the thrust of Trustee’s argument on appeal is that
    28   the bankruptcy court misinterpreted or misused the extrinsic
    -24-
    1   evidence.    First, she contends that the bankruptcy court applied
    2   the wrong legal standard to interpret the SA based on improper
    3   extrinsic evidence.     In this regard, Trustee relies on the
    4   bankruptcy court’s statement that “[t]he extrinsic evidence is
    5   consistent on one essential point.      By everything he was told by
    6   REL, it is reasonable to interpret the Settlement Agreement as
    7   Mr. Bennett does.”    Trustee maintains that the bankruptcy court
    8   erroneously relied upon the statements of REL, only one party to
    9   the agreement, and Bennett, a stranger to the agreement.
    10   Trustee contends that “at most” REL’s communications to Bennett
    11   show its subjective intent, but subjective intent is irrelevant.
    12        At another point, Trustee maintains that the Noteholders’
    13   Committee’s letter is another example of their subjective
    14   intent.   Trustee asserts that the letter does not evidence the
    15   mutual intent of the parties.     Trustee contends therefore that
    16   this evidence does not come close to establishing beyond
    17   controversy that the intent of the parties to the SA was to
    18   release this claim.11
    19        We are not persuaded by these arguments.     Error would
    20   occur, if at all, if the bankruptcy court improperly admitted
    21   extrinsic evidence showing only the undisclosed subjective
    22   intent of REL or the Noteholders Committee, which is
    23   inadmissable and incompetent under the objective theory of
    24   contracts.   Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club
    25
    11
    26        Although MF08 did not author this letter, the compromise,
    which the letter urged the Noteholders to vote in favor of, was
    27 with MF08 and benefitted its POC. MF08's silence as to the
    letter’s accuracy may be construed as an agreement with its
    28 assertions.
    -25-
    1   v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc., 
    109 Cal.App.4th 944
    , 960
    2   (2003) (“[U]ndisclosed statements regarding intent or
    3   understanding of” the writing “are irrelevant to contract
    4   interpretation under the objective theory of contracts”;
    5   appellate court determines writing’s meaning de novo “[a]fter
    6   winnowing out the extrinsic evidence that is irrelevant under
    7   the objective theory of contracts.”).   “While a party may not
    8   testify to his undisclosed subjective intent in entering into an
    9   agreement, the rule does not preclude admission of evidence of
    10   the surrounding circumstances, usage and custom in the industry,
    11   negotiations and discussion, or any other extrinsic evidence
    12   which may shed light on the mutual intention of the parties.”
    13   Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 189 Cal.App.3d at 1141-42.
    14        We conclude that REL’s statements and the Noteholders’
    15   Committee’s letter to Bennett fall within the latter type of
    16   evidence; i.e., the surrounding circumstances, negotiations, and
    17   discussion, and were not the mere “undisclosed subjective
    18   intent” of REL or the Noteholders’ Committee.   Id.   In other
    19   words, this extrinsic evidence objectively “shed[s] light on the
    20   mutual intent of the parties.”
    21        Trustee also complains that the court erred by using the
    22   extrinsic evidence to vary or modify the terms of the SA.
    23   However, what Trustee characterizes as error is, in fact, her
    24   disagreement over the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the
    25   SA based upon the extrinsic evidence which we address in this
    26   appeal.   In sum, Trustee failed to raise a genuine issue of
    27   material fact as to the proper interpretation of the terms “REL
    28   Transfer” and “Paid by REL.”
    -26-
    1        2.   “Any Third Party”
    2        We next consider the term “any third party” as used in
    3   section 4.01 of the SA.    Under this section, MF08 waived the
    4   right to pursue any MF08 Potential Avoidance Actions “provided,
    5   however, that this agreement shall not limit or restrict the
    6   right of MF08 to bring any action against any third party,
    7   including any manager, member, insider or professional of MF08.”
    8        Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court incorrectly
    9   construed this provision to mean that she could commence an
    10   action only against a “third party” that was a manager, member,
    11   insider or professional.    According to Trustee, the savings
    12   clause in section 4.01 of the SA preserves all claims against
    13   any third party, other than those against REL Noteholders who
    14   were “paid by REL.”   We disagree.
    15        Read naturally, the section’s use of the word “any” as in
    16   “any action” has an expansive meaning.    However, we cannot
    17   construe the phrase as expansively as Trustee would like because
    18   the preservation of “any action” would ordinarily mean those
    19   claims not settled.   Here, as discussed above, Bennett was
    20   included in the class of protected transferees since he received
    21   a “REL Transfer” that was “Paid by REL,” albeit indirectly.
    22   MF08 settled and released that potential avoidance action
    23   against him under the terms of the SA.    We thus read the savings
    24   clause to preserve claims other than MF08 potential avoidance
    25   claims against the REL Noteholders which were settled.    Limiting
    26   the types of claims, which were preserved in this manner, is not
    27   inconsistent with a construction that the word “including” in
    28   the phrase “any third party, including any manager, member,
    -27-
    1   insider or professional of MF08" is expansive in the sense that
    2   the Trustee may pursue nonavoidance action claims against the
    3   expansive class of third parties.
    4        This interpretation is also consistent with the undisputed
    5   objectives of the SA to:   (1) resolve the issues regarding the
    6   validity and priority of MF08's claim which was based on the
    7   alleged fraudulent transfer of $66 million to REL where tracing
    8   was problematic and the Ngs’ commingling was endemic;
    9   (2) eliminate the REL Noteholders’ risk of being sued by both
    10   MF08 and REL as the alleged recipients of fraudulent transfers
    11   in order to ensure their support for REL's Plan; and
    12   (3) eliminate MF08's ability to impede confirmation because
    13   MF08's $66 million claim made it the largest unsecured creditor
    14   in REL’s case.
    15        As the bankruptcy court observed:
    16        If there was an intent to carve this group of REL
    Noteholders out of the release, it had to be precisely
    17        stated before the settlement was incorporated into
    REL's Plan. MF08 acknowledged from the start that the
    18        ‘Ngs caused’ every payment by any of these affiliated
    entities to be made in a way that suited their designs
    19        and the record shows the Trustee was in possession of
    records that would have enabled her to trace this
    20        transfer before she signed the Settlement Agreement.
    To pretend otherwise endorses a fiction—that MF08 had
    21        legitimate independent management.
    22        The Trustee obtained the $5 million ‘enhancement’ and
    the REL Noteholders agreed to reduce their claims by
    23        50% of what they had been paid on their REL
    investments pre-petition. The REL Noteholders were
    24        led to believe their risk of being sued—by MF08 and
    REL—as the recipients of allegedly fraudulent
    25        transfers was eliminated.
    26        In sum, Trustee failed to raise a genuine issue of material
    27   fact as to the interpretation of the savings clause under
    28   section 4.01 of the SA.    In the words of the bankruptcy court:
    -28-
    1   “As a REL Noteholder, Mr. Bennett is not the type of third party
    2   the Trustee may sue” on an avoidance action.
    3                           VI.   CONCLUSION
    4        For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM.
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    -29-