FILED
OCT 28 2019
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. CC-18-1186-TaLS
YOANA AYANOVA KIPRILOV, Bk. No. 6:18-bk-12309-SC
Debtor.
YOANA AYANOVA KIPRILOV,
Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
LOREN PAUL ZAHN; JEFFREY L. HOFFER,
Appellees.
Submitted Without Oral Argument on October 24, 2019
at Pasadena, California
Filed – October 28, 2019
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Central District of California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
Honorable Scott C. Clarkson, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Appearances: Yoana Ayanova Kiprilov on brief pro se; Barry Z.
Brodsky, Steve R. Belilove, and Vincent S. Green of
Kaufman Dolowich Voluck LLP on brief for appellee
Loren Paul Zahn.
Before: TAYLOR, LAFFERTY, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Yoana Ayanova-Kiprilov filed a chapter 71 bankruptcy petition while
embroiled in a dispute with her former attorneys. She reached a
postpetition settlement of the dispute and then requested dismissal of her
bankruptcy. Before hearing on her motion, the bankruptcy court entered a
discharge order. Eight days later, it orally denied the motion to dismiss.
The next day, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov filed a notice of appeal of the
discharge order, and thereafter the bankruptcy court entered its order
denying her dismissal request.
On appeal, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov argues that the bankruptcy court
erred when it denied her dismissal motion. But she did not appeal from
that decision and did not provide a record that allows us to review it. And
we cannot address her request that we purge the public record of evidence
1
Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
2
that she sued her attorneys and initiated a bankruptcy.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
FACTS
Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov filed a chapter 7 petition.2 Thereafter, she filed
a notice of removal of a state court lawsuit targeting her former attorneys
and created an adversary proceeding. The attorneys filed a proof of claim.
In the adversary proceeding, the attorneys filed a motion to dismiss.
And at a status conference, the bankruptcy court engineered an elegant
resolution. It confirmed that: (1) Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov’s complaint
asserted only prepetition defensive claims and did not seek affirmative
recoveries from the attorneys; and (2) the attorneys agreed that their claims
were dischargeable. So, the bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss
the adversary proceeding: to the extent the complaint alleged affirmative
claims, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov lacked standing; and, to the extent the
complaint sought a reduction in counsels’ claim, it was either premature or
unnecessary.
During the hearing, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov asked if it would be
possible to withdraw her bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court appropriately
declined this informal request for relief.
2
We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically
filed in the bankruptcy case and the adversary proceeding. See Atwood v. Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood),
293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
3
Shortly thereafter, the chapter 7 trustee filed his report of no
distribution, and Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov filed a motion to dismiss the
bankruptcy case. She requested dismissal because she had settled the
disputes with her attorneys that led her to file a chapter 7 bankruptcy and
now no longer needed bankruptcy protection.
While the case dismissal motion was pending, the bankruptcy court
entered Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov’s chapter 7 discharge. It later orally denied
the case dismissal motion.
Thereafter, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov filed a notice of appeal from the
discharge order. Later that day, the bankruptcy court entered an order
denying her case dismissal motion (the “Dismissal Denial Order”) for the
reasons set forth on the record and for good cause shown.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1334
and 157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court err when it denied Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov’s
motion to dismiss her bankruptcy case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion a bankruptcy court’s denial of a
debtor’s motion to dismiss a voluntary chapter 7 case. Bartee v. Ainsworth
(In re Bartee),
317 B.R. 362, 365 (9th Cir. BAP 2004).
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov reiterates the argument she made
in her motion to dismiss and alleges error. Although we liberally construe
her briefs due to her pro se status, Kashani v. Fulton (In re Kashani),
190 B.R.
875, 883 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), her appeal has no merit. The problems are
multiple.
First, she did not appeal the Dismissal Denial Order; she appealed
from the discharge order. And on appeal, she advances no argument
relevant to entry of her discharge. We may affirm an appeal from the
discharge order on this basis. McKay v. Ingleson,
558 F.3d 888, 891 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“Because this argument was not raised clearly and distinctly in
the opening brief, it has been waived.”).
As to the Dismissal Denial Order, we acknowledge that, in many
instances, such orders are interlocutory and merge into a later, final order.
In such a case, a premature appeal is not fatal. But here the Dismissal
Denial Order was entered after the discharge order—it cannot, as a result,
merge into it. We could dismiss as to the Dismissal Denial Order because
she failed to file a timely appeal.
And, even if we assume she somehow correctly appealed from the
Dismissal Denial Order, we must affirm because we lack a record that
allows for adequate abuse of discretion review. The Dismissal Denial Order
states that the motion was denied for the reasons stated on the record.
5
Where a bankruptcy court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law on
the record, the appellant must include the transcript as part of the excerpts
of record on appeal. McCarthy v. Prince (In re McCarthy),
230 B.R. 414,
416–17 (9th Cir. BAP 1999); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(4). Here,
Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov did not do so. Nor can we find a copy of the
transcript on the bankruptcy court’s docket. We, thus, cannot meaningfully
or adequately review the Dismissal Denial Order and summary affirmance
is appropriate. Morrissey v. Stuteville (In re Morrissey),
349 F.3d 1187, 1189
(9th Cir. 2003).
Last, in her brief, Ms. Ayanova-Kiprilov notes that various websites
contain information about her lawsuits. She alleges that, as a result, she is
stigmatized and asks us to order those websites to remove her name from
the search results; she wants to purge the public record of all evidence of
the lawsuits and the bankruptcy that led to the settlement. But we lack any
authority to do this. We cannot alter the dockets of the bankruptcy and
state courts, and we cannot control the electronic availability of the data
contained therein. Accordingly, we deny this request.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.
6
