Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Jorgensen (In Re Jorgensen) ( 2012 )


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  •                                                             FILED
    SEP 11 2012
    1
    SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK
    U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    2                         ORDERED PUBLISHED               O F TH E N IN TH C IR C U IT
    3                  UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    4                            OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    5   In re:                        )      BAP   No.    HI-12-1055-JuHPa
    )
    6   STACY MARIE JORGENSEN,        )      Bk.   No.    10-03328
    )
    7                                 )      Adv. No.     11-90016
    Debtor.        )
    8   ______________________________)
    )
    9   EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT )
    CORPORATION,                  )
    10                                 )
    Appellant,     )
    11                                 )
    v.                            )      OPINION
    12                                 )
    STACY MARIE JORGENSEN,        )
    13                                 )
    )
    14                  Appellee.      )
    ______________________________)
    15
    16
    17                   Argued and Submitted on July 19, 2012
    at Pasadena, California
    18
    Filed - September 11, 2012
    19
    Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    20                       for the District of Hawaii
    21        Honorable Robert J. Faris, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
    22                         _________________________
    23   Appearances:     Adam C. Trampe, Esq. argued for Appellant
    Educational Credit Management Corporation;
    24                    Stacy Marie Jorgensen argued pro se.
    _________________________
    25
    26   Before:   JURY, HOLLOWELL, and PAPPAS Bankruptcy Judges.
    27
    28
    1   JURY, Bankruptcy Judge:
    2
    3           Debtor Stacy Marie Jorgensen (“Jorgensen”) sought to
    4   discharge student loan debt owed to Educational Credit
    5   Management Corporation (“ECMC”) as an undue hardship under
    6   § 523(a)(8).1    The bankruptcy court granted a partial discharge
    7   of the debt.     ECMC appeals, contending that the bankruptcy court
    8   erred in finding that Jorgensen met all three prongs of the
    9   undue hardship test set forth in Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher
    10   Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 
    46 B.R. 752
     (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
    11   1985) aff’d, 
    831 F.2d 395
     (2d Cir. 1987).     We AFFIRM.
    12                                  I. FACTS
    13           Jorgensen is forty-four years old with no dependents.    She
    14   earned a bachelor of science degree in wildlife biology from the
    15   University of Montana in 1992, a master of science degree in
    16   botany from the University of Georgia in 1996, and a Ph.D. in
    17   geography from the University of Georgia in 2002.
    18           Jorgensen financed her graduate education partly with
    19   student loans.     She made timely payments on her loans from
    20   January 2002, when payments first became due, until June 2010.
    21   She obtained a forbearance beginning in July 2010.     She has made
    22   no payments since the forbearance period ended.     The loan is
    23   currently payable at $270.07 per month.     As of November 17,
    24   2011, she owed ECMC $36,284.81 plus interest at six percent per
    25
    26       1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section
    27 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
    .
    28                                    -2-
    1   annum.
    2        From January 2002 until June 2004, Jorgensen worked as a
    3   visiting assistant professor of geography at Ohio University.
    4   From August 2004 to the present, she has worked as an assistant
    5   professor of geography at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.
    6   She applied for jobs with the federal government, but was
    7   unsuccessful.
    8        In early 2010, a blood test revealed that Jorgensen
    9   suffered from stage IIB pancreatic adenocarcinoma.   Initial
    10   blood tests in Hawaii failed to correctly identify the cancer.
    11   Jorgensen elected to seek treatment at the M.D. Anderson Cancer
    12   Center in Houston, Texas (“MDACC”).   MDACC has substantially
    13   more experience and expertise with pancreatic cancer than any
    14   facility in Hawaii.
    15        After undergoing chemotherapy and radiation treatments to
    16   reduce the size of the tumor, Jorgensen underwent a pylorus-
    17   preserving pancreaticoduodenectomy.   Surgeons removed the head
    18   of her pancreas, her gall bladder, a section of her duodenum,
    19   and thirty-five lymph nodes.   She returned to Hawaii and
    20   underwent further chemotherapy from July to October 2010.     She
    21   receives quarterly checkups at MDACC to look for cancer
    22   recurrence.
    23        Reports from Jorgensen’s doctors show that she “is doing
    24   quite well” and that she “[is] free of disease after completing
    25   an additional four cycles of chemotherapy.”   Jorgensen does not
    26   challenge her doctor’s reports.
    27        In the wake of her cancer, however, Jorgensen suffers from
    28   several other ailments that affect her ability to work.     For
    -3-
    1   example, she testified that she suffers from pancreatic enzyme
    2   insufficiency, high blood pressure, and anemia.     As a symptom of
    3   her anemia, she experiences serious fatigue.     The fatigue forced
    4   a reduction in her workload by twenty-five percent for the 2010-
    5   2011 academic year.    In the 2011-2012 academic year, Jorgensen
    6   resumed a full workload, but she became so fatigued that another
    7   professor took over her teaching duties for one of her two
    8   classes in the middle of the fall semester.     Jorgensen asserts
    9   that maintaining a full-time workload would not be possible
    10   because her anemia treatments over the past two years have been
    11   unsuccessful.
    12        Jorgensen filed her chapter 7 bankruptcy petition pro se on
    13   October 29, 2010.    On February 4, 2011, Jorgensen filed a
    14   complaint to discharge her student loan debt under
    15   § 523(a)(8).    She alleged that the student loans imposed an
    16   undue hardship on her.
    17        In her petition, Jorgensen listed $2,804 in net monthly
    18   income.   At the January 10, 2012 trial, Jorgensen revised her
    19   schedules.   Jorgensen’s net monthly income increased to $3,750
    20   for the academic year 2011-2012.      Jorgensen testified that her
    21   income increased because she returned to full-time work after
    22   her cancer treatment.    Jorgensen’s petition listed $2,920 in
    23   monthly expenses.    Jorgensen’s revised monthly expenses were
    24   $4,092 as of January 2012.    Jorgensen testified that she revised
    25   her expenses because she neglected to include several expenses
    26   when she drafted her original schedules.
    27        Jorgensen pays $1,450 per month for rent.     Jorgensen
    28   testified that she had not searched for cheaper housing because
    -4-
    1   she moved into her current apartment weeks before being
    2   diagnosed with cancer.     She also testified that she will be
    3   giving up her apartment in January 2012 because she will be
    4   teaching in Paris for the spring semester.      Jorgensen admitted
    5   that she will not pay rent while she is in Paris as an apartment
    6   will be provided for her.     Jorgensen plans on putting her rental
    7   savings towards her car payments.
    8           Jorgensen testified that she spends an average of $800 per
    9   month for medical expenses.     Because of her cancer, she must
    10   complete quarterly check-ups for three to five years.2       After
    11   three to five years, she can reduce her checkups at MDACC from
    12   quarterly to annual.
    13           In addition to her monthly medical expenses, Jorgensen
    14   incurred a one-time expense in summer 2011 of $4,699 for
    15   orthodontic treatment.     She testified that the orthodontic
    16   treatment was necessary to resolve a problem with her bite,
    17   which was deteriorating.     Jorgensen’s insurance company
    18   determined that the treatment was not cosmetic and contributed
    19   $1,000 to pay for the treatment.       She admitted to paying for her
    20   orthodontic care with a summer salary grant.      She testified that
    21   she used the remaining portion of her summer grant to pay her
    22   monthly expenses; until that time her parents helped her make up
    23   for her monthly deficit.
    24           In late 2011, Jorgensen purchased a new 2011 Mazda 2
    25
    26
    2
    Jorgensen asserted that returning to MDACC for follow-up
    27 care was essential because the facility had pertinent knowledge
    of her medical history and has an expertise in treating her type
    28
    of cancer.
    -5-
    1   subcompact.   Jorgensen testified that her previous vehicle, a
    2   2001 Honda CRV with 90,000 miles, was in a state of disrepair.
    3   In 2009, Jorgensen spent $3,000 in repairs on her Honda CRV.
    4   She testified that she was facing thousands of dollars in
    5   additional repairs to fix the vehicle’s alignment, air
    6   conditioning, and electronic windows.   In light of these
    7   repairs, Jorgensen made the decision to purchase a new car.
    8   Jorgensen financed the vehicle at a rate of $362.73 per month
    9   over five years.   Jorgensen bought the car in Texas where it was
    10   substantially cheaper and left it there with her sister until
    11   she returned from Paris.
    12        Jorgensen spends $625 per month for food.    Jorgensen
    13   originally listed $500 per month for food in her petition.
    14   Jorgensen testified that her revised food expenses were higher
    15   because before her petition was filed, she spent twenty-two
    16   weeks in Texas where food is cheaper.      Jorgensen spends $150
    17   per month for clothing.    Jorgensen testified that her clothing
    18   expenses increased by $50 per month because she lost a
    19   substantial amount of weight as a result of her cancer
    20   treatment.
    21        At the January 10, 2012 trial, Jorgensen admitted that ECMC
    22   offered her a payment plan (“Graduate Repayment Option”) to
    23   reduce her monthly student loan payment.    Under the Graduate
    24   Repayment Option, Jorgensen would make payments of $180 per
    25   month for 25 years.   Jorgensen testified that she rejected the
    26   Graduate Payment Option because she did not have any surplus
    27   funds available.   She also testified that the Graduate Payment
    28   Option was not acceptable because it was based on her income,
    -6-
    1   not her expenses.
    2        The bankruptcy court issued a memorandum decision applying
    3   the three-prong test established in Brunner, which was adopted
    4   by the Ninth Circuit in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena
    5   (In re Pena), 
    155 F.3d 1108
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 1998), to determine
    6   undue hardship under § 523(a)(8).
    7        The bankruptcy court found that Jorgensen met all of the
    8   elements of the Brunner test.   The bankruptcy court determined
    9   that Jorgensen’s monthly income is $350 less than the monthly
    10   expenses she must pay to maintain a minimal standard of living.
    11   The bankruptcy court also found that Jorgensen’s financial woes
    12   are likely to persist for the rest of her life.      Finally, the
    13   bankruptcy court found that despite her decision to receive
    14   orthodontic treatment, which may not have been medically
    15   essential, in the totality of circumstances she acted in good
    16   faith to repay her student loan debt.
    17        Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court refused to discharge all
    18   of Jorgensen’s student loan debt.     The bankruptcy court
    19   determined that Jorgensen’s rent savings accruing from her
    20   semester in Paris were not necessary to maintain a minimal
    21   standard of living.   The bankruptcy court also found that
    22   Jorgensen did not satisfactorily explain her purchase of a
    23   vehicle before going to Paris rather than after she returned.
    24   On January 19, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered a judgment in
    25   which it refused to discharge $8,045.02 of Jorgensen’s student
    26   loan debt.   ECMC filed a timely appeal.
    27                            II. JURISDICTION
    28        The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    -7-
    1   §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1).   This Panel has jurisdiction under 28
    
    2 U.S.C. § 158
    .
    3                                 III. ISSUE
    4        Whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting Jorgensen a
    5   partial discharge of her student loan debt.
    6                          IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    7        We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s application of the
    8   legal standard in determining whether a student loan debt is
    9   dischargeable.   Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 
    245 F.3d 10
       1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
    11        We review the bankruptcy court’s exercise of its equitable
    12   powers under § 105(a) for abuse of discretion.    Missoula Fed.
    13   Credit Union v. Reinerston (In re Reinerston), 
    241 B.R. 451
    , 454
    14   (9th Cir. BAP 1999).   We apply a two-part test to determine
    15   whether a bankruptcy court abused its discretion.    United States
    16   v. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    , 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009)(en banc).
    17   First, we review de novo whether the bankruptcy court identified
    18   the correct legal rule to apply the relief requested.    Second,
    19   we determine whether the trial court’s application of the
    20   correct legal rule was illogical, implausible, or without
    21   support in the record.   
    Id. at 1262
    .
    22        We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear
    23   error.   Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464
    
    24 F.3d 878
    , 881 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Miller v. Cardinale (In
    25   re DeVille), 
    361 F.3d 539
    , 547 (9th Cir 2004)).
    26                              V. DISCUSSION
    27        Under § 523(a)(8), student loan debt is presumed
    28   nondischargeable unless the debtor establishes that repayment
    -8-
    1   would impose an undue hardship.    The Bankruptcy Code does not
    2   define undue hardship.    Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re
    3   Nys), 
    446 F.3d 938
    , 944 (9th Cir. 2006).    We apply the three
    4   part test established in Brunner to determine if repayment would
    5   impose an undue hardship.    See In re Pena, 
    155 F.3d at
    1112
    6   (adopting the “Brunner test” from In re Brunner, 
    46 B.R. at
    7   753).   Under the Brunner test, the debtor must prove that:
    8   (1) she cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a
    9   minimal standard of living for herself and her dependents if
    10   required to repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist
    11   indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
    12   significant portion of the repayment period; and (3) the debtor
    13   has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.    Id. at 1111.
    14   The debtor bears the burden of proof on all three elements.      In
    15   re Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1087-88.
    16   A.   Partial Discharge
    17        Bankruptcy courts may exercise their equitable authority
    18   under § 105(a) to partially discharge student loans.    Saxman v.
    19   Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Saxman), 
    325 F.3d 1168
    , 1173
    20   (9th Cir. 2003).    The bankruptcy court has discretion in
    21   determining the amount and terms of payment of a partial
    22   discharge.   Bossardet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
    23   Bossardet), 
    336 B.R. 451
    , 457 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
    24        However, a bankruptcy court’s discretion to grant a partial
    25   discharge is not unlimited.    In each case, the bankruptcy court
    26   must find that all three prongs of the Brunner test were
    27   satisfied as to the portion of debt discharged.    In re Saxman,
    28   
    325 F.3d at 1174
    .    Bankruptcy courts have struggled to fashion a
    -9-
    1   partial discharge around the third prong of the Brunner test
    2   because good faith, by its very nature, applies broadly to
    3   debtors regardless of their financial circumstances.    See
    4   Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 
    468 B.R. 901
     (D. Or. 2012),
    5   Ristow v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ristow), BAP No.
    6   AZ-11-1376-DJuPa, 
    2012 WL 1001594
     (9th Cir. BAP March 26, 2012).
    7   In contrast, the first prong of the Brunner test allows the
    8   bankruptcy court to determine the amount of student loan debt
    9   that prevents the debtor from maintaining a minimal standard of
    10   living and discharge only that amount.
    11        In this case, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
    12   discretion when issuing a partial discharge.   The bankruptcy
    13   court refused to discharge $6,050 because Jorgensen received a
    14   windfall by not paying rent while she was in Paris.    During
    15   Jorgensen’s five and one-half months in Paris her income
    16   exceeded her expenses by $1,100, for a total of $6,050.    The
    17   bankruptcy court found that Jorgensen did not satisfactorily
    18   explain why the excess $6,050 was necessary to maintain a
    19   minimal standard of living.   The bankruptcy court also refused
    20   to discharge $1,995.02 because Jorgensen purchased a vehicle
    21   prior to her trip to Paris.   The bankruptcy court found
    22   Jorgensen’s car payment while she was in Paris was not necessary
    23   to maintain a minimal standard of living.
    24        Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court found that, as to the
    25   remainder of Jorgensen’s debt, each prong of the Brunner test
    26   was satisfied.
    27   B.   Minimal Standard of Living
    28        Under the first prong of the Brunner test the debtor must
    -10-
    1   prove that she cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if
    2   she were required to repay the loans.   
    Id. at 1088
    .   The debtor
    3   must show more than simply tight finances.   United Student Aid
    4   Funds v. Nascimento (In re Nascimento), 
    241 B.R. 440
    , 445 (9th
    5   Cir. BAP 1999).   “In defining undue hardship, courts require
    6   more than temporary financial adversity, but typically stop
    7   short of utter hopelessness.”   
    Id.
    8        Here, the bankruptcy court found that Jorgensen’s average
    9   monthly income was $3,750.   The bankruptcy court also found that
    10   Jorgensen’s necessary average monthly expenses were $4,100.     The
    11   bankruptcy court concluded that Jorgensen’s expenses were
    12   “essential . . . due to the nature of her employment and her
    13   serious health issues.”
    14        ECMC contends that the bankruptcy court’s conclusion is
    15   erroneous because Jorgensen’s budget contains unnecessary items
    16   such as a new car, extravagant food spending, new clothes, dry
    17   cleaning, travel, and miscellaneous expenses.   ECMC contends
    18   that Jorgensen’s budget does not constitute a minimal standard
    19   of living.
    20        ECMC argues that courts have declined to discharge student
    21   loan debt where the debtor’s budget included a new car, high
    22   clothing expenses, and extravagant food expenses.   See In re
    23   Nascimento, 
    241 B.R. at 445
     (holding that a debtor’s expenses
    24   were not minimal because they included a hairdresser,
    25   chiropractor, and $544 car payment); Chapelle v. Educ. Credit
    26   Mgmt. Corp. (In re Chapelle), 
    328 B.R. 565
    , 570 (Bankr. C.D.
    
    27 Cal. 2005
    ) (finding that a debtor’s $100 recreation and $100
    28   clothing expenses were “modest but perhaps not reasonable given
    -11-
    1   [her] student loan obligation and lack of full-time
    2   employment”).
    3          While a number of courts have declined to discharge student
    4   loans in similar circumstances, the bankruptcy court’s refusal
    5   to require Jorgensen to further reduce her expenses in this case
    6   is not clearly erroneous.    In re Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1088.   The
    7   calculation of cost reductions are factual in nature and, as
    8   such, “is a matter properly left to the discretion of the
    9   bankruptcy court.”    In re Pena, 
    155 F.3d at 1112
    .   Accordingly,
    10   we will not disturb those findings unless they are clearly
    11   erroneous.    Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re
    12   Birrane), 
    287 B.R. 490
    , 496 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).      A finding is
    13   clearly erroneous when the reviewing court’s interpretation of
    14   the facts was illogical, implausible, or without support in the
    15   record.    Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d at 1262
    .
    16          Here, the evidence supports Jorgensen’s purchase of a new
    17   car.    Her old vehicle lacked proper alignment, functional air
    18   conditioning, and automatic windows.    Her new vehicle is a
    19   reliable and inexpensive subcompact with a warranty.
    20          Jorgensen’s $650 monthly food expense is directly related
    21   to her health problems.    Jorgensen testified that she doesn’t
    22   digest fats properly because she suffers from pancreatic enzyme
    23   deficiency.    Moreover, this Panel is not in a position to
    24   evaluate food expenses in Hawaii; that determination falls
    25   within the bankruptcy court’s proper discretion.
    26          Jorgensen’s clothing expense is the result of her
    27   fluctuating weight after cancer.    Once again, we refuse to opine
    28   about the clothing expenses for a professional female in Hawaii.
    -12-
    1   ECMC challenged several of Jorgensen’s other expenses, all of
    2   which were de minimus.3
    3            Accordingly, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that
    4   Jorgensen’s expenses exceeded her income by $350.
    5   C.   Additional Circumstances
    6            The second prong of the Brunner test requires the debtor to
    7   show “that additional circumstances exist indicating that this
    8   state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion
    9   of the repayment period of the student loans.”      In re Brunner,
    10   831 F.3d at 396.      Additional circumstances are any circumstances
    11   that show the inability to repay is likely to persist for a
    12   significant portion of the repayment period.      In re Nys, 308
    13   B.R. at 444.      “The circumstances need be ‘exceptional’ only in
    14   the sense that they demonstrate insurmountable barriers to the
    15   debtor’s financial recovery and ability to pay.”      Id.   A court
    16   may consider a number of factors not limited to the following:
    17   the debtor’s age, training, physical and mental health,
    18   education, assets, and ability to obtain a higher paying job or
    19   reduce expenses.      Id.
    20            Here, the bankruptcy court concluded that “there is a
    21   significant chance her income will fall; she may be denied
    22   tenure and lose her current job, or her health may preclude her
    23   from working full time.”      ECMC contends that Jorgensen’s cancer
    24   is not likely to return.      ECMC, however, has not challenged
    25
    3
    26         For example, ECMC challenges Jorgensen’s $50 per month
    travel expense to see her family once a year. ECMC also
    27 challenges Jorgensen’s $85 miscellaneous expense which she uses
    for unpredictable expenses that arise throughout the year (new
    28 suitcases for example).
    -13-
    1   Jorgensen’s various other health problems that imposed, and will
    2   continue to impose, a significant obstacle to her financial
    3   recovery.    In addition, ECMC did not dispute Jorgensen’s dubious
    4   employment circumstances.
    5        ECMC contends that Jorgensen is the archetype of good
    6   health.    ECMC cites Jorgensen’s medical records which indicate
    7   she is free of disease and doing quite well with no evidence of
    8   recurrence.    ECMC argues that Jorgensen did not satisfy her
    9   burden to show that recurrence is a probability, not a mere
    10   possibility.    ECMC’s challenge to Jorgensen’s health is not
    11   persuasive because it does not address her overall health as an
    12   obstacle to financial improvement.     For example, Jorgensen
    13   suffers from anemia which has reduced her energy levels.
    14   Jorgensen’s doctor suggested that her energy may never return to
    15   normal.    Jorgensen testified that when she returned to full-time
    16   employment she became increasingly fatigued.     Consequently,
    17   Jorgensen asked her superiors to be relieved from one of her
    18   classes.    Anemia is not Jorgensen’s only ailment.   Jorgensen
    19   takes prescription medication for hypothyroidism and high blood
    20   pressure.
    21        In addition to her health concerns, Jorgensen’s future
    22   employment prospects are uncertain.     Jorgensen testified that
    23   she has had a “rough time” in her current position at the
    24   University of Hawai’i at Manoa.    Jorgensen’s research requires a
    25   lab which took her university four years to provide and had “a
    26   negative impact” on her.    Jorgensen testified that her
    27   department split 50-50 on her recommendation for tenure.
    28        The bankruptcy court considered all of these factors when
    -14-
    1   determining that Jorgensen met the second prong.    Its findings
    2   are not clearly erroneous.
    3   D.   Good Faith
    4        The third and final prong of the Brunner test requires the
    5   debtor to prove that she made good faith efforts to repay the
    6   loans or show that the forces preventing repayment are truly
    7   beyond her control.   In re Brunner, 
    46 B.R. at 755
    .   To
    8   determine good faith, the court measures the debtor’s efforts to
    9   obtain employment, maximize income, minimize expenses, and
    10   negotiate a repayment plan.    In re Mason, 464 at 884.   Whether a
    11   debtor made payments prior to filing for discharge is also a
    12   persuasive factor in determining whether she made a good faith
    13   effort to repay her loans.    In re Pena, 
    155 F.3d at 1114
    .
    14        Here, the record supports the bankruptcy court’s finding
    15   that Jorgensen is optimally employed and maximized her income.
    16   After obtaining her Ph.D. in geography, she worked as a visiting
    17   assistant professor of geography at Ohio University.      Two years
    18   later, she started her current position as an assistant
    19   professor of geography at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.
    20   While Jorgensen has applied for federal jobs, where she might
    21   increase her income, her efforts have been unsuccessful.
    22        The record also supports the bankruptcy court’s finding
    23   that Jorgensen made loan payments before filing for discharge
    24   and that she negotiated a repayment plan in good faith.
    25   Jorgensen made timely payments on her student loans from January
    26   2002 until she entered forbearance in June 2010.    ECMC offered
    27   to reduce her payment to $180 per month for 25 years through the
    28   Graduate Repayment Option.    Jorgensen rejected the Graduate
    -15-
    1   Payment Option because she did not have the funds available to
    2   make the payments.     She also testified that the Graduate Payment
    3   Option was not acceptable because it was based on her income,
    4   not her expenses.     In an effort to resolve the matter, Jorgensen
    5   offered to pay ECMC $180 for 18 months.     ECMC refused.4
    6           Turning to the expense factor, Jorgensen’s decision to
    7   purchase a new car before she went to Paris and her decision to
    8   obtain orthodontic treatment both weigh against a finding of
    9   good faith.5    To be clear, Jorgensen’s purchase of a new car was
    10   not improper; she certainly needed a new car and purchased a
    11   relatively inexpensive and economical vehicle.     Her decision to
    12   purchase the vehicle before she left for Paris, however, was
    13   imprudent.     As a result, she incurred several thousand dollars
    14   of a car payment expense without using the vehicle.     The
    15   bankruptcy court properly accounted for her error by finding
    16   that the extraneous expense could not be discharged.
    17           Jorgensen’s decision to use her summer grant to pay for
    18   orthodontic treatment instead of paying her loans also weighs
    19   against minimizing her expenses.     While Jorgensen testified that
    20   she had a problem with her bite, she did not introduce any
    21   evidence that the treatment was medically necessary.     The
    22
    4
    23         At oral argument ECMC argued that Jorgensen’s failure to
    accept the Graduate Repayment Option was de facto evidence of a
    24 lack of good faith. To accept this argument would write
    § 523(a)(8) out of the Code and bestow ECMC with absolute
    25 discretion to forgive debt without judicial review.
    26      5
    ECMC also challenges several of Jorgensen’s living
    27 expenses.  As discussed earlier, the majority of these expenses
    are the result of her health problems, and therefore, beyond her
    28 control.
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    1   bankruptcy court’s memorandum of decision, however, reflects
    2   that the court weighed this unwise decision against all other
    3   factors to determine whether the debtor made a good faith effort
    4   to repay.
    5        While this case presents a close question on good faith,
    6   after considering all of the circumstances, we will not disturb
    7   the bankruptcy court’s determination that Jorgensen made good
    8   faith efforts to repay her student loans.
    9                            VI. CONCLUSION
    10        Having determined the bankruptcy court’s factual findings
    11   are not clearly erroneous and the bankruptcy court correctly
    12   applied the Brunner test, we AFFIRM.
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