United States v. Williams ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1532
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ABIJAH WILLIAMS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Jon D. Levy, Chief U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
William L. Welch, III for appellant.
Benjamin M. Block, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
September 2, 2022
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. In the instant case, Defendant-
Appellant Abijah Williams pled guilty at the District Court for
the District of Maine to one count of possession with intent to
distribute fentanyl and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1)1 after a traffic stop near Wells, Maine uncovered both
hidden within his vehicle.
This appeal presents two issues. The first is whether
the district court erred under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 in accepting Williams's guilty plea. Although the government
argues that Williams waived this claim by disclaiming in the
district court the Rule 11 argument he now seeks to make on appeal,
we exercise our discretion to review it for plain error. In doing
so, we hold Williams's claim is meritless. The transcript shows
that the district court properly followed all of the required Rule
11 procedures, the counseled plea was voluntary and knowing, and
an adequate factual basis for accepting the plea existed. Indeed,
Williams's argument on appeal focuses on his statements at the
plea hearing that he was not speeding before he was stopped by the
state trooper. But that is irrelevant to the Rule 11 error
assertion. There was thus no plain error.
1 The statute in pertinent part provides that "[e]xcept as
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally . . . [to] possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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The second claim is that the court erred when it denied
Williams's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Williams concedes
that this claim too is subject to plain error review, as the
argument he makes on appeal is different from that which he made
to the district court. This claim is foreclosed by our holding on
the first issue. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background
We commence with a brief recitation of the facts that
brought us to this appeal. On the evening of December 19, 2017,
Maine State Trooper Matthew Williams was traveling on I-95 North
in York, Maine. At around 9:00 PM, he noticed a gray Infiniti
sedan driving too closely behind other vehicles on the highway,
and determined by radar that the car was speeding, traveling
seventy-nine miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was
seventy miles per hour.2 The trooper began following the sedan,
at which point the vehicle exited the highway in Wells, Maine.
The trooper continued following the car through the toll plaza.
Once through, the car pulled into the toll plaza's employee parking
lot and the trooper followed. The trooper then turned on his
vehicle's blue lights, exited his car, and approached the stopped
vehicle.
2 We note that, during the plea colloquy, Williams
disputed that he was speeding and stated that he was not.
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The trooper asked for the operator's driver's license
and determined that Williams was driving the vehicle. Williams
had a female passenger with him, and they told the trooper that
they were lost. When the trooper began to question Williams about
his destination and the friends he was going to meet there, he
faltered in his answers. His demeanor was nervous. To the
trooper, he seemed rigid and tense, and his hands were shaking.
Based on this behavior, combined with Williams's actions on I-95,
the trooper began to suspect criminal activity was afoot. He
ordered Williams out of the vehicle and called for a drug-sniffing
canine to be brought to the toll plaza parking lot.
The trooper then ran Williams's license information, and
determined that he was on parole for attempted homicide in
Connecticut and, additionally, that he was subject to a Connecticut
protective order which named his female passenger as the protected
person. The information available to the trooper did not indicate
the terms of the protective order, and both Williams and the female
passenger disputed that they were in violation of it.
Nevertheless, the trooper placed Williams under arrest for
violating the protective order.
While under arrest, Williams gave the trooper permission
to retrieve his phone from the driver's side door of the car in
order to obtain his parole officer's contact information. While
the trooper was looking for the phone in the driver's side door,
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he observed a small, folded envelope with a distinctive stamp on
it. Believing it to contain drugs based on his training and
experience, he opened the envelope and saw that it did indeed
contain a small amount of what appeared to be heroin. When the
drug-sniffing dog arrived, it alerted the officers to the smell of
narcotics on the vehicle. The trooper then searched the vehicle
and found 400 envelopes of heroin and 45 grams of cocaine base
concealed in a plastic container in the car's engine compartment.
In addition, he also found a sandwich bag containing heroin on the
ground near another police car that had arrived and was in
proximity to Williams's vehicle.
Williams and the female passenger were both taken to the
trooper barracks in Portland, Maine for additional questioning.
The passenger waived her Miranda rights and told the police that
Williams was trafficking drugs. She stated that while the trooper
was following them, knowing he would be pulled over, Williams told
her to hide the heroin-filled sandwich bag, causing her to toss it
towards the police car.
A grand jury indicted Williams for one count of
possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). During the pretrial phase of
his case, Williams filed a motion requesting the withdrawal of his
appointed counsel. Following a conference, and with Williams's
acquiescence, the court denied the motion to withdraw.
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On January 31, 2019, Williams entered a guilty plea to
the sole count of the indictment. The district court conducted a
Rule 11 hearing -- which we will discuss in greater detail infra
as it forms much of the basis of this appeal -- and accepted
Williams's plea of guilty.
In June of 2019, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.3 Williams's motion did not assert that the district
court had committed any error under Rule 11 in accepting his guilty
plea, but rather focused on his claim that his counsel at the
change of plea hearing had been ineffective. Following an
evidentiary hearing as well as additional briefing on the issue,
the district court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The district court ultimately sentenced Williams to sixty months
of imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release, a
sentence which is not at issue here. This timely appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Rule 11 Hearing
Williams posits that the district court committed two
errors while conducting his Rule 11 hearing. First, he argues
that the district court failed to advise him that he was giving up
the right to file pretrial motions (specifically, a motion to
3 In between his guilty plea and his motion to withdraw
the plea, in March of 2019, Williams obtained new counsel following
a motion to withdraw by his previous trial counsel.
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suppress) by pleading guilty. Second, he contends that the
district court erroneously found a factual basis for his guilty
plea in violation of Rule 11(b)(3).
1. Standard of Review
We review an unpreserved Rule 11 claim for plain error.
See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59 (2002). The
government asserts that Williams's Rule 11 argument is not only
unpreserved, but it also is waived and therefore cannot be raised
on appeal. See United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir.
1991). In support of this assertion, the government argues that
Williams affirmatively disclaimed any Rule 11 error before the
district court by expressly acknowledging, through counsel, that
there was no Rule 11 error of the type he now raises on appeal.4
"Where a defendant's claim would fail even if reviewed
for plain error, we have often declined to decide whether the
defendant's failure to raise the issue below constituted waiver or
mere forfeiture." United States v. Acevedo-Sueros, 826 F.3d 21,
24 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Aguasvivas-Castillo,
668 F.3d 7, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2012)). We follow that well-trodden
4 This concession appeared in Williams's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, wherein he stated: "The defendant
asserts that his decision to plead guilty was a voluntary,
intelligent, and informed decision . . . ." The district court
acknowledged it as such in its ruling on the motion, stating
"Williams concedes that the plea colloquy at his change of plea
hearing satisfied Rule 11(b)."
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path in this opinion, as we hold infra that the defendant's claim
would fail even under plain error review.
We utilize a four-part plain error test. To succeed on
plain error review, Williams must establish that "(1) an error
occurred; (2) the error was 'clear or obvious'; (3) the error
affected [his] substantial rights; and (4) the error 'seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of [the]
judicial proceedings.'" United States v. Kitts, 27 F.4th 777, 784
(1st Cir. 2022) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).
2. Analysis
Williams focuses primarily on one exchange during his
Rule 11 hearing that he argues was in error and merits reversal.
We quote the exchange in full below:
THE COURT: Mr. Williams, have you reviewed
th[e] prosecution['s] version [of the facts]?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
THE COURT: And did you understand it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is it all true to your personal
knowledge?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What's -- what's not true in it?
THE DEFENDANT: The speeding, that's all.
THE COURT: What is it?
THE DEFENDANT: The speeding part.
THE COURT: The what part?
THE DEFENDANT: Speeding. The reason they
stopped me.
MS. FAIRFIELD: He doesn't believe that --
THE COURT: You don't believe you were stopped
for speeding?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I wasn't speeding.
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MS. FAIRFIELD: He doesn't believe he was
speeding.
THE COURT: You don't believe you were
speeding?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I wasn't, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else
untrue in there?
THE DEFENDANT: That is all.
THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Joyce, you
have a witness who would testify that he was
speeding, a state trooper; is that correct?
MR. JOYCE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Otherwise it is true?
THE DEFENDANT: What, the speeding?
THE COURT: No, other -- otherwise this
document is true --
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, yes.
THE COURT: -- except you didn't believe you
were speeding.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, everything else is true
except for speeding.
THE COURT: Okay. I find a factual basis for
the guilty plea for the crime charged in this
indictment.
Williams argues that, on the basis of this exchange, the
district court violated Rule 11 by accepting the plea when it was
evident that Williams did not understand that the plea would
prevent him from bringing a suppression motion. Rule 11 defines
the contours of the plea hearing, setting forth the rights the
defendant waives by pleading guilty and directing the district
court to "address the defendant personally in open court . . .
[and] inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands," the rights that he is waiving, including "the right
to a jury trial" and "the right at trial to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-
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incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the
attendance of witnesses," among others. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).
Under Rule 11, the court must also ensure that the plea is
voluntary. Id. 11(b)(2). Additionally, "[b]efore entering
judgment on a guilty plea, the [district] court must determine
that there is a factual basis for the plea." Id. 11(b)(3).
District court judges within the geographic confines of
the First Circuit have relied on our ample jurisprudence to conduct
Rule 11 hearings and accept defendants' guilty pleas.
Specifically, judges follow our articulation of the core concerns
of Rule 11, violations of which "mandate[] that the plea be set
aside." See United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1995) (quoting United States v. Medina-Silverio, 30 F.3d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1994)). These "core concerns" are a lack of coercion, the
defendant's understanding of the charges against him, and the
defendant's "knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea."
Id.; see also Kitts, 27 F.4th at 784. Williams seeks to add a new
core concern to that list -- namely, that the defendant must
"underst[and] that by proceeding he would be waiving the right to
challenge the seizure of evidence." We decline to so expand Rule
11's core concerns. See United States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 835
(1st Cir. 1996); Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4.
The filing of pretrial motions such as a motion to
suppress is not identified by Rule 11(b)(1) as a right that the
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district court must inform the defendant that he is waiving, as
Williams concedes in his opening brief. Therefore, the district
court's failure to so inform the defendant here does not constitute
plain error. See United States v. Rabb, 5 F.4th 95, 101 (1st Cir.
2021) (to establish plain error, "a party must show that the error
is contrary to existing law"). Williams does not point to any of
our caselaw to the contrary.
To the extent that Williams means to be arguing that his
plea was plainly not knowing because of his failure to understand
that he could not file a motion to suppress if he pled guilty, we
disagree. A meticulous review of the Rule 11 plea colloquy
demonstrates that any claim that Williams's plea was not knowing
or voluntary is baseless. Pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1), the district
court informed Williams that "[w]hen you plead guilty, you give up
some very important constitutional rights." The district court
described that if he went to trial, Williams, through counsel,
"would have the opportunity to cross-examine every Government
witness and to object to any evidence the Government offers against
[him]." (Emphasis added). The district court then stated, "[i]f
I accept your guilty plea, you will have given up your right to a
trial, and all these other important rights I have just described
to you," and asked if Williams understood that proposition.
Williams stated that he did. This exchange further undermines
Williams's argument on appeal that "[t]he record of the Rule 11
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hearing does not reflect any discussion about whether Mr. Williams
understood that by proceeding he would be waiving the right to
challenge the seizure of evidence."
In an apparent reference to Rule 11(b)(3)'s requirement
that "the [district] court must determine that there is a factual
basis for the plea," Williams's second purported error is that
there was no acceptance on his part that he was speeding, which he
alleges was the probable cause for his traffic stop. Williams
contends that when he did not agree with the prosecution's version
of the facts during the Rule 11 colloquy quoted supra, the district
court should have recognized that there was no factual basis for
the plea and thus should have stopped the Rule 11 proceeding.5
Instead, the court made an "arbitrary choice finding probable
cause" by deciding the factual issue without calling witnesses to
resolve the issue definitively.
The primary problem for Williams's argument is that the
fact he disputes is not an element of the offense to which he pled
guilty. He is not, for example, disputing any facts that comprise
5 In his appellate brief, Williams cites two cases from
Maryland that distinguish between an agreed-upon statement of
facts and a statement of stipulated evidence in the context of
trials by such evidence. See Barnes v. State, 354 A.2d 499 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Bruno v. State, 632 A.2d 1192 (Md. 1993).
Notably, neither of these cases involve guilty pleas. Instead,
the defendant in each case went to trial on the basis of an agreed-
upon statement of facts, Barnes, 354 A.2d at 501, or on stipulated
evidence, Bruno, 632 A.2d at 1193. As such, they are inapplicable
to our present analysis.
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an element of the charged offense, such as possession or the intent
to distribute fentanyl and cocaine base. Cf. United States v.
Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Here, [the disputed
fact] was no mere lagniappe but, rather, an essential element of
the charge to which the appellant pleaded. Thus, the factual basis
for the plea had to cover this point." (citation omitted)); United
States v. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d 33, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding factual basis for plea when element of offense was
contested, then acquiesced to, at Rule 11 hearing).
Williams's argument does not go to the factual basis of
the guilty plea, which is a core concern of Rule 11(b)(3). After
all, Rule 11(b)(3)'s factual basis "requirement serves to ensure
that the defendant's conduct actually corresponds to the charges
lodged against him." Jiminez, 498 F.3d at 86. "It protects a
defendant 'who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing
that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.'" Id.(quoting United States v. Ventura–Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 59–60 (1st
Cir. 2003)). Speeding does not constitute an essential element of
the charge to which he pled guilty, possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute. There are no facts indicating
that Williams's conduct did not correspond to the charge against
him, and Williams advances no argument to that effect. "Though a
district court has an unflagging obligation to assure itself that
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a guilty plea is grounded on an adequate factual foundation, it
need not gratuitously explore points removed from the elements of
the offense." United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 615-16 (1st
Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, when conducting a Rule 11 hearing, the
district court is entitled to rely on the prosecution's uncontested
version of the facts. See Jiminez, 498 F.3d at 86 ("The facts
relevant to [a factual basis for the plea] may be gleaned either
from the defendant's admissions or from the prosecution's version
of the evidence (to the extent that it is acknowledged by the
defendant)."). The district court's role under Rule 11(b)(3) is
to ensure that there was "an admission, colloquy, proffer, or some
other basis for thinking that the defendant is at least arguably
guilty." United States v. Delgado-Hernández, 420 F.3d 16, 27 (1st
Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1,
6 (1st Cir. 2000)). In making that determination, the district
court is entitled to rely on "government proffers as supported by
credible evidence." Id. (quoting Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d at 6).
As discussed previously, all of the elements of the offense and
factual basis thereof were admitted by Williams and coincided with
the prosecution's version of the evidence. The speed of the
defendant's vehicle is simply not an element of the offense.
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B. Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
Williams has another arrow in his quiver, though it
differs only slightly from the arguments addressed supra. In June
2019, prior to the imposition of his sentence, Williams filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Following an evidentiary
hearing and additional briefing on the issue, the district court
denied the motion. Advancing the same alleged errors as above,
Williams argues that we should reverse the denial of his motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.
1. Standard of Review
When the issue is preserved, "we review the district
court's denial of such a motion solely for abuse of discretion."
United States v. Flete-Garcia, 925 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2019);
see also United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2010).
This discretion may be "somewhat more limited" when one of Rule
11's core concerns is implicated. See United States v. Abbott,
241 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Raineri,
42 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1994)). We review unpreserved arguments
only for plain error. Gurka, 605 F.3d at 43.
Williams concedes that plain error review applies to
this claim because his withdrawal motion before the district court
was based on the purported ineffective assistance of counsel, a
claim he does not raise on appeal. Instead, he now argues that
the basis for withdrawing the guilty plea is the purported error
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during the Rule 11 hearing. Because Williams is raising a new
ground for withdrawal of the guilty plea that was not raised before
the district court, plain error review likely applies. See United
States v. Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004); Negrón-
Narváez, 403 F.3d at 37. We need not resolve the issue, however,
as Williams's argument fails under either standard. See
Acevedo-Sueros, 826 F.3d at 24.
2. Analysis
Under Rule 11(d)(2)(B), applicable here because Williams
moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to the imposition of a
sentence, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea if he "can show
a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." To
determine whether the defendant has so shown, we examine the
following six factors:
(1) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary
and in compliance with Rule 11, (2) the
strength of the reason for withdrawal, (3) the
timing of the motion to withdraw, (4) whether
the defendant has a serious claim of actual
innocence, (5) whether the parties had reached
(or breached) a plea agreement, and (6)
whether the government would suffer prejudice
if withdrawal is allowed.
United States v. Gardner, 5 F.4th 110, 118 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing
United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Williams argues that his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea should have been granted because, under the first factor, it
was not knowing, voluntary, or in compliance with Rule 11. As
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advanced in his first argument, Williams argues that at his Rule
11 hearing, he did not know that by pleading guilty, he was waiving
his right to move to suppress the evidence obtained by the state
trooper at the traffic stop. Williams contends that this "variance
from Rule 11 affecting the substantial right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures" is a fair and just reason for
withdrawing the guilty plea.
"The question of whether the defendant's guilty plea was
entered voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly is regarded as
the 'most significant' of the relevant factors." United States v.
Dunfee, 821 F.3d 120, 127 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Cotal–Crespo,
47 F.3d at 3). As such, this factor is both the start and end
point of our analysis. As we discussed in greater detail supra,
pretrial motions to suppress are not contemplated under Rule 11 as
a requirement that the district court must inform the defendant of
before accepting a guilty plea. Apart from this argument, Williams
"offers no plausible basis for concluding that he did not fully
understand the charges against him." Flete-Garcia, 925 F.3d at
25. "In the absence of any plausible basis for discounting them,
the district court was 'entitled to give weight to the defendant's
statements at his change-of-plea colloquy.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Santiago Miranda, 654 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2011)).
Therefore, we decline to disturb the district court's well-
reasoned opinion and order on this point.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Williams's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the judgment below are
AFFIRMED.
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