United States v. Texeira-Nieves ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1034
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
SAIEED JEAN TEXEIRA-NIEVES,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Selya, Circuit Judges,
and McCafferty,* District Judge.
Eleonora C. Marranzini, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Franco L.
Pérez-Redondo, and Cherrelle Herbert, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders, were on brief, for appellant.
Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E.
Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, were on brief, for appellee.
* Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
January 12, 2022
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Saieed Jean
Texeira-Nieves appeals the district court's denial of his motion
for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as
amended by the First Step Act (FSA), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b),
132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018). Concluding, as we do, that the
district court's order was within the ambit of its discretion, we
affirm.
I
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case. In 2018, Puerto Rico police arrested the defendant during
a traffic stop. He was driving a vehicle that contained a loaded
gun, thirty-one additional rounds of ammunition, and a satchel of
controlled substances. In an interview with federal agents, the
defendant admitted that he possessed the controlled substances
because he was in the business of selling drugs and that the
firearm was there for protection.
In due course, the defendant was charged in a five-count
federal indictment. He subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts:
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,
see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and possession of controlled
substances with the intent to distribute them, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D).1 The plea agreement confirmed that the
1The remaining counts were later dismissed as contemplated
in the plea agreement.
- 3 -
firearms charge carried with it a mandatory minimum prison term of
five years. With respect to the drug charge, the plea agreement
noted that the guideline sentencing range was zero to six months
of imprisonment. The probation department proceeded to prepare a
presentence investigation report (PSI Report) that reflected the
guideline calculations and ranges as adumbrated in the plea
agreement.
The district court convened the disposition hearing in
July of 2019. The court imposed a one day term of immurement on
the drug count and a consecutive sixty-month sentence on the
firearms count. The court also imposed concurrent terms of
supervised release. The defendant did not appeal.2 And according
to calculations by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) — the defendant is
scheduled to be released on or about February 1, 2023.
The defendant, who is in his late twenties, has several
pre-existing medical conditions, including sickle cell disease.
His sickle cell anemia and complications stemming from that
disorder were documented in the PSI Report. In June of 2020 —
after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic — the defendant
submitted alternative requests to the warden of the correctional
facility at which he was confined: he sought compassionate release
2Indeed, no appeal was permitted: the aggregate sentence
was within the parameters limned in the plea agreement and,
therefore, the waiver-of-appeal provision in the plea agreement
pretermitted the defendant's right to appeal.
- 4 -
pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A) or, in the alternative, transfer
to home confinement pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2), 134
Stat. 281, 516 (2020). His requests referred not only to his
sickle cell anemia, which — according to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention — presents a significantly increased risk
for severe illness from COVID-19, but also to other medical
conditions (such as thalassemia). The defendant did not receive
a response.
In October of 2020, the defendant moved for
compassionate release pursuant to the compassionate-release
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In support, he argued
that his heightened risk of complications stemming from COVID-19,
given his pre-existing medical conditions, constituted an
"extraordinary and compelling" reason warranting a sentence
reduction. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He added that a reduction in
his sentence and conversion of his remaining time to supervised
release on home confinement would be a sufficient sentence in light
of the applicable sentencing factors. The defendant also described
the CARES Act and alleged certain considerations that might weigh
in favor of transferring him to home confinement pursuant to that
law. The government reasonably construed these arguments as an
alternative request for home confinement.
- 5 -
In December of 2020, the district court denied the
defendant's motion on the papers. In its order, the court stated
that it adopted as its reasons for denial those provided by the
government in its opposition and sur-reply memoranda. The court
went on to state that the defendant had not demonstrated any
extraordinary or compelling reason to grant his request for
compassionate release, that the defendant was still a danger to
the community, and that the court did not have the authority to
order him to home confinement. This timely appeal followed.
II
Before granting a sentence reduction in response to a
prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release alleging
extraordinary and compelling reasons, a district court must make
three findings. The court must find both that the defendant has
presented an "extraordinary and compelling" reason warranting a
sentence reduction, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that "such
a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission," id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Next, the
district court must consider any applicable section 3553(a)
factors, see id., and "determine whether, in its discretion, the
reduction . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the
particular circumstances of the case," United States v. Saccoccia,
10 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010)). The district
- 6 -
court is not required to address the section 3553(a) factors unless
it finds in favor of the movant on the other issues. Our review
is aided, though, when the district court takes the additional
step of making a section 3553(a) determination. See United States
v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 371 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
In this appeal, the defendant marshals three primary
arguments. First, he contends that the district court unduly
constrained the sweep of its discretion because it considered
itself bound by the current policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission. Second, he contends that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to offer an adequate explanation
for denying his motion. Third, he contends that the district court
erroneously concluded that it did not have the legal authority to
order him to serve the remainder of his sentence on home
confinement. After pausing to address a threshold issue, we
examine the defendant's trio of arguments one by one.
A
As an initial matter, the government asserts that the
defendant's compassionate-release motion was improperly before the
district court because the defendant failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides in
relevant part that a defendant may move a district court for a
sentence reduction "after [he] has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a
- 7 -
motion on [his] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of [his] facility, whichever is
earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, the government does
not dispute that the defendant asked the BOP for a sentence
reduction and waited the required amount of time before filing his
motion in the district court. Instead, the government alleges
that the facts and claims presented in the defendant's requests to
the warden differ in some respects from those limned in his
district court motion. These discrepancies, the government
suggests, require a finding that the defendant did not properly
exhaust his administrative remedies.
The question of whether and to what extent issue
exhaustion applies to judicial review of compassionate-release
motions is freighted with uncertainty — but we need not resolve
that question today. Cf. Privitera v. Curran (In re Curran), 855
F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) ("[C]ourts should not rush to decide
unsettled issues when the exigencies of a particular case do not
require such definitive measures."). Rather, we assume, favorably
to the defendant, that he has satisfied section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s
administrative exhaustion requirement.
To be sure, some district courts have questioned whether
the administrative exhaustion requirement for prisoner-initiated
compassionate-release motions is jurisdictional. See, e.g.,
United States v. Guzman Soto, No. 18-10086, 2020 WL 1905323, at *3
- 8 -
(D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020). If the administrative exhaustion
requirement is of jurisdictional dimension, bypassing the issue
may not be an available option. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff,
484 F.3d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that "a federal court
ordinarily may not assume the existence of jurisdiction in order
to decide the merits of a case or controversy"). In our judgment,
however, this exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional
limitation: as several circuits previously have held, it is a
non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. See United States v.
Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (collecting
cases).
A rule is jurisdictional only if Congress has "clearly
state[d] that a prescription counts as jurisdictional," and "when
Congress does not rank a prescription as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character."
Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2019) (quotations
and alterations omitted). The administrative exhaustion
requirement in section 3582(c)(1)(A) neither "speak[s] in
jurisdictional terms" nor "refer[s] in any way to the [court's]
jurisdiction." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,
394 (1982); see Fort Bend, 139 S. Ct. at 1846, 1850. Thus, there
is nothing resembling a jurisdictional defect here.
- 9 -
B
On the merits, the defendant's lead argument relates to
the requirement of the compassionate-release statute that a
reduction be "consistent" with "applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Specifically, he argues that the district court mistakenly
considered itself bound by this requirement. He bases this claim
of error partially on the premise, not advanced below, that the
current policy statement is not an "applicable" policy statement
that should be regarded as binding a district court adjudicating
a prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release.
We have encountered this argument before, see Saccoccia,
10 F.4th at 7-8, and briefly trace its contours. The FSA amended
the compassionate-release statute — which previously required such
motions to be initiated by the BOP — to allow for prisoner-
initiated motions. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat.
at 5239. The current policy statement (section 1B1.13) was crafted
by the Sentencing Commission before the passage of the FSA and
addresses the compassionate-release process as one requiring a
motion by the BOP. See USSG §1B1.13. The application notes to
the policy statement also provide categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons, including a catch-all category of "[o]ther
[r]easons" "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons." Id. cmt. n.1(A)-(D) (delineating other categories
- 10 -
related to medical conditions, age, and family circumstances).
The Sentencing Commission has not had a quorum from the time the
FSA was passed and, therefore, has not been able to issue any
revised guidance. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 7. For this reason,
the defendant says, the current policy statement is not an
"applicable" policy statement that should be construed to bind a
district court's consideration of a prisoner-initiated motion.
The overwhelming majority of courts of appeals have adopted this
view. See id. at 8 (collecting cases). But see United States v.
Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021) (determining that
current policy statement is still an "applicable policy statement"
for prisoner-initiated motions).
This issue — at least potentially — could have
significant ramifications in other cases. For example, if the
current policy statement does not apply, a district court is free
(within the usual constraints of statutory construction) to craft
its own definition of "extraordinary and compelling reasons." As
another example, if the policy statement does not apply, a district
court would not need to adhere to the policy statement's
requirement that the court may grant compassionate release based
on extraordinary and compelling reasons only if "the defendant is
not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the
- 11 -
community."3 USSG §1B1.13(1)(A), (2). With such ramifications in
mind, we previously have found it prudent to refrain from resolving
this issue when the circumstances of a particular case do not
demand such a resolution. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 8.
We follow the same path today. The defendant's qualms
about the inapplicability of the policy statement were not raised
below and, in any event, this case does not require that we decide
the issue. Even if we assume (favorably to the defendant) that
the district court treated section 1B1.13 as mandatory and that,
in so doing, it committed error (or even plain error), the
defendant still would not prevail. We explain briefly.
A defendant who demonstrates both that extraordinary and
compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction and that such a
reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statement must
clear yet another hurdle. He must persuade the district court
that the section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence
reduction. See id. at 4 (explaining that court must consider
3The compassionate-release statute does not require a finding
that a defendant is not a danger to the community in order to grant
compassionate release based on an extraordinary and compelling
reason. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But the statute does
require such a finding for compassionate release pursuant to
section 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii), which allows a district court to reduce
a sentence for some imprisoned persons at least seventy years of
age, who have served at least thirty years. See id.§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). This statutory provision expressly requires
a determination by the BOP that "the defendant is not a danger to
the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under
section 3142(g)." Id.
- 12 -
sentencing factors and determine whether reduction is "warranted
in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case"
(quoting Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827)). These issues need not be
considered in any particular order. See United States v. Jones,
980 F.3d 1098, 1116 (6th Cir. 2020) (Cook, J., concurring) ("No
feature of [section] 3582(c)(1)(A) precludes a court from tackling
the [section] 3553(a) factors first."). Thus, a district court's
decision to deny compassionate release may be affirmed solely on
the basis of its supportable determination that the section 3553(a)
factors weigh against the granting of such relief. See, e.g.,
Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2021); United
States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020); United
States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2020); United
States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2020). In other
words, a supportable determination that the balance of the section
3553(a) factors weighs against a sentence reduction constitutes an
independent reason to deny compassionate release. See United
States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 569 n.4 (1st Cir. 2021);
Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 8; cf. United States v. Zayas-Ortiz, 808
F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that even when a defendant
is eligible for a section 3582(c) sentence reduction, a district
court may determine, based on the sentencing factors, that "a
reduction would be inappropriate" (quotations omitted)).
- 13 -
This is such a case. The district court expressly found
that the defendant remained a threat to the community and cited to
section 3553(a). Its order also explicitly adopted "the reasons
indicated by the United States in its opposition and sur-reply."
These reasons included the government's position that the
sentencing factors disfavored a sentence reduction and outweighed
the defendant's medical concerns. Thus — assuming that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in calibrating the
section 3553(a) balance — there is no need for us to wade into the
debate over the applicability of the current policy statement.
C
This brings us to the district court's decision to deny
the defendant's motion based on the section 3553(a) factors. We
start with the elementary tenet that district courts possess
significant discretion in evaluating motions for compassionate
release. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4-5. Our review is solely
for abuse of that discretion. See Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th at 564;
Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4-5. Under this respectful standard, "we
review the district court's answers to legal questions de novo,
factual findings for clear error, and judgment calls with some
deference to the district court's exercise of its discretion."
Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2020).
As relevant here, the compassionate-release statute
provides that a district court "may" reduce a sentence "after
- 14 -
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable." See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A
district court's balancing of the section 3553(a) factors
represents a quintessential judgment call and, therefore, falls
into the last of the three buckets described in Akebia. See United
States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 232 (1st Cir. 2014). This
makes perfect sense: the district court is "in a superior position
to find facts and judge their import under [section] 3553(a) in
the individual case." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007) (quotations omitted).
To permit appellate review, we must be able to discern
to some extent a district court's reasoning. This does not mean,
however, that the district court must spell out the reasons for
denying a compassionate-release motion in granular detail. "The
appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when
to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances." Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (describing judicial opinion-
writing generally). A short, concise statement usually will
suffice. Cf. id. at 359 (concluding in the initial-sentencing
context that a district court need not provide an extensive
explanation for its sentencing decision when a "matter is
conceptually simple" and the "record makes clear that [it]
considered the evidence and arguments"). In some cases, the
district court may simply state that it has considered the parties'
- 15 -
arguments and then rely on the record in making its determination.
"The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge's own
professional judgment." Id.In reviewing the imposition of a sentence, we consider
the entire context and record. See Chavez-Meza v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018). So, too, we consider the entire
context and record in determining whether a district court's denial
of a compassionate-release motion allows for adequate appellate
review. See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112; cf. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct.
at 1967 (reviewing entire record in assessing sufficiency of
district court's explanation for sentence-modification decision).
With this preface, we turn to a consideration of whether
the district court abused its discretion in weighing the section
3553(a) factors. Section 3553(a) is "a tapestry of factors,
through which runs the thread of an overarching principle." United
States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 228 (1st Cir. 2008). This
overarching principle directs courts to ensure that a sentence is
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Even though this principle was fashioned for use in the initial-
sentencing context, its spirit must guide a court tasked with
considering the sentencing factors in light of any form of
sentence-reduction motion (including a motion for compassionate
release).
- 16 -
In effect, section 3553(a) "invite[s] the district court
to consider, broadly," United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 74
(1st Cir. 2008), information relevant to the "nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It simultaneously invites
the court to consider matters like "the need for the sentence
imposed" to "reflect the seriousness of the offense," "to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," and "to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant." Id.Here, the context and record show that the district court
gave due consideration to the section 3553(a) factors. It
concluded — by adopting the government's arguments and reasons for
denial of the defendant's compassionate-release motion — that the
section 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of a sentence
reduction. The reasoning for this conclusion can easily be
discerned from the record, especially the parties' briefing and
the court's order. See United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d
514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by
Rita, 551 U.S. 338 (explaining that a court's reasoning for its
sentence can "often be inferred by comparing what was argued by
the parties or contained in the pre-sentence report with what the
judge did").
The district court cited to section 3553(a) immediately
following its finding that the defendant posed a danger to the
- 17 -
community. This signifies that the court considered the offenses
of conviction and the defendant's history and characteristics — as
outlined in the government's briefing and chronicled in the PSI
Report — and that these data points informed the district court's
consideration of the sentencing factors. And we are confident
that the district court also weighed its finding that the defendant
continued to pose a danger to the community as part of its section
3553(a) analysis. There would have been no reason for the district
court to have cited those factors after its dangerousness finding
unless the finding had relevance to that analysis. The weight
that we accord this reference seems especially appropriate given
that the district court apparently adopted the government's view
that it need not reach the sentencing factors if it considered
dangerousness an absolute bar to relief under the policy
statement.4
An additional factor helps to tilt the balance. The
defendant's compassionate-release motion was decided by the same
judge who originally had sentenced him. When imposing a sentence,
a judge necessarily acquires an intimate knowledge of the offense
of conviction and the history and characteristics of the offender.
See United States v. Aponte-Guzmán, 696 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir.
4 We have no occasion to pass upon the propriety of relying
on a finding of dangerousness alone as an independently sufficient
reason to deny compassionate release pursuant to section
3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
- 18 -
2012) (affording "considerable measure of respect" to denial of
sentence-reduction motion by judge who imposed original sentence
and, thus, had "superior coign of vantage" and "hands-on
familiarity with the case"). This reservoir of knowledge does not
vanish into thin air when the judge later considers the offender's
motion for compassionate release.
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in denying
compassionate release based on the section 3553(a) factors. As
the government argued below, the offenses were serious: the
defendant — an admitted drug-peddler who carried a firearm to
protect himself and his inventory — was arrested driving a car
while in possession of a firearm loaded with eleven rounds of .40
caliber ammunition, several additional rounds of ammunition, and
a satchel of drugs. What is more, the judge — after considering
the defendant's history and characteristics — determined that the
defendant continued to pose a danger to the community, and that
finding was not clearly erroneous.
The defendant counters that there are other reasons the
sentencing factors should weigh in favor of a sentence reduction.
He points to the effect of the pandemic on the conditions of
incarceration, which could not have been predicted at the time of
sentencing. He also points to aspects of his history, health, and
characteristics that, in his view, throw shade on the district
- 19 -
court's finding that he continues to pose a danger to the
community. But the defendant's arguments, along with the relevant
medical records and the PSI Report, were before the district court.
And where, as here, the district court weighs the relevant
considerations and makes a reasonable judgment call, deference is
due to its determination. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 9 (noting
that "[m]erely raising potentially mitigating factors does not
guarantee a favorable decision" (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.
2010))); see also United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21
(1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that the court of appeals "must accord
significant deference to the [district] court's informed
determination that the section 3553(a) factors justify the
sentence imposed").
D
In a related vein, the defendant contends that the
district court's sparse reasoning is itself an abuse of discretion.
The fact that we have been able to review the district court's
decision, see supra Part II(C), is a good indication that the
district court's order is not so inscrutable as to constitute an
abuse of discretion.
It is true, of course, that the district court's order
contains only minimal reasoning. A fuller explication of the
court's thinking would have been helpful. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S.
- 20 -
Ct. at 1967 ("Providing a more detailed statement of reasons often
serves a salutary purpose separate and apart from facilitating
appellate review." (quotations omitted)). In the circumstances of
this case, however, we deem the explanation adequate.
Critically, the district court's reasoning is
illuminated by what the order says, by the briefing, and by the
record as a whole. Though the district court's minimalistic
approach of merely adopting the government's reasons for denying
compassionate release could conceivably be inadequate in some
cases, cf. id. at 1967 (suggesting — with respect to motion for
sentence reduction — that "district court's use of a bare bones
form order," though sufficient based on circumstances at hand,
might "be inadequate" in other cases), we think that such an
approach was within the ambit of the court's discretion in this
case. As a denial of a sentence reduction by the same judge who
shortly before had imposed the defendant's sentence, the
consideration of the sentencing factors involved passing on much
the same information as at the initial sentencing. Any new
considerations brought forward by the defendant were relatively
uncomplicated matters. Thus, we reject the defendant's contention
that the explanation was so sparse as to constitute an abuse of
discretion.
- 21 -
E
Finally, the defendant challenges the district court's
conclusion that it lacked the authority to order home confinement.
Because this challenge hinges on a question of law, our review is
de novo. See Akebia Therapeutics, 976 F.3d at 92.
The compassionate-release provision contemplates any
form of sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
(providing generally that district court "may reduce the term of
imprisonment"); see also Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4, n.2. In
addition, the statute specifically provides that a district court
may "impose a term of probation or supervised release with or
without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of
the original term of imprisonment." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Despite this wide sweep, though, the statute does not specifically
grant a district court authority to change the site of a
defendant's confinement. The statute's silence on this point
comports with the BOP's "plenary control . . . over the place of
the prisoner's imprisonment."5 Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S.
319, 331 (2011) (quotations omitted).
For the sake of completeness, we note that the CARES Act,
5
passed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, extended the period
of home confinement that the BOP is statutorily authorized to order
pursuant to section 3624(c)(2). See Pub. L. 116-136,
§ 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. at 516.
- 22 -
We "must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says." Ruiz v. Bally
Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461-62 (2002)). "Unless
the statute means something other than what it says" — and we do
not think that it does — "the absence of" any reference to
modifying a defendant's location of confinement denotes that
section 3582(c)(1)(A) does not afford a district court the
authority to order a defendant to serve his unmodified sentence at
home.
In an effort to make an end run around the statutory
scheme, the defendant advances a different reading of the district
court's ruling. To lay the groundwork for this alternate reading,
the defendant notes that the district court could have reduced his
sentence to a term of supervised release and ordered home
confinement as a condition of supervised release. Building on
this foundation, he says that the district court's ruling
incorrectly assumed that the court did not have these powers. In
other words, he suggests that the district court must have thought
that it could not craft any sort of sentence modification
incorporating home confinement even if it granted the
compassionate-release motion.
This reading of the district court's ruling elevates
hope over reason. In the proceedings below, both parties
- 23 -
acknowledged that the district court could reduce a sentence to
time served, impose a term of supervised release equal to the
unserved portion of the term, and order home confinement as a
condition of supervised release. The district court flatly
rejected this alternative: it concluded that no sentence reduction
(let alone a reduction to time served) was warranted. Viewed
against this backdrop, the purport of the district court's
statement is clear as day: it believed that the duration of the
defendant's sentence should not be modified and that the court
lacked the authority to change his place of confinement.
The defendant has a fallback position. He argues that
the district court could have recommended that the BOP place him
in home confinement. But this argument was not advanced in the
court below, and a party who has not asked for specific relief in
the district court cannot secure that relief on appeal. See United
States v. Adams, 971 F.3d 22, 37 (1st Cir. 2020) (applying "general
rule that a party cannot ask the court of appeals for relief that
he did not seek in the district court"); Beaulieu v. IRS, 865 F.2d
1351, 1352 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It is a party's first obligation to
seek any relief that might fairly have been thought available in
the district court before seeking it on appeal."). Consequently,
we deem the argument waived.
- 24 -
III
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
— Concurring Opinion Follows —
- 25 -
MCCAFFERTY, District Judge, concurring. I agree with
the majority that the district court's decision can be affirmed
based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. I write separately to
express dismay that the government –- both before the district
court and on appeal -- repeatedly attempted to call into question
Texeira-Nieves's well-documented sickle cell anemia, with no
apparent factual basis to do so. The district court denied release
in a short order citing "the reasons indicated" by the government.
The government did not deserve such wholesale deference.
The record was undisputed that Texeira-Nieves suffered
from sickle cell anemia.6 First, Texeira-Nieves's Presentence
Investigation Report ("PSR") included the names of two doctors who
had treated him for sickle cell anemia. One of the doctors
certified that Texeira-Nieves had been her patient for several
years, and records indicated that prior to his arrest, Texeira-
Nieves saw her once a month for care related to his sickle cell
disease. Further, the PSR stated that in the two years prior to
his arrest, Texeira-Nieves had been hospitalized twice for sickle
cell anemia complications and had required blood transfusions and
6 Sickle cell anemia is the most severe form of sickle cell
disease, an umbrella term for a group of inherited red blood cell
disorders. Sickle Cell Disease (SCD), Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/facts.html
(last visited January 4, 2022).
- 26 -
intravenous medication. It also indicated that he had been
hospitalized more than 25 times since 2014, though it did not state
specifically whether those hospitalizations were related to sickle
cell disease.
In addition, Texeira-Nieves attached medical records
from 2018 to his October 2020 compassionate release motion.
These records stated that he had sickle cell anemia, and indicated
that he was "stable on treatment" yet "chronically ill." He also
attached a declaration from a doctor who had not evaluated him
specifically, but stated that, in general, preliminary data
revealed that the COVID-19 mortality rate for those with sickle
cell disease was twice that of the general population.
Despite this evidence, the government asserted in its
opposition brief before the district court that the defendant
"ha[d] not provided sufficient documentation or evidence that the
asserted medical condition is currently active and seriously
affecting his health," nor any evidence that his "ailments still
exist today." Given the chronic nature of sickle cell anemia (and,
if there were any doubt, defendant's medical records indicated he
was "chronically ill"), the government's assertions were spurious.
In response to the government's assertions, Texeira-
Nieves attached additional medical records to his reply. These
records indicated that while incarcerated in October 2020,
Texeira-Nieves "was found to be in sickle cell crisis" and was
- 27 -
admitted to an outside hospital.7 They also stated that while
incarcerated he continued to take medication to treat his sickle
cell disease. In addition to his sickle cell symptoms, the records
indicated that Texeira-Nieves needed hip surgery, experienced
"debilitating pain," and suffered from various additional medical
conditions.
Yet in the government's surreply, it again attempted to
cast doubt on Texeira-Nieves's sickle cell anemia. The government
acknowledged that Texeira-Nieves had provided "some medical
notes," but argued that the diagnoses in the medical records were
based only on Texeira-Nieves's own reports, and that "there [were]
no independent medical records corroborating Defendant's diagnoses
and/or that he currently suffers [from] those medical conditions
(except for hip pain)." The government's repeated assertion that
Texeira-Nieves did not suffer from sickle cell anemia was entirely
unfounded.
Even on appeal, the government has not relented. In its
brief to this court, it asserts:
As the government argued, and the district court agreed,
Texeira failed to adequately support that he had a sickle
cell disease condition. He initially provided old medical
7 "Sickle cell crisis" refers to the periodic episodes of pain
which are a major symptom of sickle cell anemia. Severe sickle
cell crises require hospitalization. Sickle cell anemia, The Mayo
Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/sickle-
cell-anemia/symptoms-causes/syc-20355876 (last visited January 4,
2022).
- 28 -
notes, which these [sic] did not clearly indicate a clear
diagnosis of sickle cell disease and reflected generally good
health. (ASA 48). In a subsequent reply, Texeira provided
additional medical records. (ASA 132). But the records again
did not reflect a clear diagnosis of sickle cell disease.
(Id.).
I am at a loss to understand how the government can argue in good
faith that a PSR containing uncontroverted evidence of Texeira-
Nieves's sickle cell anemia, combined with records from medical
providers he saw while incarcerated that confirm the same, is not
sufficient documentation of his chronic illness.
The district judge's order denying Texeira-Nieves's
compassionate release motion stated that the motion was "DENIED,
for the reasons indicated by the United States in its opposition
and sur-reply." The order went on to state that "Defendant
Texeira-Nieves ha[d] not shown any extraordinary or compelling
reason to grant his request for compassionate release."
If this court were to reach the issue of extraordinary
and compelling reasons, I would hold that the district court's
finding that Texeira-Nieves did not present extraordinary and
compelling reasons was premised on a clearly erroneous factual
finding. The district court based its denial of release on the
government's argument. The government's argument that Texeira-
Nieves had not shown he suffered from sickle cell anemia is not
only clearly erroneous based on reviewing the entire record, but
it lacks any supporting evidence whatsoever. See Pullman-Standard
- 29 -
v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 284 n.14 (1982) (citation omitted) ("A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."). However, since the extraordinary and compelling
reasons issue need not be reached in this case, I concur with the
majority.
- 30 -