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USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1746
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
DARYL YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
_____________________
David J. Van Dyke, by Appointment of the Court, with whom __________________
Berman & Simmons, P.A. was on brief for appellant. ______________________
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, ______________________
with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Jonathan ________________ ________
R. Chapman, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for ___________
appellee.
____________________
March 21, 1996
____________________
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Defendant-appellant Daryl TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. ____________
Young ("Young") challenges his criminal conviction, as well as
his resulting sentence imposed pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). Young was convicted with co-
defendant Dennis Johnson ("Johnson") (1) of conspiring to possess
with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 846, and (2) of possession of heroin
with intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). After the close of evidence in his
jury trial, he waived his right to trial by jury and submitted to
a verdict by the court. The district court found him guilty and
sentenced him to ninety-two months' imprisonment, to be followed
by five years of supervised release. We affirm both the judgment
and the sentence of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND I. BACKGROUND
In December 1994, Young met Al Hendricks ("Hendricks")
while the two men were enrolled in a drug detoxification program
at a Maine hospital. At trial, Young testified that Hendricks
constantly talked about drugs, disrupting Young's therapy. Young
and Hendricks continued to communicate after Young had left the
detoxification program. Shortly thereafter, starting on
December 27, Hendricks, on his own initiative, taped twelve
conversations with Young.
On the first tape, Young told Hendricks he had sent a
car to retrieve twenty-one grams of an unspecified substance, and
when Hendricks said he wanted some drugs, Young and Hendricks
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agreed on a meeting place. On January 5, 1995, Hendricks
contacted the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). On January 9, 1995,
Hendricks was formally enrolled as an informer. Subsequently,
Hendricks and DEA Agent Henry J. O'Donoghue ("Agent O'Donoghue")
arranged a deal whereby Young and Johnson would travel to the
Bronx to purchase heroin, which they would then resell to Agent
O'Donoghue (the "controlled buy"). On January 13, 1995, Young
was arrested at the Greyhound Bus terminal in Portland, Maine,
after he conveyed heroin to Agent O'Donoghue.
Although not included in the charge before it, at
sentencing the district court included two other quantities of
drugs under the rubric of relevant conduct pursuant to the United
States Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines. First, in
November 1994, Officer Brian Higgins of the Maine State Police
found Young unconscious in Machias, Maine, in an automobile owned
by Johnson, and in possession of approximately 11 ounces of
cocaine. The district court took this cocaine into account (the
"Machias cocaine") in computing Young's sentence in the instant
conviction. Additionally, Johnson testified that Young had sold
him heroin for almost two years previous to Young's January 13,
1995, arrest. The district court also took this heroin into
account (the "Johnson heroin") in computing Young's sentence in
the instant conviction.
At trial, after the district court refused to instruct
the jury on the defense of entrapment, Young waived his right to
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a jury trial, submitted to a verdict of the district court, and
was convicted and sentenced.
II. DISCUSSION II. DISCUSSION
A. The Requested Entrapment Instruction A. The Requested Entrapment Instruction
Young challenges the district court's refusal to
instruct the jury on his defense of entrapment. "[A] defendant
is entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment if there is
record evidence which fairly supports the claims of both
government inducement of the crime and defendant's lack of
predisposition to engage in it." United States v. Rodr guez, 858 _____________ _________
F.2d 809, 814 (1st Cir. 1988). The record must show "hard
evidence," which if believed by a rational juror, "would suffice
to create a reasonable doubt as to whether government actors
induced the defendant to perform a criminal act that he was not
predisposed to commit." Id. The existence or nonexistence of ___
the required quantity of evidence in a given case is a matter of
law for the court, see id. at 809, and thus our review is ___ ___
plenary, reading the record evidence in the light most favorable
to the defense. See United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 217 ___ _____________ ______
(1st Cir. 1992); Rodr guez, 858 F.2d at 814. Once a defendant _________
carries his or her entry-level burden, the government may prove
the absence of entrapment by showing, beyond a reasonable doubt,
"that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior
to being first approached by government agents." Gifford, 17 _______
F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1994).
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We conclude that even assuming all of Hendricks' acts
could be considered government conduct,1 the district court did
not err in finding a lack of "hard evidence," which if believed
by a rational juror, would suffice to create a reasonable doubt
as to whether Hendricks committed acts that would meet the legal
definition of entrapment.2 To be entitled to the instruction on
entrapment, a defendant must show hard evidence that, if
believed, would lead a reasonable person to the requisite
conclusion; it is not enough that there be doubt in the absence
of evidence on a given point. See United States v. Pratt, 913 ___ _____________ _____
F.2d 982, 988 (1st Cir. 1990); Rodr guez, 858 F.2d at 814. As we _________
have previously stated,
[i]f an accused suggests that entrapment
belongs in the case, it seems not unfair
____________________
1 Young argues that all of Hendricks' acts, dating from their
first meeting, should come under the lens of entrapment's
examination for improper government action that contaminated the
prosecution. Young asserts that Hendricks intended to become a
government agent from the beginning, when he befriended Young,
and thus all of Hendricks' actions constitute the actions of a
government agent. Relying on Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. _______ _____________
369 (1958), Young contends that even though there is no "private
entrapment" defense, see United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, ___ _____________ _______
962 (1st Cir. 1994) (collecting cases), because Hendricks may
well have began his association with Young with a view towards
turning government informant, the government "ratified"
Hendricks' acts, including those committed before Hendricks first
contacted O'Donoghue.
Because we find no hard evidence of inducement even those of
Hendricks' acts that pre-date his enrollment with the DEA, we
assume the validity of Young's novel theory of entrapment by
government ratification without ruling on it.
2 We do not consider this definition with respect to O'Donoghue,
because the record, including Young's testimony (described
infra), shows that O'Donoghue had minimal contact with Young _____
before the controlled buy that led to this appeal.
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to expect him to point to a modicum of
evidence supportive of his suggestion.
The alternative -- that the prosecution
be forced to disprove entrapment in every
case -- seems plainly unacceptable.
Id. at 813-14 (citations omitted). In the entrapment context, ___
inducement must be such that it implicates concerns of government
"overreaching," see Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962; solicitation alone ___ _______
does not suffice as inducement, see id. at 961. This court has ___ ___
previously stated that
[a]n improper "inducement," however, goes
beyond providing an ordinary "opportunity
to commit a crime." An "inducement"
consists of an "opportunity" plus ____
something else -- typically, excessive
pressure by the government upon the
defendant or the government's taking
advantage of an alternative, non-criminal
type of motive.
See id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Examples of ___ ___
improper "inducement" include intimidation, threats, dogged
insistence, and "arm-twisting based on need, sympathy,
friendship, or the like." United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d at ______________ _______
468; see also Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. ________ _______
The district court concluded that Young essentially
testified that there was no inducement on the part of Agent
O'Donoghue. Reviewing the record, we agree. In response to
repeated questioning on cross-examination, Young failed to point
to any statement or action of Agent O'Donoghue that Young
considered inducement. In fact, by his own testimony, Young
pinpointed the time of any inducement to his contact with
Hendricks in the hospital. With respect to Hendricks, Young
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attempted to depict a pattern of inducement. Young testified
that Hendricks allegedly induced him to sell narcotics by
befriending him while both were in treatment, by telling "war
stories," by "com[ing] into [his] hospital room," and by saying
that he could arrange for Young to obtain drugs. Young testified
that Hendricks allegedly led him into selling drugs by telling
Young "to trust him," and that "[b]y just being there," Hendricks
"was the answer to everything."
Even viewing the record most favorably to Young, we
find that the district court properly found that Young did not
produce "hard evidence" that Hendricks used coercion,
intimidation or any promise of benefits other than the
opportunity to commit the crime. Young's own trial testimony was
that Hendricks' actions amounted to talking about drugs,
referring to the availability of drugs, and arranging the
purchase with O'Donoghue. There was no testimony or other
evidence, let alone "hard evidence," of coercion or intimidation.
Cf., e.g., United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 963 (9th Cir. ___ ____ _____________ _______
1993) (describing government officials who used threats against a
defendant's family); United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 _____________ _____
(7th Cir. 1993) (describing government officials who called every
day and "began threatening" the defendant). Unlike in Sherman v. _______
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), there was no evidence that ______________
Hendricks feigned physical suffering due to withdrawal symptoms.
Id. at 373. While there was testimony that Hendricks showed ___
Young his track marks, there was no testimony by Young, nor any
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other evidence, of any attempt to attract sympathy in order to
obtain drugs for Hendricks or O'Donoghue. With respect to
coercion or emotional appeals to sympathy, then, we find no hard
evidence in the record regarding the instant offense that would
satisfy the required showing of inducement, that is, "opportunity
plus something else."
Similarly, while there have been cases in which pleas
based upon a defendant's friendship with an informant have
justified a finding of entrapment, see, e.g., Sorrells v. United ___ ____ ________ ______
States, 287 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1932) (using sentiment of "one ______
former war buddy . . . for another" to get liquor during
prohibition), there was no such evidence here. There was hard
evidence, in the form of Young's testimony, from which a rational
jury could have inferred a friendship with Hendricks, albeit a
recently established one. There was no testimony from Young, nor
was there any other hard evidence, that Hendricks made any plea
based upon any degree of friendship that the two men had
established during their brief acquaintanceship, which Young
testified began on or about December 23, 1994, to encourage Young
to do anything that he was not predisposed to do. We cannot
find, and Young does not cite authority for, the proposition that
friendship, without a plea predicated upon friendship, suffices
legally as inducement; indeed case law suggests that, as a matter
of law, friendship alone does not constitute sufficient
inducement. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 918 F.2d 1343, ___ ____ ______________ ____
1348 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that, "as a matter of law,"
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evidence that a defendant thought he or she was doing a favor for
a friend by selling that friend illegal drugs does not suffice
for showing inducement to obtain entrapment instruction); United ______
States v. Jones, 487 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[f]riendship ______ _____
is not, by itself, a sufficient inducement to constitute
entrapment as a matter of law"). The sole evidence pertinent to
how Hendricks purportedly managed to "lead" Young to selling
drugs to Agent O'Donoghue is Young's testimony that Hendricks
said "I have a friend that wants heroin and I will set you up."
There is no accompanying allegation of coercion, threat, or plea
based upon friendship or sympathy that would constitute more than
mere opportunity, which alone cannot suffice legally as
inducement. See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961.3 ___ _______
Furthermore, while Young contends that Hendricks
disrupted his drug treatment program by bringing up the subject
of drugs in conversation, we can find no authority for the
proposition that merely affording the opportunity for illegal
activity can qualify legally as inducement simply because of the
context, were Young to make such an argument. In fact, authority
____________________
3 Accordingly, we need not consider the additional required
finding of predisposition. However, we note that Hendricks'
first tape, from December 27, 1994, contains strong evidence of
Young's interest in providing drugs to Hendricks. Without any
request from Hendricks, Young brings up the subject of a car
"going in five minutes" that is going to obtain 21 grams of an
unidentified substance that would be "enough for all of you."
What hard evidence existed regarding predisposition suggests that
not only did Hendricks not offer more than an opportunity, but
also, in fact, that Young may already have been predisposed to
sell or provide drugs to others, and that Young may have
initiated the component of his relationship with Hendricks that
involved the buying and selling of illegal drugs.
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exists for the proposition that context is irrelevant where an
informant's action was "nothing more than a solicitation to act."
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1995) ______________ _____
(finding no inducement where former patient, acting as a
government agent, convinced physician to write her prescription
for pharmaceuticals, forming the factual basis of his conviction
for distributing controlled substances outside the scope of his
medical practice for other than legitimate medical purposes, and
for falsifying prescription information); see United States v. ___ ______________
Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1004 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding no _______________
inducement and rejecting defendant's self-portrayal as "gullible
alcoholic," finding dispositive that the record indicated that
"the government informer did no more than advertise [an Agent's]
interest in purchasing cocaine" and setting up the controlled
buy). By contrast, the informant in Sherman, a case on which _______
Young relies heavily, repeatedly sought drugs from the defendant
in a treatment context, supplementing his recurring requests with
claims of physical discomfort from withdrawal. Sherman, 356 U.S. _______
at 371 (noting that the defendant there tried to avoid the issue
of illegal drugs "from the first," and "[n]ot until after a
number of repetitions of the request, predicated on [the
informant's] presumed suffering, did petitioner finally
acquiesce").
Ultimately, while Young testified that Hendricks
befriended him and brought up the subject of drugs, he never
testified that Hendricks used this friendship as leverage
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constituting the "opportunity plus something else" legally
required for a finding of inducement, see Gendron, 18 F.3d at ___ _______
961. The December 27 recording, in fact, shows that Young was in
the process of obtaining drugs before offering them to his friend
Hendricks. In fact, at trial, Young provided the following
summary of how Hendricks "led" him into selling drugs: "[b]y just
being there, he was the answer to everything." Assuming, without
concluding, that Hendricks was a government agent, we might find
it distasteful that a government agent was even present talking
about drugs in a detoxification center. But this circuit has
never held, and we do not now hold, that the context in which
government conduct occurs waives the defendant's burden to show
hard evidence of legally sufficient inducement. Without the
requisite evidence, as here, we conclude that the district court
properly found that Young was not entitled to have a jury
consider his entrapment defense, and therefore we affirm the
district court's decision.
B. The Sentence B. The Sentence
At sentencing, the district court found the total drug
quantity attributable to Young to be equivalent to 284.41
kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a Base Offense Level of 26.
See U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(7). In making this finding, the District ___
Court found three distinct quantities of illicit drugs: (1) 17.96
grams of heroin involved in the controlled buy which formed the
predicate for the prosecution (translating to 17.96 kg of
marijuana equivalent); (2) 453 grams of cocaine representing
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drugs found on the defendant upon his arrest in Machias, Maine in
November of 1994 (translating to 90.6 kg of marijuana
equivalent); and (3) 176 grams of heroin representing drugs the
district court found that Young had sold to Johnson over a two-
year period preceding the subject prosecution (translating to 176
kg of marijuana equivalent).
On appeal, Young contends that the district court erred
by including both the Machias cocaine and the Johnson heroin in
calculating his sentence. According to Young, the circumstances
surrounding the Machias cocaine and the Johnson heroin should not
have been factored into "relevant conduct" for the purposes of
his sentence, because sufficient nexus with his charged conduct
did not exist.
To bring uncharged conduct into play, the government
must show a sufficient nexus between the conduct and the offense
of conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. See United ___ ______
States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). Absent a ______ _____
mistake of law, we review only for clear error the district
court's conclusions that drugs were part of the same conduct or
scheme or plan. See id. at 110-11. ___ ___
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, "relevant conduct"
includes all acts "that were part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction[.]"
U.S.S.G. 1B1.3. For two or more offenses to be considered part
of a common scheme or plan, "they must be substantially connected
to each other by at least one common factor, such as common
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victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus _____
operandi." U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, comment. (n.9(A)). ________
We conclude that the circumstances surrounding the
Machias cocaine and the charged offense4 were part of a common
scheme or plan because they evince at least two common factors:
a common source for the drugs in New York and common transport of
the drugs to Maine. In his appellate brief, Young concedes that
he obtained both the Machias cocaine and the heroin involved in
the charged offense from the same source in New York.
Additionally, as in the charged offense, he apparently brought
the drugs from there to Maine. Furthermore, at trial, agents
testified that a subsequent search of his house turned up used
and unused syringes, several sets of scales covered with white
powder, marijuana, pills and other drug residue. Thus, there was
evidence tending to tie the circumstances surrounding the Machias
cocaine and the offense conduct together as part of a common
scheme whereby Young conveyed drugs from his supplier in New York
to buyers in Maine.5
____________________
4 Because we find proper the district court's inclusion of the
Machias cocaine, we do not consider whether the Johnson heroin
was correctly included, since even if the Johnson heroin were
excluded, it would not change Young's base offense level or
sentencing range. "[W]hen correction of a finding would not
change the applicable offense level or affect the sentencing
range, any error therein would necessarily be harmless." United ______
States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 603 (1st Cir. 1990). ______ _______
5 Since we find that the Machias cocaine and the heroin involved
in the charged offense form part of a common scheme or plan,
according to U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, these drug quantities may be
included together under the rubric of relevant conduct. Because
1B1.3 requires a finding of either a "common scheme or plan" or __
the "same course of conduct," we do not consider Young's further
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Additionally, Young argues that the offense conduct
involved selling cocaine to Agent O'Donoghue for expected further
distribution in Canada, while assuming that if the Machias
cocaine was to be resold, it would presumably be sold in Maine.
Without concluding that different destinations require a finding
that the incidents cannot be part of a common scheme or plan, we
find this argument unconvincing given that the offense conduct
involved selling drugs in Portland, Maine, and that apparently
Agent O'Donoghue was to handle further distribution. Certainly,
we do not believe that it was clear error for the district court
to find a common scheme on these facts.
Furthermore, while Young testified that the Machias
cocaine was all for his own use, the district court was not
required to believe him. See United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d ___ _____________ ________
51, 54 (1st Cir. 1993). In reviewing sentencing proceedings, as
elsewhere, we must be mindful that "credibility determinations
lie primarily within the realm of the district court," id. at 55, ___
and where, as here, "there are two plausible views of the record,
the sentencing court's adoption of one such view cannot be
clearly erroneous," id. (citing United States v. St. Cyr, 977 ___ _____________ _______
F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir. 1992)). The district court's conclusion
was particularly plausible here, where the court heard testimony
____________________
contention that because the events surrounding the Machias
cocaine were separated in time from the offense conduct by
Young's self-admission into a detoxification center, these two
incidents cannot be considered part of the same course of conduct
under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2), because they cannot be considered
part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.
See U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, comment. (n.9(B)).
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from Maine DEA Supervisor Kenneth MacMaster that a typical dosage
of cocaine for personal use ranges from one-tenth to one-fourth
of a gram, and that a total of 453 grams of cocaine were seized
from the car, along with scales and other paraphernalia found at
Young's home, suggesting further distribution.
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CONCLUSION CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed. affirmed ________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 95-1746
Filed Date： 3/21/1996
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 3/3/2016