United States v. Robles-Pabon , 892 F.3d 64 ( 2018 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 16-2455
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    RODNEY ROBLES-PABON,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
    Jane Elizabeth Lee on brief for appellant.
    Elizabeth H. Danello, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal
    Division,   United  States   Department  of   Justice,  Rosa  E.
    Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, John P. Cronan, Acting
    Assistant Attorney General, Thomas F. Klumper, Acting Chief,
    Appellate Division, and Laura G. Montes-Rodriguez, Assistant
    United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    June 8, 2018
    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.         Rodney Robles-Pabon ("Robles"),
    on a plea of guilty in the district court, was convicted of
    conspiracy     to   possess   with    intent       to   distribute   cocaine   and
    marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C), and
    possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime,
    18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).           The district court sentenced him to
    twenty-one months on the first count and seventy-two months on the
    second, the latter to be served after the first sentence, for a
    total of ninety-three months.            He now appeals to contest his
    sentences.
    On December 17, 2015, federal agents searched a house in
    Arecibo, Puerto Rico, and found Robles hiding in a closet.                     The
    agents found drugs, currency, cell phones, AK-47 ammunition, high
    capacity   magazines,     and   a    chip     to    modify    a   Glock    firearm.
    Searching a car parked at the residence, agents found Robles'
    passport and a loaded Glock pistol, among other things.                    Neither
    search is contested on this appeal.
    A grand jury indicted Robles on six counts, but on July
    22, 2016, Robles agreed with the government to plead guilty to the
    two   counts   already   described.         The     plea   agreement      contained
    guideline calculations, one of which endorsed a decrease by two
    levels for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a),
    ignoring the possibility of a three-level reduction under the
    governing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).                    The district court
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    entered the guilty plea and a presentence investigation report
    followed.
    On November 4, 2016, the district judge at the sentencing
    hearing, relying on the 2015 version of the guidelines, approved
    a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and imposed
    the sentences set forth above.    This appeal followed, asserting as
    errors the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
    failing to secure the three-level reduction, error by the trial
    judge in ignoring the potential three-level reduction, and various
    claimed infirmities in the district court's choice of sentence.
    In response, the government parries.     It denies that
    Robles' attorney can on this record be shown to be ineffective but
    says that "because Robles could establish attorney ineffectiveness
    in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255," this court "should vacate
    the sentence and remand to allow the government to file a Section
    3E1.1(b) motion," presumably to secure the extra level reduction
    and allow Robles to be resentenced.
    Given the joint agreement that Robles deserves the extra
    level decrease and resentencing, and seeing no reason to disagree,
    we turn to Robles' further claims, which are two.     The one merely
    repeats the request for a third level decrease under a different
    heading (judge error as opposed to counsel error) but the other is
    a multipart attack on the prior sentencing on grounds that bear
    upon any further sentencing proceeding of this defendant.
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    Patently    the   district    court,       as   expressed   in   the
    sentencing colloquy, intended to vary upward from the guideline
    sentence, although the judge and the parties would not necessarily
    share the same view of what would constitute a proper guidelines
    range.   The attacks on the upward variance are that the court
    relied on unsubstantiated facts, failed to explain adequately the
    variance and did not "individualize" Robles' sentence as required
    in Gall v. United States, 
    522 U.S. 38
    (2007), and other precedents
    including our own, e.g., United States v. Vázquez, 
    854 F.3d 126
    ,
    130 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2017).
    Robles'    counsel   argues    that   in    varying   upward,    the
    district court relied importantly on its belief that the murder
    rate in Puerto Rico had decreased significantly because of a joint
    firearms initiative. The district court referred to such a belief,
    but taken as a whole, its rationale was far more straightforward:
    that Robles was an armed and dangerous drug dealer whose criminal
    behavior should be strongly discouraged by an upward variance.
    In a set of cases, this court has upheld upward variances
    on roughly similar facts and, in a leading case, focused on the
    requirement that a variance be reasonable and found it satisfied.
    See United States v. Rivera-González, 
    776 F.3d 45
    , 50-51 (1st Cir.
    2015) (Selya, J.); see also United States v. Garay-Sierra, 
    885 F.3d 7
    , 15-16 (1st Cir. 2018) (Thompson, J.); United States v.
    Fuentes-Echevarria, 
    856 F.3d 22
    , 25-26 (1st Cir. 2017) (Howard,
    - 4 -
    C.J.); 
    Vázquez, 854 F.3d at 130
    (Torruella, J.); United States v.
    Zapata-Vázquez, 
    778 F.3d 21
    , 23-24 (1st Cir. 2015) (Kayatta, J.).
    Like the appellants in the cases just cited, Robles
    argues that the district court's concern with gun violence is a
    community consideration not adequately directed to him as an
    individual.     But the district court here did explore Robles'
    characteristics in detail and did not centrally rely on community
    considerations.     
    Vázquez, 854 F.3d at 130
    & n.2.         The district
    court's discussion of Robles' youth, lack of firearms training,
    and history of drug dealing is the very individualization for which
    the case law calls.
    In all events, Robles made no objection at sentencing
    that the district court's explanation was inadequate.              Given the
    precedents in this circuit, the upward variance is not "plain
    error" that can rescue an unpreserved objection.            For a modest
    variance    like   the   one   imposed    here,   the   district     court's
    explanation is sufficient.      Cf. United States v. Ortiz–Rodríguez,
    
    789 F.3d 15
    , 18–20 (1st Cir. 2015).
    The district court used a standard script prepared and
    deployed by the same judge for cases like Robles' of which there
    are many.     But scripts--what else are plea dialogues and pattern
    instructions but scripts?--are efficient and commonplace for busy
    district judges.    And there was nothing perfunctory or dismissive
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    about the district court's sentencing in this case.   The judge did
    efficiently but fairly his difficult job.
    The government is to be thanked for simplifying matters
    through its concession that Robles' trial counsel had failed to
    detect the possibility of an extra level decrease and its further
    concession that the extra decrease was justified. We see no reason
    for the motion practice proposed by the government, but the
    substance of its proposal does credit to the Department.
    The judgment imposing the sentences is vacated and the
    matter remanded for resentencing.     The court is free to consider
    imposing the same sentence if it thinks it has grounds for doing
    so despite the extra level reduction, but it will surely give
    counsel on both sides the opportunity to address the issue of a
    variance anew if the court is thinking in that direction.
    It is so ordered.
    - 6 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-2455P

Citation Numbers: 892 F.3d 64

Judges: Howard, Boudin, Lynch

Filed Date: 6/8/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024