United States v. Bowers ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-2100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN BOWERS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Kayatta, and Gelpí,
Circuit Judges.
Elizabeth A. Billowitz on brief for appellant.
Julia M. Lipez, Assistant United States Attorney, and Darcie
N. McElwee, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
March 1, 2022
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Jonathan
Bowers ("Bowers") pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 At sentencing,
the district court determined that his several prior Maine
convictions called for a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
years under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1).2 On appeal, Bowers challenges the imposition of his
sentence under the ACCA. We affirm.
I. Background
This sentencing and subsequent appeal arise from events
that took place on April 9, 2016. On that day, Bowers went to an
auto mechanic garage belonging to his friend J.T.3 in Chelsea,
Maine to do some work on his pickup truck. An altercation ensued
after J.T. accused Bowers of being rude to some of his customers
and asked him to leave. During the course of the argument, Bowers
1"It shall be unlawful for any person-(1) who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).
2"In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this
title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to
in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different
from one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less
than fifteen years . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
3This individual will be referred to by his initials to
maintain anonymity.
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reached for a pistol in the waistband of his pants.4 J.T. then
struck Bowers on the head with a wrench, rendering him unconscious.
Police were called to the scene to respond to the incident. Bowers
was taken to the hospital where he was given medical attention and
was found to have developed a concussion. Neither Bowers nor J.T.
was charged with any state law offense as a result of this
incident.
On November 10, 2016, a grand jury indicted Bowers for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) by
knowingly possessing a firearm despite having "previously been
convicted of a crime or crimes punishable for a term of more than
one year imprisonment." The indictment listed seven such
convictions for Bowers. Bowers pled guilty to the felon in
possession charge, leaving for sentencing the determination of the
ACCA's applicability.
On November 16, 2020, Bowers's sentencing hearing was
held. The district court reiterated its prior written order that
Bowers, due to his four prior Maine burglary convictions, qualified
for the ACCA's enhanced mandatory minimum penalty. The district
4Witnesses also reported previously seeing Bowers shooting
both a handgun and an AR-15 behind J.T.'s garage, and the police
found evidence of spent casings around the garage consistent with
reports that someone engaged in target practice there.
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court sentenced Bowers to a term of imprisonment of 180 months,
equivalent to fifteen years.5
II. Discussion
Bowers makes two arguments on appeal, which we discuss
in turn.
A. Standard of Review
In general, our review of whether a prior conviction
qualifies as a predicate offense under the ACCA is de novo. United
States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2009). When a prior
panel decision holds that a type of offense categorically qualifies
as a predicate, however, the law of the circuit doctrine applies.
See United States v. Mouscardy, 722 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2013).
B. Maine's Burglary Statute
Bowers first argues that the district court erred in
applying the ACCA to him based on his prior burglary convictions
in the State of Maine. Bowers argues that the Supreme Court's
decision in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016),
effectively overruled our earlier, directly on-point decision in
United States v. Duquette, 778 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2015).
In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the
Supreme Court held that "a person has been convicted of burglary
for purposes of [ACCA] enhancement if he is convicted of any crime,
5 The applicable Sentencing Guidelines provided a range of
180-210 months of imprisonment.
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regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic
elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,
a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. at
599. Subsequently, in Duquette, we determined that the Maine
burglary statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17–A, § 401(1),
qualifies as generic burglary under the definition set forth in
Taylor. Duquette, 778 F.3d at 318. Therefore, under Duquette, a
conviction under the Maine burglary statute "qualifies as a
'violent felony' under the ACCA." Id.
In Mathis, decided the year after Duquette, the Supreme
Court held that Iowa's burglary statute was broader than the
definition of generic burglary under the ACCA and therefore
convictions under it could not qualify as predicate offenses.
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. The Court did not redefine "generic
burglary." See id. at 2250 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 for
definition of the generic offense). Generic burglary still
consists of "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining
in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime."
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. "Iowa's statute, by contrast, reaches a
broader range of places: 'any building, structure, [or] land,
water, or air vehicle.'" Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250 (alterations
in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 702.12). The parties, in fact,
there agreed that "Iowa's burglary statute . . . covers more
conduct than generic burglary does." Id.- 5 -
Bowers argues that the Maine statute is similarly
structured to Iowa's statute and therefore, under Mathis, Bowers's
convictions for burglary under Maine law should similarly preclude
the application of the ACCA to him. Specifically, Bowers argues
that the Maine burglary statute defines "structure," as does the
Iowa statute, to include certain vehicles. Bowers posits that the
definition encompasses vehicles used to store property rather than
transport persons, and therefore, as in Mathis, is broader than
"generic burglary" as defined in Taylor. The relevant statutory
language that Bowers relies on, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
§ 2(24), defines a structure as "a building or other place designed
to provide protection for persons or property against weather or
intrusion, but does not include vehicles . . . whose primary
purpose is transportation of persons or property unless such
vehicle . . . is also a dwelling place." The Maine statute defines
a dwelling place in pertinent part as "a structure that is adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons, or sections of any
structure similarly adapted." Id. § 2(10).
Bowers argues that the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Mathis requires us to reconsider our decision in
Duquette that the Maine burglary statute qualifies as generic
burglary under the ACCA. Under the "law of the circuit" doctrine,
our panel is "bound by a prior panel decision, absent any
intervening authority." Mouscardy, 722 F.3d at 77 (quoting United
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States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 2012)). An exception
to this rule arises when "[a]n existing panel decision [is]
undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such
as an opinion of the Supreme Court." United States v. Holloway,
630 F.3d 252, 258 (1st Cir. 2011) (alterations in original)
(quoting Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 (1st Cir.
2010)). We must also be mindful that a case's "holding . . . can
extend through its logic beyond the specific facts of its case."
Id. at 258 (alteration in original) (quoting Los Angeles County v.
Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 38 (2010)).
We disagree with Bowers's interpretation of Mathis to
the effect it overrules our decision in Duquette. The Supreme
Court's decision in Mathis did not alter the definition of generic
burglary. Because our decision in Duquette was that the Maine
burglary statute qualified as generic burglary, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathis involved a statute which all parties
agreed swept more broadly than that, Mathis does not affect our
holding in Duquette.
Our conclusion is supported by United States v. Stitt,
139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). There, the Court decided whether two state
burglary statutes fell within the ACCA's definition of generic
burglary. Id. at 403-04. The statutes at issue included vehicles
used for overnight accommodation as structures for the purposes of
burglary. See id. at 404 (discussing Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-39-
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101(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-401(1)(A)-(B)). The Court held
that the pertinent statutory language relating to such vehicles
"falls within the scope of generic burglary's definition as set
forth in Taylor." Id. at 406. The Court reasoned that Congress
intended the ACCA's definition of burglary to "reflect 'the generic
sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal codes of most
States' at the time the Act was passed." Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598). At that time, "a
majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or
customarily used for lodging." Id.The Supreme Court in Stitt also addressed the argument
that "in Taylor, Mathis, and other cases, [the Court] said that
burglary of certain nontypical structures and vehicles fell
outside the scope of the [ACCA's] statutory word 'burglary.'" Id.
at 407. Using that language, the respondents in Stitt argued that
the vehicles used for overnight accommodation at issue in their
case were "analogous to the nontypical structures and vehicles to
which the Court referred in those cases." Id. The Court disagreed
and clarified that it "did not decide in either [Taylor or Mathis]
the question [then] before [it]." Id. For example, Mathis was
concerned with whether Iowa's burglary statute qualified as
generic burglary under the ACCA although some means of satisfying
the structure element fall "within Taylor's generic definition and
some . . . fall outside it." Id.
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The reasoning in Mathis and the Supreme Court's later
explication of the same in Stitt confirms that Mathis does not
provide a basis for questioning Duquette's precedential effect.
Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision and uphold
Bowers's fifteen-year sentence.
C. Application of the Categorical Approach
Bowers advances a second argument before this court
which is also unpersuasive. He posits that the categorical
approach did not require the district court to ignore the facts of
his prior convictions, which he insists fall outside the definition
of generic burglary. Specifically, Bowers underscores the fact
that, in two of his predicate burglary convictions, the structure
at issue was a mobile trailer. In making this argument, Bowers
relies on statements that the district court made in its
supplemental order which he characterizes as "implicitly
agree[ing]" that mobile trailers do not qualify as structures under
the ACCA's definition of generic burglary. See United States v.
Bowers, No. 16-CR-00151, 2020 WL 4925684, at *7-8 (D. Me. Aug. 21,
2020). Nevertheless, the district court recognized it was bound
to use the categorical approach in Bowers's case because Maine's
burglary statute did not contain divisible elements. Id. Bowers
argues that there is no consistent reasoning that prevents
sentencing judges from applying the modified categorical approach
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to ACCA predicate crimes, and indeed that Mathis encourages this
result.
Under the modified categorical approach, the sentencing
court considers "a limited class of documents . . . to determine
what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of" in
order to compare that crime's elements to those of the generic
offense. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249 (citing Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). This
elements-matching approach is utilized to determine whether a
conviction is an ACCA predicate offense when "[a] single
statute . . . list[s] elements in the alternative, and thereby
define[s] multiple crimes." Id. In contrast, the categorical
approach is applied "when a statute sets out a single . . . set of
elements to define a single crime." Id. at 2248. Those elements
are then compared with the elements of the generic offense to
"see[] if they match." Id. To apply the categorical approach,
courts "focus solely on whether the elements of the crime of
conviction sufficiently match the elements of generic burglary,
while ignoring the particular facts of the case." Id.
In this case, we have a straightforward application of
the categorical approach, and thus, we decline Bowers's invitation
to apply the modified categorical approach to his case by
considering the specific facts underlying his prior burglary
convictions. In Duquette, we utilized the categorical approach to
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analyze Maine's burglary statute and held that "[b]y its clear and
unambiguous terms, the statute contains all of the elements of
'generic burglary' that the Supreme Court set forth in Taylor."
778 F.3d at 318. For the reasons described supra, we decline to
overturn our prior decision in Duquette and its application of the
categorical approach to the same statute at issue here. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has instructed that both the "language" and
"legislative history" of the ACCA favor the categorical approach.
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-01.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's
application of the ACCA and imposition of a mandatory fifteen-year
sentence is
AFFIRMED.
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