Hann v. Micron ( 1997 )

USCA1 Opinion

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



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          No. 96-1948





                                    DAVID W. HANN,



                                Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                          v.



                              MICRON SEPARATIONS, INC.,



                                 Defendant, Appellee.



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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
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                                        Before



                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
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                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
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                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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               William T. Murphy on brief for appellant.
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               Edward  J.  Goddard and  Day, Berry  &  Howard on  brief for
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          appellee.



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                                  February 12, 1997

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                    Per Curiam.   In the suit  that underlies this  appeal,
Per Curiam.
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          plaintiff-appellant  David  W.  Hann  alleges  that  his  quondam



          employer, Micron Separations,  Inc. (Micron),  a manufacturer  of



          industrial   filtration  systems,  disregarded  a  severance  pay



          obligation  when it  terminated  him as  its marketing  director.



          Micron  moved for  summary  judgment on  the  ground that  Hann's



          written employment contract provided  for such remuneration  only



          in  the  event of  another  company's  acquisition  of Micron  (a



          circumstance that  had not occurred).   A magistrate  judge heard



          arguments and wrote a carefully reasoned report recommending that



          the district  court grant  brevis disposition in  Micron's favor.
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          The magistrate concluded, after examining the relevant  evidence,



          that the proof,  taken in  the aspect most  flattering to  Hann's



          case, proves neither a  modification of the terms of  his written



          employment  contract nor  a breach  of those terms.   On  de novo



          review,  the  district  court  accepted  the  recommendation  and



          entered  summary  judgment  for  the defendant.    Hann  appeals.



          Having  determined  that  oral  argument would  not  advance  the



          decisional process, we summarily affirm.



                    On  whole-record review,  we   believe that  this is  a



          suitable  case in  which to  act upon  our long-held  belief that



          "when  a  lower  court produces  a  comprehensive,  well-reasoned



          decision,  an  appellate court  should  refrain  from writing  at



          length to  no other  end than  to hear  its own words  resonate."



          Lawton v.  State Mut. Life Assur.  Co. of Am., 101  F.3d 218, 220
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          (1st  Cir. 1996); accord In  re San Juan  Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
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          Litig., 989  F.2d 36, 38 (1st  Cir. 1993).  Hence,  we affirm the
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          judgment for substantially  the reasons set forth  in the opinion



          below.  We add only a small coda.



                    In his brief, Hann rehashes the evidence and invites us



          to take  a more expansive view of the facts than did the district



          court.   We decline the invitation.   When summary judgment is at



          stake,  we, like the trial  court, must scrutinize  the record in



          the light most  favorable to the nonmoving party,  "indulging all



          reasonable  inferences in  that party's  favor,"   Griggs-Ryan v.
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          Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied), but
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          disregarding  unsupported  allegations, unreasonable  inferences,



          and conclusory speculation.   See Smith  v. F.W.  Morse & Co., 76
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          F.3d  413, 428  (1st Cir.  1996); Medina-Munoz  v.  R.J. Reynolds
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          Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d  5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).  If no genuine issue
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          of  material fact  percolates  through the  record, then  summary



          judgment  is proper.  So viewed, the essential purpose of summary



          judgment  is "to  pierce the  boilerplate  of the  pleadings" and



          appraise the proof to determine whether a trial is needed.  Wynne
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          v.  Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976  F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992),
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          cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).  Here, a trial would serve no
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          useful purpose.



                    We  will not tarry.  Despite the generosity of the Rule



          56 standard  vis- -vis the party opposing  summary judgment, that



          party  is not entitled to the benefit  of every inference that he



          can conjure  up;  he is  only entitled  to the  benefit of  every



          reasonable inference.   See National Amusements, Inc. v.  Town of
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          Dedham,  43 F.3d 731,  735 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.
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          2247 (1995).  In this instance, we cannot draw the inference that



          the  appellant hawks.  To the contrary, the statement of Micron's



          president,  Dr. John Greenwood, which  the appellant cites as the



          basis for his claim of an oral modification, simply will not bear



          the weight that the appellant piles upon it.



                    The  appellant's promissory  estoppel  claim  fares  no



          better  than his breach  of contract claim.   Under Massachusetts



          law, a  promisee's reliance  on  a promise  may give  rise to  an



          enforceable contract,  but only  if such reliance  is reasonable.



          See  Rhode Island Hosp. Trust  Nat'l Bank v.  Varadian, 419 Mass.
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          841,  849-50,  647  N.E.2d  1174,  1178-79  (1995); Cambridgeport
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          Savings Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass. 432, 442-43, 597 N.E.2d 1017,
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          1023-24 (1992); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 376
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          Mass.  757, 760-61, 384 N.E.2d  176, 179 (1978);  Hall v. Horizon
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          House  Microwave, Inc., 24 Mass.  App. Ct. 84,  93-94, 506 N.E.2d
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          178, 184  (1987); see also  Coll v. PB Diagnostic  Sys., Inc., 50
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          F.3d 1115, 1124-25 (1st  Cir. 1995) (refusing under Massachusetts



          law to honor a  promissory estoppel claim for an  orally modified



          employment  contract  when  reliance  was  unreasonable).    Even



          assuming  for argument's  sake  that Dr.  Greenwood had  apparent



          authority  to  bind  Micron  to  a  change  in  Hann's  severance



          arrangement   an  assumption that the record tends  to belie   no



          factfinder  rationally   could  conclude  that   the  appellant's



          professed reliance  on  Dr. Greenwood's  remark  was  reasonable.



          Even  on  the  appellant's  version,  Dr.  Greenwood's  statement





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          amounted  to  no  more than  a  passing  comment.   Only  wishful



          thinking could have  led Hann  to believe that  his contract  had



          been improved by this  passing comment   and wishful  thinking is



          not enough to support a cognizable claim of detrimental reliance.



          Thus, the magistrate judge and district court  acted within their



          proper office  in rejecting  the unreasonable inference  on which



          the appellant's case rests.  See Smith, 76 F.3d at 428.
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                    We need  go no further.   Finding,  as we do,  that the



          district   court  appropriately   granted  Micron's   motion  for



          judgment, we summarily affirm.  See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
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                    Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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