Tuvell v. International Business MacHines, Inc. ( 2016 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1914
WALTER TUVELL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Andrew P. Hanson for appellant.
Matthew A. Porter, with whom Joan Ackerstein and Anne Selinger
were on brief, for appellee.
May 13, 2016
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Walter Tuvell, brought this action
against his former employer, defendant International Business
Machines, Inc. ("IBM") claiming that it violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 151B, §§ 4(1), 4(4), 4(5), 4(16). In sum, the
complaint alleged that IBM failed to reasonably accommodate
Tuvell's disability (post-traumatic stress disorder),
discriminated against him because of this disability, as well as
because of his race, gender, and age (white male born in 1947),
retaliated against him, including unlawfully terminating him, and
failed to properly investigate his allegations. After discovery
was conducted, IBM moved for summary judgment on all counts. The
district court granted the motion. Tuvell v. Int'l Bus. Machines,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-11292-DJC, 2015 WL 4092614, at *1 (D. Mass.
July 7, 2015). Tuvell now appeals.
In finding for IBM, the district court concluded that Tuvell
could not establish a viable accommodation claim because his own
medical reports and provider showed that he was incapable of
performing his essential job functions even with accommodation
and, therefore, Tuvell was not a qualified disabled individual.
And, even assuming arguendo Tuvell was so qualified, the court
concluded that IBM did attempt to engage in an interactive process
with Tuvell and offered him reasonable accommodations (e.g.,
providing extended leave and proposing different review and
- 2 -
feedback procedures). With respect to Tuvell's disability-based
discrimination claim, the court held that Tuvell could not make
out a valid claim because the undisputed facts established (1) he
was not able to perform the essential functions of his job, (2)
the actions alleged by Tuvell (i.e., his not getting a job in
another group, certain other "tangible acts"1) were not
sufficiently adverse, and (3) IBM had a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason to terminate Tuvell, which was the fact that
he started working for another software company while still on
leave from IBM. For similar reasons (that is, no adverse
employment actions and a legitimate termination) Tuvell's
retaliation claims were also found by the court to be
unmeritorious. As for his race, age, and gender-based
discrimination claims, the court decided that Tuvell alleged no
facts to support these claims and only appeared to vaguely argue
1 Examples of the so-called tangible acts included IBM limiting
Tuvell's facilities access when he was on leave, sending him a
warning letter regarding his communication with colleagues, and
failing to process his internal complaint. Tuvell also alleges
that these acts formed the basis of a hostile work environment
claim -- a contention the district court rejected. Relatedly, the
court also dismissed Tuvell's failure to investigate claim since
it concluded that the supposed failure to investigate did not give
rise to a hostile work environment and, to the extent Tuvell was
trying to advance a standalone Massachusetts claim, failure to
investigate does not give rise to an independent cause of action
absent underlying proof of discrimination.
- 3 -
that his being required to switch projects with a younger Asian
female must have constituted discrimination.2
Under the plenary standard of review for summary judgment, we
perceive no genuine issue of material fact and agree with the
district court that IBM is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Veléz-Vélez v. Puerto Rico Highway & Transp. Auth., 795
F.3d 230, 235 (1st Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Simply said,
the district court got it right. It closely considered each of
Tuvell's arguments and, in clear terms and for persuasive reasons,
rejected them.
We have made it abundantly clear that "when lower courts have
supportably found the facts, applied the appropriate legal
standards, articulated their reasoning clearly, and reached a
correct result, a reviewing court ought not to write at length
merely to hear its own words resonate." deBenedictis v. Brady-
Zell (In re Brady-Zell), 756 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2014); see also
Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2002)
(providing that "when a lower court accurately takes the measure
of a case and articulates a cogent rationale, it serves no useful
purpose for a reviewing court to write at length").
2 Tuvell does not appear to contest on appeal the dismissal of his
race, age, and gender discrimination claims.
- 4 -
This is one of those cases. We summarily affirm the judgment
below for substantially the reasons articulated in the district
court's opinion.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
- 5 -