Winfield v. O'Brien , 775 F.3d 1 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2438
KEITH WINFIELD,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
STEVEN J. O'BRIEN,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor IV, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges,
and McCafferty,* District Judge.
Robert L. Sheketoff for appellant.
Kris C. Foster, Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts,
with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Massachusetts, was on
brief, for appellee.
December 18, 2014
*
Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. This appeal illustrates both the
considerable responsibility granted to a jury, and the restricted
scope of federal court review of state court convictions. A
heinous crime most certainly occurred. Less certain is the
perpetrator's identity. No confession, eye-witness testimony, DNA,
or similar evidence pointed the finger confidently at any one
person. Rather, the direct evidence simply narrowed the list of
suspects. A properly instructed Massachusetts Superior Court jury
then found that the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that one of the suspects, Keith Winfield,
committed the crimes. Now serving a life sentence for assaulting
and raping a two-year-old child, Winfield filed this petition for
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to
invalidate his conviction on two grounds.
First, he claims that the evidence against him was so
insufficient that no reasonable jurist could have concluded that a
rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Second, he claims that the state trial court's refusal to
permit him to cross-examine the victim's mother about her potential
bias arising from pending criminal charges against her constituted
an unreasonable application of the clearly established Sixth
Amendment confrontation right. The district court, concluding that
the state courts' rejection of Winfield's claims did not constitute
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an unreasonable application of federal law, denied the petition.
We now affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Summary
The charges on which Winfield was convicted stemmed from
the vaginal and anal rape of his two-year-old niece with a curling
iron on October 13, 2005. We recount the evidence presented
against Winfield largely as it was described in the opinion of the
Massachusetts Appeals Court, supplementing that description, where
appropriate, with other record facts consistent with the state
court's findings. See, e.g., Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 39 (1st
Cir. 2006).
The victim, who was the daughter of Winfield's wife's
sister, was born in 2003, and lived with her mother and maternal
grandparents in Tewksbury, Massachusetts. In September 2005, the
victim's mother, who was seeking employment, began leaving her
daughter with Winfield's wife, Patricia, on those days when she was
out looking for a job. Winfield and Patricia themselves had two
daughters; at the time, one was four years old, and the other was
eight months old. Winfield, Patricia, and their two daughters
lived on the first floor of a two-family home in Melrose,
Massachusetts.
On October 10, 2005, the victim's mother began a job as
a radiology assistant in Burlington, Massachusetts. She arranged
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to have Patricia provide regular daycare for the two-year-old
victim beginning on October 11, 2005,1 for approximately $150 per
week. The victim's mother and Patricia arranged that the victim's
mother would drop off the victim at Winfield's home on her way to
work in the morning, and the victim's grandmother--the mother of
both the victim's mother and Patricia--would pick up the victim at
3:00 p.m.
On Tuesday, October 11, 2005, the victim's mother
returned home from work, and, upon changing her daughter's diapers,
found bruises on her daughter's arms and legs. She nevertheless
returned the victim to Patricia and Winfield's home the next day.
That day, after work, she noticed additional bruising on her
daughter's face, arms, and abdomen. The victim's mother called
Patricia to inquire about the bruises, but both Patricia and
Winfield, who was on leave from his job and would later report that
he was home on that day, denied knowledge of them.
At the end of the following day, Wednesday, October 12,
2005, the victim's mother noticed more bruises on the victim's arms
and stomach. The only evidence of who was with the victim that day
(other than her mother) was contained in Winfield's statement to
police detectives on November 7, 2005. In that statement, Winfield
reported that he did not assist his wife in taking care of the
1
On October 10, the victim's maternal grandmother babysat
her.
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victim that day. Rather, he slept late, then left for
approximately four hours, returning just as the grandmother arrived
to pick up the victim.
On the morning of Thursday, October 13, 2005, the
victim's mother changed the victim's diaper before driving to
Patricia's to drop the victim off. The victim's mother noticed
nothing of concern in the victim's genital or anal area. She again
dropped off the victim at the Winfield home, and went to work.
Winfield was asleep when the victim was dropped off, but awoke
between 10:30 to 11 a.m. Winfield's father and brother, who lived
in the upstairs unit, were not home that day.
The victim's mother testified that over the course of
that day, she called Winfield's home from work at least three-to-
four times. The first call, which went unanswered, was at 12:40
p.m. She called a second time, at 12:55 p.m., and Winfield
answered. When the victim's mother asked where Patricia was,
Winfield informed her that Patricia had gone to get coffee and
would be home soon. When the victim's mother asked where her
daughter was, Winfield replied that she was in front of him playing
with his younger daughter and a toy. The victim's mother asked to
speak to her daughter, and Winfield stated that he was putting her
on the telephone. The victim's mother then spoke into the
telephone to her daughter for "about twenty minutes," but her
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daughter was not responsive. The mother's testimony at trial
suggested that this was unusual.
The victim's mother called a third time, immediately
after hanging up, but the line was busy. The final call took place
at 1:17 p.m., and Winfield answered the telephone. When the
victim's mother asked Winfield if her daughter was okay, the
defendant replied that she was fine and "was just sitting and
playing."
When the grandmother arrived at Winfield's home to pick
up the victim that afternoon, Winfield and Patricia were both at
home, and the victim was sleeping. After a few minutes, the victim
awoke and ran to her grandmother, crying. As they went to the car,
the grandmother tried to get the victim to walk, but she refused,
and continued to cry. As an explanation, Winfield offered only
"maybe her legs are still asleep." The victim continued to cry all
the way to Tewksbury. Once inside the Tewksbury house, the
grandmother changed the victim's diaper, and noticed that her
vaginal area was red and puffy.2
That evening, the victim's mother changed the victim's
diaper at 8:00 p.m., and the victim cried and appeared to be in
pain. The victim's vaginal and anal areas were very red. The
2
Crediting the grandmother's testimony limits the window
during which the crime could have been perpetrated to the time
between the victim being dropped off at the Winfield home and the
time the grandmother picked her up. Winfield does not argue that
the grandmother's testimony should not be credited.
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victim continued to cry, but eventually fell asleep, around 9:00
p.m. Around 11:00 p.m., the victim woke up and said she needed a
diaper change. The mother again changed the victim's diaper, this
time noticing that the victim's genital and anal areas were
bleeding, and that the skin in those areas was blistering. The
victim cried during the change, but soon fell back asleep.
The next morning, the mother took the victim to a medical
office in Somerville, Massachusetts, where Dr. Carole Allen, the
director of pediatrics, examined the victim. The victim's vaginal
area was blistered, her anal area was red, and she appeared to be
in pain. After consulting with the victim's primary care
physician, Dr. Allen formed the opinion that the victim had been
raped.
At Dr. Allen's suggestion, the mother took the victim to
Children's Hospital, where the victim was seen at approximately
10:30 p.m. by a team of physicians that included Dr. Alice Newton,
the medical director of the child protection team at Children's
Hospital. The team examined and photographed the victim, and
determined that there were second- and third-degree burns on the
victim's genitals and anus. The victim's labia majora and the
structure inside it were red and blistered. Also red, blistered,
and peeling was a four- to five-centimeter area around the victim's
anus. Internal examination revealed that the burns extended almost
an inch inside the victim's anus, and that there were three tears
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from stretching of the anal tissue. The doctors concluded that
these injuries indicated impalement by a hot, cylindrical
instrument. In addition, they observed bruises on the victim's
left jaw, her forehead, her cheek, her chest, and her right nipple.
Dr. Newton opined at trial that the vaginal and anal burns were
intentionally inflicted, with a cylindrical instrument such as a
curling iron, between twenty-four and thirty-six hours before she
examined the victim at approximately midnight on October 14--i.e.,
between noon and midnight on Thursday, October 13, the last day the
child was at Winfield's home.
A CAT scan of the victim, taken on October 15, 2005, at
1:00 p.m., revealed that the victim also had a large skull fracture
on the rear left side of her head, with internal bleeding near her
brain. Newton opined that the cause of such an injury must have
been a traumatic event, but that she could not say whether the
injury was accidental or purposefully inflicted. She opined that
the injury was sustained within three days of the CAT scan.
A skeletal survey also conducted on the 15th revealed a
healing fracture of the radius in the victim's left wrist. Dr.
Newton opined that the injury could have been accidental or
inflicted, but would have generated pain. Newton observed, based
on the healing of the injury, that the wrist fracture was at least
seven days, and not more than a month, old. The survey also
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revealed healing fractures in the fourth and fifth ribs. Newton
opined that these injuries raised the concern of inflicted injury.
On the evening of October 14, 2005, an emergency response
worker from the Department of Children and Families and a Melrose
police detective went to Winfield's home to check on his children.
Winfield was at work, but he met the following day at his home with
the emergency response worker and Melrose police detective Mark
Antonangeli. Accompanied by Patricia, Winfield stated that he was
home October 11th through 13th, 2005, while his wife was
babysitting the victim, and that he and his wife were the only
caretakers of the victim during the time she was at their house on
those days. He further stated that he changed the victim's diaper
once, on Thursday, October 13, and that as he changed the diaper,
he noticed that the victim's vaginal area was swollen, and he
called his wife to look at it. He said that they had concluded
that the victim had a bad diaper rash. He also stated that at some
point that day he heard the victim crying; he then discovered her
on the floor and assumed that she fell off the bed. When Patricia
said she had gone out with their four-year-old daughter for forty-
five minutes to one hour, the petitioner agreed.
On November 7, 2005, Winfield, accompanied by counsel,
waived his Miranda rights and was interviewed by police at the
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station.3 A redacted version of his statement was played for the
jury. During his statement, he said that on October 13, 2005, he
was at home, there were no visitors at the home, his father and
brother were at work, and he was alone with the victim and his
eight-month-old daughter for between forty-five minutes and one
hour during the middle of the day. He further stated that when the
victim's mother called midday on October 13, and he gave the phone
to the victim, she responded on the phone verbally, saying "Momma,
Momma," and other words he could not recall. He added that he did
not get along well with the victim's mother, and that he had not
been in favor of taking on another child.
B. Procedural History
In August 2006, a Middlesex County grand jury indicted
Winfield on two counts of Rape of Child, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265,
§ 22A, Indecent Assault and Battery on Child Under the Age of
Fourteen, see id. § 13B, and Assault and Battery by Means of a
Dangerous Weapon Causing Serious Bodily Injury, see id.
§ 15A(c)(I). At trial, he timely moved for a required finding of
not guilty. The judge denied his motion. On the second day of
deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges.
Winfield received concurrent life sentences on both rape charges,
3
Winfield's wife, Patricia, had spoken with police at the
station on October 29. She was accompanied by the same attorney
who would accompany Winfield on November 7.
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and concurrent nine-to-ten year sentences on the remaining two
convictions.
Winfield timely appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals
Court, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by denying
his motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the
Commonwealth's case, and by refusing to allow him to impeach the
victim's mother for bias stemming from her pending criminal
charges. After briefing and oral argument, the Appeals Court
affirmed his convictions. See Commonwealth v. Winfield, 76 Mass.
App. Ct. 716 (2010). In rejecting his sufficiency claim, it
reasoned as follows:
The main evidence presented against the defendant
was the medical evidence and the defendant's recorded
police interview. From the medical evidence, the jury
could have concluded that the burns and skull fracture of
the victim were inflicted shortly after midday on
October 13, 2005, and that the victim would have cried
aloud as she suffered the injuries. The jury could also
infer that, because the victim would have cried aloud,
the injuries were inflicted at a time when no one was
around to hear the victim's cries. Moreover, from the
defendant's prior recorded statements to the police, the
jury were aware that, on the day the injuries were
inflicted, the defendant was at home during midday with
only the victim and his eight month old daughter.
Therefore, the defendant was the only adult who had
access to the victim during the time span in which the
injuries occurred.
In addition to having access to the victim, the
defendant had the means to commit the crimes. In the
bathroom of the defendant's home was a small curling
iron. After viewing photographs of the victim's
injuries, the jury could find that the pattern of the
burns to the victim's anus were consistent with having
been inflicted by a hot instrument the same shape and
size of a small curling iron.
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Finally, the jury could consider the fact that the
defendant, and not his wife, had expressed displeasure
over the presence of the victim in his home. In his
recorded interview, the defendant stated that he never
wanted his wife to care for the victim. While such
evidence is insufficient to establish motive, the jury
could infer the defendant's hostility toward the victim,
which is relevant to motive. There was no evidence that
such hostility was shared by his wife.
. . .
In sum, the judge correctly ruled that the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
permitted a rational trier of fact to find the defendant
guilty of the indictments.
Id. at 722-23 (footnotes omitted).
Winfield sought further appellate review from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. After his application was
denied, see Commonwealth v. Winfield, 457 Mass. 1108 (2010), he
timely filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
The district court denied his petition, but issued a Certificate of
Appealability as to both issues. Winfield appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).
II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In seeking to set aside a verdict under the federal
Constitution for lack of sufficient proof, Winfield needed to
convince the Massachusetts courts that, "after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
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a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979); Magraw v. Roden, 743 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2014). This
standard "exhibits great respect for the jury's verdict," Magraw,
743 F.3d at 4, but nevertheless does not insulate such a verdict
from reversal if based on "evidentiary interpretations and
illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly
speculative." Id. (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231,
234 (1st Cir. 1995)).
With the Massachusetts courts having rejected Winfield's
direct appeal by concluding that the jury verdict was based on
sufficient evidence, this collateral attack seeking a writ of
habeas corpus from a federal court provides Winfield with a second,
more limited opportunity to set aside the jury's verdict. As
constrained by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA")4, our collateral federal review is limited to determining
whether the state courts' decision finding the evidence
constitutionally sufficient "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). In other words, we do not ask, as we might on direct
review of a conviction in federal court, whether the evidence was
constitutionally sufficient. We ask, instead, whether the state
4
See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-1219,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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courts' ruling that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient was
itself "unreasonable." Id.5 "Unreasonable" in this context means
that the decision "evinces some increment of incorrectness beyond
mere error." Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008);
see generally Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Habeas review involves the layering of two standards. The habeas
question of whether the state court decision is objectively
unreasonable is layered on top of the underlying standard governing
the constitutional right asserted."). The resulting test raises a
high bar, but it is nevertheless a bar that can be met. See
O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 304 (1st Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging the "extremely high bar that must be overcome on
habeas review to overturn a state court decision," but finding the
bar met).
Demonstrating a refined understanding of the limited
scope of our review--a scope reflective not only of statutory
requirements, but of our respect for the jury's role and our
deference to the state courts' consideration of Winfield's
challenge--Winfield joins issue only on the narrow question of
whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a
reasonable jurist to conclude that a rational jury could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Winfield, rather than his
5
We answer this question de novo, without deference to the
decision of the district court. Pena v. Dickhaut, 736 F.3d 600, 603
(1st Cir. 2013).
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wife Patricia, who committed the crime. And even without
Winfield's well-advised implicit concession, the assumption we must
make that the jury believed the testimony of the mother and
grandmother, together with the expert evidence, does indeed mean
that we need presume that either Winfield, his wife or both must
have committed the charged crime. We therefore train our review on
Winfield's key argument that "[w]hatever reason the prosecution had
for blaming [the defendant] rather than his wife, assuming there
was one, never made it into evidence before the jury."
Notionally, Winfield is correct that evidence sufficient
only to establish with nearly equal likelihood that A or B
committed a crime cannot support a verdict against either. "[I]f
the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict
gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of
guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court
must reverse the conviction." O'Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 301 (quoting
United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1995)).
The rationale for this rule is simple: A criminal trial ought not
be an arbitrary exercise, and "where an equal or nearly equal
theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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There is some question whether this rule we have
recognized applies as a law "determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In other words, is it a
simple rewording of the Jackson standard, or is it a circuit level
added refinement? See Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2014);
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Jackson after all
included the statement that "a federal habeas corpus court faced
with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting
inferences must presume--even if it does not affirmatively appear
in the record--that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts
in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution."
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Ultimately, we need not decide whether
evidentiary equipoise precludes collateral reversal of a guilty
verdict because, viewed reasonably as a rational jury may have
viewed it, the evidence did not point with nearly equal force at
both Winfield and his wife. Most notably, only Winfield was left
alone in the apartment with the two-year-old victim and the infant
on October 13, 2005. He therefore had a materially greater
opportunity to commit the offense without detection.
Winfield does offer a two-part rejoinder to the
observation that he had a materially greater opportunity to commit
the crime. He points first to his statement that he was asleep
until 10:30 or 11:00 that morning. He points second to the
possibility that the perpetrator muffled the victim's cries while
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assaulting the child, thus perhaps explaining some of the bruises.
The Massachusetts courts were unconvinced that the countervailing
force of this rejoinder was sufficient to restore equilibrium in
the directional thrust of the circumstantial evidence. Reason is
not to the contrary. The home was a single floor unit with two
bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, and a single bathroom. Any
opportunity to commit the crime without notice by Winfield, even if
thought to be still sleeping, or by the four-year-old, could
reasonably be viewed as markedly less than the opportunity to
commit the crime undetected after both the other adult and the
four-year-old left the apartment. And the fact that the doctor's
estimated range of the time of injury commenced at noon, after he
awoke, tilted the evidence in the same direction.6 In a different
but also probative manner, the conflicting testimony by the mother
and Winfield regarding whether the child was responsive on the
phone created further cause to call into question Winfield's
version of events that day.
There is also the evidence that, after the state
intervened, Winfield reported that he had noticed a "bad diaper
rash" on the day in question, and that the victim fell out of bed.
Yet there is no evidence that he reported such facts on the day in
6
The mother's phone call did, we note, interrupt by 20
minutes Winfield's 45-60 minute window alone with the victim. It
still left a window of opportunity that was greater for him than
for his wife.
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question, even when the victim was crying and limp when the
grandmother picked her up.
We do observe that, if Winfield's statement to police--
that he was out for four hours and did not watch the victim on
Wednesday, October 12--were believed, it would follow that he had
no time alone with the victim on Wednesday, while his wife did, and
new bruises were detected at the end of that day. It is not
unreasonable to think, though, that a rational jury could have
discounted Winfield's version of events. And even if not, a jury
was not compelled to find that the source of the bruises (a fall
perhaps?) was identical to the source of the vaginal and anal
injuries. More generally, the logical choices here were not
limited to either Winfield alone, or his wife alone. A third
choice was both. So the contention that logic pointed unerringly
to Winfield's guilt or innocence in equipoise is not correct.
Winfield notes that his wife never testified, and
therefore never denied the crime, while the jury heard Winfield's
recorded statement in which he denied the crime. The absence of
the wife's appearance as a witness is puzzling. Apparently both
sides concluded that there was more to lose in calling her. In any
event, given the foregoing evidence pointing more towards Winfield,
we cannot say that the absence of testimony by the wife rendered
the evidence so clearly insufficient that a finding of guilt would
represent an "increment of incorrectness beyond mere error."
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Leftwich, 532 F.3d at 23. "The prosecution may prove its case by
circumstantial evidence, and it need not exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v.
Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1025 (1st Cir. 1979)(citations omitted); see
also Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610, 615-16 (1st Cir. 1995)
("Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be premised on pure
conjecture. But a conjecture consistent with the evidence becomes
less and less a conjecture, and moves gradually toward proof, as
alternative innocent explanations are discarded or made less
likely.").
We need not consider whether the additional evidence on
which the state courts relied--for example, Winfield's access to a
curling iron (which would seem to have been equally available to
his wife), or his rather innocuous statement that he did not want
to have the victim at his home--were sufficiently illuminating to
lend further legitimacy to the verdict. "[D]etermining whether a
state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or
factual conclusion does not require . . . an opinion from the state
court explaining [its] reasoning." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.
Ct. 770, 784 (2011). Nor need we ignore the difficulty of assuming
that rational reasoning played any role in the decision to commit
the crime (or in much of the behavior leading up to October 13).
Certainly a rational jury could have acquitted Winfield. The
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question at this stage of review, though, is whether the state
courts could reasonably conclude that, where Winfield's opportunity
to commit the offense was materially, albeit marginally, greater
than that of the only other possible perpetrator7, and where the
expert evidence and the phone call cast heightened relevant focus
on the time when he was alone with the child, a rational jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator.
For the foregoing reasons, we must answer "yes."
B. Scope of Cross-Examination
Prior to trial, the state lodged a criminal complaint
against the victim's mother, charging her with 25 counts of
uttering a false prescription for a controlled substance. Winfield
sought to cross-examine the victim's mother on that criminal
complaint, so that he could raise an inference that her testimony
was influenced by the government, which plainly had leverage over
her. And because her testimony was important in establishing the
window within which the crime occurred, proof of any such bias
infecting that testimony would have been quite helpful to the
defense. The trial court precluded Winfield from this line of
examination, and the appeals court affirmed that ruling.
Our review of Winfield's collateral challenge to that
ruling is analogous to that review employed in our sufficiency
7
Assuming, as we must, that the jury believed the testimony
of the victim's mother and grandmother.
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analysis. We employ the standard governing the constitutional
right asserted (here the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation),
but we do so only for the purpose of determining whether the state
court decision rejecting Winfield's assertion of that right was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the law as clearly
established by Supreme Court precedent.
An "essential constitutional right for a fair trial," the
right of cross examination is nevertheless "subject to 'reasonable
limits' reflecting concerns such as prejudice, confusion or delay
incident to 'marginally relevant' evidence." White, 399 F.3d at 24
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdell, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986)). A
challenge to an exclusion of evidence on cross examination based on
those limits "is tenable only where the restriction is manifestly
unreasonable or overbroad." Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2003) (en banc).
The problem for Winfield here is that the criminal
charges against the victim's mother were lodged well over a year
after the she gave her statements to police and child welfare
officials, and long after her subsequent grand jury testimony. Her
trial testimony, in turn, was entirely consistent in material
respects with those prior statements and testimony. Therefore, the
premise that the testimony was crafted in part as a result of the
intervening criminal charges was not plausible. At most, one might
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speculate that the charges reduced the likelihood that she would
recant her earlier pronouncements.
Winfield points to no case holding that the exclusion of
evidence having such a logically attenuated ability to imply bias
is unreasonable. He points instead to Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974). In Davis, though, the proffered evidence was that a
crucial eye witness was on probation for burglary both at the time
of his initial statement and at the time of trial. In short, the
fact proffered as a source of bias--the probation--was operative at
all times when the inculpatory evidence helping the state was
tendered. Id. at 310-11.
We observe, too, that precluding Winfield from cross-
examining on these pending criminal charges, even if marginally
probative of bias, was like denying someone a cap gun when he has
a bazooka handy. When a child is discovered to have numerous
unexplained injuries that apparently went unaddressed for some
time, the mother has ample motive to deflect the blame towards
someone else. And there is no claim that the trial court
restricted Winfield from cross-examining on testimonial bias
arising from that motive.
For these reasons, we cannot say that the state court's
exclusion of evidence about the victim's mother's pending criminal
charges was an unreasonable application of law clearly established
by Supreme Court precedent.
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III. Conclusion
We have reviewed the record in this troubling case. Our
authority in so doing is limited. We cannot ask whether we would
have voted for conviction. Nor can we even ask whether we would
have sustained the conviction on direct review. Instead, Congress
has limited our collateral review to asking whether Massachusetts
courts could have reasonably concluded that a rational jury could
have found Winfield guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding that
they could have, we must affirm the district court's order denying
Winfield's petition. So ordered.
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