United States v. McPhail , 831 F.3d 1 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-2106
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ERIC MCPHAIL,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
William J. Cintolo, with whom Thomas R. Kiley, and Cosgrove
Eisenberg & Kiley, PC, were on brief, for appellant.
Andrew E. Lelling, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
July 26, 2016
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Convicted of committing
securities fraud and conspiring to commit securities fraud under
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 371, Eric McPhail
was neither a corporate insider nor a trader of securities.
Rather, he received material, nonpublic information from a
corporate insider, and then passed that information along to
friends who used the information to obtain substantial trading
gains. Recently, we affirmed the conviction of one of those
trading friends. See United States v. Parigian, No. 15-1994, 2016
WL 3027702 (1st Cir. May 26, 2016). We now consider McPhail's own
conviction following a trial by jury. For the reasons that follow,
we reject McPhail's arguments on appeal and affirm his two-count
conviction.
I. Background
We summarize the evidence in a light favorable to the
jury's verdict, see United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 9 (1st
Cir. 2016), reserving the detailed treatment of some points for
later in this opinion.
The probative bulk of the government's evidence at trial
consisted of emails sent to and from McPhail and testimony by
Angelo Santamaria, an unindicted individual who served from 2004
to 2011 as an executive at American Superconductor Corporation
("AMSC"), a publicly-traded corporation. McPhail, a tile salesman
by vocation, first met Santamaria in late 2007 at the Oakley
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Country Club in Watertown, Massachusetts. The two men became
frequent golf partners and, over the course of about a year, close
friends. Together, they traveled to Florida and Las Vegas on
vacation, attended sporting events such as the Kentucky Derby, and
gambled at casinos. They communicated daily and saw one another
several times a week. In May 2009, Santamaria loaned McPhail
$6,000 to pay off a gambling debt that McPhail was trying to hide
from his wife. Santamaria later forgave the debt entirely. When
McPhail's divorce jeopardized his spousal membership at the golf
club, Santamaria served as McPhail's lead sponsor and successfully
lobbied club members to permit McPhail to join as a member in his
own right. In 2010, Santamaria's wife asked McPhail to mediate a
marital argument that threatened Santamaria's marriage.
A frequent topic of conversation between the two friends
was Santamaria's preoccupation with the performance of his
retirement investments, which consisted largely of AMSC stock. In
the course of airing these concerns to McPhail, Santamaria
occasionally discussed nonpublic aspects of AMSC's business
activities and their potential impact on the company's stock
performance. McPhail, for example, learned several days in advance
that AMSC was about to lose its biggest customer. And on another
occasion, McPhail had a heads-up that AMSC was on the cusp of
signing an important deal that would surely influence the company's
stock market valuation.
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There is no claim that McPhail himself traded on the
information he received from Santamaria. Rather, beginning in
July 2009, unbeknownst to Santamaria, McPhail began passing along
the upshot of the information he received in these conversations
to a set of friends, most of whom were members of a regular golfing
group. At trial, the government demonstrated that the lion's share
of this tipping occurred via email. For example, on July 23, 2009,
McPhail emailed the group:
AMSC was up another buck today ...I spoke to
someone ;) who thinks that there is going to
be an announcement on the 29th that will bump
the stock significantly followed up with
release of earnings on the 30th that will bump
it again. Look for 20, 30, 40 percent the
middle to end of next week (wednesday and
thursday).
All told, the members of the golf group and other friends of
McPhail's made nearly $500,000 by executing AMSC trades premised
on the tips from McPhail. The government indicted McPhail,
singling him out as the scheme's tipper, and a jury convicted him
on both counts.
II. Analysis
The government's case against McPhail is predicated on
the "misappropriation" theory of liability for insider trading
first recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). Under this theory, an outsider who owes
no duty to a corporation or its shareholders commits the prohibited
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"deceit . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security," 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c), by obtaining inside
information in confidence and then failing to disclose to the
source of the information the fact that the outsider is using the
information in breach of a duty of confidence owed to the source,
see O'Hagan, 526 U.S. at 652–53. In plain terms, when Sally tells
Joe insider information about her corporation, to be held by Joe
in confidence, and Joe then trades on that information without
telling Sally, Joe is guilty of deception (of Sally) "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5;
see Parigian, 2016 WL 3027702, at *3. Such a theory of liability
can also apply when the misappropriator does not trade, but instead
obtains a benefit by revealing the information to a third person
who trades based on the misappropriated information. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
Within the construct of this misappropriation theory,
McPhail trains his appellate argument on three issues: Was the
evidence sufficient to show that he knowingly breached a duty of
confidence owed to Santamaria? Did the district court's
instructions shift the burden of proof or misstate the state of
mind element of the securities fraud offense? Did he receive a
benefit as a result of his disclosure? We address each issue in
turn.
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A. Duty of Trust and Confidence
In O'Hagan, the existence of a duty of confidence owed
by the defendant was clear: O'Hagan was a lawyer who traded on
nonpublic corporate information he possessed only because the
information belonged to a client of his law firm. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. at 647–49. The Supreme Court nevertheless did not confine
application of the misappropriation theory to circumstances where
insider and misappropriator shared such a formal fiduciary
relationship. Rather, it opened the door to circumstances in which
an expectation of trust and a reliance on discretion arises outside
of a traditional fiduciary setting. See id. at 670 (referring to
"a fiduciary or other similar relation[ship] of trust and
confidence" (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980)); see also Parigian, 2016 WL 3027702 at *6; United States
v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1402 (2015)(both discussing O'Hagan's "broad[ ] brush"
approach).
In an exercise of its statutory rule-making authority
that goes unchallenged by McPhail, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") followed up on O'Hagan by promulgating a rule
in an attempt to "clarify and enhance" the groundwork of
misappropriation liability by providing a non-exhaustive list of
possible definitions of instances when such a duty might arise.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,
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72,590 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b5–2). The rule states that:
[A] "duty of trust or confidence" exists in
the following circumstances, among others:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain
information in confidence; or
(2) Whenever the person communicating the
material nonpublic information and the person
to whom it is communicated have a history,
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences,
such that the recipient of the information
knows or reasonably should know that the
person communicating the material nonpublic
information expects that the recipient will
maintain its confidentiality[.]
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–(2).
At trial, the government focused on proving that
Santamaria and McPhail shared a "history, pattern, or practice of
sharing confidences" such that McPhail knew or "reasonably should
[have] know[n]" that Santamaria expected him to avoid sharing the
confidential business information with others. Id.§ 240.10b5-2(b)(2). The jury apparently agreed with this argument.
The district court, in turn, rejected McPhail's timely argument
that the record contained too little evidence to support a finding
that McPhail knew or reasonably should have known that his
surreptitious disclosures breached a duty of confidence owed to
Santamaria.
We review this preserved challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence de novo, "affirming unless we find that 'no rational
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jury could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Prieto, 812 F.3d at 13 (alteration in the original)
(quoting United States v. Guerra–Garcia, 336 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.
2003)). Assuming as we must that the jury resolved fairly
debatable issues of credibility against McPhail, the evidence that
he knew that Santamaria was expecting him to keep the inside
information secret is quite strong. Santamaria himself testified
that he twice expressly told McPhail "when [he] was in discussion
with [McPhail about] what was going on [with the company,] . . . you
can never repeat some of this stuff, and he nodded in agreement."
Under cross examination, Santamaria was asked, "[B]efore July
2009, did you tell Eric not to repeat anything you told him?" to
which he replied, "I have a recollection of twice saying it to
him," though he could not identify with certainty the dates on
which these conversations occurred. He further testified that, in
his memory, one such conversation occurred in the country club's
parking lot and another took place at a bar the two men frequented.
While the record is silent as to when exactly Santamaria
made these statements to McPhail, the record does contain emails
from McPhail from which one can reasonably infer that he had been
informed, or otherwise knew, that he was not allowed by Santamaria
to pass along the information from the get-go. For example, in
July of 2009, McPhail told his buddies "Try this one....AMSC...
watch it July 30th." When one of his buddies replied, "[W]hat's
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the inside scoop on July 30 Eric?" McPhail replied, "I am not
allowed to say....trust me if you want." Thereafter, McPhail began
sharing more information, as follows:
Well boys....went to the Sox game with a
friend of mine tonight. He seems to think
that AMSC has a $100 Million deal with China
that should be signed very shortly. It could
be done in the next few days... if it is not
done/announced by Thursday, it will not be
announced until the week of the 12th because
all of China shuts down on vacation for 10
days- starting Friday. This announcement
should spike them close to 10%. Furthermore,
circle October 29th for the next big day...it
could/should be as good as the last one,
provided the market cooperates that day.
I like Pinot Noir and love steak....looking
forward to getting paid back.
Good Luck....SHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
In other emails, McPhail expressly recognized that the information
"[p]robably will not be released to public for a while, if ever,"
and that it was "inside info." McPhail's emails referred to "a
friend of mine" or "my buddy" or "my friend" or "him" or
"someone ;)", never referring to Santamaria by name.
Most tellingly, despite their extremely close friendship
and frequent interaction on the golf course, in bars, and at
entertainment venues, McPhail never told Santamaria what he was
doing with the information. A reasonable jury could easily
conclude based on this evidence that McPhail knew that Santamaria
was sharing with him in confidence inside information that he
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expected was not being shared further, much less for trading AMSC
stock.
This is not to say that the case was entirely one-sided.
Santamaria's testimony was subject to attack because it materially
changed over time. Also, on one occasion, McPhail heard Santamaria
tell a third individual known to hold AMSC stock that he hoped
that person would "not . . . get hurt" like Santamaria was going
to get hurt, perhaps implying that Santamaria expected him to trade
on the warning. All of this was grist for the defense's key
argument that Santamaria gave "[t]he same general information" to
McPhail that he gave to "everybody." The jury, however, was not
persuaded. On the whole, we cannot say that the jury was
"[ir]rational" because it declined to credit one of McPhail's
counter-narratives at trial. Guerra–Garcia, 336 F.3d at 22.
McPhail also argues that the government's evidence was
insufficient because it failed to prove that there was an explicit
agreement to keep everything quiet--that both parties shared a
perfectly symmetrical understanding of the relationship's
expectations. McPhail refers to this argument as his "mutuality
argument." It is not entirely clear exactly what McPhail means by
the term "mutuality." He tells us in his brief that that he uses
the term as a "thematic buzzword to frame his defense" that there
must exist a "mutual understanding" between the parties to
establish the relevant duty. He seems to be saying that nothing
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short of evidence of an explicit agreement to keep confidential
information confidential can give rise to the kind of duty that
qualifies under O'Hagan's framework. That is, merely showing that
the recipient of the information knew from the "pattern and
practice" of the relationship that the information ought to be
kept confidential is not enough.
This argument quickly runs into two formidable legal
obstacles. First, it simply reads away the SEC's rule hinging one
definition of the trust and confidence relationship on the facts
known to the person "to whom [confidential information] is
communicated." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2). Hearing from McPhail
no argument that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority in
including this set of circumstances as one example of such a
relationship, we assume without deciding that Rule 10b5-2(b)(2)
constitutes a valid exercise of administrative rulemaking. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984).
Second, and more fundamentally, McPhail's position is at
odds with the basic legal tenets governing the formation of legally
cognizable relationships that give rise to mutually enforceable
duties. The SEC's rule does no more than reflect the traditional
position of agency law that a fiduciary relationship can "evolve[]
by implication from the conduct of the parties." CNE Direct, Inc.
v. Blackberry Corp., No. 15-1954, 2016 WL 1732762, at *4 (1st Cir.
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May 2, 2016) (quoting Theos & Sons, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,
729 N.E.2d 1113, 1120 n.13 (Mass. 2000)). Evidence of a "history,
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences" between the insider
and the misappropriator is nothing more than evidence that a
relationship of trust and confidence arose by implication. We see
no indication in O'Hagan or Chiarella that these traditional
principles are somehow inapplicable when the relationship in
question arises outside of a strict, formal business setting. Cf.
McGee, 763 F.3d at 314 (holding that "the imposition of a duty to
disclose under Rule 10b5–2(b)(2) when parties have a history,
pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with
Supreme Court precedent").1
McPhail argues, finally, that while the evidence may
have showed that he and Santamaria discussed confidential personal
information, it did not follow that McPhail knew that Santamaria
also expected him to keep the business disclosures secret. The
jury, though, was entitled to reject such a proposed boundary on
the extent of the two buddies' confidential relationship. Rational
jurors could have instead credited the weight of countervailing
evidence showing that the exchange of information was part and
parcel to the kinds of confidences the two men routinely shared.
1 For the foregoing reasons, we also reject what is, in any
event, a perfunctory suggestion in McPhail's brief on appeal that
the district court should have said something in its instructions
about a "mutuality" requirement.
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B. Mens Rea
We turn now to McPhail's state of mind. McPhail argues,
in substance, that even if the evidence supported a finding that
a duty of confidence existed and that he knew he was breaching it,
the district court did not require that the jury find that he had
such an awareness. Rather, it instructed the jury that it need
only find that McPhail "knew or reasonably should have known" that
Santamaria expected him to keep the information secret.2
McPhail's preservation of this argument has been
halting, bordering on waiver. He actually proposed instructing
jurors that a duty of confidence could be inferred from a history
of sharing confidences if "the recipient of the information knows
or reasonably should know" that he is expected to hold the
information in confidence. At the charge conference, his counsel
2The relevant jury instructions tracked the language of
Rule 10b5-2(b):
By law, in this case, a relationship in which
the defendant has a duty of trust or
confidence to Mr. Santamaria could arise under
the following circumstances: One, whenever
the defendant has agreed to keep information
confidential; or, two, whenever the parties
have a history, pattern or practice of sharing
confidences such that the recipient of the
information knew or reasonably should have
known that the person communicating the
material, nonpublic information expected that
the recipient would maintain its
confidentiality.
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then told the district court that such a formulation was
inconsistent with the statute's language in criminalizing only
willful violations of the securities fraud regulations. Counsel
asked "I would either ask that you . . . explain what knowingly
and willfully means at the time that you use [the 'knew or
reasonably should have known' formulation] or excise that portion
that says [']should have known[']." Noting that the draft
instructions already twice referenced the willfulness requirement,
the district court replied, "I think the instructions are
appropriate and straightforward on this point. I will read through
them, particular[ly] in section [two] with an eye toward how the
intent, knowledge, and willfulness instruction is incorporated as
to both count [one] and count [two]."
The following day, the district court read instructions
that both included willfulness language3 and stated that:
[T]he government must prove . . . beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . that Mr. McPhail had a
duty of trust and confidence to Mr. Santamaria
as discussed earlier, and that Mr. McPhail was
entrusted with material, nonpublic
information that he knew or reasonably should
have known he was supposed to keep
confidential.
3
"To act 'willfully,'" the court instructed, "means to act
voluntarily and intelligently and with the specific intent that
the underlying crime be committed, that is to say, with bad
purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law, not to act by
ignorance, accident or mistake."
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At sidebar, the court then asked counsel if there were any
objections to the instructions. McPhail's counsel renewed several
other objections that he had previously made, but neither renewed
nor raised any objections at all to the use of the "knew or
reasonably should have known" language.
Then, in his main brief on appeal, McPhail returned his
focus to the "knew or reasonably should have known" formulation,
this time contending that it "shifted the burden of proof on the
question of the existence of a duty of trust and confidence."
McPhail's main brief did not even mention the words "scienter" or
"mens rea." Not until his reply brief did McPhail return
foursquare to his previously abandoned argument that the jury
instruction was error because it failed to require that the jury
find that he actually "knew" that Santamaria expected him to keep
the information secret.
The government argues forfeiture for failure to preserve
the argument in the district court. It also argues waiver, both
because McPhail's submitted instructions invited the district
court to use the now challenged formulation, see United States v.
Kakley, 741 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1984), and because McPhail failed
to raise the issue adequately in his opening brief on appeal.
The waiver argument is close. McPhail did propose the
instruction, then he sort of withdrew it, and then, by silence, he
arguably made it appear that he still wanted it. McPhail's main
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brief on appeal, in turn, only glancingly backs into the issue,
highlighting the "knew or reasonably should have known
instruction," but never really developing the scienter argument in
any direct manner. On the other hand, the government seemed to
perceive the argument lurking in McPhail's main brief, as the
government included in its main brief a defense of the district
court's "scienter requirement," with specific reference to the
"knew or should have known" language.
Ultimately, we need not reach the question of waiver.
Even assuming no waiver, we find a clear forfeiture, triggering a
review for only plain error, which we then find is not present
here. We have been unflaggingly clear that to preserve a jury
instruction objection, "a litigant must lodge a specific objection
and state the grounds for the objection after the court has charged
the jury and before the jury begins deliberations," and that
"[o]bjections registered during pre-charge hearings are
insufficient to preserve the issue." United States v. Roberson,
459 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, by failing to renew the
objection to the "knew or reasonably should have known" language
after the instructions were given--especially in light of the
district court's conscientious invitation soliciting any and all
of counsel's objections for the record--McPhail's attorney failed
to preserve the question for de novo review. See Prieto, 812 F.3d
at 17. Instead, we review the district court's instruction only
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for plain error, the existence of which requires, among other
things, a finding that the challenged instruction was "clear or
obvious error." United States v. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, 46 (1st
Cir. 2008).
Our own recent decision in Parigian suggests that the
instruction was likely error. See 2016 WL 3027702, at *3–*5. But
we have not actually held that it is error, and at least two
circuits have expressly blessed the "knew or reasonably should
have known" standard. See United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578,
593 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 324–25
(7th Cir. 2007). The language at issue also appears in the
relevant SEC rule routinely applied in civil Rule 10b5 cases, and
thus plausibly presents as a presumptively proper candidate for
inclusion in the instructions in criminal Rule 10b5 cases when
courts are not prompted to consider the different mens rea
presumptions applicable to criminal cases. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b5-2(b)(2). All in all, the error, if any, here is simply
not obvious enough to require that we proceed further with the
plain error inquiry. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1121, 1130 (2013) (to make a successful claim of plain error
premised on subsequent change in the law, appellant must show
alleged error "plainly" conflicts with a "holding"); United States
v. LaPlante, 714 F.3d 641, 644 (1st Cir. 2013) (if one prong of
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conjunctive plain error test is not satisfied, "our analysis starts
and ends with that prong").
Finally--and somewhat confusingly--McPhail tries out
another argument: that the district court's instruction
permitting jurors to convict if they found that McPhail should
have known, but did not know that he was required to keep the
Santamaria information confidential somehow impermissibly shifted
the burden of proof from the government to McPhail. In support of
this argument, McPhail does little more than rehash his complaints
with the court's instructions on the duty of confidentiality, which
we have earlier discussed. McPhail points us to no burden-shifting
error, much less the obvious error required to successfully advance
this new argument. He isolates no remark from the prosecutor or
mistake by the district court that would overcome the court's
"strong and explicit instructions about the burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence, and the fact that the court, not counsel,
is the source of the applicable law." United States v. Madsen,
809 F.3d 712, 718 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1394 (2016).
At no point during McPhail's trial did the burden of proof shift.
C. Personal Benefit
The Supreme Court has instructed that, in the classical
insider trading context,4 whether a corporate insider has breached
4 "Under the 'traditional' or 'classical theory' of insider
trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when a
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his or her duty in sharing material nonpublic information pivots,
in part, on "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly
or indirectly, from his disclosure." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
662 (1983). Assuming that this principle extends to tippers in
misappropriation cases, McPhail argues that the government failed
to prove that he anticipated a legally recognizable personal
benefit in return for sharing the information with his golf
buddies. He challenges both the sufficiency of the government's
personal benefit evidence and the district court's instructions to
jurors regarding what kind of benefit he had to have expected for
the crime to have been consummated. McPhail objected on both
grounds in district court, and we review the denial of these
objections de novo. See United States v. Berríos–Bonilla, 822
F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2016) (refusal to instruct); Prieto, 812
F.3d at 13 (sufficiency).
The district court instructed jurors on this point at
length, but McPhail objects only to the final sentence of those
instructions:
You may find that Mr. McPhail received or
expected to receive a direct or indirect
benefit from providing inside information to
others if you find that he gave the
information to others with the intention of
benefiting himself in some tangible or
intangible way or as a gift with the goal of
corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on
the basis of material, nonpublic information." O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
at 651–52.
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maintaining or furthering a personal
friendship.
McPhail takes issue with the emphasized "or" above, which permitted
the jury to "find that Mr. McPhail received or expected to receive
a direct or indirect benefit" if they determined that, at a
minimum, "he gave the information to others . . . as a gift with
the goal of maintaining or furthering a personal friendship."
This instruction, McPhail argues, amounts to legal error
in light of the Second Circuit's recent decision to "adopt[] a
more discriminating definition of the benefit to a tipper in a
classical insider trading case," Parigian, 2016 WL 3027702, at *8
(citing United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015)), and the Supreme Court's more
recent grant of certiorari to review the personal benefit question
posed by United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015),
cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
McPhail is correct that the nature of the personal
benefit requirement in insider trading cases is the source of some
inter-circuit tension likely to be resolved by the Supreme Court
in its next term. But "[h]ow this will all play out, we do not
venture to say because, as a three-judge panel, we are bound to
follow this circuit's currently controlling precedent." Parigian,
2016 WL 3027702, at *8.
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That precedent dictates affirmance: McPhail does not
argue that the instruction given by the district court fails to
align with the law in this Circuit. We have in the past only
entertained the assumption that personal benefit to a tipper need
be shown in a misappropriation case, see Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 7
n.4; SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000), and have
said that if such a showing is required, it is satisfied by
benefits as thin as "reconciliation with [a] friend" and the
maintenance of "a useful networking contact," Sargent, 229 F.3d at
77, or "the mere giving of a gift to a relative or friend,"
Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 7 n.4.
At closing, the government argued that McPhail
anticipated receiving two broad types of "personal benefits":
"concrete" ones and "more subtle" ones. Among the "concrete"
benefits identified at trial were McPhail's expectations that he
would receive a free dinner, wine, and a massage parlor visit from
the beneficiaries. The government further reminded jurors of
evidence that McPhail had given an AMSC stock tip to a close friend
that yielded a nearly $200,000 profit, arguing further that McPhail
ultimately benefited from a $3,000 "kickback" from that grateful
friend.5 "[M]ore subtl[y]," the government argued, McPhail stood
5 McPhail argues that the tip to his friend was no "gift" and
that the $3,000 deposit into his bank account the day after his
friend liquidated his AMSC profits was no kickback. But a rational
juror could certainly have disagreed.
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to benefit from the group's general gratitude for his largesse.
Jurors were told: "It makes him one of the guys, they're all kind
of impressed."
Under the governing Rocklage and Sargent standards, the
cumulative weight of this evidence was surely sufficient to show
that McPhail anticipated receiving a personal benefit in return
for the tips. We see no error.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm McPhail's criminal
convictions.
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