United States v. Arias-Mercedes ( 2018 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 17-1229
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
YNOCENCIO ARIAS-MERCEDES,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Selya and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Vivianne M.
Marrero, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and Liza L. Rosado-
Rodriguez, Research and Writing Specialist, on brief for
appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Thomas
F. Klumper, and Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United
States Attorneys, on brief for appellee.
August 16, 2018
[REDACTED OPINION]

The full version of this opinion was filed on July 30, 2018,
and remains on file, under seal, in the Clerk's Office."
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Ynocencio
Arias-Mercedes challenges his 87-month incarcerative sentence as
procedurally flawed and substantively unreasonable. Among other
things, his appeal poses questions about how a district court
should apply the Sentencing Commission's revised commentary
regarding mitigating role adjustments. See USSG App. C, Amend.
794. After careful consideration of these questions and the other
issues raised on appeal, we affirm the challenged sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal follows a guilty plea and, thus, we draw the
facts from the plea colloquy, the undisputed portions of the
presentence investigation report (PSI Report), and the transcript
of the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Fields, 858 F.3d
24, 27 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 51
(1st Cir. 1991). On April 24, 2015, the Coast Guard intercepted
a 20-foot vessel off the coast of Dorado, Puerto Rico. Aboard the
vessel were 72.5 kilograms of cocaine and three men: the
defendant, Victor Mercedes-Guerrero (Mercedes), and Juan A.
Concepción-García (Concepción). Initially, the trio claimed to be
Dominican nationals headed to Puerto Rico in search of work.
Later, the defendant changed his tune and admitted his
participation in a drug-smuggling enterprise.
On May 21, 2015, a federal grand jury sitting in the
District of Puerto Rico returned a four-count indictment. The
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indictment charged all three men with conspiracy to import five
kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States, aiding and
abetting that conspiracy, conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and aiding and
abetting that conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 952(a), 960(a)(1), 963. In due course, the
defendant entered a straight guilty plea to all four counts.
The probation office prepared a PSI Report. Because the
offenses of conviction involved more than 50 kilograms but less
than 150 kilograms of cocaine, the PSI Report recommended a base
offense level of 34. After factoring in a three-level credit for
acceptance of responsibility, see USSG §3E1.1, the PSI Report
suggested a total offense level of 31. Coupled with a criminal
history category of I, this offense level yielded a guideline
sentencing range (GSR) of 108-135 months. The GSR, however, was
trumped in part by a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 960(b)(1).
The defendant countered by moving for a downward
departure or variance, making clear his objection to certain
aspects of the PSI Report. Pertinently, he argued that he had
played only a minor role in the criminal activity and, therefore,
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should receive a two-level role-in-the-offense reduction. See
USSG §3B1.2. [redacted]1
The defendant took the position that, because he was a
"mere transporter of the contraband," he deserved a mitigating
role adjustment.2 He argued that he was less culpable than Mercedes
and other unindicted coconspirators (though he did not claim to be
less culpable than Concepción). He also sought a downward
departure or variance.
At the disposition hearing, the district court accepted
the PSI Report's recommendations, except that it reduced the GSR
to 87-108 months.3 The court then determined that the defendant
was not entitled to a minor participant reduction. Considering
the newly constituted GSR and the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), the court proceeded to reject the defendant's entreaty
for a downward departure or variance. Instead, it imposed
concurrent 87-month terms of immurement on all four counts of
conviction. This timely appeal followed.
1
[redacted]
2The sentencing guidelines recognize two strains of
mitigating role adjustments: minimal participant reductions, see
USSG §3B1.2(a), and minor participant reductions, see id.
§3B1.2(b). In this case, the defendant argues only that he should
have received a minor participant reduction.
3 [redacted]
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II. ANALYSIS
We evaluate claims of sentencing error by means of a
"two-step pavane." United States v. Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d 174,
177 (1st Cir. 2017); see United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92
(1st Cir. 2008). At the first step, we address claims of
procedural error. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007); Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d at 177. If the sentence passes
procedural muster, we then address challenges to its substantive
reasonableness. See Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d at 177. Here, we
are confronted with claims of both procedural and substantive
error. We discuss them sequentially.
A. Alleged Procedural Flaws.
As a general matter, "claims of sentencing error are
reviewed for abuse of discretion." United States v. Pérez, 819
F.3d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 2016). This standard is not monolithic.
"Within it, 'we assay the district court's factfinding for clear
error and afford de novo consideration to its interpretation and
application of the sentencing guidelines.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013)).
1. Mitigating Role. The defendant's principal
procedural plaint posits that the district court erred in refusing
to grant him a minor participant reduction. See USSG §3B1.2(b).
At sentencing, "[a] defendant who seeks a mitigating role
adjustment bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
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evidence, that he is entitled to the downward adjustment." Pérez,
819 F.3d at 545. We have cautioned before that "[r]ole-in-the-
offense determinations are notoriously fact-specific." United
States v. Cortez-Vergara, 873 F.3d 390, 393 (1st Cir. 2017)
(quoting Pérez, 819 F.3d at 545). "[A]bsent a mistake of law,
battles over a defendant's status . . . will almost always be won
or lost in the district court." United States v. Graciani, 61
F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1995).
Against this backdrop, we look first to the applicable
law. The sentencing guidelines authorize a two-level reduction in
a defendant's offense level if he "was a minor participant in any
criminal activity" for which he is being held accountable. USSG
§3B1.2(b). Prior to November 1, 2015, a two-pronged test was
typically employed to determine a defendant's entitlement to such
a reduction. First, the court had to determine whether the
defendant was "less culpable than most of those involved in the
offenses of conviction." United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d
508, 512 (1st Cir. 2005). If so, the court proceeded to determine
whether the defendant was less culpable than "most of those who
have perpetrated similar crimes." Id.The legal landscape shifted when the Sentencing
Commission, effective November 1, 2015, promulgated an amendment
that displaced the second prong of the original test. See USSG
App. C, Amend. 794. This amendment made pellucid that, in deciding
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whether to grant a minor participant reduction, a sentencing court
should not compare the defendant to hypothetical participants in
similar offenses.4 See id. Instead, the sentencing court should
limit its inquiry to whether a given defendant is "substantially
less culpable than the average participant in the criminal
activity" in which he was involved. Id. §3B1.2, cmt. n.3(A). For
this purpose, a "participant" is defined as "a person who is
criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need
not have been convicted." Id. §3B1.1, cmt. n.1. We treat this
revised commentary as authoritative. See Stinson v. United States,
508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993); United States v. Carrasco-Mateo, 389 F.3d
239, 244 (1st Cir. 2004).
The defendant contends that the court erred in
performing this task because it did not properly identify the
universe of participants. Specifically, the defendant complains
that the court compared his conduct only to that of Mercedes and
Concepción, not to the full pantheon of co-conspirators (whether
indicted or unindicted) in the broader drug-smuggling enterprise.
[redacted] This plaint lacks force.
4
Even though the offenses of conviction occurred in April of
2015, the defendant was not sentenced until February 10, 2017.
"Barring any ex post facto problem, a defendant is to be punished
according to the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing."
United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir.
1990). Neither party disputes the sentencing court's decision to
apply the version of the guidelines in effect on the date of
sentencing.
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Under the revised commentary — as before — the defendant
bears the burden of showing that he was substantially less culpable
than the average participant in the criminal endeavor. See United
States v. De la Cruz-Gutíerrez, 881 F.3d 221, 225-26 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 2018 WL 2064973 (2018). A defendant cannot carry
this burden merely by showing "that he was a minimal or minor
participant in the conspiracy overall." United States v. Coviello,
225 F.3d 54, 67 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). Rather,
he must focus on the offenses of conviction and "demonstrate that
he was a minimal or minor participant in the conduct that formed
the basis of his sentence." Id. To that end, the court must
consider a universe composed of those involved in "his relevant
conduct as a whole." United States v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 50
(1st Cir. 2009); see United States v. Rodríguez De Varón, 175 F.3d
930, 944 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (looking to "those participants
who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the
defendant"); see also United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377, 381
(6th Cir. 2000) (similar). As we have explained, "[w]here a
defendant is hired to transport a single shipment of drugs and
does not otherwise participate in the larger conspiracy, his
relevant conduct ordinarily will be limited to that shipment."
Vargas, 560 F.3d at 49-50.
The defendant would have us believe that Amendment 794
expanded those parameters. We think not. The amendment simply
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eliminated the need to compare a defendant's conduct with the
conduct of hypothetical participants in similar offenses (the now-
obsolete second prong of the original test). It does not require
courts, when weighing mitigating role adjustments, to appraise a
defendant's role in the broader conspiracy as opposed to his role
in the specific criminal activity for which he is being held
accountable. See USSG App. C, Amend. 794 (instructing courts to
determine "defendant's relative culpability . . . only by reference
to his or her co-participants in the case at hand").
The upshot is that with respect to identifying the
universe of relevant participants, earlier precedent developed
under the first prong of our minor participant jurisprudence
remains velivolent, notwithstanding the promulgation of Amendment
794. See De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881 F.3d at 225-26. Since the
district court colored within these lines, we hold that the
defendant's claim of legal error in the court's application of
section 3B1.2 is without substance.
This holding does not end our journey. Even when it
hews to the correct legal rule, a district court must still
exercise judgment to identify the universe of participants
involved in the particular conduct that forms the basis of the
defendant's sentence. Here, the defendant challenges the district
court's exercise of that judgment — a challenge that we review for
clear error. See Cortez-Vergara, 873 F.3d at 393.
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The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import
five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States,
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine, and aiding and abetting both conspiracies. The
charges were premised on the defendant's participation in a
discrete enterprise: he was one of three men who brought a drug-
laden vessel into the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
The defendant's base offense level was determined by reference to
the specific drug quantity involved in that singular transport —
not the amount trafficked through any broader conspiracy. It
follows that the conduct for which the defendant is being held
responsible is his role in that voyage. See Vargas, 560 F.3d at
50; cf. United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1559-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (refusing to compare defendant to participants in
"overall conspiracy" when base offense level was determined with
reference to narrower offense); United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d
1289, 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (refusing to compare defendants to
members in broader conspiracy because defendants had "only been
held responsible for cocaine that they were actively involved in
distributing — not the additional amounts involved in the entire
conspiracy").
Given the scope of the conduct for which the defendant
is being held accountable, there is no principled way in which we
can find clear error in the district court's decision to limit its
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comparison only to those persons directly involved in this
particular drug-smuggle. See, e.g., De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881
F.3d at 225-27 (comparing defendant in maritime drug-transport
case to others aboard vessel when considering minor participation
reduction); Cortez-Vergara, 873 F.3d at 393 (similar); Pérez, 819
F.3d at 545-46 (similar). That the record contains "references"
to unindicted and unidentified persons who had links to the broader
criminal organization does not alter this conclusion. [redacted]
[A] sentencing court cannot make mitigating role adjustments based
on suppositions woven entirely out of gossamer strands of
speculation and surmise. See Rodríguez De Varón, 175 F.3d at 944(explaining that a sentencing "court should look to other
participants only to the extent that they are identifiable or
discernable from the evidence"); cf. Pérez, 819 F.3d at 546
(rejecting argument that defendant's "bit part" compared to drug
"owners" and distributors entitled him to minor participant
reduction). [redacted] After all, determinations relating to
mitigating role adjustments are "invariably fact-specific," United
States v. Meléndez-Rivera, 782 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2015), and
the court reasonably could have determined that the defendant had
not carried his burden [redacted].
With the district court's universe of comparable
participants validated, we turn to the substance of the comparison.
The defendant maintains that the district court clearly erred in
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determining that he was not substantially less culpable than the
average participant in the offenses of conviction. Our review is
for clear error. See Pérez, 819 F.3d at 545.
The determination as to whether to grant a minor
participant reduction is "based on the totality of the
circumstances and involves a determination that is heavily
dependent upon the facts of the particular case." USSG §3B1.2,
cmt. n.3(C). The Sentencing Commission has provided a non-
exhaustive list of factors to be considered:
(i) the degree to which the defendant
understood the scope and structure of the
criminal activity;
(ii) the degree to which the defendant
participated in planning or organizing the
criminal activity;
(iii) the degree to which the defendant
exercised decision-making authority or
influenced the exercise of decision-making
authority;
(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant's
participation in the commission of the
criminal activity, including the acts the
defendant performed and the responsibility and
discretion the defendant had in performing
those acts;
(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to
benefit from the criminal activity.
Id.
The court below found that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant "was not substantially less culpable
than the average participant" in the drug smuggle. In its view,
the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal
activity and knew that he was transporting narcotics. By the
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defendant's own account, he had agreed to participate in an illegal
smuggling operation.5 Once aboard the vessel, the defendant's
participation in the criminal activity was substantial: he worked
in tandem with the captain (Mercedes) to assure the success of the
voyage. Although he did not participate in either planning or
organizing the criminal activity, he exercised a modicum of
decisionmaking authority in steering and navigating the vessel
toward its destination.
Last — but surely not least — the district court
supportably found that the defendant stood to benefit from the
criminal activity. He was paid handsomely to traverse the
Caribbean Sea and, in addition, received what he had sought all
along: passage to the United States.
"To be entitled to the role reduction, [the defendant]
had to prove that he was less culpable than his cohorts." De la
Cruz-Gutíerrez, 881 F.3d at 226 (emphasis in original). The
district court found that he had failed to carry this burden, and
that finding was not clearly erroneous. The defendant's cohorts
can be located on a continuum. Mercedes, who had primary
5Of course, the defendant went to the port of departure
anticipating that he would be assisting in the smuggling of illegal
aliens, not the smuggling of narcotics. That the criminal activity
proved to involve a different cargo does not detract from the
significance of the defendant's decision to join an illegal
smuggling venture (although it may help to explain why the district
court opted to sentence him at the bottom of the applicable
guideline range).
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responsibility for the voyage, stands at one end of the continuum.
Concepción, whom even the defendant seems to admit was not a
meaningful contributor to the enterprise, stands at the opposite
end. The defendant, who was involved in the navigation and
steering of the vessel, stands somewhere in the middle. Thus, the
district court reasonably could have found that he was not
substantially less culpable than the average participant. When a
person undertakes to provide material assistance in transporting
a large quantity of drugs as a member of a tiny crew in a hazardous
voyage at sea, it ordinarily will not be clear error for the
sentencing court to refuse him a mitigating role adjustment. See,
e.g., Pérez, 819 F.3d at 546. So it is here.
In an effort to efface the district court's reasoning,
the defendant argues that an offender who lacks a proprietary
interest in the criminal activity should receive a mitigating role
adjustment. In support, he relies on Amendment 794. His reliance,
however, is misplaced. The commentary does not indicate that every
such offender is entitled to a mitigating role adjustment; it
merely instructs that every such offender "should be considered
for a mitigating role adjustment." USSG App. C, Amend. 794. Here,
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the court considered the defendant's importunings and found them
wanting.
2. [redacted]6
B. Substantive Reasonableness.
This brings us to the defendant's claim that his sentence
is substantively unreasonable. We review this claim of error for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d
223, 226 (1st Cir. 2015).
"The 'linchpin' of substantive reasonableness review is
an assessment of whether the sentencing court supplied a 'plausible
sentencing rationale' and reached a 'defensible result.'"
Rodríguez-Adorno, 852 F.3d at 177 (quoting Martin, 520 F.3d at
96). This formulation recognizes that "[t]here is no one
reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe of
reasonable sentencing outcomes." Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592.
"Challenging a sentence as substantively unreasonable is
[generally] a heavy lift," and this "lift grows even heavier where,
as here, the sentence falls within a properly calculated GSR."
Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d at 572; see Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
We need not tarry. The district court sentenced the
defendant at the very bottom of the applicable guideline range
6 [redacted]
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notwithstanding that the offenses of conviction involved a very
large quantity of drugs. Even so, the defendant says that the
court should have varied downward.
This is pie in the sky. The district court explained
that it had balanced all the section 3553(a) factors and had mulled
the defendant's personal circumstances. It concluded that an
87-month sentence was appropriate because after reviewing the
defendant's background, studying his file, analyzing the arguments
presented by defense counsel, and hearing defendant's allocution,
"a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range . . . [was]
just and not greater than necessary to promote the objectives of
sentencing." This rationale is plausible, and the defendant has
offered no convincing basis on which we might disavow it.
So too, the length of the sentence is easily defensible.
The offenses of conviction were serious, and they involved a large
quantity of drugs. Yet, the court chose a sentence at the nadir
of a properly calculated GSR. Nothing in the record suggests a
compelling reason to override the district court's exercise of its
discretion.
To say more would be to paint the lily. We conclude,
with scant hesitation, that the challenged sentence fell well
within the wide compass of the district court's discretion. It
was, therefore, substantively reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
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We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the sentence is
Affirmed.
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