Tokarska v. I.N.S. ( 1992 )


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    July 7, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 91-2227

    ALICJA TOKARSKA,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

    Respondent.


    ____________________

    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
    THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE



    ____________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________
    Cyr and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________

    Steve J. Gutherz and Law Offices of Steve J. Gutherz, P.C., on
    _________________ ________________________________________
    brief for appellant.
    Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
    _________________
    Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director, and Marshall Tamor Golding,
    _________________ _______________________
    Attorney, Office of Immigration and Litigation, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

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    Per Curiam. Alicja Tokarska appeals a final order
    __________

    of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board affirmed an

    immigration judge's order finding Tokarska deportable for

    overstaying her visitor's visa, denying her applications for

    asylum and for withholding of deportation, and granting her

    voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. 8 U.S.C.

    1251(a)(2)(1952) (amended 1990), 1158, 1253(h). On appeal,

    Tokarska argues solely that we should reverse the Board's

    decision because it erred in determining that she failed to

    show that she had suffered past persecution, as a member of

    the Solidarity movement, sufficient to justify granting her

    "refugee" status and asylum. She asks this court to declare

    that she is entitled to a discretionary grant of asylum.

    She overlooks, however, the very limited role of

    this court in reviewing asylum cases. The Attorney General

    is authorized (in his discretion) to grant asylum to an

    alien who is a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. 1158(a). The statute

    defines a "refugee" as an alien who is unable or unwilling

    to return to her home country "because of persecution or a

    well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

    religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

    group, or political opinion," 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).

    Thus, the Board has held that an alien who seeks "refugee"


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    status may do so by showing either (1) that she reasonably

    fears that she will be persecuted if she returns to her home

    country, or (2) that she has suffered, in the past,

    persecution so severe that her suffering warrants asylum, on

    humanitarian grounds, despite the lack of any real

    likelihood that she would face persecution in the future.

    See Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989).
    ___ ______________

    Tokarska does not contest, on this appeal, the

    Board's determination that she had no reasonable fear of

    future persecution; she argues only that the Board erred in

    finding no past persecution sufficiently horrendous to
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    qualify her as a "refugee" on humanitarian grounds, even if

    that persecution would not be repeated. (The Board took

    notice of the fact that Solidarity is now part of the

    coalition governing Poland, so that Tokarska clearly could

    fear no future persecution for her Solidarity membership.

    Cf. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 593-97 (7th Cir.
    ___ ___________ ___

    1991).)

    We can reverse the Board's determination that

    Tokarska was not entitled to asylum only if the evidence she

    presented in respect to her past suffering "was so

    compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find"

    that she had made the requisite showing or the INS had


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    abused its discretion in deciding that the persecution she

    suffered was not sufficient. INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112
    ___ ______________

    S.Ct. 812, 817 (1992). See also NLRB v. Columbian
    _________ ____ _________

    Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
    ________________________

    Most "refugee" asylum cases involve claims of a

    reasonable fear of future persecution, but the few that

    address claims of past persecution involve facts that are

    very different from those presented here. To merit a grant

    of asylum on the basis of past persecution, "an alien must
    ____

    show past persecution so severe that repatriation would be

    inhumane." Baka v. INS, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 10318, *7
    ____ ___

    (10th Cir. May 13, 1992). This more demanding standard

    where past persecution alone is in issue, although not

    manifest in the terse language of the statute, does have a

    substantial basis in policy and the past decisions of the

    courts and the Board. See Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364 (7th
    ___ ______ ___

    Cir. 1991).

    On the record in this case, Tokarska's experiences

    in Poland as a member of the Solidarity movement do not make

    out such a claim. She points to several facts in support of

    her claim of sufficiently severe past persecution: she was

    struck and injured by a tear-gas canister during an anti-

    government demonstration; she was arrested during another


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    demonstration, suffered physical injury at the hands of

    police during that arrest and subsequent questioning, and

    spent twenty-four hours in jail; afterwards, her desk at

    work was searched, and she never again received a promotion

    or pay raise, although she had in the past.

    These facts are significantly less compelling than
    ____

    those in other cases in which federal courts have upheld

    administrative rejections of similar asylum claims based on

    past persecution. Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 704, 708-09
    ______ ___

    (10th Cir. 1991) (denial of asylum lawful where claimant

    arrested four times, detained three times, beaten once, had

    house searched, was treated badly at work; other claimant

    suffered two-day interrogation, detention, and beating,

    parents' home was searched, received bad work projects and

    no bonus, conscripted into army where he was harassed,

    finally fired from job); Skalak, 944 F.2d at 365 (denial of
    ______

    asylum lawful where claimant jailed twice for interrogation,

    three days each time, harassed by officials at work); Kubon
    _____

    v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (denial of asylum
    ___

    lawful where claimant jailed for five days; "a brief

    confinement for opposition to a totalitarian regime does not

    necessarily constitute persecution."); see also Zalega v.
    ________ ______

    INS, 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990) (neutral, non-Solidarity
    ___


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    member repeatedly arrested and interrogated, fired from

    job). While "[t]he experience of persecution may so sear a

    person with distressing associations with his native country

    that it would be inhumane to force him to return there, even

    though he is in no danger of further persecution," Skalak,
    ______

    944 F.2d at 365, this is not such a case. Consequently, the

    persecution Tokarska describes is not "so compelling" that

    the agency must find her eligible for "refugee" status and
    ____

    asylum.

    The judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals

    is summarily affirmed pursuant to Local Rule 27.1.
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