-
USCA1 Opinion
December 29, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-1382
CHRISTOPHER AMANN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
STOW SCHOOL SYSTEM, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
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Richard Amann on brief pro se.
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Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Pierce O. Cray,
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Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees Commonwealth
of Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals, Department
of Education, and Department of Public Health.
Kevin M. Hensley and Needham and Warren on brief for
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appellee Town of Stow.
Regina Williams Tate and Murphy, Hesse, Toomey and Lehane on
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brief for appellees Stow School System and Stow School Committee.
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Per Curiam. This appeal presents a challenge, under the
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
1400 et seq., to the adequacy of an "individualized education
program" prepared by the Town of Stow, Massachusetts for a
learning-disabled child who lives in the town.1 The district
court ruled that Stow had followed the required procedures in
formulating the education program, that the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had given the plaintiffs all the process due them
in their administrative challenge to the program's adequacy, and
that the program provided a "free appropriate public education"
for the child. It therefore granted summary judgment to all
defendants. This appeal followed. We affirm.
I
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The IDEA requires states that receive federal special
education funds to provide all handicapped children in their
jurisdictions with a "free appropriate public education." 20
U.S.C. 1415(a); 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(18). This requirement has
both procedural and substantive components. Burlington v.
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Department of Education, 736 F.2d 773, 788 (1st Cir. 1984)
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("Burlington II"). "The primary safeguard is the obligatory
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development of an individualized education program (IEP)."
Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983, 987 (1st
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Cir. 1990). "An IEP is a program of instruction and related
services that has been specially designed to meet the unique
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1The IDEA was once known as the "Education of the
Handicapped Act." See Section 25(b) of Public Law 102-119, 105
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Stat. 607 (substituting "Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act" for "Education of the Handicapped Act").
needs of the child. The IEP document contains information
concerning the child's present levels of performance; a statement
of annual goals and short term instructional objectives; a
statement of the specific educational services to be provided,
and the extent to which this can be done in the regular
educational programs; and objective criteria for measuring the
student's progress." Hampton School District v. Dobrowolski, 976
_______________________ ___________
F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1992).
The IEP is developed by a team that includes a
representative of the local educational agency, the child's
teacher and parents, and, in appropriate cases, the child
himself. 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(20). The IEP must be reviewed at
least annually and revised when necessary. 20 U.S.C.
1414(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. 300.343(d). The parents are entitled to
reject a proposed IEP, and if they do, they can demand an
"impartial due process hearing" on its adequacy and
appropriateness. 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(2). In Massachusetts, such
hearings are conducted by the Bureau of Special Education
Appeals. 603 C.M.R. 28.400.0 et seq. Any party aggrieved by
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the decision of the administrative hearing officer can appeal to
either state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. 1415(c).
Substantively, the IDEA itself requires courts evaluating an
IEP to ask only whether the program is "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits." Board of
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Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). Federal law,
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however, merely establishes a floor upon which the states are
free to build. See Burlington II, 736 F.2d at 792. The
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Massachusetts legislature has gone further than Congress; it
defines an appropriate education as one that assures the "maximum
possible development" of the child. M.G.L. ch. 71B, 2.
II
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Christopher Amann, now fourteen years old, lives in Stow,
Massachusetts with his parents, Richard and Barbara Amann. In
1983, Christopher enrolled in kindergarten in a Stow public
school. It soon appeared that Christopher suffered from learning
disabilities. This discovery triggered the Town's obligations
under the IDEA, and in November 1983 Stow implemented an IEP for
Christopher. Christopher's parents accepted this program, and
three subsequent annual revisions, and Christopher attended Stow
schools through the third grade.
By September 1987, however, when Christopher entered the
fourth grade, his parents had become disenchanted with his
educational progress, or lack of it, in the Stow school system.
Rather than return him to public school, they enrolled
Christopher in Carroll School, a private school in Lincoln,
Massachusetts that is devoted to teaching children with learning
disabilities. The Amanns say that some representative of the
Stow school system recommended sending Christopher to a private
school. However, the Amanns never asked for or obtained Stow's
formal consent to the transfer, nor did they formally reject the
then-current IEP calling for Christopher to attend public school,
or request a hearing on its adequacy.
Christopher attended the fourth and fifth grades at Carroll
School, at his parents' expense. During this time, neither Stow
nor Carroll School reviewed or revised the IEP that the Town had
promulgated in December 1986, and that would, in the normal
course of events, have come up for examination in December 1987.
Stow considered Christopher's enrollment at Carroll School to be
a unilateral, private placement that extinguished the Town's
obligations under the IDEA, while Carroll School does not create
IEPs for privately funded students.
This was the status quo until January 1989, when, in the
middle of Christopher's fifth-grade term, the Amanns sent Stow a
letter asking it to prepare an IEP for Christopher, and, "during
the pendency," to pay for his education at Carroll School.
Stow declined to pay Christopher's Carroll School tuition,
but it did respond to the request for an IEP. It evaluated
Christopher, convened a "team," and in March 1989 came up with a
new IEP. The Amanns neither accepted nor rejected this program.
Rather, they postponed their decision until after Christopher had
been evaluated, at Stow's expense, at Children's Hospital in
Boston. In the meantime, Christopher finished fifth grade and
entered sixth grade at Carroll School.
After the evaluation, in late 1989, Stow produced another
IEP. Under its terms, Christopher would have returned to Stow
and received his language arts and mathematics instruction from a
special education teacher who would also have provided him with a
daily "academic support class." However, the IEP would have
"mainstreamed" Christopher into regular education classes for
social studies, science, music, art, and non-academic subjects
such as physical education and industrial arts.
The Amanns formally rejected this proposal and asked for a
hearing. Stow renewed the rejected IEP in April 1990.
A hearing officer at the Massachusetts Bureau of Special
Education Appeals (BSEA) heard four days of testimony in May and
June 1990, and compiled a formidable documentary record. The
Amanns were represented by counsel. At the end of August 1990
the hearing officer issued his decision. He ruled that Stow had
no obligation, either to pay for Christopher's private education
or to review or revise his IEP, between September 1987, when the
Amanns placed Christopher at Carroll School, and January 1989,
when they asked Stow for a new IEP.
The hearing officer also ruled that the IEP Stow had
proposed after receiving the Children's Hospital evaluation was
"appropriate to address [Christopher's] special education needs
so as to assure his maximum possible educational development in
the least restrictive educational environment." However, the
hearing officer ordered Stow to make two changes to the IEP: 1)
to record on the document the services of a "mainstream
facilitator" (a teacher designated to monitor and support
Christopher's progress in regular education classes), and 2) to
make it clear that Christopher would not attend regular
industrial arts classes without appropriate support to ensure his
safety when using power tools or other dangerous instruments.
Because the proposed IEP was otherwise adequate, the hearing
officer concluded that Stow was "not financially responsible for
[Christopher's continued] Carroll School placement."
In September 1990, Christopher entered the seventh grade at
Carroll School. His parents, meanwhile, contested the hearing
officer's ruling. Their lawyer filed a motion for
reconsideration, claiming that the last proposed IEP was
inadequate because it did not provide for a "mainstream
facilitator."2 The hearing officer denied this motion. Mr.
Amann then asked for a "compliance hearing" to challenge Stow's
implementation of the IEP. The BSEA held a compliance hearing in
November 1990, and found that Stow had complied with the hearing
officer's decision by making the required modifications to the
IEP and thus had "implemented" the program insofar as that was
possible given Christopher's continued attendance at Carroll
School. Finally, the Amanns asked to re-open the proceedings in
order to raise new charges of lead contamination in the Stow
public schools. The BSEA heard argument on this request in
December 1990, but refused to reopen the case because it found
that the Amanns could, and therefore should, have made the
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2The Amanns' lawyer bowed out after filing the motion for
reconsideration. In all subsequent administrative and judicial
proceedings, Mr. Amann, acting "pro se," represented himself, his
wife and his son. We generally do not allow non-lawyers to
represent litigants other than themselves, see Herrera-Venegas v.
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Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1982), and the Second
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Circuit has applied this principle to prohibit a parent who was
not a lawyer from representing his child. Cheung v. Youth
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Orchestra Foundation of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir.
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1990). However, because we affirm on the merits, we need not
determine whether Christopher and Barbara Amann's appeals are
properly before us. See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532
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(1976); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 8 n.5
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(1st Cir. 1991). Similarly, we need not decide whether the
notice of appeal, which named only "Christopher Amann et al." in
its caption, but was signed by Mr. Amann, adequately identified
Mr. Amann as an appellant. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
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487 U.S. 312 (1988); Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d
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174, 176 (1st Cir. 1988) (court of appeals lacks power to hear
appeal from party not specified in notice of appeal, and "et al."
does not sufficiently identify an appellant).
charges earlier.
Even before the BSEA proceedings had concluded, the Amanns
went to court. Mr. Amann filed a perfunctory complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in
November 1990, but did not immediately serve it on the
defendants. In March 1991, Mr. Amann filed a lengthy amended
complaint. The amended complaint named Christopher, Richard and
Barbara Amann as plaintiffs, and the Town of Stow, the Stow
School System, the Stow School Committee, and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (through the BSEA and the Massachusetts Department
of Public Health) as defendants.
The amended complaint contained more than 150 paragraphs
organized into six counts. Count One asserted a lead-poisoning
claim against the Town of Stow under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
42 U.S.C. 300j-8(a). Count Two made a claim against the Town
under the IDEA, and Count Three asked for legal fees from the
Town. Counts Four and Five asserted the liability of the Stow
School System and the Stow School Committee under the IDEA.
Count Six alleged that the Commonwealth had failed to implement
its regulations and ensure compliance with the IDEA. The Amanns
asked for both monetary and injunctive relief.
In February 1992 the district court entered judgment for all
defendants on all counts. With respect to the Safe Drinking
Water Act claim, the court ruled that the Amanns had not provided
the notice that is a prerequisite to suit under the statute. 42
U.S.C. 300j-8(b). With respect to the IDEA claims, the court
found 1) that the defendants had satisfied the Act's procedural
requirements by giving the Amanns a "fair opportunity to be heard
on their claim," and 2) that "the IEP developed by the Stow
School System and modified by the BSEA is reasonably calculated
to enable Christopher Amann to receive educational benefits."
On appeal, the Amanns have attacked both the substantive
validity of the IEP, and the Town's and the Commonwealth's
procedural compliance with the IDEA; however, they have not
challenged the dismissal of their claim under the Safe Drinking
Water Act.
III
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The district court ruled that Stow's proposed IEP was
substantively adequate because it was "reasonably calculated to
enable Christopher . . . to receive educational benefits." This
was, it appears, a factually unexceptionable proposition, but
because it applied the federal "educational benefits" standard
created by the IDEA, rather than the more stringent "maximum
possible development" benchmark mandated by Massachusetts law, it
was legally incorrect. See Roland M., 910 F.2d at 987 (state
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standards enforceable in federal court insofar as they are not
inconsistent with federal rights).
However, the BSEA hearing officer measured the IEP against
the correct, Massachusetts, standard. Therefore, as long as the
record supports the BSEA decision, we can affirm the judgment
upholding it. See Doe v. Anrig, 728 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1984)
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(appeals court is free to affirm on any ground supported by the
record).
The Amanns contend that Stow's IEP did not satisfy the
Massachusetts requirement that it maximize Christopher's
development because Christopher has done, and will continue to
do, better academically at Carroll School than in the Stow public
schools. If he can do better elsewhere, they reason, then it
follows logically that the Stow program does not assure his
maximum possible achievement.
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The Amanns have, in essence, repeated an argument made and
rejected in Roland M. v. Concord School Committee. There, we
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noted that "purely academic progress -- maximizing academic
potential -- is not the only indicia of educational benefit
implicated either by the Act or by state law." 910 F.2d at 992.
Rather, under the IDEA, "[a]n IEP must prescribe a pedagogical
format in which, 'to the maximum extent appropriate,' a
handicapped student is educated 'with children who are not
handicapped.'" Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. 1412(5)(B); 34 C.F.R.
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300.550(b)(1)). Massachusetts law states the same requirement in
different terms; it calls for "maximum possible development in
the least restrictive environment." M.G.L. ch. 71B, 2.
Federal and state law, therefore, both dictate a policy of
"mainstreaming." "[T]heir common objective is the provision of
needed services promptly to learning-handicapped children through
the free, local public school system except where the resources
of those schools cannot appropriately meet the children's needs."
School Committee of Franklin v. Commissioner of Education, 17
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Mass. App. Ct. 683, 697 (1984).
Parents, of course, are free to make private educational
choices solely to maximize their child's academic progress, but
the public schools, state agencies and courts charged with
administering and enforcing the IDEA do not enjoy the same
liberty. "Mainstreaming may not be ignored, even to fulfill
substantive educational criteria." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992-
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93. "[T]he correlative requirements of educational benefit and
least restrictive environment operate in tandem to create a
continuum of educational possibilities," id. at 993, and in order
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"[t]o determine a particular child's place on the continuum, the
desirability of mainstreaming must be weighed in concert with the
Act's mandate for educational improvement." Id.
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In deciding whether Stow's IEP "reasonably calculated" the
balance between academic progress and least restrictive
environment, the district court had to bear in mind two
additional considerations: 1) that the Amanns bore the burden of
proving the IEP's inadequacy, see Burlington II, 736 F.2d at 794,
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and (2) that "the alchemy of 'reasonable calculation' necessarily
involves choices among educational policies and theories --
choices which courts, relatively speaking, are poorly equipped to
make." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992.
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On this record, and taking the relevant legal principles
into account, we find ample reason to affirm. There was
substantial proof from which the BSEA could have rationally
concluded that the IEP was adequate and appropriate. See Roland
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M., 910 F.2d at 994. First, there is no question that Stow's
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plan envisioned a less restrictive environment for Christopher's
education. Its program would have enabled Christopher to spend
much of his school day learning alongside non-handicapped
children. This opportunity was not available at Carroll School.
Second, even giving full credit to the Amanns' allegation
that Christopher enjoyed better academic progress at Carroll
School than he would have had he returned to Stow, "there was
considerable room for the BSEA, and the district court, to find
that the advantages inherent in the IEP did not severely
compromise educational benefits." Id. The evaluation from
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Children's Hospital reported that Christopher's "deficits are
likely to have their primary impact in domains that depend
heavily on output skills," such as writing (but not reading) and
mathematics. Stow's IEP would have given Christopher more than
ten hours per week of special education in language arts and
mathematics.3 The parties agreed that the special education
teacher, Ms. Watskin, was experienced and capable in those areas.
Thus, there would seem to be no reasonable dispute about the
adequacy and appropriateness of the Stow program with respect to
the areas in which Christopher's disabilities were likely to have
the greatest effect on his ability to learn and to perform
academically.
The Stow program would have "mainstreamed" Christopher into
regular classes in science, social studies, music, art,
industrial arts, and physical education, but even there, the IEP
did not contemplate leaving Christopher entirely to his own
devices. As amended in accordance with the hearing officer's
instructions, the IEP designated Ms. Watskin as Christopher's
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3In contrast, the 1986-87 IEP that was in place when the
Amanns first enrolled Christopher at Carroll School provided for
slightly more than six hours of special education per week.
"mainstream facilitator." Had Christopher returned to public
school, Ms. Watskin would have observed his regular classes to
track his development and performance, worked with the teachers
in those classes to help ensure that he received appropriate
attention and instruction, and provided Christopher with an
"academic support" class to help him, among other things, prepare
for his mainstream classes and work on his needs in those
subjects.
"Where the evidence permits two plausible views of
adequacy/appropriateness, the agency's choice between them cannot
lightly be ignored." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994. An IEP "may
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not be the only appropriate choice, or the choice of certain
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selected experts, or the child's parents first choice, or even
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the best choice," G.D. v. Westmoreland School District, 930 F.2d
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942, 948 (1st Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original), yet still
provide a free appropriate public education. Our review of the
record assures us that the program offered by Stow struck a
suitable balance between the goals of mainstreaming and "maximum
possible development." We need go no further.
IV
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The Amanns claim that they can identify more than five dozen
procedural violations of the IDEA and state or federal
regulations, but their appellate brief treats only five such
issues in any detail, and we will restrict our discussion to
them. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
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1990) ("issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied
by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived").
First, the Amanns say that Stow ignored its statutory duty
to "prepare" an IEP for Christopher between September 1987 and
January 1989. Stow had last reviewed Christopher's IEP in
December 1986, and the IDEA requires responsible educational
agencies to re-examine IEPs at least annually. 20 U.S.C.
1414(a)(5). However, federal regulations promulgated under the
IDEA also say that public officials need "develop[] and
implement[]" an IEP for a child in private school only if the
child was "placed in or referred to [the] private school or
facility by a public agency." 34 C.F.R. 300.341(b) (emphasis
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added).
By December 1987, when the 1986 IEP would have come up for
its annual review, Christopher had enrolled at Carroll School.
He was not placed there by a public agency; his parents enrolled
him unilaterally, without challenging the IEP or obtaining Stow's
consent to the transfer. According to regulation, their action
relieved the Town of its responsibility to "develop and
implement" an IEP for Christopher; and if Stow was not required
to create an IEP for Christopher, then it follows that the Town
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had no obligation to review or revise the IEP already in place.4
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4 Our decision in Burlington II is not to the contrary.
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There, the parents placed their child in a private school, but
they also invoked their right to an impartial due process hearing
on the adequacy of the Town's IEP. We said "that pending review
of an earlier IEP, local educational agencies should continue to
review and revise IEPs, in accordance with applicable law." 736
F.2d at 794. The review process may take several years, and
"[w]ithout an IEP as a starting point, the court [would be] faced
with a mere hypothesis of what the Town would have proposed and
effectuated during the subsequent years." Id. The pendency of
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review, not the placement in private school, creates the need to
Second, the Amanns accuse the BSEA of denying them due
process by refusing to re-open its proceedings to hear their
allegations of lead poisoning in the water supply of Stow's
public schools. The BSEA refused to convene a hearing to
consider the lead-contamination issue because, the hearing
officer said:
Any issues bearing on Stow's capacity to implement the
BSEA decision concerning the 1990-1991 IEP should have
been presented at the compliance hearing. The parent
may not now raise new objections based on evidence that
was available to the parties at the time of the prior
compliance hearing, but which the parent chose not to
present or argue. Conservation of administrative
resources, as well as the principles of fairness and
finality, demand closure of this matter at this level.
The "impartial due process hearings" guaranteed by 20 U.S.C.
1415(b)(2) "are to be conducted in accordance with state law .
. . ." Burlington II, 736 F.2d at 781. In Massachusetts, "the
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granting of a rehearing is discretionary with the agency."
Brookline v. Commissioner of Department of Environmental Quality
_________ ____________________________________________________
Engineering, 387 Mass. 372, 385 (1982). Although the BSEA has
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not published regulations defining a petitioner's right to re-
open an agency proceeding, a notice attached to the hearing
officer's initial decision informed the Amanns that motions to
re-open would be limited to "newly-discovered evidence, in
existence at the time of the hearing, but which could not have
been discovered with due diligence."
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maintain and update the IEP. Because the Amanns did not complain
formally about the IEP, or invoke their right to a BSEA hearing
concerning its adequacy, there was no administrative or judicial
review pending between September 1987 and January 1989, and hence
no obligation to review and revise.
The BSEA did not abuse its discretion in so limiting the
Amanns' rights. Other Massachusetts agencies have imposed
similar restrictions, see J.C. Hillary's v. Massachusetts Com.
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Against Discrimination, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 204 (1989), and the
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Massachusetts statute governing judicial review of agency
decisions says that a court should reopen a matter to hear
additional evidence only if it finds "good reason" for the
failure to offer it earlier. M.G.L. ch. 30A, 14(6).
Nor did the BSEA abuse its discretion by denying the
specific request at issue here. The affidavits that Mr. Amann
submitted to the district court showed that he knew of the
alleged lead problem no later than the "Spring of 1990." If this
knowledge came too late to bring the issue up at the initial
hearing in May and June, it certainly came in time to raise the
alleged contamination in the context of either the motion to
reconsider or the compliance hearing.
The Amanns' three other procedural contentions share a basic
flaw. We have said that courts "must strictly scrutinize IEPs to
ensure their procedural integrity. Strictness, however, must be
tempered by considerations of fairness and practicality:
procedural flaws do not automatically render an IEP legally
defective. Before an IEP is set aside, there must be some
rational basis to believe that procedural inadequacies
compromised the pupil's right to an appropriate education,
seriously hampered the parents' opportunity to participate in the
formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational
benefits." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994.
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None of the remaining alleged procedural lapses had such a
significant consequence. Stow may have violated a Massachusetts
regulation by "unilaterally" modifying the IEP to conform to the
hearing officer's instructions, rather than convening the full
"team" (including the parents) to perform the task. See 28
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C.M.R. 28.404.5 ("The TEAM which completed the school
evaluation shall write the IEP incorporating the decision of the
hearing officer"). But any error was harmless, as the hearing
officer found, because in making the modifications -- which
recorded the services of a "mainstream facilitator" and the
restriction on Christopher's use of power tools in shop classes -
- Stow merely "fulfilled a ministerial function and rendered no
independent judgment . . . ." Had the full team met, it "would
have had no discretion to expand, amplify or alter the IEP"
beyond the terms set by the hearing officer. The Amanns'
absence, in other words, did not "seriously hamper" their ability
to participate meaningfully in the formulation process.
Similarly, the BSEA committed at worst a harmless error by
failing to give the Amanns a transcript of a hearing held on
December 7, 1990, at which the BSEA heard the Amanns' request to
re-open the proceedings. The hearing was recorded but the BSEA
apparently lost the tape. The lack of a transcript may have
violated the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. 1415(d)(3) (party to agency
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hearing has "right to a written or electronic verbatim record of
such hearing"), but, because the hearing officer spelled out in
writing her reasons for denying the request to re-open, and
because we have found that she was within her discretion to make
the denial, the BSEA's procedural negligence caused no
substantive injury.
Finally, the Amanns complain that the BSEA rendered an
untimely decision. A federal regulation, 34 C.F.R.
300.512(a)(1), requires agencies like the BSEA to reach a final
decision with respect to the "impartial due process hearing"
within 45 days after it has received a request for such a
hearing. The BSEA indisputably missed this deadline. The Amanns
requested the initial hearing on February 8, 1990, and the
hearing officer did not issue his decision until August 31, 1990,
204 days after the request was made.
The Amanns say that the BSEA's tardiness in issuing a
decision caused them prejudice because the decision, dated August
31, 1990, "was not delivered to the parents until they had
already paid the tuition and started Christopher in Carroll for
the term . . . ." The implication is that the Amanns might have
complied with the BSEA decision and enrolled Christopher in Stow
for the 1990-91 school year, saving themselves the tuition, if
only the BSEA had made a decision before the school year started.
However, the record gives us no reason to believe that the
Amanns would have responded to a timely adverse decision by
sending Christopher back to Stow. They submitted no evidence to
that effect, and their appellate brief indicates that Christopher
remained in private school not only in 1990-91, but for the 1991-
92 school year as well. If the Amanns enrolled Christopher in a
private school in September 1991, a year after they learned that
the BSEA had confirmed the adequacy of Stow's IEP, then we can
only infer that they would not have returned him to public school
in 1990, regardless of the outcome of the BSEA hearing. And if
the hearing officer's late decision had no effect on their choice
of schools for the 1990-91 school term, then it caused no
remediable harm.
Affirmed.
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Document Info
Docket Number： 92-1382
Filed Date： 12/29/1992
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015