Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc. ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1043
JAMES BILTCLIFFE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor IV, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Selya, and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Evan P. Lowney, with whom Mazonson Law Office, P.C. was on
brief, for appellant.
Donald E. Frechette and Joseph A. Farside, Jr., with whom
Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP was on brief, for appellee.
November 25, 2014
STAHL, Circuit Judge. After Defendant-Appellee initiated
foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiff-Appellant's house, he filed
suit, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court
granted summary judgment to Defendant on all counts, and denied
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
I. Facts & Background
James and Kathleen Biltcliffe purchased a home in
Bridgewater, Massachusetts in 2004. The Biltcliffes' mortgage was
ultimately assigned to Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. The mortgage
agreement allows for acceleration of the debt in the event of
default, provided the mortgagee gives the mortgagor notice and the
opportunity to cure. The agreement permits CitiMortgage to invoke
the statutory power of sale if the borrower fails to cure the
default or pay the accelerated debt. The mortgage document also
provides that the lender "may accept any payment or partial payment
. . . without waiver of any rights hereunder."
The Biltcliffes defaulted on their mortgage payments in
2008. While Plaintiff avers that the couple never received written
notice of default, Defendant provided the district court with two
demand letters addressed to Plaintiff's home, one dated September
4, 2008 and the other September 24, 2008. Both letters gave the
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Biltcliffes ninety days to make up missed payments and late fees,1
warning that "[f]ailure to cure . . . may result in the
acceleration of all sums due." Plaintiff did not make up the
payments and Citi accordingly accelerated the debt, notifying the
couple by letter dated April 9, 2010 and addressed to their home.
Although Plaintiff's complaint alleged that he "can find no record
of notice of any such acceleration ever having occurred," Defendant
submitted an affidavit from one of its attorneys verifying the
authenticity of the acceleration notice and confirming that it was
sent.
Plaintiff and his wife filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in
March of 2011. Five months later, in August, Defendant sent the
Biltcliffes a Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)2
modification offer. The HAMP offer stated explicitly that the loan
documents "will not be modified unless and until . . . the Lender
accepts this Agreement by signing and returning a copy of it to
[the borrower]." Plaintiff and his wife signed the HAMP agreement
and returned it to Defendant. Though Defendant never returned a
1
While the current Massachusetts statute gives homeowners 150
days to cure if certain conditions are met, both parties agree that
the pre-2010 version of the statute applies here. Compare Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 35A, with 2007 Mass. Acts ch. 206, § 11.
2
HAMP is a federal program intended to encourage lenders and
loan servicers to offer loan modifications to certain eligible
borrowers. See generally Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d
224, 228-29 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing HAMP's purpose and
structure).
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signed copy to the Biltcliffes, the couple began making a lower
monthly payment on their mortgage.
A few months later, Defendant denied Plaintiff's HAMP
application by letter dated December 9, 2011. According to
Plaintiff's complaint, the couple's Chapter 13 bankruptcy action
was dismissed on July 20, 2012. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307. The next
month, Defendant invoked its statutory power of sale and sent a
notice of foreclosure sale to Plaintiff's home address. Plaintiff
filed suit in state court, alleging breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Defendant removed the case to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction and moved for judgment on the pleadings.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Thereafter, the district court notified
the parties that it intended to consider documents submitted by the
parties and treat Defendant's motion as one for summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The district court entered an
electronic order granting the parties seventeen days to file
additional affidavits in support of or in opposition to Defendant's
motion. The day after the July 1, 2013 deadline, Plaintiff asked
for a twenty-one-day extension in order to gather information to
counter the affidavits and documents that Defendant timely filed
the day before. The district court found that Plaintiff failed to
show good cause for a late filing and denied his motion for
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additional time. The district court granted summary judgment to
Defendant on all counts and denied Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration. Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d
371 (D. Mass. 2013). This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Scope of Plaintiff's Appeal
Plaintiff's notice of appeal presents the court with a
preliminary jurisdictional quandary. Although Plaintiff now
asserts that he appeals from both the district court's summary
judgment decision and the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
Plaintiff's notice of appeal states only that he appeals from
"Final Order Denying Reconsideration of Entry of Judgment, entered
in this action on November 22, 2013." The district court clerk
entered the notice of appeal only as to "[Docket Entry] 45, Order
on Motion for Reconsideration"; Plaintiff did not seek to correct
that docket entry. However, Plaintiff's docketing statement in
this court, filed twenty days after his notice of appeal, lists
July 10, 2013 -- the date of the district court's summary judgment
decision -- as the "[d]ate of entry of judgment or order appealed
from."
A party's notice of appeal must "designate the judgment,
order, or part thereof being appealed." Fed. R. App. P.
3(c)(1)(B). Rule 3(c) requirements are "jurisdictional in nature,
and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate review."
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Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). While the Supreme Court
instructs us to interpret these requirements broadly, it has warned
litigants that the "principle of liberal construction" will not
"excuse noncompliance with the Rule." Id.; see also Chamorro v.
Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that
while courts are not "invariably . . . bound to read the notice of
appeal literally," "rescue missions are not automatic, and
litigants will do well to draft notices of appeal with care"). As
a general rule, appellate jurisdiction is "limited to review of
orders and judgments specifically described in the notice of
appeal." Rojas-Velázquez v. Figueroa-Sancha, 676 F.3d 206, 209
(1st Cir. 2012). Thus, "failure to include a particular issue in
a notice of appeal can be fatal to this court's jurisdiction over
that issue." Constructora Andrade Gutiérrez, S.A. v. Am. Int'l
Ins. Co. of P.R., 467 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2006); see also
Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 945 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[A]n
appeal from the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is not an appeal from
the underlying judgment.").
At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel characterized his
notice of appeal designation as an "accident" caused in part by the
short amount of space provided on the form to write in the order
being appealed from. Counsel argued that Plaintiff's notice of
appeal, read in the context of the full record, including the
docketing statement, fairly put CitiMortgage on notice that he
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intended to appeal both the summary judgment and the
reconsideration decisions. See Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 981 F.2d
7, 11 (1st Cir. 1992). We are not persuaded that this is so.
Past cases have construed a notice of appeal solely
referencing the denial of reconsideration as encompassing appeal
from the final judgment where the appellant's motion for
reconsideration "largely rehashed the arguments it made in
opposition to the original judgment." Díaz Aviation Corp. v.
Airport Aviation Servs., Inc., 716 F.3d 256, 262 (1st Cir. 2013);
see also Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408,
415 (1st Cir. 2000) (reviewing both reconsideration decision and
underlying dismissal where Rule 59(e) motion covered "more or less
the same points" as opposition to dismissal and district court
"tersely denied [the motion for reconsideration] relying on its
original decision") (emphasis in original). Other recent cases in
this circuit have declined to reach this jurisdictional question
when the denial of reconsideration specifically listed in the
notice of appeal presents issues intertwined with the underlying
judgment such that "full as opposed to limited review does not
alter the outcome [of the] case." McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 2012); Markel Am. Ins. Co. v.
Díaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, while the
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration pointed to flaws in the
earlier grant of summary judgment, the motion also raised new and
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unique issues related to the district court's procedural handling
of the case. Plaintiff's brief on appeal challenges the
reconsideration denial on grounds distinct from argument concerning
the summary judgment decision. To the extent he revisits certain
substantive bases for the district court's summary judgment order,
he argues only that the court made manifest errors of law and, as
a result, abused its discretion; in other words, he makes arguments
we can properly resolve on appeal from the denial of his motion for
reconsideration. Those arguments, however, do not give us license
to extend our analysis and reconsider the summary judgment order in
full.
While we do not doubt that Plaintiff may well have hoped
to appeal both decisions, it is "the notice afforded by a document,
not the litigant's motivation in filing it, [that] determines the
document's sufficiency" under Rule 3(c). Smith, 502 U.S. at 248.
Plaintiff's notice of appeal makes no reference to the district
court's grant of summary judgment and specifically lists the
reconsideration decision. The document cannot fairly be said to
give CitiMortgage notice of Plaintiff's intent to appeal anything
but the reconsideration decision and therefore fails to meet Rule
3(c)(1)(B)'s designation requirement as to any other order. Cf.
Kotler, 981 F.2d at 11 ("Omitting [one] order while, at the same
time, designating a completely separate and independent order
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loudly proclaims plaintiff's intention not to appeal from the
former order.").
B. Denial of Motion for Reconsideration
Because Plaintiff appealed only from the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, our review is limited to the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. Int'l Strategies Grp.,
Ltd. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 482 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007). A
party may seek to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) relief is granted sparingly, and
only when "the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law,
if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow
situations." Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489
F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). A motion for reconsideration is not
the venue to undo procedural snafus or permit a party to advance
arguments it should have developed prior to judgment, Iverson v.
City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006), nor is it a
mechanism to regurgitate "old arguments previously considered and
rejected," Nat'l Metal Finishing Co., Inc. v.
BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir.
1990).
Plaintiff urges reversal of the district court's denial
of reconsideration based on four grounds. We consider each in
turn. First, he asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to discuss Shealey v. Fed. Ins. Co., 946
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F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Mass. 2013), in its reconsideration order.
From what we can discern, Shealey, a decision by the same district
court judge where a plaintiff somewhat similarly presented only his
own sworn statements as evidence, does not control the outcome of
Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion. In any event, courts are not
required to address every case cited by a litigant, and declining
to distinguish a particular non-controlling decision can hardly
constitute an abuse of discretion.
Second, Plaintiff avers that the district court committed
a manifest error of law in concluding that the demand letters sent
in 2008 were statutorily sufficient to constitute an acceleration.
This argument misconstrues the district court's analysis. Neither
CitiMortgage nor the district court asserted that the 2008 default
notices accelerated Plaintiff's debt; the 2008 demand letters
stated only that "failure to cure . . . may result in the
acceleration of all sums due" (emphasis added). As the district
court properly concluded, CitiMortgage did not accelerate
Plaintiff's debt until 2010, when its attorneys sent an
acceleration notice to Plaintiff's home.
Third, Plaintiff asserts that the district court also
committed a manifest error of law when it declined to reconsider
its grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim. The district court based its grant of summary judgment, in
part, on the rationale that Plaintiff alleged the same damages
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under both his breach of contract and unjust enrichment cause of
action, declining to reach the latter because the former gave
Plaintiff an adequate remedy at law. Under Massachusetts law, the
existence of a contractual relationship between the parties
typically precludes an unjust enrichment claim arising out of that
contract. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 984 N.E.2d 835, 849
(Mass. 2013) ("Ordinarily, a claim of unjust enrichment will not
lie 'where there is a valid contract that defines the obligations
of the parties.'") (quoting Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Sec'y of
Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs., 974 N.E.2d 1114, 1132 (Mass.
2012)). The denial of Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration
pointed to another reason for summary judgment on this claim:
CitiMortgage could not be unjustly enriched by accepting the
Biltcliffes' partial payment when the couple owed a higher amount
each month. Under either rationale, the district court did not
commit a manifest error of law warranting reconsideration.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the district court should
have granted his motion for reconsideration because he submitted
newly discovered evidence in support of his motion, to wit, two
affidavits from his attorneys disputing the authenticity of
documents submitted by Defendant at the summary judgment stage.
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration argued that he could have
provided the district court with these affidavits if the court had
allowed his motion for additional time to submit evidence before it
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granted summary judgment to Defendant. As described above,
Plaintiff requested an additional twenty-one days to submit his
materials after the deadline set by the district court had already
passed. We typically defer to the trial court's discretion to
govern filing deadlines on its own docket and "will not meddle
unless we are persuaded that some exceptional justification
exists." Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor
Printing Providence, Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001). Further,
the district court determined that even if it accepted the
affidavits, the information contained therein was previously
available to Plaintiff and thus did not present the court with "new
evidence." While Rule 59(e) contemplates reconsideration based on
newly discovered evidence, a district court may conclude in its
discretion that the moving party's supposedly new evidence could
have been presented prior to summary judgment. Alicea v. Machete
Music, 744 F.3d 773, 781 (1st Cir. 2014). After review of the
affidavits, we agree that the affidavits are not new evidence
sufficient to warrant Rule 59(e) relief and conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration.3
3
Even if we had jurisdiction to review the district court's
underlying summary judgment decision under the more lenient de novo
standard of review, we would affirm. The parties' mortgage
agreement permits CitiMortgage to accept partial payment without
waiving its contractual rights to accelerate the debt and to
foreclose on the property. CitiMortgage sent two default notices
(and later, an acceleration notice) to Plaintiff's residence.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
denial of Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
While Plaintiff contends that he and his wife never received these
notices, CitiMortgage put forth evidence that they were mailed.
See 2007 Mass. Acts ch. 206, § 11 (written notice of mortgagor's
default "shall be deemed to be delivered to the mortgagor . . .
when mailed to the mortgagor at the mortgagor's address").
Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Turning to his unjust
enrichment claim, even under de novo review, CitiMortgage's
acceptance of partial monthly payments when it was owed a higher
monthly amount hardly qualifies as inequitable, and as discussed
supra, the court properly declined to reach this equitable claim
since Plaintiff's contract-based claim afforded him an adequate
remedy at under Massachusetts law. As for the third count of
Plaintiff's complaint, he abandoned his breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing claim on appeal.
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