United States v. Oppenheimer-Torres ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1676
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DAVID OPPENHEIMER-TORRES,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Kayatta, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Lisa Aidlin, on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney,
on brief for appellee.
November 13, 2015
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant David
Oppenheimer-Torres ("Oppenheimer") appeals his sentence after
pleading guilty of conspiring to possess and distribute illegal
drugs near a public housing facility, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 860, and of possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). Because the sentence was within the range
specified in a plea agreement containing a waiver of appeal,
because we find that the prosecutor's false start in performing
the prosecutor's duties under that plea agreement did not
constitute a breach of the agreement, and because we find in
Oppenheimer's arguments no other request for setting aside the
agreement, we dismiss the appeal.
I. Background
Because this appeal follows a guilty plea, we derive the
facts from the plea agreement, the change-of-plea colloquy, the
unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report
("PSR"), and the sentencing hearing transcript. United States v.
Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2013). From 2004 to 2012,
Oppenheimer was the leader of a drug trafficking organization
operating in the public housing projects of Carolina, Puerto Rico.
Oppenheimer acted as an "enforcer" and oversaw the supply and
distribution of cocaine, heroin, and other drugs. In May 2012, a
grand jury indicted Oppenheimer, along with 73 other individuals,
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on six drug-trafficking-related charges. He pleaded guilty to
conspiring to traffic drugs near public housing and to aiding and
abetting the use or carrying of a firearm in connection with drug
trafficking. The district court dismissed the remaining counts.
A. The Plea Agreement
The written plea agreement (the "Agreement") executed in
accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B)
stipulated that each party would recommend a sentence that fell
within the range of 135-168 months on the conspiracy charge. The
parties selected this range under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines by, in relevant part, assuming a base level Criminal
History Category (in other words, no criminal history). The
Agreement further provided that the government would not recommend
a sentence in excess of 168 months on the conspiracy charge even
if the assumed Criminal History Category turned out to be
understated. Finally, the Agreement called for a statutory minimum
sentence of 60 months for the firearm charge, to run consecutively.
All remaining counts were dismissed.
The Agreement included a clause waiving Oppenheimer's
right to appeal "provided that the defendant is sentenced in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Sentence
Recommendation provision of this Plea Agreement." At the change
of plea hearing, the court determined that Oppenheimer's guilty
plea was intelligent and voluntary.
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B. The Sentencing Hearing
After reading from the Agreement at sentencing, the
judge asked the prosecutor for the government's position, stating
"you have the right to request the maximum." The prosecutor
answered:
That is correct, Your Honor. And the United
States will request that we stand by what we
have recommended, and that the United States
would be able to argue for a sentence within
the applicable guideline range.
In this case, I understand that the applicable
guideline range is a level of 33. And the
defendant's criminal history category turns
out to be criminal history II, based on the
fact that the conviction in the year 2003 was
and should be considered relevant conduct for
purposes of making that determination.
That being the case, the United States, based
on what has been proffered to the Court, when
the Court asked us in relation to the
defendant's participation in the conspiracy,
request [sic] that he be sentenced to the
maximum of the applicable guideline range....
[T]he United States requests that the Court
will take all these factors into consideration
in imposing the maximum sentence that could be
imposed when taking into consideration the
defendant's criminal history category and the
total offense level that was stipulated by the
parties in this case.
This was the first mention in the record of the fact that the PSR
calculated a Criminal History Category of II, rather than I as
assumed in the Agreement. Slightly later in the proceeding,
immediately after an off-the-record discussion at sidebar between
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the Court and the Probation Officer, the following exchange
occurred:
THE COURT: United States, your position is we
ought to stay with 135 to 168?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: That's the criminal history,
I understand that's the agreement, and it was
an agreement that was also made with Counsel
Contreras, that the 2003 conduct could be
considered relevant conduct for the purpose of
determining the defendant's criminal history
category.
THE COURT: But we are not including that all.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: So it is not to be included.
And then it's total offense level 33, with a
criminal history of II, and the guideline
range will be 135, 168.
THE PROBATION OFFICER: 151 to 181.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: 151 to 188.
THE COURT: 151 to 188, but your agreement is
at 138 [sic], right?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But page 7 of the
agreement, it says: "Notwithstanding, the
parties specifically agree to the above-
mentioned sentence recommendation
irrespective of defendant's criminal
history..."
THE COURT: Criminal history.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And resulting guideline
range, and it will be 135 to 168.
THE COURT: So it was known then by the United
States that he could have had a higher
history?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Obviously, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. Okay.
At that point, it was clear to the court that the
government's recommendation was as in the Agreement, and even the
belatedly-enlightened prosecutor thereafter sought a high-end
sentence of only 168 months on the conspiracy charge. Eliminating
any doubt, the judge reiterated that under a Criminal History
Category of II, the guidelines sentencing range would have been
151 to 188 months, "but the parties stipulated 135 to 168,
irrespective if he was history I or II." The judge then imposed
a total prison sentence of 150 months for the conspiracy charge
and 60 months for the firearm charge for a total of 210 months--a
sentence in the middle of the range contemplated by the Agreement.
II. Analysis
The government argues that this appeal must be dismissed
because Oppenheimer entered into a plea agreement under which he
waived any right to appeal if he was "sentenced in accordance with
the terms and conditions set forth in the Sentencing Recommendation
provision of [the plea agreement]." Oppenheimer replies that he
must be re-sentenced because the government broke the plea
agreement, or because there were alleged defects in the acceptance
of his plea in the first instance. For the following reasons, we
agree with the government.
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A.
Oppenheimer first argues that his sentencing was not "in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the
Sentencing Recommendation provision" of the Agreement because the
prosecutor breached the Agreement by first recommending a sentence
not in accord with the agreed recommendation. Therefore, reasons
Oppenheimer, the condition precedent to triggering the waiver
never occurred.
The government replies that when the transcript is
viewed as a whole, it reveals no breach of the plea agreement
because the prosecutor corrected the initial misstep. At one time,
such an argument by the government may not have reached first base,
as the law in this circuit was that an erroneous sentencing
recommendation in breach of a plea agreement was not cured by
withdrawal in favor of a belatedly compliant recommendation.
United States v. Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295, 302 (1st Cir. 1990).
Subsequently, however, the United States Supreme Court expressly
stated that "some breaches [of agreements for sentencing
recommendations] may be curable upon timely objection—for example,
where the prosecution simply forgot its commitment and is willing
to adhere to the agreement." Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 140 (2009). So the question potentially posed in this case
is whether the prosecutor's misstep in this case was one that could
be satisfactorily cured by correction.
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Of course, we only need answer this question directly if
the claim of error was preserved. In fact, it was not. Unlike
the defendant in Kurkculer, Oppenheimer never suggested to the
district court that the error was incurable, or that the particular
cure was ineffective. Most notably, Oppenheimer did not ask for
the relief he now seeks (re-sentencing by a different judge who
would not have heard the erroneous recommendation). Instead,
having secured a corrected recommendation in accordance with the
plea agreement, he took his shot at seeing what sentence he
received. To now argue for the first time on appeal that the
prosecutor's error was not cured, and that the district court judge
should have declined to issue a sentence, Oppenheimer need carry
the burden of plain error review by showing: "(1) that an error
occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3)
affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4)
seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings." United States v. Marchena-Silvestre,
No. 14-1404, 2015 WL 5813344, at *3 (1st Cir. Oct. 6, 2015)
(quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
We can find no obvious error in the district court's
decision to proceed following the prosecution's unambiguous
correction of its initial error. In context it is abundantly clear
that the insufficiently prepared prosecutor at the sentencing
hearing was simply confused about the nature of the Agreement that
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another lawyer in her office had drafted. Once coached by the
sentencing judge and alerted by defense counsel to the actual
language of the Agreement that the prosecutor had apparently not
read, the prosecutor abandoned without protest or equivocation her
uninformed recommendation.
It was apparent all along to the district court that the
false start by the prosecutor who covered the hearing was the
product of ignorance rather than a sign that the government had
second thoughts. This is not a record in which the misstep
conveyed a message that the ultimate recommendation was insincere.
United States v. Alcalá-Sánchez, 666 F.3d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding a breach where the prosecutor's "equivocations left room
for doubt about the government's position"). Rather, this is a
case in which the transcript as a whole makes clear that all
present (except, initially, the prosecutor) knew plainly and
correctly that the government's considered recommendation was as
in the Agreement. In short, it is not obvious that there was a
breach that was not adequately corrected as the Supreme Court
anticipated in Puckett. On plain error review, Oppenheimer
therefore fails to convince us that he was not sentenced in accord
with his plea agreement.
B.
Oppenheimer next argues that his guilty plea itself was
invalid for two reasons. First, he claims that the voluntariness
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of his guilty plea was vitiated by an alleged misstatement of the
law made by the district court during sentencing. He further
alleges that the factual basis for his guilty plea was inadequate
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Oppenheimer never raised these arguments in the district
court, and thus would confront the burden, at least, of plain error
review should we consider them on appeal. On this particular
appeal, though, we need not consider these arguments at all because
Oppenheimer quite carefully--and likely wisely--does not ask us to
free the parties from the terms of the Agreement. Rather, he asks
only that we remand for resentencing under that very Agreement.
This argument is precisely the equivalent of asking us to affirm
the Agreement while simultaneously freeing him of one of its
central terms (the appeal waiver). Such an attempt to retain the
benefit of the bargain struck with the government while revoking
part of the consideration for that bargain must fail. See United
States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2002) (client's
desire not to withdraw guilty plea should preclude attacks on
voluntariness and adequacy of plea); United States v. Terwilinger,
69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 1995)(unpublished)(per curiam) ("Because
[defendant] does not wish to withdraw his plea, any omission in
questioning during the Rule 11 hearing by the district court did
not affect [the defendant]'s substantial rights."); Vega v. United
States, Nos. CR-F-05-389, CR-F-02-5408, 2008 WL 2915393, at *2
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(E.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) ("Petitioner's contention that he does
not seek . . . to set aside his guilty plea negates any validity
to his arguments that the plea was not intelligently entered.").
III. Conclusion
Because we find that Oppenheimer was sentenced "in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth" in the
Agreement, and there being no cause to consider whether the
Agreement should be set aside, the waiver of appeal he signed is
enforceable and we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal. It
is therefore dismissed.
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