Cummings v. Housing Authority ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    January 21, 1993
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-1611

    GLENN A. CUMMINGS,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    SOUTH PORTLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
    _____________

    Brown,* Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________

    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    _____________________

    John J. Finn for appellant.
    ____________
    Terry A. Fralich, with whom Peter J. DeTroy III and Norman,
    _________________ ___________________ _______
    Hanson & DeTroy, were on brief for appellees.
    _______________



    ____________________


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    ____________________

    * Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.














    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Appellant Glenn Cummings
    ______________

    brought suit against appellee South Portland Housing Authority

    ("SPHA") for: (1) the unconstitutional deprivation of a property

    interest in continued employment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983

    (" 1983"); (2) breach of contract; (3) intentional interference

    with prospective employment; and (4) negligent infliction of

    emotional distress. The district court adopted a magistrate's

    recommendation that appellant lacked a constitutionally protected

    property interest in continued employment, and thus granted

    summary judgment for the SPHA on the 1983 claim. The district

    court also dismissed the three state law claims because

    supplemental jurisdiction was inappropriate once the court

    dismissed the only federal claim. The judgment dismissed the

    1983 claim with prejudice and the state law claims without

    prejudice. Because we find that appellant had a constitutionally

    protected property interest in his continued employment, we

    reverse and remand the case to the district court for further

    proceedings.

    BACKGROUND
    BACKGROUND
    __________

    The SPHA is a municipal authority authorized under a

    state enabling statute. See Maine Housing Authorities Act, Me.
    ___

    Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, 4701 (West 1991). Appellant worked

    for the SPHA as a department head in charge of maintenance. On

    May 30, 1988, when the SPHA hired appellant, it informed him that

    he would have to serve a probationary period during which the

    SPHA could fire him at any time. The SPHA further informed

    appellant that after the probationary period he would become a















    permanent employee, and that the SPHA's personnel policy would

    govern his employment.

    Sometime during appellant's first year of employment,

    he gave the executive director of the SPHA an undated, written

    letter of resignation, and told him to use it if he ever failed

    to fulfill his responsibilities at the SPHA. On July 13, 1990,

    well after the probationary period ended, the executive director

    presented appellant with this letter, stating that they had come

    to a "parting of ways." Appellant then requested a termination

    hearing, and the SPHA rejected that request.

    DISCUSSION
    DISCUSSION
    __________

    I. Section 1983 claim
    I. Section 1983 claim

    The central issue on appeal is whether appellant had a

    constitutionally protected property interest in his continued

    employment. A public employee has such an interest when he

    reasonably expects that his employment will continue. Perkins v.
    _______

    Board of Directors, 686 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1982). An "at
    ___________________

    will" employment contract creates no reasonable expectation of

    continued employment, while an employment agreement that permits

    termination only "for cause" does create that expectation. Id.
    __

    Whether an employment contract permits dismissal solely

    "for cause" is a matter of state law. Id. at 52. In general,
    __

    under Maine law, "a contract of employment for an indefinite time

    is terminable at the will of either party." Libby v. Calais
    _____ ______

    Regional Hospital, 554 A.2d 1181, 1182 (Me. 1989). However,
    __________________

    parties may restrict the employer's ability to terminate the


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    employment contract to occasions when "cause" exists by clearly

    and expressly stating that intention. Id. That intention can be
    __

    expressed in an employment manual. Id. at 1183. However, the
    __

    manual must use clear and express language to restrict the

    employer's ability to discharge employees. Id. Language in a
    __

    manual merely implying a "for cause" limitation will not bind an

    employer. Id.
    __

    There are two relevant sections in the employee manual.

    Section 1(a) reads:

    Merit System. The employment of
    ______________
    personnel and all actions effecting (sic)
    employees shall be based solely on merit,
    ability (performance), and justice.

    Section 7(b) reads:

    Dismissals. An employee who provides
    __________
    unsatisfactory service or who is guilty
    of substantial (sic) violation of
    regulations shall be subject to dismissal
    without prior notice. In such cases, the
    employee shall have the right to a
    hearing before the Executive Director.
    The employee may appeal the decision of
    the Executive Director to the existing
    Personnel Committee.

    Appellee argues that the SPHA manual does not provide a

    clear and specific restriction on termination as required by

    Libby. Appellee apparently takes the position that the manual
    _____

    would have to specifically use the words "for cause" in order to

    limit an employer's ability to terminate employees to occasions

    where cause exists. However, Maine law does not support that

    position.

    In Durepos v. Town of Van Buren, 516 A.2d 565, 566 (Me.
    _______ _________________


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    1986), the Maine Supreme Court stated that "[t]he phrase 'for

    cause' . . . refers to conduct affecting the ability and fitness

    of the employee to perform his duties." Thus, language in a

    manual that permits dismissal based only on an employee's ability

    to do his job constitutes a "for cause" limitation.

    Similarly, in Lovejoy v. Grant and Maine School
    _______ _________________________

    Administrative District No. 37, 434 A.2d 45, 50 (1981), the Maine
    ______________________________

    Supreme Court found that Maine law provides that "certain public

    school teachers may be discharged only for cause." The court

    based its conclusion on a statute entitling tenured teachers to

    substantive and procedural protections from non-renewal of their

    contracts and a statute permitting the dismissal of unfit or

    unprofitable teachers. Id.
    __

    Against the backdrop of these precedents, the SPHA

    employment manual clearly restricts the SPHA's ability to

    terminate employees. It specifically states that all actions
    ___

    affecting employees will be based on merit and ability.

    Accordingly, the SPHA manual created a constitutionally protected

    property interest in appellant's continued employment. Thus, we

    reverse the district court's judgment and remand for a

    determination of whether appellant received due process in his

    dismissal.

    II. State Law Claims
    II. State Law Claims

    Because appellant has stated a federal cause of action,

    we reverse the dismissal of the state law claims and remand them

    to the district court to determine whether supplemental


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    jurisdiction is appropriate.

    Reversed and remanded.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 92-1611

Filed Date: 1/22/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015