Municipio Autónomo De Ponce v. United States Office of Management & Budget , 809 F.3d 28 ( 2015 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 14-2287
    MUNICIPIO AUTÓNOMO DE PONCE; CENTRO DEAMBULANTES CRISTO POBRE,
    INC.; LUCHA CONTRA EL SIDA, INC.; INICIATIVA COMMUNITARIA, INC.;
    ITCIA HERNÁNDEZ-LABOY; JORGE ORTIZ-TORRES; JOSÉ ALVAREZ-MEDINA;
    HOGAR CREA POSADA LA ESPERANZA,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET; BRIAN DEESE,
    Acting Director, United States Office of Management and Budget;
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; SYLVIA
    MATHEWS BURNWELL, Secretary, United States Department of Health
    and Human Services; UNITED STATES HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES
    ADMINISTRATION; MARY WAKEFIELD, Administrator, Health Resources
    and Services Administration,
    Defendants, Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Kayatta, Stahl, and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Jeffrey A. Clair, Attorney, Civil Division, Department of
    Justice, with whom Michael S. Raab, Attorney, Civil Division,
    Department of Justice, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice,
    and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, were on
    brief, for appellants.
    Edgar Hernández Sánchez, with whom Cancio, Nadal, Rivera &
    Díaz, P.S.C., was on brief, for appellees.
    December 22, 2015
    KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.    This lawsuit concerns the Ryan
    White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act ("Ryan White Act"
    or the "Act"), Pub. L. No. 101–381, 
    104 Stat. 576
     (1990) (codified
    at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff et seq.).      Under "Part A" of the Act, the
    U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") disburses
    funding to combat HIV/AIDS infection in metropolitan areas that
    are home to more than a specified number of individuals who have
    AIDS.   42 U.S.C. § 300ff-11(a).    This lawsuit arose because HHS
    recently determined that the Ponce metropolitan area no longer has
    enough AIDS cases to qualify for continued Part A funding.   Joined
    by several community health groups, Ponce claims that HHS has
    unfairly drawn the boundaries of Ponce's metropolitan area too
    narrowly, and that the addition of three adjoining communities
    would raise the total number of AIDS cases enough to qualify for
    continued funding.   Confronted with what it correctly recognized
    as largely unhelpful briefing by the parties, the district court
    agreed with Ponce in part and declared that the boundaries of the
    Ponce area were "unlawful as they now stand."   Municipio Autónomo
    de Ponce v. U.S. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
    40 F. Supp. 3d 222
    , 234
    (D.P.R. 2014), reconsideration denied, No. 3:14-CV-01502 JAF, 
    2014 WL 4639896
     (D.P.R. Sept. 16, 2014) ("Ponce").     Because we agree
    with HHS that Congress can reasonably be said to have dictated
    - 3 -
    that HHS use the boundaries that it uses in defining the Ponce
    metropolitan area, we reverse.1
    I.   BACKGROUND
    The Act originally defined "metropolitan area" to be "an
    area referred to in the HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report of the Centers
    for Disease Control and Prevention as a metropolitan area."                     42
    U.S.C.    §   300ff-17(2)    (1992);     see    also   id.   §    300ff-19(d)(3)
    (explicitly adopting the § 300ff-17 definitions for the subsection
    relevant to Ponce).         When Congress enacted this definition, the
    CDC used the Office of Management and Budget's ("OMB") delineations
    of geographical Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("MSAs") in its
    Surveillance Reports.        See Ctr. Disease Control, Dept. Health &
    Human.    Servs.,     HIV/AIDS    Surveillance     Report    21    (Jan.    1990).
    Accordingly, the practical effect of the manner in which Congress
    defined "metropolitan area" was to require HHS to use as its
    metropolitan areas under the Act the MSAs developed by OMB, unless
    and   until     CDC   started    using   some    other   definition        in   its
    surveillance reports.        And CDC has in fact continued to use OMB's
    MSAs in its surveillance reports. See, e.g., Ctr. Disease Control,
    Dept. Health & Human Servs., HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 18
    1We have expedited this appeal because, according to HHS:
    "Funding decisions are typically made by January 15th of each year,
    and funds are typically awarded on or about March 1st. Moreover,
    once funds are disbursed, HHS's practical ability to recoup
    erroneous awards and redistribute them to eligible grantees is
    exceedingly limited."
    - 4 -
    (July       1993)     (hereinafter,    "1993    Surveillance     Report");      Ctr.
    Disease       Control,       Dept.    Health    &    Human     Servs.,   HIV/AIDS
    Surveillance Report 14 (2013).
    For its own purposes, OMB has delineated the boundaries
    of MSAs (under various names) since the 1940s.                 See 2010 Standards
    for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas,
    
    75 Fed. Reg. 37,246
    , 37,246 (June 28, 2010) (hereinafter "2010 MSA
    Standards").          OMB's standards for arriving at the delineations and
    the MSAs themselves are published decennially in the Federal
    Register.       See Revised Standards for Defining Metropolitan Areas
    in the 1990's, 
    55 Fed. Reg. 12154
    -01 (Mar. 30, 1990) (hereinafter,
    "1990 MSA Standards").           The delineations are issued according to
    OMB's       general    statutory     mandate   to   "develop    and   oversee   the
    implementation          of   Governmentwide     [sic]   policies,     principles,
    standards, and guidelines concerning--(A) statistical collection
    procedures and methods; (B) statistical data classification; (C)
    statistical information presentation and dissemination; [etc.]."
    
    44 U.S.C. § 3504
    (e)(3); see also 
    31 U.S.C. § 1104
    (d) (overlapping,
    similar statutory mandate).
    OMB has made it clear that it developed the MSAs to be
    used "solely for statistical purposes" and they might not be
    suitable for allocating funding.               2010 MSA Standards at 37,246.2
    2
    See also, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget Bull. No. 15-01,
    Revised   Delineations   of   Metropolitan  Statistical   Areas,
    - 5 -
    The   CDC,   though,   does   not   make   the   Ryan    White    Act   funding
    decisions.     Nor did it "select" OMB's MSAs to be used for that
    purpose.     The CDC uses the MSAs as they were intended: for the
    purpose of gathering statistics.           It did so before and when the
    Act was enacted; and there is no hint in the Act at all that the
    CDC needed to set aside its own purposes in selecting how to define
    "metropolitan areas."
    Under OMB's 1993 delineation used by CDC in its 1993
    Report and, thus, used by HHS to award Part A grants in fiscal
    year 1994, Puerto Rico was divided into four "metropolitan areas":
    the "Combined Metropolitan Area" of San Juan, which includes 38 of
    the   island's   78    communities,   and     three     other    "Metropolitan
    Statistical Areas," one of which is comprised of Ponce and five
    other communities.     As thus delineated, Ponce initially qualified
    as eligible to receive funding under the Act.             In 1996, however,
    Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and Combined Statistical Areas,
    and Guidance on Uses of the Delineations of These Areas 3 (2015),
    available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
    bulletins/2015/15-01.pdf ("These areas should not serve as a
    general-purpose    geographic    framework   for    nonstatistical
    activities, and they may or may not be suitable for use in program
    funding formulas."); Office of Mgmt. & Budget Bull. No. 13-01,
    Revised Delineations of Metropolitan Statistical Areas 3 (2013)
    (same language); Standards for Defining Metropolitan and
    Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 
    65 Fed. Reg. 82,228
    , 82,228 (Dec.
    27, 2000) ("Programs that base funding levels or eligibility on
    whether a county is included in a Metropolitan or Micropolitan
    Statistical Area may not accurately address issues or problems
    faced by local populations . . . .").
    - 6 -
    Congress raised the eligibility requirements,3 enough so that
    Ponce's number of AIDS cases no longer rendered it eligible.
    Nevertheless, for a decade Ponce continued to receive funding as
    if it were eligible based on a grandfathering provision included
    in the 1996 legislation.        42 U.S.C. § 300ff-11(d) (2000), as
    amended by Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No.
    104-146, § 3(d), 
    110 Stat. 1346
    , 1347 (1996) (amended 2006, 2009).
    In 2006 Congress removed the grandfathering provision,
    but Ponce still managed to receive funding under the newly-created
    category of "transitional [grant] area[s]."           Ryan White HIV/AIDS
    Treatment Modernization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-415, §§ 101,
    2609, 
    120 Stat. 2767
    , 2768, 2781–83 (2006) (codified in part at 42
    U.S.C. § 300ff-19 (2012) (amended 2009)).            A transitional grant
    area is defined as a metropolitan area "for which there has been
    reported to and confirmed by the Director of the Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention a cumulative total of at least
    1,000, but fewer than 2,000, cases of AIDS during the most recent
    period of 5 calendar years . . . ."      Id.   Under the current amended
    statute,    a   metropolitan   area   ceases    to    be   eligible   as   a
    transitional grant area if, in each of three consecutive years, it
    fails to have more than 1,000 and less than 2,000 reported AIDS
    cases in the preceding five years, id. § 300ff-19(c)(2)(A)(i), and
    3   42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff-11(a); (c)(1) (2000).
    - 7 -
    fails to have a cumulative total of at least 1,400 living AIDS
    cases       in    the     most     recent    calendar      year,4       id.    §§    300ff-
    19(c)(2)(A)(ii),           (2)(B);     see     generally       County    of    Nassau     v.
    Leavitt, 
    524 F.3d 408
     (2d Cir. 2008).
    In the 1996 legislation, and then as refined in the 2006
    legislation,            Congress      also   froze       the    boundaries          of   the
    metropolitan areas to be used by HHS.                     Ryan White Amendments of
    1996 § 101.             For metropolitan areas that received funding as
    "eligible areas" in 2006, "the boundaries of such metropolitan
    area shall be the boundaries that were in effect for such area for
    fiscal      year     1994,"      42    U.S.C.     §     300ff-11(c)(1),        while      for
    metropolitan areas that become "eligible areas" after fiscal year
    2006, "the boundaries of such metropolitan area shall be the
    boundaries        that    are    in   effect    for     such   area     when   such      area
    initially receives funding . . . .," id. § 300ff-11(c)(2).                               The
    2006 amendments, however, did not so directly dictate which year's
    boundaries should be used for metropolitan areas like Ponce that
    were no longer eligible areas for funding under 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-
    11(a), but were instead receiving funding as "transitional areas"
    under § 300ff-19.           HHS nevertheless applies the same approach to
    transitional areas (all of which were once eligible areas), and
    4
    Unless the grantee had not "[]obligated" at least 95 percent
    of the Part A funding it had received in the previous year, in
    which case it was required to have 1,500 living AIDS cases that
    year. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff-19(c)(2)(A)(ii), (2)(B).
    - 8 -
    supports this consistent approach by appealing to administrative
    convenience and "continuity of care," noting that acting otherwise
    would lead to overlapping "eligible" and "transitional" areas and
    confound Congress's scheme.    Ponce offers no rejoinder to this
    conclusion.5
    By fiscal year 2014, the number of cumulative AIDS cases
    and the number of living AIDS cases within the Ponce metropolitan
    area as delineated in the 1993 OMB MSA had dropped enough for a
    long enough period of time that HHS notified Ponce that it no
    longer qualified for transitional funding.6   Ponce thereupon filed
    this lawsuit, arguing that HHS must expand its delineation of
    Ponce's boundaries to include three additional municipalities7 and
    that, as thus expanded, Ponce would have enough AIDS cases to
    5 Nor, for that matter, does Ponce argue that it would qualify
    for funding under any subsequent MSA delineations adopted by CDC
    or OMB. In fact, the 1993 boundaries of the Ponce MSA appear to
    be the same as those most-recently promulgated by OMB in 2010 and
    revised in 2015, save for the more recent addition of only the
    municipality of Guánica.      Compare Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
    Metropolitan Areas and Components 21 (June 30, 1993), with Office
    of Mgmt. & Budget Bull. No. 15-01, supra n.2, at 45.
    6 Ponce may well have failed to qualify earlier were it not
    for additional grandfathering provisions added by Congress in 2006
    and 2009, meaning that metropolitan areas that were eligible areas
    in 2010 (or 2007) but not in 2011 (or 2008) became transitional
    grant areas without regard to the number of AIDS cases they had.
    See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-19(c)(1) (2008), as amended by Ryan White
    Modernization Act of 2006 § 2609; 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-19(c)(1)(2012),
    as amended by Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009,
    Pub. L. No. 111-87, § 4(a)(1), 
    123 Stat. 2885
    , 2889 (Oct. 30,
    2009).
    7 Namely, the municipalities Adjuntas, Santa Isabel, and
    Coamo.
    - 9 -
    continue to qualify.       In support of this argument, Ponce presented
    the report of a management consultant, who opined that defining
    Ponce's boundaries in that manner would be consistent with OMB's
    standards.
    Sympathetic    to    Ponce's    request,     the   district     court
    concluded that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in employing
    the MSAs to define the "metropolitan area" of Ponce because HHS
    has no records that would demonstrate this was "a rational exercise
    of deliberative decision making."            Ponce, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 231
    (quoting Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 
    127 F.3d 104
    ,
    111 (1st Cir. 1997)).       The district court also decided that HHS's
    methodology for defining metropolitan areas in Puerto Rico was
    unfair   and    discriminatory         because    HHS   used    boundaries    for
    metropolitan areas in New England "that were different from the
    OMB MSAs."     
    Id. at 229
    .       The court issued an order requiring HHS
    to develop a new definition of the Ponce metropolitan area that
    would more adequately address the factors that the district court
    believed needed to be addressed.            
    Id. at 233
    .
    II.    ANALYSIS
    While a court might, we assume, order relief if HHS
    refused to use the boundaries Congress told it to use, there is in
    this legislative scheme no license for a court to tell HHS not to
    use what Congress said to use: those boundaries that were "in
    effect for such area for fiscal year 1994" (i.e., the areas as
    - 10 -
    "referred to" in the CDC's 1993 Surveillance Report).                        42 U.S.C.
    § 300ff-11(c)(1).           Nor is there any license here for a court to
    review either CDC's choice of area delineation in its own 1993
    Report,      or    OMB's    choices   in     delineating          the    boundaries   of
    metropolitan areas for its own reports.                The relevant standards of
    selection in this case are the statutory mandate that HHS in 1994
    use the area that CDC was using, and the statutory direction in
    1996 as refined in 2006 that HHS continue to use the delineation
    that it used in 1994.          And HHS has plainly complied with both of
    these mandates.            See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
    Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress
    is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . .").
    As for the district court's "discrimination" theory, it
    appears that the court mistakenly believed that HHS was not
    following Congress's mandate to use the areas referred to in the
    CDC's surveillance reports (the OMB MSAs) and was instead using a
    different definition for the New England states.                          Ponce, 40 F.
    Supp.   3d    at    227–29.     According       to    the    district      court,   this
    represented "unexplained discrimination."                     Id. at 231 (quoting
    P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 
    8 F.3d 73
    , 77 (1st Cir. 1993)).
    In fact, HHS does use the same delineations that CDC uses, which
    is the statutorily relevant question, including those for the New
    England      states.          And     thus     there        was     no     "unexplained
    discrimination."       
    Id.
    - 11 -
    To be sure, the CDC's explanation of the technical
    methodology it used to compile its 1993 Surveillance Report is
    less than clear.       See 1993 Surveillance Report at 18.        The Report
    explains that "[t]he metropolitan area definitions [used in the
    report] are the MSAs for all areas except the 6 New England states.
    For these states, the New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMA)
    are used."     
    Id.
         The district court apparently read this to mean
    that HHS chose not to adopt the OMB's delineations for these few
    states.    In fact, the CDC was merely describing how the OMB itself
    treats New England states differently.            In 1990, for example, OMB
    explained that "in New England," it used "an alternative county-
    based   definition      of    MSAs   known   as   the   New   England   County
    Metropolitan Areas (NECMAs)."         1990 MSA Standards at 12,157.       The
    NECMAs are thus an "alternative [] definition" of an MSA, not an
    alternative to an MSA.        
    Id.
    To put all this in perspective, it is helpful to observe
    that only 52 metropolitan areas in the entire United States
    received such funding in the last fiscal year.                See U.S. Dep't
    Health Human Servs., Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program FY 2014 Part A
    Awards,        http://www.hrsa.gov/about/news/2014tables/ryanwhite/
    parta.html (last viewed Dec. 17, 2015) (demonstrating that no
    metropolitan area in Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont
    received funding).           And San Juan received one of the larger
    outlays.     See 
    id.
         While we acknowledge that Puerto Rico suffers
    - 12 -
    the disadvantage of lacking formal representation in Congress,
    there is simply nothing whatsoever in this case to suggest that
    HHS treats the Ponce metropolitan area under the Act in any way
    differently than it does hundreds of similarly-situated areas
    across the United States.
    In sum, we reject the district court's assumption that
    this litigation somehow provides an opportunity for the court to
    question HHS for doing what Congress told it to do.   See Ponce, 40
    F. Supp. 3d at 231–32.   Congress told HHS, first, to use in 1994
    whatever areas CDC was using at the time in its surveillance
    reports.   And it then told HHS to use whatever area it used in
    1994.   HHS plainly did both of these things.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We reverse the district court's entry of judgment for
    plaintiffs and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendants
    dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
    - 13 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-2287P

Citation Numbers: 809 F.3d 28, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22321, 2015 WL 9286753

Judges: Kayatta, Stahl, Barron

Filed Date: 12/22/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024