Abril-Rivera v. Johnson , 806 F.3d 598 ( 2015 )


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  •               United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    _____________________
    No. 14-1316
    FRANCISCO ABRIL-RIVERA, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    and
    MADELINE AGUAYO, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    JEH JOHNSON, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; FEDERAL
    EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    __________________
    Before
    Torruella, Lynch, and Thompson,
    Circuit Judges.
    ORDER OF COURT
    Entered: November 17, 2015
    Plaintiffs-appellants' petition for panel rehearing is granted to the extent of the
    amendments made to the revised opinion, which will issue this day. The petition for panel
    rehearing is otherwise denied. The court's opinion issued on July 30, 2015 is withdrawn
    and the judgment entered on July 30, 2015 is vacated. The Clerk is directed to issue the
    new opinion simultaneously with this order.
    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I dissent from the withdrawal of the
    opinion and effective denial of panel rehearing. The majority here uses withdrawal and
    revision as a tactic for avoiding a rehearing en banc. This maneuver is merely the converse
    of that to which I objected in Igartúa v. United States, 
    626 F.3d 592
    , 612 n.21 (1st Cir.
    2010).
    The disposition to reach a pre-determined outcome in this case has been self-evident
    for some time. It was clearly demonstrated by the majority's ruling in its original panel
    opinion, which was principally based on its motu proprio raising of the so-called safe
    harbor defense, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), an affirmative defense never raised, or even
    mentioned, by Defendants-Appellees before either the district court or this Court. See
    Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 
    795 F.3d 245
    (1st Cir. 2015) (withdrawn). This was, of course,
    not only an unusual and unjustified judicial action but a clear violation of longstanding
    circuit and judicial precedent. See FDIC v. Ramírez–Rivera, 
    869 F.2d 624
    , 626 (1st Cir.
    1989); Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 
    15 F.3d 1222
    , 1226 (1st Cir. 1994);
    see also Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 
    678 F.2d 992
    , 1012 (11th Cir. 1982).
    Faced with a dissenting opinion objecting to this inappropriate procedure and subsequent
    petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc drawing upon that dissenting opinion, the
    majority withdrew its reliance on this erroneous reasoning.
    By the Court:
    /s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk
    cc: Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, Ms. Frances de Moran, Clerk, United States District Court for the
    District of Puerto Rico, Mr. Arias-Marxuach, Mr. Bruno-Rovira, Mr. Charnes, Mr. Ortiz Garcia,
    Ms. Gautier, Mr. Roman-Negron, Mr. Calderon, Mr. Jed, Mr. Perez-Sosa, Mr. Webb, & Ms.
    Sanchez-Pares.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1316O

Citation Numbers: 806 F.3d 598, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19908, 128 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484, 2015 WL 7253433

Judges: Torruella, Lynch, Thompson

Filed Date: 11/17/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024