United States v. Santiago-Rivera ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2022
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
EDUARDO SANTIAGO-RIVERA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya, and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Jonathan G. Mermin and Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios,
LLP, on brief for appellant.
Sangita K. Rao, Attorney, Criminal Division, Appellate
Section, United States Department of Justice, Damon King, Acting
Chief, Criminal Division, Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section, United States Department of Justice, Amy Larson,
Attorney, Criminal Division, Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section, United States Department of Justice, Leslie R. Caldwell,
Assistant Attorney General, and Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
November 9, 2015
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Eduardo Santiago-Rivera pleaded
guilty to nine counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a), and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B). Some of the pornography showed him having
intercourse with one of the child victims. In exchange for his
plea, the government agreed to recommend a sentence of between 35
and 40 years of imprisonment. While the recommended guidelines
sentencing range provided for a term of life imprisonment, the
combined statutory maximums for each of the ten counts totaled 280
years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2252(b)(2).
Santiago-Rivera's change of plea hearing, held on
January 13, 2014, was nearly impeccable. The magistrate judge,
before recommending acceptance of the plea agreement, engaged in
an interactive colloquy with Santiago-Rivera, as required under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b). Santiago-Rivera stated
at the hearing that he had not recently been treated for mental
illness, that he did not then have any psychiatric or psychological
conditions, that he felt well physically and mentally, and that he
believed that he understood the proceedings. Santiago-Rivera's
counsel also stated that she believed that he was competent to
understand the proceedings. After further questioning, the
magistrate judge determined that Santiago-Rivera's plea was
intelligent and voluntary and recommended its approval. The
district court accepted the plea on February 11, 2014.
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Santiago-Rivera's counsel filed an eleventh-hour motion
requesting leave to withdraw his guilty plea on August 15, 2014,
a full seven months after the change of plea hearing, and just ten
days before the scheduled sentencing hearing. The motion failed
to state in writing any grounds to support the request, and was
denied without a hearing.
But counsel later moved for reconsideration, telling the
court at sentencing that she would like to have the defendant state
to the court in person the reasons for the motion. The district
court obliged and heard the defendant and counsel, permitting them
to explain at length the specific reasons why Santiago-Rivera
wished to withdraw his guilty plea. Santiago-Rivera stated that,
despite the assurances to the contrary that he and his attorney
gave during his change of plea hearing, he had been "immersed in
a severe depression" at the time and "was just beginning [his]
treatment." When asked to provide evidence of this depression,
Santiago-Rivera's counsel, who insisted that his plea was
consequently involuntary, had nothing to give the court. The
district court again denied the motion.
On appeal, Santiago-Rivera asks us to remand to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing on his reconsideration
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We will not. On appeal, he
would have us credit that "[t]he district court denied him the
opportunity to present [his] proof." That is plainly false, as
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the record demonstrates. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Santiago Miranda, 654 F.3d 130, 137 (1st Cir.
2011), we find that the district court acted well within its
discretion in denying a further evidentiary hearing beyond what
was already done at sentencing.
We also decline to remand for an evidentiary hearing on
Santiago-Rivera's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This
is not one of those rare cases that presents "special
circumstances," United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 531
(1st Cir. 2005), justifying deviation from our general rule that
"such claims 'must originally be presented to the district court'
as a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255," United States v.
Colón-Torres, 382 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Ovalle-Márquez, 36 F.3d 212, 221 (1st Cir. 1994)).
The magistrate judge did advise Santiago-Rivera at his
change of plea hearing that he faced a potential term of life
imprisonment, which was technically an error given the applicable
statutory maximums, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2252(b)(2).
Santiago-Rivera says that this was plain error that warrants
vacating his plea. But the "error" was neither plain nor
prejudicial. See United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34,
39 (1st Cir. 2006). Santiago-Rivera was 45 at the time he pleaded
guilty. His actual sentencing exposure was 280 years, which is
more than a term of life imprisonment, notwithstanding his
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thoroughly fanciful argument that scientific discoveries might
quadruple the average human lifespan.
We also recognize the severe prejudice that the
government would face were Santiago-Rivera permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea, and the burden that his victims would face were
they forced to relive the trauma inflicted upon them so long after
they believed this case had ended. See United States v. Isom, 580
F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (identifying "prejudice to the
government if the withdrawal is allowed" as a factor to be
considered in determining whether to permit withdrawal). We
accordingly reject his request for relief.
The judgment is affirmed.
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