Brown v. Chicopee Fire ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    March 15, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 92-2258

    MELVIN A. BROWN,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    CHICOPEE FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 1710, IAFF, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Cyr and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ____________________

    Melvin A. Brown on brief pro se.
    _______________
    Marshall T. Moriarty, Craig D. Robinson, and Maskell & Moriarty,
    ____________________ _________________ __________________
    on brief for appellees.


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    Per Curiam. Melvin A. Brown appeals pro se from
    __________ ___ __

    the district court's dismissal of his claims against the

    Trial Court of Massachusetts, District Court Department,

    Springfield Division, Small Claims Department and the Trial

    Court of Massachusetts, District Court Department, Small

    Claims Sessions, Chicopee Trial Court, state court

    defendants, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

    dismissal of his federal constitutional claims against

    Chicopee Fire Fighters Local 1710 (the "Union") as time-

    barred, and dismissal without prejudice of his state law

    claims against the Union. The district court dismissed

    appellant's claims in two thorough and well-reasoned opinions

    dated October 8, 1991 and September 17, 1992. We affirm

    based on those opinions. We add only the following comments.

    On appeal, Brown's central contention is that the

    district court mischaracterized his fair representation claim

    as a state law claim. The district court determined that the

    National Labor Relations Act did not apply to appellant, as a

    municipal employee, and that, therefore, the fair

    representation claim could only be brought pursuant to Mass.

    Gen. L. ch. 150E. Appellant argues, however, that by

    breaching its statutory obligation to provide fair

    representation, the Union violated his constitutional rights

    to due process of law. Therefore, he contends, the district

    court has jurisdiction over the claim. Furthermore, since



















    the failure to represent is a "continuing event," continuing

    into the present time, appellant argues, the statute of

    limitations period has not yet begun to run, much less

    expired.

    Appellant has failed to state a federal claim with

    respect to his assertion that he was denied fair

    representation by the Union. Therefore, the district court

    did not err in dismissing his fair representation claim for

    lack of subject matter jurisdiction once it had dismissed all

    of appellant's federal claims. The Union's obligation to

    fairly represent appellant, if any, derives solely from state

    statutory law. As the district court stated in its September

    17, 1991 Memorandum and Order:

    The rights of public employees in
    Massachusetts are governed by the Public
    Employee Collective Bargaining statute,
    Mass. Gen. L. ch. 150E. Under chapter
    150E, public employees may initiate
    failure to represent actions with either
    the Massachusetts Labor Relations
    Commission or in the state court. See
    ___
    Graham v. Quincy Food Serv. Employees
    _________________________________________
    Ass'n, 407 Mass. 601 (1990); Leahy v.
    _____ _________
    Local 1526, American Fed'n of State,
    _________________________________________
    County & Mun. Employees, 399 Mass. 341
    _________________________
    (1987).

    There is no federal constitutional right to fair

    representation.1 Therefore, appellant has failed to state a


    ____________________

    1. As the district court correctly concluded, appellant, as
    a municipal employee, and the Union, as a municipal union,
    are excluded from the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
    185(a), and therefore appellant does not have a federal
    statutory right to fair representation.

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    claim pursuant to 1983 of deprivation of a constitutional

    right by the Union's alleged breach of its obligation under

    state law to fairly represent him. "Mere alleged misuse or

    disregard of state law by state officials does not constitute

    a deprivation of property without constitutional due process

    of law." Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 708 (1st
    ___________ _____________

    Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022
    _____________

    (1986). Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing

    appellant's fair representation claim as a state law claim.

    Because we find that appellant failed to state a federal

    claim, we need not decide when the statute of limitations

    begins to run on appellant's failure to represent claim.

    Affirmed.
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